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Abstract
The Treatment Centre (TCs) Programme in England has been put forward as part 
of a government strategy to add capacity, to improve quality and access to care to 
NHS patients and to provide competitive incentives to improve quality within the 
NHS. At present, two types of TCs are being rolled out: the Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISTCs), managed by the private sector, and the NHS Treatment 
Centres (NHS TCs), managed by the National Health Service (NHS).
This dissertation focuses on a number of important questions raised by the 
increase in the number of these Treatment Centres in England. Are there differences 
between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of efficiency? Are there differences 
between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of quality? Are there differences in the 
organisational, managerial and technological approach between the Independent 
Sector Treatment Centres and the NHS Treatment Centres? And how does the 
difference in their ownership structure relate to any differences in performance and 
approach found between the ISTCs and NHS TCs?
A quantitative and qualitative research methodology is used. Basic descriptive 
analysis, weighted mean difference and regression analyses are conducted for the 
quantitative approach using Dr. Fosters 2007 patient record information. The purpose 
of the quantitative analysis is to establish whether there are quantifiable differences in 
performance between the Treatment Centres in terms of efficiency and quality. The 
qualitative analysis is designed to open the ‘black box’ of the quantitative results and 
to investigate in depth the nature of the underlying relationships revealed by the 
quantitative analysis. It uses a comparative case study design as the primary approach 
with interviews and site visits to 18 different treatment centres and hospitals.
The quantitative evidence suggests that ownership may play an important role in 
facility performance. The qualitative evidence shows that there are differences in the 
actual organisational structure and operations of these treatment centres which affect 
performance and suggests that ownership is indeed the determining factor for these 
differences, although due to the methodological approach of the dissertation, the 
evidence cannot be entirely conclusive in how and to what extent this links back to 
differences in the quantitative evidence.
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Chapter 1 
The Treatment Centre Programme: The Context
It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without 
debating it.
Joseph Jouber
1.0 Introduction
Change is rarely unopposed and the Treatment Centre Programme in England -  a 
programme designed to expand the country’s healthcare access and to bolster the 
quality of its services (Department of Health 2005) -  has not been free of controversy. 
The programme envisioned new private sector (commonly referred to as the 
independent sector) treatment centres providing care to 250,000 patients per year1 
with an additional 170,000 cared for by public sector (England’s NHS) treatment 
centres (Commercial Directorate 2005; Department of Health 2005; Timmins 2005; 
Timmons 2005; UNISON 2005; C BI2008). The programme’s supporters hailed the 
advantages of the treatment centres’ ‘focused’ approach to healthcare, which they 
argued would improve quality of care while reducing costs. Opponents of the 
programme feared the new treatment centres would simply ‘cherry pick’ the most 
profitable procedures and patients from the NHS, disrupt continuity of care, reduce 
training opportunities for young medical practitioners and fragment the healthcare 
system into a large number of small operations, each duplicating the efforts and costs 
of the others (Royal College of Physicians 2003; British Medical Association 2005; 
UNISON 2005).
Furthermore, there has also been considerable misrepresentation of the facts of the 
TC Programme as part of the political tensions surrounding it. Recent examples 
include a news story in the Times and a column by Polly Toynbee of the Guardian 
highly critical of the ISTC programme, both of which cited a study alleging poor 
performance with respect to hip replacements by an ISTC. In fact the Treatment
1 The NHS is in the process of launching a Wave 2 program that will provide additional capacity for 
approximately 125,000 patients per year.
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Centre concerned, Weston-Super-Mare was an NHS TC, and had no connections with 
the independent sector2. The Toynbee article also made other errors, notably 
describing United Healthcare as one of the ISTC owners, whereas in fact United had 
not even bid.
This dissertation focuses on England’s experience and whether the Treatment 
Centre Programme or something similar can be an effective policy mechanism for 
attaining a national health system’s goals and objectives. It is important to note that 
while there are Treatment Centres in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, this 
dissertation only concerns the Treatment Centre Programme in England. Hence, 
references to the NHS are intended to refer to the English NHS.
The overriding theme of this dissertation has been the assessment of the evidence 
related to the Treatment Centre Programme with the view to determining whether the 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) deliver higher performance than NHS 
Treatment Centres (NHS TCs), and, if so, why. More specifically, the dissertation 
focuses upon the following research questions:
Are there differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of 
efficiency?
Are there differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of quality? 
Are there differences in the organisational, managerial and technological 
approach between the ISTCs and NHS TCs?
If such differences exist, how can they be explained?
1.1 The Context
For many years, UK governments have been trying to cut the time NHS patients 
must wait for elective procedures. It has aimed to do this in part by encouraging the 
emergence of a wider range of healthcare providers, so as to increase capacity, to 
encourage innovation and the improvement of services, and to give patients more 
choice. An important element of this policy was the creation of treatment centres 
capable of providing a limited range of planned -  that is, non-emergency -  surgery 
and diagnostic services in both England’s NHS and the independent sector. It was 
expected that separating the two types of activity would mean that planned care could
2 ‘NHS paying a high price for bungled hip replacements Times 22nd September 2009. ‘Beware the 
zealots Guardian (20th October 2009). See also replies by Julian Le Grand (Guardian Letters 27th 
October 2009) and Ken Anderson (Guardian Response 30th October 2009). A further twist to this tale 
is that the study concerned was undertaken by surgeons working in Cardiff: a competitor losing 
business to Weston.
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be reliably delivered without the risk that facilities would be requisitioned for 
emergency procedures.
There are two ways that Treatment Centres are operated in England. Some are run 
by the NHS Trusts and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Currently, there are well over 40 
NHS Treatment Centres, managed by the National Health Service (NHS) (Department 
of Health 2005; Department of Health 2009). Others have been commissioned from 
the independent sector (ISTCs) who are contracted to run these facilities. For the first 
wave of tenders, 24 ISTCs were initially planned (Healthcare Commission 2007).
Both types of treatment centre are run to treat NHS patients.
The total size of the ISTC programme represents an investment of only 1% of the 
NHS’ total budget. But few initiatives have met such sustained opposition, both 
professional and political. This was largely because the programme represented a 
strategic shift in NHS attitudes towards the private sector. The core objectives of the 
new ISTC policy were to:
- help the NHS to reduce waiting times;
- broaden the range of available service providers and increase patient choice
- promote new service models;
- contribute to the long-term development of relationships between the 
independent sector and the NHS in support of their efforts to reach local NHS 
targets (Commercial Directorate 2005; Department of Health 2005; Timmins 
2005; Timmons 2005; UNISON 2005).
An additional key motivation for the inclusion of the independent sector in the 
Treatment Centre Programme was to allow for new market entrants, increase 
competition and to bring down costs for hospital services. Until the initiation of the 
program, private sector involvement in NHS clinical services was largely confined to 
surgery contracted out to private hospitals and private providers on NHS premises. 
This began to change in 2003, when the government launched the first wave of 
specialist diagnostic and treatment centres to be run by the private sector and the 
NHS.
The first wave, commonly referred to as Wave I, which this dissertation assesses, 
sought to increase the permanent capacity for elective surgery and diagnostic services 
in England. The aim was not only to reduce waiting times for elective procedures but 
also to expand choice and to increase productivity through new models of patient 
care. Unlike the existing NHS TCs, expansion was to be achieved by encouraging the
16
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introduction of private, or independent sector, companies establishing facilities. 
Emphasis was on increasing permanent capacity, marking a strategic shift on 
purchasing from the private sector for public health care provision. In years past, the 
NHS had contracted with the private sector but this was on an ad hoc basis. Further, 
emphasis was not just to create additional physical (e.g. infrastructure) capacity in 
England but also to develop additional human capacity. As a result, an important 
aspect to this programme was the fact that these facilities were to employ staff not 
currently working for the NHS.
The first of these ISTCs, focusing on low risk elective surgeries and diagnostic 
services, opened in 2003 (Browne, Jamieson et al. 2008). In total, 32 ISTC schemes 
were to open by 2008 (Anderson 2006) caring for an estimated 250,000 patients per 
year (Commercial Directorate 2005). However, as of early 2008, there were 23 
centres plus three mobile units in operation under Wave I delivering in excess of
170,000 operations annually (CBI2008). The main winners in this first wave were 
companies from South Africa, the United States and Canada. England-based private 
hospital companies that had expected to share in this initiative lost out largely because 
they were too expensive.
The first impact of the ISTCs was on the existing English private sector. After 
losing out in the first wave of ISTCs, the England based companies Capio and 
Nuffield Hospitals, who see the NHS as their major source of business, cut their 
prices to close to the NHS tariff. Nuffield also bought a company that makes mobile 
operating theatres. Regardless of whether or not the ISTC programme has been 
successful in its other goals, it has driven down the cost of private hospital services to 
the NHS. The NHS paid a premium of up to over 40% for private beds until the 
launch of the Wave 1 tenders (UNISON 2005).
Clearly, the first wave of the ISTC programme has been shown to be an agent of 
change for the way healthcare is delivered in England. If physical capacity was the 
only issue, it is likely the incumbent private hospital market (BMI, Bupa, Capio, 
Nuffield, etc.) could have met the demands of the healthcare market. However, the 
Government intended for the ISTC programme to be a lever of change in the NHS. A 
key question, however, was what volume of work should be let to the Independent 
Sector Treatment market to ensure reasonable prices and thus continue to lever this 
change in the NHS (Commercial Directorate 2004)?
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To answer this question the Commercial Directorate commissioned a report to aid 
in the defining and planning of the next wave of ISTC procurements. The report was 
approached both from the perspective of creating a new, competitive healthcare 
market and from the perspective of transforming England’s existing independent 
market (Commercial Directorate 2004). To adequately address these questions, the 
type of market desired had to be decided upon. There were different types of 
‘sustainable’ markets that could be created -  a small ISTC market with niche players, 
a low-cost ISTC market, or whole pluralistic markets with 3-4 national providers -  
and it was expected that the independent sector would adapt and react to the different 
opportunities presented by each market in a way that made commercial and financial 
sense to their investors (Commercial Directorate 2004).
Prior to the launch of the first wave, the private medical provider market in 
England could be characterised as a somewhat niche high-cost, low-throughput 
business where the private medical insurers were the primary customers. With such a 
small private sector, the NHS paid in excess of 40% of current HRG tariff prices to 
augment local capacity on average—i.e. spot purchasing (Commercial Directorate
2004)
A second wave, Wave II, of tenders was announced shortly after the launch of the 
first wave. However, the procurement of Wave II ISTCs by the Department of Health 
has been beset with delays and uncertainties. Of the 27 schemes originally intended, 
only seven are going ahead. This second wave now will likely to amount to less than 
half of the initially planned £700m (250,000 patients per year) (Timmins 2007; CBI 
2008).
Though the Wave II tenders have been scaled down significantly, we now have 
the beginnings of a ‘mid-tier market’ where independent sector providers have 
entered England based on a high-throughput, low-cost business model with the NHS 
as the primary customer. We also have evidence that the incumbent providers are 
‘retooling’ their businesses to be far more competitive. In both cases, we have seen 
the introduction of a number of innovations that allow these organisations to operate 
much more efficiently and deliver strong results (Commercial Directorate 2004).
The impact on the NHS has been more controversial. UNISON and other critics 
from health professions expressed concern about the impact of these centres on 
existing NHS resources (Lister 2005; UNISON 2005). Some of the critics wondered 
why the government was providing new money preferentially to the private sector,
18
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rather than adopting the ‘cheaper and easier policy’ of expanding NHS provision. 
These critics asserted that the private health care sector has always been a "small and 
marginal operation, feeding o ff historic wait lists and poaching NHS staff” (Lister 
2005). UNISON argued that the experiences of other countries show that the private 
sector is "never cheaper or better value ” (UNISON 2005).
In the summer of 2006, the Parliamentary Health Committee published an inquiry 
on whether the primary objectives of the ISTC Programme had been met. The 
Committee concluded that ISTCs had not yet made a major direct contribution to 
increasing capacity. The Committee concluded that ISTCs did have a significant 
effect on the spot purchase price and increased patient choice via offering more 
locations for care and earlier treatments. However, there was concern that patients 
were not offered informed choice without information relating to clinical quality 
(Health Committee 2006).
The Committee found ISTCs embodied good practice and introduced innovative 
techniques, but it was unclear whether that NHS facilities had adopted in any 
systematic manner these practices and techniques from the ISTCs. A number of 
concerns were raised also about the ISTC programme by the professional medical 
bodies and others. However, there was no hard, quantifiable evidence to prove that 
standards in ISTCs differed from those in the NHS (Health Committee 2006).
The Committee found that waiting lists declined since the introduction of ISTCs, 
but it was unclear how much is a direct result of the introduction of the ISTC 
Programme and how much is due to additional NHS spending and the emphasis 
placed by the Government on waiting list targets over the study period (Health 
Committee 2006).
Competition was also assessed. The Committee found that the threat of 
competition from the ISTCs may have had a significant effect on the NHS, but the 
evidence is largely anecdotal and could not be quantified (Health Committee 2006).
Key arguments raised by opponents to the ISTC Programme included3:
- ISTCs, run for the benefit of ‘profit maximising’ shareholders, would charge 
higher costs, and take on only the most minor and uncomplicated surgeries.
3 The proceedings of the House of Commons Health Select Committee meetings themselves have been 
challenged. In the book titled Confuse & Conceal: The NHS and Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres by Stewart Player and Colin Leys (2008), the authors suggest that the Health Select 
Committee tried to assess the programme early on in so that it would not be revealed that the TC 
programme was really a bridge-head to a private sector take-over of the NHS.
19
Matthias Loening Chapter 1 The Treatment Centre Programme: The Context
The NHS would be left to deal with more complex cases for 
disproportionately less money;
- Far from delivering new and expanded services and capacity the private sector 
would divert vital funds from the NHS to the commercial sector.
The centres would inevitably draw off NHS staff and resources, and do little to 
address the problem of staff shortages;
- The diversion of resources would cut across the necessary training of 
specialist doctors and nursing staff, jeopardising medical education;
Any apparent increase in private sector provision would entail corresponding 
reductions and cancellations of plans to expand and develop NHS services; 
Any eventual reduction in waiting times that may arise after such schemes are 
introduced would be achieved only at the expense of higher costs and longer 
delays than would have been necessary for an expansion of mainstream NHS 
care;
- Rather than enhancing patient choice, the ISTC Programme may in fact risk
destabilising and forcing the closure of popular local units, perhaps even of
whole hospitals that offer comprehensive care, including emergency services, 
to a wide section of the public.
- Prior to committing to second wave, a full and objective public evaluation of 
the impact of the first round of treatment centres, including their impact on the 
wider NHS, should be commissioned.
So it is apparent that the ISTC programme raises a number of key issues, most of 
which can only be settled by empirical investigation. But perhaps the most important 
of these is the question of ownership. Does the fact that the ISTCs are independently 
owned and operated affect their performance as providers to NHS patients? Is there 
evidence to support the belief held by many that private providers are more efficient 
and provide services of higher quality than public ones? If differences in efficiency 
and quality do exist, what causes them? What, ultimately, is the role of ownership in 
determining, the performance of health care providers? It is to these questions that this 
thesis is addressed.
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1.2 The Research Questions
The research aims to answer to the following questions:
R. 1: Are there differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of 
efficiency?
R.2: Are there differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of quality? 
R.3: Are there differences in the organisational, managerial and technological 
approach between the ISTCs and the NHS TCs? If so, do these explain any 
observed differences between the ISTCs and the NHS TCs in terms of efficiency 
and quality?
R.4: If such differences exist, how can they be explained? In particular how does 
the difference in their ownership structure relate to the differences in performance 
found between the ISTCs and NHS TCs? Or could there be various alternative, or 
confounding, influences which may affect the conclusions suggested by the 
evidence?
First, the quantitative evidence will be assessed as to whether there are differences 
between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of efficiency (R.1). The evidence will also 
be assessed as to whether there are differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in 
terms of quality outcomes (R.2). The quantitative methodological approach is 
intended to conduct an initial assessment on the specific issue of treatment centre 
performance and initiate the hypothesis that there are differences in performance 
between the Treatment Centres. It is important to note that the quantitative analysis is 
simply to obtain initial correlations and establish that there are differences in 
performance.
Qualitative evidence will then be explored to investigate whether there are 
differences in the organisational, managerial and technological approach between the 
ISTCs and the NHS TCs. If so, do these explain any observed differences between the 
ISTCs and the NHS TCs in terms of efficiency and quality (R.3)?
Lastly, qualitative evidence on the role o f ownership will be assessed, specifically 
to ascertain how it may drive the differences in performance found between the ISTCs 
and NHS TCs (R.4). The researcher theorises there are a number of potential reasons 
for these differences, such as: ownership; the competitive effects in the market; 
differences in payers and payment methodologies; active selection by ISTCs of 
patients with lower risk than the NHS TCs; and integration of some treatment centres
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with larger hospitals. The importance of these factors will be further assessed within 
this dissertation.
1.3 Dissertation Plan
The dissertation plan is as follows. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2
establishes a theoretical framework to provide a context for the research question and 
a review of the literature investigating the effects of Treatment Centres on efficiency 
and quality. In this chapter, there is an additional section on the theoretical 
underpinnings of ownership and competition, and how they relate to the health sector. 
As most of the existing literature is from the United States, data is heavily weighted 
toward that country. However, where possible, research is presented from England, as 
there is some evidence from the introduction of the Internal Market in the 1990s and 
GP-fundholding schemes, as well as initial reports on the performance of the 
Treatment Centres.
Chapter 3 sets forth the research design and methodology to be used. Three 
quantitative approaches are used to ascertain the relationship between the type of 
provider and health outcomes, as well as the provider’s ownership and health 
outcomes. Three approaches of quantitative analysis are used: basic descriptive 
statistics, weighted mean differences and regression.
The quantitative analysis is complemented by a qualitative case study approach. 
The use of a qualitative approach is intended to provide evidence and conclusions 
made from the quantitative approach and to help draw out meaningful conclusions.
Chapter 4 uses quantitative methods to provide empirical evidence on the specific 
issue of treatment centre performance. The research is geared to providing answers to 
whether there are differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of efficiency 
and quality. Because the Treatment Centre Programme encompasses not only ISTCs, 
but also NHS Treatment Centres (NHS TCs), we have an opportunity quantitatively to 
assess the performance of IS and NHS Treatment Centres alongside NHS Trust 
Hospitals and Independent Sector General Hospital Providers and as a result uncover 
whether there are advantages in terms of efficiency and quality that may be associated 
with differing ownership structures (public or private) and facility type (treatment 
centre or hospital). An initial analysis is undertaken by analysing basic descriptive 
statistics. This is followed by pooling the mean differences between groups. 
Multivariate regression analyses are then undertaken in order to assess the predictive
22
Matthias Loening Chapter 1 The Treatment Centre Programme: The Context
value of these mean differences, to control for potential confounding factors and to 
determine the significance of variables such as ownership status, treatment centre 
focus, age and deprivation. It is important to note that this analysis is not intended to 
explain causation or prediction, but rather to initiate the hypothesis that there are 
differences in performance between the Treatment Centres and obtain initial 
correlations and ensure that there are differences in performance. This chapter is to 
support the initial hypothesis and to justify the rest of the thesis through ensuring that 
there is a difference to explain.
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters that will add to the research literature on 
England’s Treatment Centre Programme by providing qualitative evidence on the 
differences in performance between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. Unlike much economic 
research, which tends to be satisfied with statistical relationships between given 
phenomenon even if the causal nature of the relationship remains hidden in a ‘black 
box,’ this chapter will attempt to uncover the reasons why we find differing 
performance between IS and the NHS TCs. In a sense, this chapter will attempt to 
‘open’ the black box of the institutions, and try to identify exactly what the proximate 
factors are that explain the differences in outcomes.
Chapter 6 takes the argument a stage further by trying to identify the causes of 
those differences found in Chapter 5, focusing particularly on the role of ownership. 
There are a number of potential explanatory variables that must be discounted before 
it can be asserted that ownership is indeed the primary explanatory variable for 
differences in performance. Other potential explanatory variables that could account 
for the differences in performance are competition, type of payer and method of 
reimbursement, case mix selection, physical and organisational integration and 
differences in ownership. The chapter uses qualitative evidence to disentangle the 
correlations identified in the quantitative results and to gain insight into the causal 
relationships involved.
Chapter 7 concludes the research by drawing together the evidence reviewed to 
contribute to an overall assessment of the policy and implications of the Treatment 
Centre Programme. The limitations of the research and areas of further research are 
put forward. A key tenet of this chapter is that the evidence from England will allow 
for a broader discussion of the global role of Treatment Centres, as well as the 
independent sector, in the delivery of care for public patients, as other countries 
attempt to deal with the policy issues surrounding these facilities. Treatment Centres
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(also known as specialty hospitals, outpatient surgery centres, ambulatory surgery 
centres, and day case centres) will undoubtedly increase in numbers over the coming 
years, and difficult policy decisions will have to be confronted with regard to their 
role in a country’s health system.
1.4 Summary
The TC debate should not be regarded as merely the ‘topic du jour.’ The real 
conflict is just beginning, with large and powerful hospitals on one hand, and small 
upstart treatment centres on the other. As hospitals typically receive the largest 
proportion of funding in any country’s health sector, they most often represent a 
powerful lobbying force. Therefore, the topic of emerging, alternative methods of 
access to health care quickly becomes politicised. Compounding this political debate 
is the notion that policy-makers are searching for ways to control costs, while patient 
consumers are increasing their demands for improved access and better quality of 
care. Preserving the traditional model of hospital care is increasingly becoming 
difficult.
Today we are seeing this emergent, and increasingly conflicted, intersection of 
policy, economics and business. From the policy standpoint, questions arise over 
efficiency, equity, quality and choice, against the backdrop of ever-rising costs. From 
the economic standpoint, questions arise over new and increasingly market-oriented 
ways to finance increasing demands, largely via the pricing mechanisms of 
competition and choice. From the business standpoint, questions arise over whether 
the independent sector and individual physicians should be allowed to provide and 
own these services, what types of services they should be commissioned, and how 
they should be remunerated for service.
Questions surrounding Treatment Centres within a health system are only 
beginning to be asked by policy-makers world wide. Of course, each health system 
is different, with varying policy goals and objectives, but all share common 
challenges: managing increasing demand, containing rising costs, and, ideally, 
improving access and quality. This dissertation will add to the literature of 
Treatment Centres by providing empirical evidence on issues of efficiency and 
quality, and their relationship to structures of ownership.
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
We are recorders and reporters o f the facts—not judges o f the behavior we describe.
Alfred C Kinsey, 1956
2.0 General Overview of the Theory and Research Literature
This chapter reviews the research evidence concerning efficiency, quality, 
ownership and competition as related to Treatment Centres. ‘Treatment Centre’ is the 
UK’s terminology for a facility that provides health care services of an elective nature 
that can be provided on an outpatient, day-case or short-stay basis. Other terms for 
these types of facilities exist, including ambulatory surgery centre (ASC), outpatient 
surgery centre, day case centre and specialty hospital. These terms have varying 
definitions1. For the purposes of this research, a ‘treatment centre’ will be more 
broadly defined as a facility that treats patients with specific medical conditions or 
patients who are in need of specific medical or surgical procedures (Schneider, 
Ohsfeldt et al. 2005) within only a few clinical specialty areas on an inpatient and 
outpatient basis. Further, the term ‘treatment centre’ will be used interchangeably 
with the other terms listed (e.g. ASC, outpatient surgery centre and specialty hospital), 
with ‘specialty hospital’ the preferred term to allude to the specialisation of this type 
of facility, as opposed to a ‘general hospital’, which provides general hospital 
services.
Because the expansion of treatment centres is a relatively new phenomenon, the 
literature that has been published to date is limited. Most of the evidence comes from
1 For example, there is no standard definition of a specialty hospital (GAO, 2003). The US’s Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) defines specialty hospitals as 
hospitals that are physician owned and ‘primarily or exclusively engaged in the care and treatment of 
patients with a cardiac or orthopaedic condition, patients receiving a surgical procedure, or any other 
specialized category of services designated’ (MedPac, 2003). The United States General Accounting 
Offices (GAO) designates a facility a specialty hospital ‘if two-thirds or more of inpatient claims are in 
one or two major diagnostic categories, or two-thirds of the inpatient claims are for surgical diagnostic- 
related groups’ (GAO, 2003).
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the United States and is from the past few years. There is, however, substantial 
evidence on efficiency and quality, as well as some discussion and analysis of the role 
of competition and ownership, from studies in the hospital sector. However, 
reviewing literature from the hospital sector as opposed to treatment centres presents 
some limitations and differences, which will be drawn out where applicable.
A range of methods was used to identify relevant published material, including: 
Searching electronic databases (King’s Fund Library dataset, Medline, PubMed)
- Searching in libraries for material not generally included on electronic databases 
(offprint collections, published bibliographies, and (‘grey literature’).
- Asking experts from the academic research community, the United States 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the NHS, including 
Directors of Health in England, to identify relevant papers and reports.
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2.1 reviews the literature on 
efficiency. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on quality. Section 2.3 reviews the 
literature on ownership. Section 2.4 reviews the literature on competition. Section 2.5 
provides summary remarks.
2.1 Efficiency
Efficiency is often identified with cutting costs. However, a more refined 
definition would encompass the way in which resources are used effectively (Le 
Grand, Mays et al. 1998). There are two general definitions of efficiency: technical, or 
internal efficiency, and allocative efficiency. A technically efficient firm produces as 
much output as possible with a given amount of inputs, or produces a given output 
with the minimum possible quantity of inputs (Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Le Grand, 
Mays et al. 1998; Hensher 2001). Allocative efficiency is where the ‘best’ mix of 
outputs across different services areas is selected (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). 
Allocative efficiency is especially important to health, and large health systems such 
as the NHS, where there is a monopsony purchaser of services. The evidence of 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency in light of the treatment centres will be 
reviewed below.
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2.1.1 Technical Efficiency
There are various aspects to technical efficiency including economies of scale, 
economies of scope, operating margins and transaction costs. Each of these 
components of technical efficiency will be reviewed.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale exist if the average costs of producing a product or service
decline as the volume of production increases (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). A facility
that specialises in a certain procedure (i.e., hernias) should in theory maximise its
productivity when it concentrates on performing a certain set of procedures. Staff
skills are honed, turn-around time is minimised, equipment utilization is maximised
and patient expectations can be clearly anticipated (Utley and Gallivan 2005).
Economic theory would predict that mixing surgical procedure types and staffing is
likely to be an inefficient way to utilise surgical facilities. A treatment centre achieves
its efficiency by targeting the less complex cases, allowing other providers to take on
those that are more complex.
The evidence on economies of scale in the production of hospital services on
balance indicates that US general hospitals typically experience scale economies
(Schneider, Ohsfeldt et al. 2005). Specific to the treatment centres, or specialty
hospitals as they are referred to in the US, evidence further suggests that scale
economies exist. Three important studies conducted on treatment centres in recent
years all provide strong evidence that specific hospital volume and operating margins
exceed those that are performed at general hospitals within the same market areas
(GAO 2003; Hackbarth 2005; Leavitt 2005; Schneider, Ohsfeldt et al. 2005).
Economies of Scope
In some cases the joint production of two or more products or services can be
accomplished at lower cost than the combined costs of producing each individually;
these are known as economies of scope (Panzar and Willig 1981). Economies of
scope can exist when production relies on common resources, such as technology,
workers, inputs and general overhead. A key argument against specialty hospitals is
that these facilities increase the fragmentation of care which directly leads to a loss of
economies of scope and therefore loss of technical efficiency (Royal College of
Physicians 2003; UNISON 2005).
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However, evidence on economies of scope in the hospital industry is inconclusive 
(Schneider, Ohsfeldt et al. 2005). In a study on inpatient-outpatient services in US 
chain and non-chain hospitals, limited evidence of scope economies was found 
(Menke 1997). A study of 262 hospital mergers in the US between the years 1987 and 
1990 found evidence of economies of scope in the merging of acute and sub-acute 
care and intensive care and outpatient visits. However, the merging of other services 
showed either diseconomies of scope or evidence which was statistically insignificant 
(Sinay and Campbell 1995). A study of hospitals in Washington State found no 
evidence of economies of scope (Li and Rosenman 2001). Overall, the literature does 
not provide strong evidence for the existence of economies of scope in hospitals.
Operating Margins
In the US, payment by Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) provides strong
incentives for hospitals to specialise in those DRGs for which they have relatively low 
production costs (Dranove 1987). Recent studies have found that margins within 
treatment centres are higher than in general hospitals (Hackbarth 2005; Leavitt 2005). 
Where the evidence is less clear is whether the margins are higher because of the 
choice of procedures, or because they are able to maximise fixed costs through their 
focused approach.
A study conducted by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 
an independent Congressional agency, analysed hospitals’ Medicare cost reports and 
inpatient claims from 2002 (the most recent available at the time) and found that 
treatment centres tend to focus on surgery procedures, or DRGs, which were more 
profitable than medical DRGs in the same specialty (Hackbarth 2005). Inpatient 
margins treatment centres generated from treating Medicare beneficiaries (an average 
of 9.4 per cent) were slightly higher in 2001 than those reported by general hospitals 
(8.9 per cent). Further, the study found that within these DRGs, treatment centres had 
lower severity patient mixes than peer, competitor, or community hospitals. Patients 
with a lower severity, or case mix, are generally more profitable than the average 
Medicare patient, since they usually require lower costs but an identical payment is 
still made for the procedure (Hackbarth 2005).
Transaction Costs
Another efficiency issue concerns transaction costs. Transaction costs refer to the 
administrative costs of such activities as ensuring that contracts are clear, negotiated
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appropriately and continuously monitored. Transaction costs can be interpreted as a 
technical efficiency concern (Le Grand, Mays et al. 1998),
The trade union for public service workers, UNISON, argues that high transaction 
costs are one of the biggest risks to the efficiency of the new NHS market (UNISON
2005). The costs of administering and managing the market must be assessed, as well 
as the costs of providing information, operating the pricing system, and monitoring 
and enforcing contracts. There may be further transaction costs in terms of regulating 
competition, which will be discussed in the section on competition.
There may also be transaction costs associated with market entry. During the 
summer of 2006, the Health Select Committee questioned the then Secretary of State 
Patricia Hewitt on whether ISTCs provided real Value for Money (VFM), since an 
average 11% premium was being paid to the ISTC providers for clinical service 
provision. Ms. Hewitt responded that this price was necessary to bring the new 
providers into the system during the first wave of tenders and that this is still much 
less than the 40% premium paid on spot purchasing of services from private hospitals, 
which is no longer necessary (Hewitt 2006). Nevertheless, the others testified to their 
concern that the transaction costs necessary to allow the entry of ISTCs are not 
warranted.
2.1.2 Allocative Efficiency
Most opponents of treatment centres will argue that, even though there may be 
evidence of an increase in technical efficiency, the fragmentation of health service 
leads to allocative inefficiency through the duplication of services, loss of economies 
of scope (as discussed in the previous section) and supply induced demand. An inter­
related component is cream skimming, as it relates to allocative efficiency. The 
literature will be briefly reviewed on these aspects of allocative efficiency.
Supply Induced Demand
Theory suggests supply-induced demand in health care is possible. This occurs
when adding capacity leads to more utilization on a per capita basis than if capacity 
had not been increased, raising costs to the health care system as a whole (Roemer 
1961). This is the reason why one-half of US states have certificate of need (CON) 
laws to limit the expansion of medical capacity.
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Schneider et. al (2005) examined whether supply induced demand existed and 
whether the development of treatment centres needed to be regulated. The authors 
found there was no evidence that specialty hospitals increased demand for services, 
affected access to care, or led to an increase of referrals, which could theoretically 
have happened because of physician-owned treatment centres and the incentive to 
self-refer and increase the number of procedures (Schneider, Ohsfeldt et al. 2005)
Despite the possibility of supply induced demand, England’s current policy is pro­
actively to increase supply and spending, while controlling costs on a per procedure 
basis. There is already anecdotal evidence that the introduction of additional supply to 
the health system via the ISTC program is driving a dramatic shift in the way private 
hospitals and NHS Trust Hospitals provide services (Commercial Directorate 2005; 
Smith 2006). With NHS waiting lists falling, and likely to continue falling, private 
hospitals in England will have to adapt to a competitive market where they can no 
longer depend on long waiting lists at NHS hospitals, even as ISTCs vie for elective 
surgery patients and insurance companies continue to demand lower premiums. 
Hospital companies such as BUPA, Capio and Nuffield cut their prices to close to 
NHS tariffs after the launch of the ISTC Programme (UNISON 2005) and announced 
plans to increasingly focus on the ISTC market (Commercial Directorate 2005).
Cream Skimming
The Treatment Centre Programme, and more specifically the ISTCs, was to
improve access to care by adding capacity, offering patients choice and reducing the 
number of patients on waiting lists for surgical procedures (Commercial Directorate 
2005; Department of Health 2005). However, opponents of the ISTCs argue that, in 
fact, the programme will negatively impact access and equity. There will be an impact 
on a hospital’s financial stability because of competition, and this may force some 
hospitals to close, thus decreasing health care access and choice (Royal College of 
Physicians 2003; Hackbarth 2005; UNISON 2005). In a recent questioning of 
Secretary of State for Health Patricia Hewitt, MP Penning stated that ‘there is no 
choice if you close hospitals,’ in order to ensure the success of the ISTC program 
(Hewitt 2006). More generally, the ISTC business model is claimed to ‘cherry pick,’ 
or cream skim, healthy patients and/or profitable services, which engenders the 
restriction of access to certain population segments and thus lead to increased 
inequality within the health system. (UNISON 2005).
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The danger of cream skimming was an equity issue that worried many analysts at 
the start of the internal market (Matsaganis and Glennerster 1994; Le Grand, Mays et 
al. 1998), though evidence of this was never found (Le Grand 1999). Nevertheless, 
this same concern has been voiced against the ISTCs (Royal College of Physicians 
2003; British Medical Association 2005; UNISON 2005). ‘Cream Skimming’ is the 
idea that ISTCs will ‘cherry pick’ healthy patients and/or profitable services, thus 
restricting access and increasing inequality within the health system. (Carvel and 
Tomlinson 2005; UNISON 2005). Le Grand defines cream skimming as the deliberate 
selection by providers of patients who are easier or less costly to treat (Le Grand, 
Mays et al. 1998). The OECD similarly defines cream skimming as when a provider 
tries to select the most favourable individuals with expected costs below revenues in 
order to increase profits (OECD 2005). Getzen (1997) defines cream skimming as 
either providing only the most profitable services or only providing services to the 
healthiest patients. Further, the method of reimbursement influences both the intensity 
of services and who is treated when patients differ in severity of illness. Prospectively 
paid providers more often select low severity patients and skimp on high severity 
ones. There is also the potential for dumping of high severity patients, which occurs 
when providers reject cases they deem to be unprofitable (Ellis 1998; Department of 
Health 2006).
In the US, a central argument for controlling the development of treatment centres 
is that they select only the most profitable patients and leave the unfunded, and/or 
high cost patients to general hospitals (Shactman 2005). There are four studies that 
have assessed this issue with respect to patients in treatment centres vis-a-vis general 
hospitals. The MedPAC study found that specialty hospitals did indeed tend to focus 
on procedures that were more profitable and had lower severity patient mixes than 
peer, competitor, or community hospitals (Hackbarth 2005). The GAO found that 
‘patients at specialty hospitals tended to be less sick than patients with the same 
diagnoses at general hospitals’ (GAO 2003). A study by Cram et al. (2005) evaluating 
quality in treatment centres also found that patient severity for cardiac surgery 
patients was lower than in general hospitals (Cram, Rosenthal et al. 2005). Only the 
MedCath study found treatment centres admitted sicker patients than those admitted 
to competing general hospitals (Dobson 2004).
There has been anecdotal evidence that ISTCs engage in cream skimming by 
referring complex patients to NHS Trust Hospitals. However, from the perspective of
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specialisation, an organization should match its capabilities to the goods it produces. 
This is in line with the conclusions of the Browne et al. (2008) research study. If a 
facility is tailor-made to perform minor surgery, it makes no sense for it to perform 
major operations. Therefore, from an economic standpoint, cream skimming may in 
fact be efficient. Evidence supporting the positive effects of cream skimming include 
a case study of the Shouldice Hospital (Herzlinger 1997; Chilingerian 2004; Urquhart 
and O'Dell 2004), where the facility focused solely on hernia repair.
The evidence supports the claim that, though treatment centres in the US target 
low complexity patients, there has been little, or no, negative financial impact on 
general hospitals, at least none that would potentially limit access to care. It is too 
early to tell whether there has been an impact on access to care following the 
introduction of the ISTCs in England. There is data that shows waiting lists have 
decreased within certain specialties and in certain regions. However, the overall effect 
for the entire health system is not yet clear.
2.1.3 Efficiency Summary
In theory, a facility that specialises in a certain procedure should maximise its 
productivity when it concentrates on performing the procedures. Staff skills are 
honed, turn-around time is minimised, equipment utilization is maximised and patient 
expectations can be clearly anticipated. One of the most inefficient ways to utilise 
surgical facilities is to mix surgical procedure types and staff. A treatment centre 
achieves its efficiency by targeting less complex cases, leaving the rest to other 
providers.
Economic advantages appear to be associated with specialisation, mainly from 
process redesign, increased learning, and an emphasis on core competencies. A 
treatment centre achieves its efficiency by targeting cases either by complexity and/or 
procedure. The treatment centre approach may improve efficiencies at a systemic 
level, since the approach allows other providers to take on the more complex cases or 
other types of procedures. Thus, society may be better off if  both organizations 
become more focused and achieve operational effectiveness for a given patient 
population with the treatment centres taking on less complex cases, and the general 
hospitals taking on more complex cases.
Some have argued that increasing a system’s capacity can actually raise costs, and 
decrease allocative efficiency, because of supply induced demand. The US has
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widespread Certificate of Need (CONs) regulations in place to limit the development 
of medical facilities and there was an 18-month moratorium on physician-owned 
specialty hospitals so that Congress could further assess these negative impacts. 
However, CONs have begun to fall out of favour in recent years and Congress let the 
18-month moratorium expire following the MedPac, CMS and GAO studies.
2.2 Quality
There are many different definitions of quality. Quality may be defined and 
measured in terms of health outcomes indicators such as mortality. It could refer to 
patient satisfaction from the services provided. It may refer to the outputs and 
productivity of the overall health system, such as hospital discharges and waiting lists. 
Or it may refer to the inputs within a health system such as physicians, physician to 
bed ratio, nurses, facilities and equipment (e.g. beds and operating ro) (Le Grand, 
Mays et al. 1998). Further, it must be decided if quality is to be measured at the level 
of the individual practioner’s performance, or at the level of the entire health system 
(Donabedian 1988).
Here, we define quality in terms of outcome. A general literature review is 
undertaken to examine the evidence for a correlation between volume and quality as 
measured by outcome indicators. The research on the quality outcomes of the US 
specialty hospitals is also discussed. There is some initial recent evidence on quality 
from the ISTCs because of Key Performance Indicator (KPI) reporting. These studies 
will be assessed in the following sections.
2.2.1 Quality Outcomes: The Volume and Quality Correlation
Outcomes are the improvements to an individual’s health directly attributable to 
the relevant policy intervention (Le Grand, Mays et al. 1998). Extensive research has 
been undertaken to uncover a link between quality and volume (Hannan, O’Donnell et 
al. 1989; Hannan, Racz et al. 1997; Birkmeyer, Siewers et al. 2002; M. Porter and E. 
Teisberg 2004; Enthoven 2005). The terms quality and outcomes will be used 
interchangeably in this chapter.
The most extensive research on the correlation between volume and quality was 
conducted in the United States. Luft et al. (1979) studied mortality rates for 12 
surgical procedures of varying complexity in 1,498 hospitals to determine whether 
there was a relationship between a hospital’s surgical volume and its surgical
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mortality. Luft found that the mortality of certain procedures (i.e., open-heart surgery, 
vascular surgery, transurethral resection of the prostate and coronary bypass) 
decreased as the number of operations increased. For certain other procedures 
however, the mortality curve flattened at lower volumes. For example, Luft found that 
hospitals doing 50 to 100 total hip replacements attained a mortality rate almost as 
low as that of hospitals doing 200 or more. Luft also found there were some 
procedures, such as cholecystectomy, where there was no relation between volume 
and mortality. Luft concluded that in general there was a direct relationship between 
volume and quality. Some have since argued that the procedures for which there was 
no correlation between volume and mortality may be because of other factors, such as 
physician experience, referrals to institutions with better outcomes, as well as patient 
selection (Luft, Bunker et al. 1979).
Dudley et al. (2000) provide further evidence that high-volume hospitals (HVHs) 
have lower mortality rates than low-volume hospitals (LVHs) for certain procedures. 
Their research sought to quantify how many deaths could potentially be avoided in 
California by referral to HVHs. The authors found statistically significant results 
supporting a volume-outcome relationship. Mortality was significantly lower at HVHs 
for more than a dozen procedures and the authors estimated that 602 deaths at LVHs 
could be attributed to their low volume (Dudley, Johansen et al. 2000).
Shortell and Hughes (1988) studied inpatient Medicare discharges for 16 selected 
clinical conditions and examined the effects of the regulation of hospital rates, state 
certificate-of-need programs, competition, and hospital ownership, on mortality rates. 
The authors found no statistically significant association between mortality rates 
among inpatients and the type of hospital ownership or the number of hospitals 
competing in the market area. However, die authors did find statistically significant 
associations between higher mortality rates and the higher level of strictness in the 
level of regulation of hospitals (CON) in a state. The findings cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of high levels of regulation on hospital quality, when compared to 
hospitals in relatively competitive markets (Shortell and Hughes 1988).
Birkmeyer et al. (2002) provides further evidence that higher volume is associated 
with better quality and leads to lower per-case costs. The authors used information 
from the national Medicare claims data base and the Nationwide Inpatient Sample to 
examine the mortality associated with six different types of cardiovascular procedures 
and eight types of major cancer resections between 1994 and 1999 (total number of
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procedures, 2.5 million). The authors found that mortality decreased as volume 
increased for all 14 types of procedures studied. However, like the Luft study, the 
importance of volume varied significantly according to the type of procedure. The 
authors concluded that there was a statistically significant volume-mortality 
relationship for Medicare patients undergoing certain procedures (i.e., cardiovascular 
and cancer). However, without being able to evaluate quality at the level of the 
physician or other comparison hospitals in close proximity to die hospitals studied, 
the study’s findings are limited (Birkmeyer, Siewers et al. 2002).
Though evidence appears to suggest there is a clear volume-quality relationship, 
Enthoven and Tollen feel the importance of volume sensitivity to quality is 
overstated. Their review of the literature found statistically significant results 
supporting a volume-outcome relationship in only 36 conditions/procedures out of 
more than 500 DRGs (Enthoven 2005).
Welke, et al. (2005) conducted a retrospective cohort study of Medicare patients 
undergoing a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) in US hospitals from 1996 to 2001 
and assessed the relationship between hospital volume and CABG mortality. The 
authors found volume alone was a poor discriminator of mortality and ‘only slightly 
better than a coin flip’ (Welke, Barnett et al. 2005).
Opponents of treatment centres argue that these facilities cannot secure a high 
enough volume to improve quality and reduce costs without taking patients away 
from the local hospitals. It has been argued that when more hospitals compete for an 
identical or lower volume of services, quality may actually decline because each 
hospital individually has less volume (Royal College of Physicians 2003; Enthoven 
2005; UNISON 2005). If this is the case, promoting a policy of specialisation and 
thereby further fragmenting a health system, may in fact create poorer quality 
outcomes (UNISON 2005) than if no such policy had been adopted.
The evidence does indicate there is a statistically significant relationship between 
volume and quality, using mortality as an outcomes measurement. However, the 
volume-quality relationship is not uniform and the level of volume needed to provide 
evidence that is statistically significant is dependent on the type of procedure. Threats 
to the validity of the studies may also be present, as outcomes may be dependent on 
the experience and quality of the specific physician, as well as the hospital.
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2.2.2 Quality Outcomes: Evidence from US Specialty Hospitals
The empirical evidence on the quality of care provided by the US specialty 
hospitals is limited to just a few studies, one by the Lewin Group (Dobson 2004) and 
another by Cram et al. from the University of Iowa (Cram, Rosenthal et al. 2005). The 
US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) studied the impact of treatment 
centres on access and quality in the health system but from a qualitative standpoint.
The Lewin Group examined how cardiac care services provided in MedCath heart 
hospitals, the only publicly-traded specialist hospital focused on cardiac surgery in the 
United States, compared peer hospitals across the country on measures of patient 
severity, quality and community impact. The Lewin Group found that MedCath 
hospitals had a higher case mix severity (20.6%), 16% lower mortality rates, and 
shorter average length of stay (ALOS) when adjusted for case mix index (CMI) 
(Dobson 2004). Still, the conclusions are not universally endorsed. For example, the 
authors used national average data, but comparing MedCath hospitals with competitor 
hospitals (a 20 mile radius as defined by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS)) may have been more relevant (Leavitt 2005). Furthermore,
MedCath’s unwillingness to share the full publication of its research has raised 
additional questions on the research design and methodology used.
A study by Cram et al. (2005) attempted to evaluate whether quality is in fact 
better in US specialty hospitals because of their focused approach. The authors 
conducted a retrospective cohort study of 42,737 Medicare beneficiaries who 
underwent either an angioplasty (42,737 cases) or coronary bypass surgery (26,274 
cases) in 2000 and 2001 in specialty cardiac hospitals and general hospitals in the 
same markets. One of the important strengths of the study was the investigation’s 
focus on patients who received treatment in one of 15 cardiac treatment centres or 80 
general hospitals in the same markets. The Cram study found that quality was better 
within the specialty hospitals, but also that these facilities admitted healthier patients. 
Adjusting for case mix, the authors found overall quality improvement was 
statistically insignificant (Cram, Rosenthal et al. 2005). However, researchers did find 
that volume levels were higher in specialty hospitals, even as the level of quality was 
equal to, or no worse, than outcomes in the competitor general hospitals.
Finally, the Schneider et. al (2005). study appears to support the Cram (2005) 
findings. Schneider studied 10 specialty hospitals and compared them to competitor
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hospitals. The empirical findings suggested the intensity and quality of services are 
likely to be higher in specialty hospitals (Schneider, Ohsfeldt et al. 2005).
The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) studied the impact of 
treatment centres on access and quality in the health system. It found treatment 
centres had an overall positive impact on US health care, that patient satisfaction was 
high, and quality of care was as good, or better, than at competitor hospitals. The 
HHS study did find that treatment centres provided a smaller share of uncompensated 
care vis-a-vis competitor hospitals. However, since treatment centres paid real estate 
and property taxes, as well as income and sales taxes, whereas not-for-profit 
community hospitals did not, it can be argued the total proportion of net revenue that 
treatment centres devoted to uncompensated care, combined with taxes, exceeded the 
proportion of net revenues that community hospitals devoted to uncompensated care 
(Leavitt 2005).
2.2.3 Quality Outcomes: Evidence from the ISTCs
Some initial evidence on quality outcomes from the ISTCs can be drawn from the 
Key Performance Indicator (KPI) reporting. The KPIs are reported monthly to the 
Central Contract Management Units (CCMU) and cover 26 performance measures for 
the NHS to track. The National Centre for Health Outcomes Development (NCHOD), 
using KPI indicator reporting, published a report of five providers that have 
commenced operations under the ISTC programme. The schemes included had been 
in operation for over six months prior to June 2005. NCHOD were quite positive 
(National Centre for Health Outcomes Development 2005), noting:
There is a robust quality assurance system in place, more ambitious and 
demanding than that for NHS organisations. The KPI data to be collected 
and provided by the ISTCs extends beyond that used by the NHS.
- Early results of quality monitoring are encouraging.
However, of the 26 KPIs, only six encompass clinical data, as the KPIs 
themselves are about improving processes rather than specific outputs or, in this case, 
outcomes (2006).
Less encouragingly, five Leeds musculoskeletal radiologists have been involved 
in reporting orthopaedic x-ray exams undertaken on patients who were treated at the 
Nuffield Hospital, which was part of the ISTC Wave 1 contracts. The physicians 
reviewed 70 hip replacements, as well as both the pre- and post-operative appearances
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of the x-ray images. The physicians found that in 47 (67%) of the cases the x-ray 
images led the researchers to have serious concerns about the surgical practice of the 
individuals undertaking these procedures. The findings suggest a wide range of 
problems which include: selection of prosthesis size and type, adequacy of cement 
mantles and acetabular cup and femoral component positioning. In one case there 
were only minor changes from the pre-operative images and the researchers 
questioned whether a hip replacement was necessary at all, from a radiographic view 
point (O'Connor and Grainger 2005). Furthermore, a Bristol Audit found that the 
Cheltenham Nuffield Hospital re-operation rates for hip and knee replacement 
surgeries were 10 times higher than that of the Bristol and Weston Hospitals 
(Bannister 2006). As a result of the ISTCs, the NHS was ‘left to pick up the pieces’ 
(Wallace 2006).
There is there may be some potential linkages between a reduced average length 
of stay followed by an increased readmission rate thus presenting poorer outcomes 
and even a potential increased cost to the health system. The literature was reviewed 
in this respect.
There is some evidence which indicates that patients that are readmitted have a 
longer length of stay from their initial admission and that providers with lower than 
average lengths of stay for first admission have higher readmission rates (Dobrzanska 
and Newell 2006; Hamilton and Bramley-Harker 1999). The Dobrzanska and Newell 
research aimed to identify the reasons that may have contributed to the emergency 
readmission of older people to a medical unit, within 28 days o f hospital discharge. 
The authors conducted a year-long study which examined reasons for unplanned 
readmission of patients (aged 77 and over) within 28 days of hospital discharge. The 
population was patients, registered with North Bradford PCT General Practitioners, 
readmitted to one of five care of older people wards in two local acute trust NHS 
hospitals. The research suggested that a shorter length of stay was associated with 
increased likelihood of earlier readmission. However, a key limitation of this study in 
terms of relevant to the TC programme is that there are high risk patients whereas the 
TC target lower or patients were risks for readmission should be contained.
Hamilton and Bramley-Harker (1999) studied the internal market NHS reforms 
introduced in 1991 to provide incentives for efficiency and cost effectiveness, 
specifically to reduce waiting times and to improve postsurgical outcomes. The
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authors found that waiting times for hip fracture surgery declined after the NHS 
reforms but that patients were more likely to be discharged to another provider.
However, there is also evidence of the reverse (Clarke and Rosen 2001; Downing, 
Scott et al. 2008; Epstein, Bogen et. al 1991; Harrison, Graff et. al 1996; Louis, Yuen 
at al. 1999). For example, Clarke and Rosen (2001) conducted a review of the 
research literature on reducing average length of stay and the impact upon health care 
quality outcomes. They found no adverse effects on health outcomes from the 
reduction of ALOS.
Clarke and Rosendo point out that there may nevertheless ethical or moral reasons 
for a minimum ALOS. Further, a reduction in ALOS may in fact cause increased 
expenditure as a result of an increase in the number of high intensity days of hospital 
care at the expense of less costly and lower intensity days at the end of a hospital stay. 
And lastly, lower ALOS within a hospital may result in cost shifting on to community 
carers, relatives and friends.
In the Epstein (1991) study, the authors examined lengths of stay and readmission 
rates for all Medicare patients discharged from Massachusetts acute care hospitals 
between October 1982 through September 1986. The period coincided with the 
implementation of the prospective payment system in the United States. The authors 
found that over the four years of the study, ALOS decreased by 25% overall and by 
12% to 38% for the individual conditions studied (all p less than .05). The authors did 
find that readmission rates increased by approximately 10% (p less than .05) during 
this period; but the increase was not statistically associated with the method of 
prospective payment and the reduced ALOS.
In Canada, a similar study was conducted (Harrison, Graff et. al 1996). The 
authors attempted to determine whether decreasing lengths of stay over time for 
selected diagnostic categories were associated with increased hospital readmission 
rates. The study included seven large (125 beds or more) acute care hospitals in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba. The patients included those who were admitted to any one of 
the seven hospitals because acute myocardial infarction (AMI), bronchitis or asthma, 
transurethral prostatectomy (TURP) and uterine or adrenal procedures for non- 
malignant disease during the fiscal years 1989-90 to 1992-93. The ALOS decreased 
significantly over the four years for all of the four categories with the smallest change 
being observed for patients with AMI (11.1%) and the largest for those with 
bronchitis or asthma (22.0%). Overall, the authors found that there was no significant
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correlation between length of stay and readmission rates for individual hospitals in 
1992-93 in any of the four categories. As a result, the authors concluded that 
improving hospital efficiency by reducing ALOS did not appear to result in increased 
rates of readmission within 30 days after hospital discharge.
The Louis (1995) research examined the implementation of the DRG system in 
Italy and how it would affect hospital productivity and outcomes. The research found 
that there was a decrease in ordinary hospital admissions, an increase in day hospital 
admissions, and a greater severity of illness among hospitalized patients, suggesting 
better use of existing resources and improved productivity, with little or no change in 
mortality and readmission rates.
Specific to the UK, Downing et al (2008) researched the number of acute medical 
admissions to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Gateshead unit, a short-stay unit (SSU) 
which was developed specifically for such patients. The authors found that, through 
the use of the SSU, the mean length of stay was 33 hours and the overall length of 
stay across the entire hospital was significantly lower (4.6 days) than the 
corresponding period a year earlier (5.5 days) (p = 0.02), with readmission rates not 
being affected. This suggested that the introduction of an SSU can help identify and 
treat those patients with more minor illness who can often be discharged home at an 
earlier stage, much like the goal of the TCs.
In summary, the review of the potential relationship between lower ALOS and 
increased readmissions (or more general poorer outcomes data) suggests that there is 
little effect. However, this cannot be completely conclusive as there may be 
significant externalities, with the possibility of extra costs being imposed on support 
systems outside the hospital. Clearly the evidence would be strengthened if there was 
research specific to the TC Programme or other procedure areas that are of an elective 
nature.
2.2.4 Quality Summary
In general, research indicates higher volume is associated with better quality and 
lower per-case costs. Drawing on the theory of specialisation, proponents argue that 
specialty hospitals can secure high volumes, thereby improving quality and reducing 
costs. Opponents argue that specialty hospitals cannot secure a high enough volume to 
improve quality and reduce costs without taking patients away from community 
hospitals. When more hospitals compete for the same or lower volume of services,
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quality may decline and thus per-case costs may increase because each hospital has 
less volume.
In sum, the principal results for quality fail to decisively prove that specialisation 
improves quality in terms of outcomes. On balance however, the evidence does 
support the assertion that specialty hospitals provide no worse quality in terms of 
outcomes and mortality indicators, as opponents of these types of facilities have 
contended.
2.3 Ownership
The belief as to whether public services can and should be delivered by the private 
sector is often distinguished by political affiliation. However, the research 
surrounding economic theory has tended to ignore the issues of ownership (Preker and 
Harding 2002) and the rationale for the ownership status affecting a firm’s behaviour 
and performance (Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
This sub-section will lay out the general theory on ownership and discuss the 
evidence of ownership specific to health care. However, there are a number of other 
reasons for assessing the evidence, beyond the obvious and important point that 
ownership may be an important factor in determining differences in efficiency and 
quality levels within the health care facilities. As policy makers in the health sector 
increasingly struggle to increase access, improve quality and control costs, the role of 
the private sector ownership in public health service provision is becoming 
increasingly seen as an important mechanism to attain these health policy goals and 
objectives.
2.3.1 General Theory on Ownership
Already over two centuries ago Adam Smith pointed out that there was a positive 
connection between ownership and performance. Adam Smith (1776) noted:
The directors o f.. .companies,.. .being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail,.. .in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.
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John Vickers and George Yarrow (1988) present the most comprehensive and 
rigorous analysis of privatization - both in general and in the UK - that has appeared 
to date. Vickers and Yarrow argue that ownership of a firm will have significant 
effects on its behavior and performance, since changes in property rights will alter the 
structure of incentives faced by decision makers in the firm (Vickers and Yarrow 
1988).
Vickers and Yarrow conclude that the allocation of property rights does matter 
because it determines the objectives of the ‘owners’ of the firm (public or private) and 
the systems of monitoring managerial performance. Public and private ownership 
differ in both respects. As a result, changes in property rights will materially affect the 
incentive structures, and hence the behavior of management (Vickers and Yarrow 
1988).
One widespread perception is that privately owned companies are profit 
maximisers for their shareholders, or owners, and maximising shareholder benefits is 
not always seen as maximising benefits to society as a whole. Therefore, the rationale 
for public ownership has been in large part used for pursuing social objectives when 
the market fails (Preker and Harding 2002). To put it another way, though there may 
be internal efficiency benefits within firms under private ownership, these benefits are 
seen to be outweighed by the loss of allocative efficiency and the resulting costs to 
society as a whole (Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
This divergence between shareholders’ and society’s interests, and internal and 
allocative efficiency, may exist for a number of reasons. First, competitive solutions 
may not exist because of a natural monopoly. Second, competitive solutions may in 
fact exist; however, these solutions are not efficient in an allocative sense due to 
externalities on public goods. A third reason may be asymmetry of information, where 
information to one party in a transaction has more or better information than the other 
party. Addressing these market failures and thus maintaining the wider interests of the 
public provides the justification for supporting public ownership in the health sector 
(Preker and Harding 2002).
The traditional assumption that the objectives of the government policymakers 
and the managers of public organizations were identical has been an underlying 
rationale for public sector ownership. The assumption was that public ownership 
removed the opportunistic ‘profit maximiser,’ and with the financial motivations 
removed, the public sector managers would be able to pursue the public interest.
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The original welfare state of Great Britain was designed based on this assumption. 
Those who worked within the welfare state were knights. Doctors, nurses, teachers, 
social workers, etc. were viewed as being motivated primarily by their professional 
ethic and hence concerned only with the interests of the people they were serving (Le 
Grand 2003).
However, in reality politicians, civil servants and professionals have not 
always turned out to be the ‘high custodian of public interest (OECD 1992).’
Clearly, there are other potential motivations to these individuals than purely 
the interests of the people they serve.
Le Grand concludes (2003):
We cannot rely on the public service ethos - pure knightly motivations 
- to deliver public services in the quantity and quality that we require.
But rewards for public service should not be such that all elements of 
sacrifice are removed - otherwise there is a danger that all public 
services will only be provided by knaves.
In fact, it is not necessary to turn knights into knaves for pawns to 
become queens. What we need are well-designed public policies, ones 
that employ competitive mechanisms but that do not allow unfettered 
self-interest to dominate altruistic motivations. Knavish and knightly 
incentive structures should not work against one another but instead 
should be aligned.
Beyond Le Grand’s investigation into motivation of individuals, there has been a 
significant amount of research of late to identify the key factors that cause these wide 
variations in organisational performance. Specific to health care, there are a number 
of ‘streams of thought’ that have dealt with the public-private firm comparison: 
Agency Theory; Property Rights Theory; Public Interest; and Organization Theories 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Villalonga 2000; Preker and Harding 2002). Here we 
categorise the research into two main streams of thought: Principal-Agent Theory and 
Motivation.
Principal - Agent Theory
Principal-Agent Theory, or Agency Theory, is based on the different agency 
relationships that are associated when an agent is authorised to act on behalf of the 
principal. Agency refers to the capacity of individual humans to act independently and
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to make their own free choices (Parker 1995; Villalonga 2000). However, difficulties 
arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information. This is especially 
prevalent in health.
The agency problem is best illustrated when an owner (principal) and manager 
(agent) of a firm do not share the same objectives. The principal wants the agent to act 
in his (the principal’s) interests. However, the principal does not have full information 
about the agent. The principal-agent theory is focused on this problem of information 
and incentives (Preker and Harding 2002).
There are a number of varying principal-agent relationships in society including: 
employers and workers; lenders and borrows; and regulators and managers. In health, 
the most pointed to relationship is between the physician and patient. The physician 
wants the patient to act accordingly to his or her advice. Issues arise if the physician is 
financially incentivised to perform certain procedures (e.g. highly profitable) or refer 
to a certain facility (e.g. where there is a financial stake involved) regardless of the 
quality or cost to the patient.
Another relationship often pointed to is between the physician and hospital 
manager. Physicians and hospital managers have divergent interests, yet there is a 
high level of interdependence (Preker and Harding 2002). This creates an 
environment of natural tension between practicing physicians and the hospital 
managers. This tension arises between the physician’s primary role in providing the 
best quality of care to the patient, irrespective of cost and an administrator’s primary 
role in managing costs (Crilly and Le Grand 2004).
There is also tension in a publicly run health care system, such as the NHS 
between the central government and provider units. In England, the NHS Trust 
Hospitals are under stress at the end of every fiscal year to meet targets mandated by 
the central government such as wait list targets.
Clearly, it is this principal-agent relationship which could be a main driving factor 
between efficiency and quality outcomes data that differentiate the publicly and 
privately owned facilities. Managers (the agent) in both public and private firms (e.g. 
treatment centres) are assumed to seek the maximization of their own utility rather 
than that of the organization or its owners (the principal). However, Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988) argue that problems with the principal-agent relationship, with 
differing objectives, is less prevalent within private firms. First, there is a market for a 
firm’s ownership rights enabling owners to sell if they are not satisfied with
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managerial performance. This is the focus of Property Rights Theory and discussed in 
the following paragraphs. Second, there is the threat of takeover. Underperforming 
firms may be acquired if other companies find that they can improve profitability 
within the respective firm through the use of existing, or less, resources. Third, there 
is the threat of bankruptcy incentivise private sector managers and owners. And 
fourth, there is a labour market for managers. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that 
these mechanisms are absent, or at a minimum, less prevalent within public firms.
Motivation
There are a number of various streams of thought on motivation and appropriate 
incentive structures. These include property rights theory, public-interest theory and 
organisational theory. These will be further discussed below.
The underlying premise in property rights theory is that changes in property rights 
alter the structure of incentives faced by decision makers in a firm. These changes can 
be through the possession of residual decision rights or the allocation of residual 
returns. Residual rights of control are defined as the rights to decision-making over 
the use of an asset. Typically, an asset owner usually holds these rights. However, the 
owner or the law may allocate many rights to others, such as the granting of 
concession rights of a hospital to the private sector. A driver for this transfer of rights 
of control to the private sector is that governments relieve themselves of the 
responsibility for funding hospital deficits and continuous capital expenditure 
commitments (Preker and Harding 2002).
The idea of ownership as residual control is relatively clear for a simple asset such 
as an automobile. However, when a number of assets are bundled together, which 
frequently lead to unclear decision rights, residual control becomes more complex 
(Preker and Harding 2002). An example is a tertiary care hospital, with 
responsibilities for medical care provisioning as well as teaching and research 
responsibilities. Typically, the hospital is owned by the state, but the academic 
physicians and researchers will be employees of the university, which could also be 
state owned.
The over-riding assumption to this point has been that the sole aim of privately 
owned firms is profit maximization2. However, in reality there are a number of
2 Profit maximization here is assumed to encompass both current and future financial flows.
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constraints put on the pursuit of profit maximization: firm’s shareholders; other 
investors or their agents; and the firm’s creditors (Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
As a result, there are a number of problems with the assumption that a firm’s 
shareholders will seek to maximise their expected financial return from the company. 
This assumption ignores the time-frame for the return on investment. Shareholders 
have different expected time-frames for their respective return on investment. In the 
health sector, returns to investment may take longer than other industries typically due 
to the nature of large capital expenses. A pension fund might prefer a higher dividend 
payout ratio than an individual investor faced with somewhat a different tax position. 
Moreover, the expected pay-out may be different within the various shareholders 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
There is also the threat of takeover by other investors. This affects not only the 
shareholders but also management. If the management of a firm does not perform in 
line with the expectations of the market, the share price of the company may fall. As a 
result, the cost of purchasing shares will decline. The existence of this threat of 
takeover acts as an incentive mechanism and control on management and should deter 
management from pursuing policies which may hurt the company’s share value. 
Therefore, interests of shareholders and management may in reality be quite closely 
aligned (Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
The threat of bankruptcy constraints can be viewed as another constraint put on 
the pursuit of profit maximization. In the event of default, owners may lose control of 
the company and the firm’s creditors could seek managerial changes. Therefore, 
bankruptcy can be regarded quite closely to the takeover constraint described above 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
From the discussion, it can be expected that the transfer of ownership will be 
associated with some change in the types of incentives within a firm. Under private 
ownership, employers and even employees can receive financial remuneration linked 
to the company’s share price or options schemes. At the same time, profit 
maximization may in reality have a number of constraints put upon the owners and 
managers of a firm such as differing expectations of a return on investment by various 
shareholders, the threat of a takeover by another firm and bankruptcy leading to a loss 
of employment. Therefore, these constraints may in fact provide a significant amount 
of discipline, tempering the profit maximization that is assumed within the private 
sector.
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Public interest theory is based upon the assumption that government seeks to 
maximise the economic welfare of society. However, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) cite 
four potential drivers where the public good is not maximised within publicly owned 
industries: displacement of social objectives by political objectives; a preference for 
direct political intervention in managerial decisions over an ‘arm’s length’ 
relationship that would restrict government departments to the task of setting 
appropriate managerial incentive structures; internal inefficiencies in bureaucracies 
and inefficient levels of bureaucratic activity.
As a result, public choice theory has arisen. Public choice theory studies the 
behaviour of voters, politicians, and government officials with the notion that all are 
primarily self-interested agents (Zeckhauser and Horn 1989; Haskel and Szymanski 
1992; Boycko and Vishny 1996). Public choice theorists see bureaucrats as self- 
interested utility-maximisers, motivated by such factors as: salary, prerequisites of the 
office, power and public status (Niskanen 1973).
Organisational theory is based upon the study of individual and group dynamics in 
organisations. Organisational theory draws heavily from public choice theory and 
public interest theory (Villalonga 2000). It is argued that organisational characteristics 
of private firms are different for those of state-owned firms. These characteristics are 
different with respect to incentives and control mechanisms (Ricart, Gual et al. 1991), 
culture (Bishop and Thompson 1992), objectives, organisational structure, 
communications and reporting systems, management, labour and type of business 
(Parker 1993; Parker 1995; Martin and Parker 1997).
In general, incentive mechanisms are a result of financial remuneration, as well as 
the control mechanisms in place. With respect to England’s National Health Service, 
the NHS consultants have recently received a 25% increase in their pay between 
2004-2007 while seeing their workload fall (National Audit Office 2007). However, 
new market entrants will likely have affects on future negotiations with the NHS 
consultants. The incentive mechanisms in place within the NHS TCs will be assessed 
vis-a-vis the ISTCs.
A fundamental aspect of organisation theory is that the goals and activities of a 
firm are determined by the organisation’s structure. The NHS is one of the world’s 
largest employers, with a central command structure, directed by policy-makers from 
London. As will be discussed, the current emphasis on reducing waiting times from 
London has resulted in the current operational priorities within the NHS facilities.
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Ownership Summary
Theory predicts the ownership status of a firm has significant effects on a firm’s 
behaviour and performance. The effect of a change in ownership is driven by a 
change in the objectives of the owners of the firm (public or private) and the incentive 
arrangements in place for management. The major streams of thought have dealt with 
the differences between public and private firms. Each stream considers aspects of 
information, motivation, innovation, and the implications for how productive activity 
can best be organised. However, none of these theories fully capture how ownership 
impacts a firm’s behaviour and performance. It is possible to argue that the 
privatization of a firm that enjoys substantial market power will tend to improve 
internal efficiency. However, the increase in market power tends to heighten the risk 
of worsening allocative efficiency unless profit-seeking behaviour is appropriately 
regulated and competitive regulations are put into place.
The privatization program during the Thatcher-era was partly motivated by 
dissatisfaction with the economic performance of publicly owned firms. The firms 
providing electricity, gas, telecoms and water were all monopolies. However, there 
was little evidence from which to benchmark performance and so, most empirical 
research on the UK privatization program has focused upon more competitive market 
structures where the two types of ownership have coexisted (Vickers and Yarrow 
1988). The evidence does suggest that where competition is effective, and market 
failures are absent, private enterprise is generally to be preferred on both internal and 
allocative efficiency grounds (Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Vining and Boardman 
1992).
However, the health sector is different from other public services. The NHS is a 
large organization with the purchasing and provisioning functions taken at various 
levels. Purchasing could be undertaken by the General Practioners (GPs), Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) and even at the national level of the NHS. Provisioning is 
relatively fragmented as well, depending on the type and complexity of clinical 
service need. Therefore, there is the potential to assess the evidence and provide 
comparative benchmarks between the local Trust Hospitals. We will now review the 
evidence specific to the health care sector.
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2.3.2 Ownership in Health Care
A key aspect that may differentiate the health sector from other sectors is the 
various organisational structures involved which may affect behaviour and in turn 
impact performance. There are also a number of ways of classifying hospitals, the 
main provider of health care services. For example, the OECD classifies hospitals as: 
public, private not-for-profit (NFP), and private for-profit (FP). Busse (2002) uses a 
classification which incorporates not only ownership structure and die autonomy of 
hospital management, but also how the hospital is paid (e.g., it defines budgetary 
organizations as being paid on a line-by-line budget). Preker and Harding (2002) 
focus on five elements of a hospital’s organisational structure: the extent to which 
hospitals can make decisions about their activities; the degree to which hospitals can 
keep any surpluses; the extent of reliance on market incentives; the nature of 
accountability; and the approaches taken to protect social functions which might not 
be financially viable. Other elements which may be incorporated into typologies 
include statutory responsibility, and the existence of defined contracts (Deber, Topp et 
al. 2004).
Relevant to the English is the typology of organisational arrangements put forth 
by Harding and Preker (2003). These typologies include: administrative unit, 
autonomous unit, corporatised unit and private. The administrative unit is where most 
budgetary and input decisions for the hospital are made, under the hierarchical control 
of government authorities. In effect, the facility is directly managed by its government 
owners (Harding and Preker 2003). This form was commonplace for most NHS Trust 
Hospitals until the 1991-1997 Internal Market reforms (Le Grand, Mays et al. 1998).
Facility managers within autonomous units have much greater decision-making 
authority. Key decision-making inputs could be in the selling of services, charging 
fees and budget management. However, facilities that remain under public ownership 
are typically subject to public sector rules for procurement, labour usage and 
contracting (Harding and Preker 2003). Following the implementation of the NHS 
internal market reforms, NHS Hospitals became established as semi-autonomous 
trusts (Le Grand, Mays et al. 1998; Enthoven 2000) and were allowed greater 
flexibility in their spending and staffing level decisions.
Managers in corporatised units have full, or nearly full, decision rights over input, 
service mix, financing and spending. They are accountable in terms of financial and
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service performance, but are generally free from public sector rules that would restrict 
them in areas such as procurement, labour and contracting. Corporatised facilities, 
however, are still under public ownership and must comply with the commitment of 
providing care to public patients (Legnini, Anthony et al. 1999; Harding and Preker 
2003). The current transition to Foundation Trust (FT) Status for a number of NHS 
Trust Hospitals is relevant here, as these hospitals could be deemed corporatised units.
FTs are theoretically free from interference by the Department of Health (DH), 
which means they can set their own priorities for service delivery on the basis of need, 
not national targets. They are free to provide private health services, to borrow money 
on private financial markets, to buy and sell land and buildings, and, most 
importantly, to keep the proceeds for their own ends (Seddon 2007).
The private form of ownership can consist of not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit 
(FP) entities. These entities are fully responsible for financial and operational 
performance. In theory, incentives are aligned to earn revenues, monitor and maintain 
performance, and expand or at least retain market share (Harding and Preker 2003). 
Depending on the country, NFP hospitals can play an important role in the 
provisioning of care.
The vast majority of the literature specific to ownership stems from the United 
States due to the strong emphasis of private provisioning (NFP and FP). However, 
most of literature pertinent to the discussion on ownership is assessed in conjunction 
with competition and/or level of regulation in the market.
There has been a general trend in the US of converting to private NFP and FP 
status. The number of public hospitals has been decreasing since at least the mid- 
1980s (Legnini, Anthony et al. 1999). In the past 25 years, 330 of the nation’s 5,000 
hospitals converted to FP status alone. There are a number of reasons for this, 
including the belief that an FP status will improve efficiency, will allow for additional 
cost cutting, and increase access to capital (Cutler and Horwitz 1998).
In another publication by Horwitz (2005), the author examined a hospital’s 
objectives, capital prices and market characteristics vis-a-vis ownership type. Horwitz 
found that hospital behaviour is most dependent on the ownership form of their 
competitors in the same market.
Most often the literature specific to ownership in health care has been assessed 
within the context of competition. Woolhandler and Himmelstein (2004) have found 
that private hospital care is relatively expensive in markets that are more competitive.
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Shortell and Hughes (1988) found no statistically significant relationship between 
inpatient mortality rates and either the type of hospital ownership or the number of 
hospitals competing in the market area. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) examined 
competition in the US hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type on 
the hospital industry in California. They found both that there is competition and that 
ownership matters. Further, NFP hospitals exploit market power in the same capacity 
as FP hospitals. Their research is more fully discussed in the section relating to 
competition.
Regulation of services also plays an important role in the health market. Health 
care authorities in a number of countries regulate the clinical services and the number 
of beds within a certain area. In the US, for example, 70 per cent of the states use 
Certificate of Need (CON) to regulate the development of health care services in 
some capacity (AASC 2006). There has also been substantial evidence pertaining to 
the correlation between performance and the level of regulation in a state (Shortell 
and Hughes 1988). CONs have not succeeded in cost containment -  indeed, the bulk 
of the literature indicates that CONs increase costs. A fundamental problem with 
CONs is that they award a property right, often in perpetuity, thus giving in effect a 
monopoly franchise (Ohsfeldt and Schneider 2006).
In Englad, the level of regulation has been relatively high and competition 
relatively restricted, with respect to NHS patients. However, following the recent 
introduction of ISTCs, there has been substantial anecdotal evidence that NHS Trust 
Hospitals are changing their habits merely when an ISTC program is announced in 
their market area. As a result, it is expected that competition will increase, likely 
leading to an increase in research on health care competition in England.
Physician Ownership in Health Care
Separately, one must assess the uniqueness of the role of the physician in health 
care. Much of the debate in the US has been on the increasing physician ownership of 
specialty hospitals. Though this debate does not yet directly apply to England, the 
research can provide key insights into incentives, potential motivations and the 
consequences of physician ownership in clinical service provisioning.
Prominent in the US debate was the fear that physician ownership in specialty 
hospitals could cause supplier induced demand (ASHA 2003). General theory predicts 
that specialty hospitals with significant physician ownership will treat higher volumes
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of profitable surgical diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), lower severity cases, and 
focus on privately insured patients, compared to facilities not owned by physicians. 
The greater the complexity, the lower the profitability and theory predicted the 
uninsured would be referred to general hospitals. However, the research conducted by 
the United States Government General Accounting Office (GAO), CMS and the 
MedPAC found no evidence that this practice existed (GAO 2003; Hackbarth 2005; 
Leavitt 2005).
With respect to the ISTC Programme, there is some evidence of increased 
efficiencies in ISTCs in comparison to the NHS. Anastasiou (2005) examined the 
utilisation of operating theatres and, using the example of BUPA Redwood, found 
different levels of utilisation between Redwood and the NHS average. Measuring 
three types of utilisation figures and then calculating an overall score, the study 
compared the targets set by the Audit Commission in 2003, the average NHS results 
as detailed in the Healthcare Commission Review in 2005, and results from BUPA 
Redwood. The overall target for theatre utilisation was 77.0%, but the NHS overall 
result was only 56.9%. BUPA Redwood, which scored higher than the NHS in every 
section, had an overall score of 81.0%, above even the Audit Commission’s optimistic 
target.
However, a major weakness of this is that it compares NHS Trust Hospitals with 
ISTCs. It is therefore possible the superior performance of ISTCs is due to their 
specialty focus, rather than their private ownership. It must be noted that the Redwood 
facility uses NHS seconded consultants, which seems to suggest the difference in 
utilisation lies either in the private management of the facility and/or the separation 
from the larger NHS Trust Hospital priorities.
2.3.3 Ownership Summary
Whether privatization actually leads to an improvement in efficiency has been the 
subject of what appears to be a considerable amount of research, both theoretical and 
empirical. The literature review is primarily concerned with whether private 
ownership leads to a higher efficiency than public ownership. However, several 
factors, independent of the private-public distinction, intervene in the relationship 
between ownership and efficiency, such as the level of regulation and competition in 
the market. The literature indicates this is true for health care specifically, as well as 
in general.
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From a theoretical perspective, it can be concluded that ownership does matter in 
the sense that changes in the principal-agent relationship, motivation, or incentive 
structures in place, are likely to have significant effects on firm behaviour. However, 
it is difficult to be precise on the effects of ownership structure as these are dependent 
on the relevant institutional environment, framework of regulation, the market 
structures of firms in which they operate and other factors. As a result of this complex 
set of interactions, the empirical results do not always support the theoretical 
prediction of higher efficiency.
2.4 Competition
There has been a great deal of literature written on competition, in general, and 
competition in health care specifically. In this section we will review briefly the 
literature that has been published in this area. The literature will briefly review the 
general theory of competition, followed by literature specific to competition in health 
care.
2.4.1 General Theory on Competition
The primary economic argument for competition is that it has a significant effect 
on a firm’s behaviour and performance. The competitive process drives internal 
efficiency and serves as a mechanism conducive to allocative efficiency (Vickers and 
Yarrow 1988). Further, it is entirely possible to have competition, and with it all the 
benefits of competition, between publicly owned entities without any participation 
from the private sector (Le Grand 2007).
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) present some of the most comprehensive analysis on 
the subject of competition in light of the British privatization program during the 
Thatcher-era. This analysis is directly relevant in the NHS’s own attempts to reform 
itself. There are a number of issues to consider in creating a competitive market. The 
first is the trade-off between allocative efficiency and economies of scale. There is 
also the related question of whether free entry into the market can lead to losses of 
cost efficiency within the system as a whole. Restricting entry into the market is an 
argument often advanced by industries with economies of scale, such as the health 
sector. The theory is that free entry leads to the undesirable duplication of fixed costs 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Donaldson and K. 1993; Cookson and Dawson 2006).
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Therefore, it could be better to have a few (or even just one) large firms within a 
market than to have many smaller ones.
The trade-off between allocative efficiency and scale economies is central to 
many problems in competition policy. Market power is greater when there are fewer 
firms, and monopolistic behaviour worsens allocative efficiency. This trade-off leads 
to two very important questions. First, how many firms are needed in a market to 
maximise social welfare? Clearly, each industry is different and each market is 
different. For example, the market for the utilities industry could cover an entire 
country, whereas the health market may be limited to a Strategic Health Authority 
(SHA) or Primary Care Trust (PCT). Second, does free entry lead to the existence of 
too few or too many firms at the market equilibrium (Vickers and Yarrow 1988)?
The second issue concerns the role of public enterprises in markets where they 
compete with private firms. There are a number of reasons why competitive forces 
may improve industry performance where public enterprise exists. First, competitive 
threats upon the managers of public firms will enhance internal efficiencies (referred 
to as a ‘disciplining effect’).3 A second advantage of competition is that it fosters 
innovation. Rival firms might have the incentive to produce new products or 
processes into parts of the public firm’s market, which in turn acts as a spur to the 
public firm to be more innovative itself (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). Innovation 
clearly yields long-run efficiency gains (Schumpeter 1943) and a stated goal of the 
ISTC program is to encourage the development of new techniques for providing care 
(Health Committee 2006).
A third advantage is that the mere potential for an introduction of competition or 
the threat that another firm might enter can increase efficiency. The threat of potential 
competition upon the incumbent firm, or firms, compels them to meet consumers' 
demands with maximum efficiency, or else risk losing market share (Vickers and 
Yarrow 1988; Iglehart 2005; Bian and Morrisey 2006) .
So, why might introducing competition improve health care performance? 
Following Vickers and Yarrow (1988), we can identify two central arguments. First, 
providers will operate more efficiently because providers facing competition have an 
incentive to eliminate organisational inefficiency, or slack. Second, there will be the 
new entry of efficient providers and exit of inefficient providers.
3 Indeed, it has been said that the greatest of all monopoly profits is the quiet life.
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2.4.2 Competition in Health Care
Though the UK has had much experience with competition in other public service 
industries (Vickers and Yarrow 1988), there is little evidence of competition in health 
care delivery. Most of the evidence on competition in health care comes from the 
United States, since competition between hospitals has been a feature of the US health 
care market for over two decades. This literature will be discussed followed by the 
scant English literature that exists on the topic. The research on competition in 
England’s health sector is primarily limited to the experience in introducing a quasi­
market via the internal market reforms. Lastly, the most recent literature with respect 
to the Treatment Centre Programme will be briefly reviewed.
Competition in Health Care: United States
The vast majority of the literature provides evidence that there is competition in 
the US hospital market. However, the evidence varies on whether the goals of a 
competitive marketplace -  lower pricing, improved quality and better information and 
access -  have actually been achieved.
Research shows that higher volume is associated with better quality and leads to 
lower per-case costs (Gardener 1992; Eastaugh 2001; Birkmeyer, Siewers et al. 2002), 
although this varies by clinical specialty and procedure. Furthermore, increased 
competition means that volume levels are spread more thinly amongst the competing 
providers in a market. Therefore, when more providers compete for an identical or 
lower volume of services, quality may decline and per-case costs may actually 
increase as capacity becomes not fully utilised (Robinson and Luft 1985; Herzlinger 
2004; UNISON 2005). Finding the optimal level of volume vis-a-vis number of 
competitors and then vis-a-vis the specific procedure is difficult.
A key issue in health is information asymmetry. The lack of reliable and accurate 
information about price and quality means consumers have difficulty identifying and 
obtaining goods and services they desire, which limits the effectiveness of 
competition. Most consumers have limited information about their illness and 
treatment options. Consumer uncertainty about reliability of health care information 
increases transaction costs, fraud and deception.
Gaynor and Vogt (2003) examined competition in the US hospital industry, in 
particular by simulating the effect of a merger. The effects of a merger are important 
to assess because the goals are to generate efficiencies (i.e., economies of scale) as
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well as market power, the result which could allow for a hospital to increase or 
decreases prices in the local marketplace. The authors found that a hospital’s price 
was elastic relative to merger created market power and that demand was relatively 
inelastic to price. The author’s results provide support that not-for-profits exploit 
market power in the same capacity as for-profit hospitals (Gaynor & Vogt, 2003).
The threat of competition alone, also known as peer effects, appears to be an 
important determinant of hospitals’ efficiency (Baumol, Panzar et al. 1982; Iglehart 
2005; Bian and Morrisey 2006). Ferrier and Valdmanis (2005) provide evidence that 
the more efficient a hospital, the greater the average efficiency of its peers.
The rapid development of a specialty hospital in a particular market has been 
shown to have a strong influence on competing general hospitals. A case in point is 
the city of Indianapolis, one of 12 cities or counties that have been studied closely 
over the past decade by the Center for Studying Health System Change, a non-profit 
research organization supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The 
research found that the mere threat of a new, physician owned cardiac center in 
Indianapolis, was sufficient to allow physicians to negotiate a better financial position 
at existing hospitals (Iglehart, 2005).
The effect of peer competition already seems to be at play within the NHS and the 
Treatment Centre Programme. There has been substantial anecdotal evidence that 
NHS Trust Hospitals often changed their habits when the ISTC program was 
announced (Smith 2006) and private hospitals lowered their spot purchase price 
(Health Committee 2006). Though ISTCs have so far had a limited impact on volume 
figures (2006; Health Committee 2006), they have had a major effect on behaviour on 
the NHS (Timmins 2005). The mere arrival of an independent treatment centre has 
suddenly made conversations with NHS consultants about how services are organised 
and how waiting times can be cut much easier (Smith 2006). Simon Stevens, Tony 
Blair’s former health adviser, put it bluntly, stating that if NHS consultants did not 
perform the operations, there would be “a bunch of Germans coming round the comer 
who would” (Timmins 2005).
Competition in Health Care: The Role o f the Physician
The quote in the previous paragraph by Timmins touches upon the unique role of 
the physician in the health sector. The vast majority of the literature, as well as this 
dissertation, is focused on competition between facilities. However, a key aspect of
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competition in health care is the role of the physician. Hospitals compete for 
physicians, but hospitals can also compete against physicians.
In the US, physicians are often investors in specialty hospitals (Devers, Brewster 
et al. 2003; Iglehart 2005), as in the Indianapolis case. And because most of the 
physicians who invest in a specialty hospital retain their admitting privileges at a 
general hospital, they can select which of their patients to admit to the specialty 
hospital and which to the general hospital.
Another example of how a new specialty hospital can alter referral patterns is the 
Oklahoma Heart Hospital, which, when it opened in 2002, had a significant impact on 
the nearby Oklahoma University Medical Center. The number of inpatients admitted 
for cardiac care plummeted at the University Hospital after 16 surgeons and 
cardiologists on the clinical faculty began to refer all their patients to the specialty 
hospital. The medical centre said that it lost $11.6 million in cardiology operating 
income between 2002 and 2004 as a consequence of the shifting of patients to the 
specialty hospital (Iglehart, 2005).
The flight of physicians from NHS Hospitals for specialty hospitals has not yet 
happened in England. However, there is a competitive market in place for NHS 
physicians working extra hours for the independent sector. This has an impact on 
reducing wait lists and increasing access to the NHS patient population. In Exeter, for 
example, NHS patients who had been told they would have to wait months for a hip 
replacement suddenly found themselves being offered one at the local NHS hospital 
within days or weeks of an independent treatment centre opening up nearby (Timmins 
2005).
However, there are also arguments to regulate competition in the health sector. A 
key concern is supply-induced demand. In 1974, the US Congress required every state 
to have a certificate of need (CON) program (Tanner 2002 ) to restrict the 
development of health care facilities. CONs were intended to control the potential 
over-supply of health facilities in a state. Shortly thereafter, Congress lifted the CON 
restriction and a number of states did away with their programs (McGinley 1995).
Although more than 70% of states still continue use CONs to regulate the 
development of health care services in some capacity (AASC 2006), these regulations 
have been loosening in recent years. An important decision by the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice (2004) concluded that barriers to entry should 
be removed, and the existing players should not be allowed to block the entry of new
57
Matthias Loaning Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
competitors. Again, Shortell and Hughes (1988) found statistically significant 
correlations between higher mortality rates and the strictness of hospital regulation in 
a state.
Competition and Quality
Evidence on the correlation between competition and quality of care is more 
limited and contradictory (Romano and Mutter 2004). The bulk of the empirical 
evidence for Medicare patients shows that quality is higher in more competitive 
markets, though empirical results for privately insured patients are mixed across 
studies (Gaynor 2006). Others suggest competition has a negative or negligible effect 
on quality (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Volpp, Ketcham et al. 2005). Shortell and 
Hughes (1988) found no statistically significant association between mortality rates 
among inpatients and either the type of hospital ownership or the number of hospitals 
competing in the market area.
Kessler and McClellan find that hospital competition improved quality of care, as 
measured by one-year mortality rates and readmission rates, following admission for 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI). In this respect, its findings conflict with those of 
other US studies which have suggested that competition has a negative or negligible 
effect on quality (Shortell and Hughes 1988, Volpp and Buckley 2004, Volpp et al. 
2003, Sari 2002).
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) studied the impact of competition on Medicare 
and Health Maintenance Organisation (HMO) patients in Southern California. The 
research methodology used was similar to the methodology employed by Kessler and 
McClellan. The authors’ findings were mixed. The evidence suggests that as 
competition increased, mortality fell for HMO patients, but rose for Medicare 
patients.
Further, there have been a number of studies on whether competition leads to 
improved or weakened quality. A number of studies in health found an inverse 
relationship between the level of competition and quality. One such study by Shortell 
and Hughes found no statistically significant association between mortality rates 
among inpatients and either the type of hospital ownership or the number of hospitals 
competing in the market area (S. Shortell & Hughes, 1988).
The objective of a New Jersey study was to determine whether hospital mortality 
rates changed in the state after implementation of a law that changed hospital payment
58
Matthias Loening Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
from a regulated system based on hospital cost, to price competition with reduced 
subsidies for uncompensated care. The study also hoped to determine whether 
changes in mortality rates were affected by market conditions (Volpp, Ketcham, 
Epstein, & Williams, 2005).
The study found that mortality among patients in New Jersey improved less than 
in New York by 0.4 per centage points among the insured and 0.5 per centage points 
among the uninsured. There was a relative increase in mortality for patients with 
AMI, congestive heart failure, and stroke, especially for uninsured patients with these 
conditions, but not for patients with the other four conditions studied. Less 
competitive hospital markets were significantly correlated with a relative decrease in 
mortality among insured patients (Volpp, Ketcham, Epstein, & Williams, 2005).
The researchers concluded that market-based reforms may adversely affect 
mortality for some conditions but it appears the effects are not universal. Insured 
patients in less competitive markets fared better in the transition to price competition 
(Volpp, Ketcham, Epstein, & Williams, 2005).
In defining competition, researchers must define a competition market area. Most 
studies use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness, or 
market power, and found that distance was a predictor of hospital choice. These 
approaches assume that distance alone determines hospital choice. However, Tay 
(2003) argues that quality differentiation should be an important element for Medicare 
patient decision-making, since such patients are unaffected by prices.
Tay looks at the importance of quality differentiation to assess hospital market 
competition. She finds that patient demand is responsive to both distance and quality 
and therefore, substitution toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market 
shares implies that geographic market concentration is an inadequate measure of 
hospital competitiveness. Tay finds that quality too plays a significant role in a heart 
attacks patients' choice for hospital care, even though such patients may be less 
willing to travel long distances to higher quality hospitals than patients with other 
diagnoses. One can expect that distance matters less and quality more in other 
diagnoses where care is less urgently sought, implying the effects of quality 
competition are of even greater intensity (Tay, 2003).
There is relatively little evidence from England, the UK, or even the whole of 
Europe, on the correlation between competition and quality of care, as the health 
sector has been severely regulated across the continent (Burgess 2005). Propper, et al.
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(2000) investigated whether competition between hospitals improve quality of care in 
the United Kingdom. The researchers looked at hospital death rates from cardiac 
arrest (AMI) from 258 hospital trusts, while controlling for level of competition, 
hospital size, and distribution of AMI patients. The researchers found that competition 
does reduce quality with hospitals located in more competitive areas having higher 
death rates, while controlling for hospital characteristics, actual and potential patient 
characteristics. However, the researchers admit that the estimated impact of 
competition on quality is small, stemming from the fact that UK hospitals do not 
generate profits, and therefore there is little to no incentive to profit maximise 
(Propper, Burgess et al. 2000).
Competition normally means consumers choose between price and quality. As 
there is little, or no, price competition in the UK, a consumer will be responsive 
primarily to quality. The evidence suggests that competition with fixed prices drives 
up quality (Carol Propper, Burgess, & Green, 2000). However, providers will have an 
incentive to focus on costs, which may create an environment of risk selection (i.e., 
selecting those patients that are cheaper to treat) as well as providing services that are 
lower in cost or at minimum where the costs are predictable.
Another consequence of increased competition is that volume levels will decrease 
in some facilities. Skinner stated that repetition breeds competence (1974). The 
inverse should also be true; competence decreases as volume decreases. This is 
especially important in health, where hospitals and professionals need minimum 
volume levels for certain procedures. It has been stated that the ISTCs are reducing 
volume levels in NHS Trust Hospitals (UNISON 2003) and therefore reduce quality 
in the system as a whole, as volume levels are spread amongst many more providers.
Competition: At What Level?
There has been recent debate over where policy-makers should emphasise 
promoting competition. While most researchers have studied competition at the 
hospital level, Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg recommend assessing 
competition at the level of the individual. They argue that the current failings of the 
market are due to competition currently taking place at the wrong level: the level of 
health plans, networks, and hospital groups. They recommend that policy-makers 
instead eliminate provider networks and encourage “informed, financially responsible
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consumers to choose the best provider for each condition” (M. Porter and E. Teisberg, 
2004).
In contrast, Enthoven and Tollen argue that competition among Integrated 
Delivery Systems (IDS’s) is a more promising approach than the fragmented 
physician practice-level model that Porter and Teisberg propose to encourage high 
quality and efficiency. Enthoven and Tollen propose that IDS’s should provide 
incentives for professionals to provide coordinated, efficient, evidence-based care, 
supported by state-of-the art information technology. Enthoven and Tollen further 
argue that there should be a limited number of large providers to ensure continuum of 
care and efficiency in the local health system as a whole. From this argument, they 
would likely be opposed to the introduction of ISTCs that may fragment health care 
provisioning (Enthoven 2005).
Further, Enthoven and Tollen suggest that the reason markets have not produced 
competition among IDS’s is the widespread employer practice of offering only one 
insurance carrier, which, in turn, offers only one delivery system. Seventy-seven per 
cent of insured employees are offered only a single carrier. Ten carriers, each offering 
every Fee for Service (FFS) doctor in town, is no more competition, than one carrier 
offering three design plans (HMO, PPO, point of service), and all using the same 
doctors. Offering different carriers is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
competition among delivery systems (Enthoven 2005).
There are a number of potential limitations, or harms, specific to health care that 
may come out of competition:
- exploiting reimbursement distortions;
- capitalising on conflicts of interest;
- disruption of general facility cross subsidies;
- information asymmetry.
Information problems can limit the effectiveness of competition. The lack of 
reliable and accurate information about price and quality means consumers have 
difficulty identifying and obtaining goods and services they desire. Most consumers 
have limited information about their illness and treatment options. Consumer 
uncertainty about reliability of health care information increases transaction costs, 
fraud and deception.
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Competition in Health Care: United Kingdom
Health care markets are usually thought to differ from other competitive markets 
in a number of ways: the product is differentiated, information is imperfect, 
government regulation is extensive and many firms are not-for-profit (Burgess, 2005).
As prices are fixed in the UK, providers are encouraged to compete in terms of 
quality and cost, rather than price. This focus on cost minimization may foster risk 
selection (i.e., selecting those patients that are cheaper to treat) and provision of 
services that are lower in cost or, at minimum, where costs are predictable.
As discussed previously, Propper, et al. (2000) was one of the first to investigate 
the correlation between competition and quality in the UK. The researchers found that 
competition does reduce quality, with hospitals located in more competitive areas 
having higher death rates, while controlling for hospital characteristics, as well as 
actual and potential patient characteristics. However, the researchers admit that the 
estimated impact of competition on quality is small.
In the 1990s, the UK introduced the internal market. Alain Enthoven is thought to 
be the person who brought the internal market idea to the UK, following his 
publication in 1985 of "Reflections on the Management of the National Health 
Service”. This internal market would maintain a tax-funded program of universal 
access, free at the point of service, but created market forces in the NHS to incentivise 
for improvement in efficiency and quality of care (Enthoven 2000).
Enthoven found that the internal market reforms did little to introduce market 
incentives, stimulate innovation and increase efficiency, because the essential 
conditions for the market to operate were never fulfilled (Enthoven 2000). Enthoven 
stated that on a scale of zero to ten, where zero is a totally centrally planned and 
managed system and ten is the regulated but relatively free US economy, the internal 
market got the NHS to somewhere between two and three for a year or two, before 
central control increased (Enthoven 2000).
Enthoven’s assessment was further supported in a 1998 review by Julian Le Grand 
and other prominent health services researchers which found that “competition within 
the market was limited.. .The essential conditions for a market to operate were not 
fulfilled” (Le Grand, Mays et al. 1998).
Though the District Health Authorities were not seen as strong drivers of 
competition (Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan 1998), there are well-established effects
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of General Practice Fundholding. These include reduced hospital prices for non­
emergency treatment (Propper 1996; Propper and Soderlund 1998), reduced waiting 
times for non-emergency treatment (Dowling 1997; Propper, Wilson et al. 1998; 
Propper, Croxson et al. 2002; Dusheiko, Gravelle et al. 2004) and reduced referral 
rates (Gravelle, Dusheiko et al. 2002; Dusheiko, Gravelle et al. 2004).
Patient choice -  like payer choice -  can help to reduce waiting times, and 
encourage convergence in waiting time between providers, by matching referrals with 
spare capacity. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that patient-driven 
hospital competition would reduce inequalities of access: “Choice mechanisms 
enhance equity by exerting pressure on low-quality or incompetent providers 
(Cookson and Dawson 2006).” However, patient choice is a relatively new 
phenomenon, beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Competition in Health Care: The Treatment Centre Programme
The stated goal of the NHS with the introduction of the ISTC’s was to add 
capacity and create a competitive market. It was believed these two goals would be 
mutually reinforcing. A competitive market would add capacity and added capacity 
would create a competitive market (Commercial Directorate 2005; Anderson 2006).
There is anecdotal evidence that NHS Trust Hospitals are increasing their 
efficiency. Further, the current ISTC programme has been shown to act as a change 
agent for the way health care is being delivered in England (Commercial Directorate 
2004). Prior to this programme, the private medical provider market in England could 
be characterised as a somewhat niche high-cost, low-throughput business where the 
private medical insurers are its primary customer. As a result, the NHS on average 
was paying in excess of 40% of current HRG tariff prices to augment local capacity— 
i.e. spot purchasing. The ISTC programme is driving a dramatic shift in private 
provision (Commercial Directorate 2004). The incumbent providers are ‘retooling’ 
their businesses to be far more competitive (Commercial Directorate 2004). After 
losing out in the first wave if ISTCs, Capio and Nuffield Hospitals, who see the NHS 
as their major source of business, cut their prices to close to the NHS tariff. Even the 
UNISON has acknowledged that if the ISTCs have accomplished anything, they have 
driven down the cost of private hospital services to the NHS (UNISON 2005).
In Exeter, for example, NHS patients who had been told they would have to wait 
months for a hip replacement suddenly found themselves being offered one at the
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local NHS hospital within days or weeks of an independent treatment centre opening 
up nearby. Equally, NHS managers have reportedly found it much easier to negotiate 
cheaper fees with their consultants for extra work, with payments well below the 
standard BUPA rate, whether that extra work is undertaken internally in the NHS or 
as a ‘structured secondment’ to an independent treatment centre. At the moment, this 
evidence is largely anecdotal. It is the outcome, however, that competition is intended 
to produce (Timmins 2005). The ISTCs effect on lowering the cost of private sector 
services and its effects on the NHS providers and has been noted previously in the 
research literature.
2.4.3 Competition Summary
Health care markets are usually thought to differ from competitive markets from 
other sectors in a number of ways: the product is differentiated, information is 
imperfect, government regulation is extensive and many firms are not-for-profit. This 
has implications for the operation of choice-based policies reviewed (Burgess, 2005).
As prices are fixed in England, providers seek to profit maximise by increasing 
the number of procedures performed (by attracting more customers with higher 
quality care) and by controlling cost. The latter focus can encourage risk selection 
(i.e., selecting those patients that are cheaper to treat) and a focus on low-cost, or at a 
minimum, predictable cost, services.
Furthermore, it may be argued that rather than the focused approach, it is the 
introduction of competition to England’s health care system that is increasing 
efficiency. The literature strongly suggests that competition increases efficiency and 
quality (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). However, the evidence is not so strong, as 
illustrated in the literature review with regard to quality.
2.5 Summary
This chapter reviews the research evidence concerning efficiency, quality, 
ownership and competition as related to Treatment Centres (TCs). In terms of 
efficiency, the evidence is quite clear. At the basic level, treatment centres tend to 
have lower costs, provide higher volumes and have better margins than general 
hospitals. When the entire health system is considered, however, the evidence is less 
clear, with some evidence suggesting that providing additional capacity leads to 
higher costs to the system as a whole.
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With respect to quality, on balance, the evidence does suggest that higher volume 
leads to improved quality outcomes. For specific clinical procedures treatment centres 
typically have higher volumes and theory predicts this repetition will lead to higher 
quality. In practice however, evidence from the US is unclear about whether treatment 
centres do indeed provide better quality outcomes than competitor general hospitals 
when adjusted for case mix. That said, the evidence does suggest that, at minimum, 
these types of facilities provide services of no less quality.
The principal results for ownership suggest that ownership plays an important role 
in the principal-agent relationship and helps determine the motivation of the parties 
involved. More important, however, is to understand how ownership matters in 
aligning the incentives appropriately. It is argued that the objectives of private firms 
will be driven by the relative potential for owners to sell if they are not satisfied with 
managerial performance, the threat of the take-over by another firm, potential for 
bankruptcy and the loss of managers due to the competitiveness in the labour market.
Competition is an important confounding variable to the research. However, 
competition has not historically played an important role in the NHS. As a result of 
the unique characteristics of the NHS, policy-makers have attempted to implement an 
Internal Market in the previous decade. Today choice is on the agenda as a means to 
provide the same incentive structures that would take place in a competitive market. 
There appears to be much scope for further evaluation of the effect these competitive 
market forces in the English market have so far had and how it affects the NHS’s 
goals of increasing capacity and choice.
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Chapter 3
Research Design and Methods
The acquisition o f knowledge is the mission o f research, the transmission o f 
knowledge is the mission o f teaching and the application o f knowledge is the mission 
o f public service
James A Perkins, 1966
3.0 Introduction
The objective of the research is to assess England’s Treatment Centre Programme 
and draw out information as to whether variations in quality of care and efficiency are 
due to ownership status (public or private), treatment centre focus (treatment centre or 
general hospital) or other variables. This chapter discusses the research design and the 
methodological approach.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3.1 explains the research design. 
Section 3.2 describes in more detail the quantitative research methodology. Section 
3.3 describes in more detail the qualitative research methodology. Section 3.4 
addresses some key limitations to the research. Section 3.5 provides concluding 
remarks.
3.1 Research Design
The research design uses a combined quantitative and qualitative approach, often 
referred to as ‘mixed methods research’ (Adamson 2005). The quantitative analysis is 
undertaken to provide an initial assessment of performance and initiate the hypothesis 
that there are differences in performance between the Treatment Centres in England. 
The research is followed by the qualitative approach using the comparative case study 
design.
For practical reasons, the quantitative research will be on a retrospective basis, as 
opposed to an experimental basis. This means the researcher will analyse the data and 
variables of interest on a retrospective basis (Bryman and Cramer 2005). Such studies 
have also been labelled ‘after the fact,’ or ‘ex post facto’ (Robson 1993). In such
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cases, the event has already occurred and the retrospective study investigates possible 
cause and effect relationships (Bryman and Cramer 2005).
Rather than creating an experiment, the research will rely on existing data from 
England’s National Health Service. A retrospective study design has been chosen 
because of the interest in assessing the manipulation of the variables and drawing out 
potential confounders to the results. This research method appears to be best suited for 
the goal of assessing the Treatment Centre Programme in England (the primary source 
of data for the research) and how ownership may account for differences in 
performance in terms of efficiency and quality.
The quantitative analysis simply tells us something about correlation, not 
causation. A key weakness with a purely quantitative analysis approach is that a 
number of the ISTCs are just coming on line and are therefore not fully operational. 
Furthermore, often the NHS TCs are not seen as independent units, and as a result, are 
incorporated operationally and statistically into the entire Trust Hospital. Therefore, 
there is a danger that the quantitative data by itself may not permit meaningful 
conclusions. For that reason it is necessary to assess the evidence more deeply.
Therefore the quantitative analysis is complemented by a supporting qualitative 
analysis. Adamson (2005) uses the term ‘complementarity,’ with the general goal 
being that the strengths of one method is used to enhance the other. The comparative 
case study design has been chosen as the primary approach for qualitative research. 
The qualitative approach relies on multiple sources of evidence to ‘triangulate’ 
research questions (Yin 1994; Adamson 2005); these sources include a review of 
relevant literature, documentary analysis, and primary sources of data such as 
interviews with Department of Health and private sector operators. The use of a 
qualitative approach to support evidence and conclusions made from the quantitative 
approach minimises threats to internal validity and external validity (Campbell and 
Stanley 1963; Cook and Campbell 1979), ensures generalisability (O'Rourke 2005) 
and, ultimately, helps draw out meaningful conclusions.
3.2 Research Methodology: Quantitative
Ideally, for our research purposes, there would be two health systems, identical 
except for their ownership and the efficiency and quality of healthcare provided. The 
effect of the independent variable, ownership, could then be assessed on the efficiency 
and quality of healthcare provided using quantitative methodology (see 3.2.5). Such a
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system does not exist, but the TC Programme provides a reasonably close 
approximation.
3.2.1 T reatm ent Centres
The TC programme was established as an additional, more convenient, means for 
patients to receive care. The business model of the TC is to conduct only elective 
surgeries within a number of specific procedures. By limiting themselves to elective 
patients, providers can predict patient arrivals and surgery times. Predictability allows 
for a smoothing operation within a facility and for resources to be used more 
effectively and efficiently (Gallivan and Utley 2005). Because elective surgeries 
continue to be available at traditional NHS Trust Hospitals and Private Hospitals, the 
assessment of elective surgeries allows for the drawing of valid comparisons between 
the different types of providers. Furthermore, because some TCs are privately run and 
some are publicly run, the role of ownership can be assessed.
In the quantitative work, there are four categories of providers compared: ISTCs, 
NHS TCs, NHS Trust Hospitals and Private Hospitals. In some cases, the Primary 
Care Trust (PCT) themselves have their own facility which treats patients. These 
patients have been grouped alongside the NHS Trust Hospital category.
Table 3.1 Four Categories of Providers Compared
Facility Type / 
Ownership
Private Public
Treatment Centre ISTC NHS TC
Hospital IS Hospital Providers NHS Trust Hospital (and PCTs)
3.2.2 Data Collection and Periods Exam ined
Data from the four types of providers are derived from Dr. Foster 2007 data. Dr. 
Foster is a joint venture partnership between the United Kingdom’s Department of 
Health and Dr Foster Holdings LLP. Dr. Foster is one of two data sources which 
receive NHS patient record data, with the other being Hospital Episode Statistics 
(HES).
Dr. Foster was chosen as the quantitative data source over the HES data, primarily 
because the data is more current. The researcher was able to obtain full year 2007 data 
from Dr Foster, whereas with HES data the data available as of January 2008 would
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only have been from April 1, 2006 through March 31, 2007. It is important to note 
that using the most current data is especially important with the Treatment Centre 
Programme, because these facilities have only come on line in the past few years and 
the volume ramp-up of patients has taken some time.
3.2.3 Research Population and Data Content
Dr Foster data consists of individual patient records -  defined as a Finished 
Consultant Episodes (FCE) - of every NHS patient treated as a day case or inpatient in 
England. Each patient record includes a number of data ‘fields’, containing 
demographic (e.g. age, gender) and clinical information (e.g. diagnosis, procedures 
performed). The data is from year 2007 (January 1, 2007 -  December 31, 2007). 
Because of concerns regarding the use of patient level data and confidentiality, the 
patient names, provider name and other specific indicators (e.g. age and deprivation) 
were blinded.
The patient population studied is patients that receive elective care within specific 
Health Resource Groups (HRGs). HRGs are the United Kingdom’s version of the 
Diagnosis Related Grouping (DRG) reimbursement methodology. The idea of the 
HRG, or DRG, is to provide a prospective payment to a provider for a certain 
procedure related to a grouping number. Like DRGs, the 573 HRGs are based on 
diagnostic codes from the international classification of diseases (as well as, 
sometimes, the age of the patient) (Appleby and Thomas 2000). One of the benefits of 
the HRG system is that it allows health authorities to compare hospitals in terms of 
efficiency and quality (Benton, Evans et al. 1998; Appleby and Thomas 2000;
Epstein, Mason et al. 2004; Street 2004).
The top HRGs contracted by the Commercial Directorate (CD) are cataract 
surgeries, hip and knee replacement surgery, hernia repair and arthroscopies. The 
specific HRGs that will be analysed are cataract surgeries (B14), hip replacement 
surgeries (HRG01) and hernia repair (F72), and are further detailed in the table below.
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Figure 3.1 Health Resource Groups (HRGs)
o Cataracts
- B13 Phakoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Insertion
of Lens
o Hernias
- F71 Abdominal Hernia Procedures >69 or w cc
- F72 Abdominal Hernia Procedures <70 w/o cc
- F73 Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs >69 or w cc
- F74 Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs <70 w/o cc
o Orthopaedic Procedures
- H04 Primary Knee Replacement
- H10 Arthroscopies
- H I9 Soft Tissue or Other Bone Procedures - Category 2 
<70 w/o cc
- H21 Muscle, Tendon or Ligament Procedures - Category 2
- H71 Revisional Procedures to Hips
- H80 Primary Hip Replacement Cemented
- H81 Primary Hip Replacement Uncemented
These HRGs were chosen because they are the highest volume procedures within 
the ISTCs and NHS-run TCs, accounting for 10% of total elective surgical procedures 
(Dr Foster 2008), and will therefore present a significant number of case records to 
assess quantitatively. The patient population studied will be the patients that receive 
elective care within these specific HRGs. In total, over 480,000 patient records (in the 
form of FCEs), have been selected for study within these HRGs. The table below 
provides the FCEs for each HRG and by facility type.
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Table 3.2 FCEs by HRG and Facility Type
HRG Facility Type FCEs Per cent of FCEs
Cataracts
B13 ISTC 3,196 1.3
NHS-Run TC 1,666 0.7
NHS Trust Hospital 233,504 97.6
Private Hospital 870 0.4
Total 239,236 100.0
Hernias
F71 ISTC 23 0.7
NHS-Run TC 63 1.8
NHS Trust Hospital 3,427 97.4
Private Hospital 7 0.2
Total 3,520 100.0
F72 ISTC 109 1.3
NHS-Run TC 140 1.6
NHS Trust Hospital 8,223 96.8
Private Hospital 22 0.3
Total 8,494 100.0
F73 ISTC 34 1.3
NHS-Run TC 59 2.2
NHS Trust Hospital 2,589 96.2
Private Hospital 8 0.3
Total 2,690 100.0
F74 ISTC 379 3.1
NHS-Run TC 264 2.1
NHS Trust Hospital 11,703 94.3
Private Hospital 58 0.5
Total 12,404 100.0
Hips/Knees
H04 ISTC 2,100 4.0
NHS-Run TC 2,179 4.2
NHS Trust Hospital 47,064 89.7
Private Hospital 1,138 2.2
Total 52,481 100.0
H10 ISTC 4,734 5.2
NHS-Run TC 2,692 3.0
NHS Trust Hospital 80,435 88.9
Private Hospital 2,658 2.9
Total 90,519 100.0
H19 ISTC 24 2.4
NHS-Run TC 42 4.2
NHS Trust Hospital 913 91.9
Private Hospital 15 1.5
Total 994 100.0
H21 ISTC 43 2.1
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H71
H80
H81
NHS-Run TC 50 2.5
NHS Trust Hospital 1,895 93.5
Private Hospital 38 1.9
Total 2,026 100.0
ISTC 33 0.7
NHS-Run TC 130 2.7
NHS Trust Hospital 4,703 96.2
Private Hospital 22 0.5
Total 4,888 100.0
ISTC 1,192 4.7
NHS-Run TC 627 2.5
NHS Trust Hospital 22,563 89.9
Private Hospital 716 2.9
Total 25,098 100.0
ISTC 526 3.8
NHS-Run TC 940 6.8
NHS Trust Hospital 12,225 88.5
Private Hospital 123 0.9
Total 13,814 100.0
The table below illustrates the number of providers by HRG category.
Table 3.3 Number of Providers by HRG Category
NHS NHS Total
Number of Providers ISTC TC Trust Private H. Prov.
Cataract
HRG = B13 5 4 213 4 226
Hernias
HRG = F71 4 6 265 3 278
HRG = F72 10 6 298 5 319
HRG = F73 7 6 273 4 290
HRG = F74 12 6 299 7 324
Hips/Knees
HRG = H04 8 6 236 17 267
HRG = H10 13 7 301 19 340
HRG = H19 4 6 205 2 217
HRG = H21 7 4 203 4 218
HRG = H71 5 5 216 7 233
HRG = H80 8 5 240 19 272
£ o ii a oo 8 6 221 8 243
The HRGs have been organised according to the amount of healthcare resources a 
typical patient would ‘consume’ in a hospital. For example, category H I7 is ‘soft 
tissue for other bone procedures for patients aged less than 70 years without 
complications and comorbidities. ’ All patients given this classification on discharge 
would be expected to remain in hospital for a similar length of time and to use a 
similar amount of healthcare resources (Appleby and Thomas 2000).
72
Matthias Loening Chapter 3 Research Design and Methods
However, with the HRG system is not without complications. For example, H I7 
includes both simple lipomas and some soft tissue sarcomas that are costly to treat and 
for which patients are seen at supraregional centres. Even with additional editing of 
the cases for which patients have long stays in hospital, this attempt to standardise the 
‘inputs’ (the patients) to reduce cost variations arising from different case mixes is not 
perfect (Appleby and Thomas 2000).
Furthermore, there is currently a discrepancy between the way that HRGs are 
recorded in the hospital clinical datasets and the way that they are used for 
reimbursement. An HRG for the patient is recorded in the hospital clinical datasets 
each time the patient leaves the care of a specialist. This constitutes a FCE. However, 
after leaving the care of one specialist, a patient may be transferred to another 
specialist within the same admission, meaning an inpatient spell (admission) can 
consist of more than one FCE. Hospital inpatient and daycase activity is recorded for 
administrative purposes as per HRG FCE, but the contract currency for the tariff is 
per HRG spell. In order to be reimbursed, the hospital must convert the (possibly) 
multiple HRG FCEs per patient into a single HRG spell per patient (likely the most 
costly HRG that took place during the admission is selected).
Another consequence of this discrepancy is that hospital costs are reported to the 
Department of Health (DH) as per HRG FCE. The DH adjusts the data on a national 
aggregate basis to convert hospital costs per FCE to hospital costs per spell, in order 
to set the HRG spell tariff. This national tariff is adopted for several reasons: it 
facilitates patient choice by ensuring money flows with the patient; it allows plurality 
of provision, with all purchasers using the same contracting framework with all 
providers; it provides incentives for providers to do more activity and for purchasers 
to implement better control over the demand for hospital services; it provides 
incentives to reduce costs and increase productivity; and it ensures greater 
transparency and fairness in the purchasing process (Epstein, Mason et al. 2004).
The reason reimbursement is per spell, not per FCE, is so there is no incentive for 
the provider to increase its income by transferring patients unnecessarily between 
specialists within the same inpatient stay. The consequence of the adjustment to the 
cost data is discussed in the analytic section (Epstein, Mason et al. 2004).
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3.2.4 Selection of Variables
Efficiency
HRGs, though flawed, allow for grouping health inputs like-for-like comparisons, 
but a different measure is needed for assessing health outcomes. In this research we 
assess efficiency with average length of stay (ALOS) in hours/days (measured from 
time of admission to the time of discharge), but there are obvious limitations to the 
use of ALOS as a unit of efficiency. Other potential efficiency components, such as 
operating room (OR) time, OR’s used-per-day versus number of OR’s in total, and 
surgeries per doctor per shift, may be better measures of efficiency. However, this 
data is not reported to a central NHS database. With these limitations, ALOS is the 
best measure of comparison and is therefore used here.
One of the advantages of using ALOS is that it does allow for apples-to-apples 
comparisons between TCs and hospitals (NHS and private). Further, there is a direct 
relationship between ALOS and total volume within a facility. However, a weakness 
of using ALOS is that it normally is a determinant for inpatient stay. As treatment 
centres move toward day surgery procedures, data by the hour or minute is not 
available and for some of the HRGs the vast majority of procedures are day cases 
(ALOS of 0). As a result, the per centage of day case out of total procedures was used 
for these HRGs. These HRGs are:
o B 13 Phakoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Insertion of Lens 
o F71 Abdominal Hernia Procedures >69 or w cc 
o F72 Abdominal Hernia Procedures <70 w/o cc 
o F73 Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs >69 or w cc 
o F74 Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs <70 w/o cc 
o H 10 Arthroscopies
o H I9 Soft Tissue or Other Bone Procedures - Category 2 <70 w/o cc 
o H21 Muscle, Tendon or Ligament Procedures - Category 2
Quality
Another important variable is quality. A major concern of the Treatment Centre 
Programme (specifically ISTCs) was that quality would be negatively affected. As a 
result, performance should not just measure how quickly patients are discharged, but 
also that the procedures were conducted appropriately.
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However, there are many different definitions of quality. Quality may be defined 
and measured in terms of health outcomes indicators such as mortality. It could refer 
to patient satisfaction with the services provided. It may refer to the outputs and 
productivity of the overall health system such as hospital discharges and waiting lists. 
It may also refer to the inputs within a health system such as physicians, physician to 
bed ratio, nurses, facilities and equipment (beds, operating rooms, CTs, MRIs) (Le 
Grand, Mays et al. 1998). Further, a determination must be made as to at what level 
shall quality be assessed, whether it is the performance of practitioners or also the 
contributions of patients and of the health system (Donabedian 1988).
In this research quality outcomes have been chosen as the method of analysis. The 
best measurement of quality outcomes is from the patient record data. Death rates and 
patient readmission rates are detailed in the patient record data. Clearly, any changes 
in death rates and readmissions with the advent of the Treatment Centre Programme 
can thus be assessed. The death rate indicator used is patient deaths within 30 days of 
hospitalization (death30). Patient readmission rates are defined as patients readmitted 
to the hospital within 30 days following discharge (readm38). It must be noted that 
there is a limitation of these quality measures with respect to the selected HRGs. In 
particular, not many people die from these types of outpatient procedures (e.g. 
cataracts, hernias). In spite of this fact, we can still assess whether the Treatment 
Centre Programme and the use of the independent sector has led to a decrease in 
quality (e.g. increase in death rates and re-admission rates), as some have argued 
(Royal College of Physicians 2003; UNISON 2005).
Case Mix
When comparing the quality and efficiency outcomes of health providers it is 
important that an adjustment is made for case mix, to ensure like-for-like comparisons 
between providers. This is especially important in light of the fact that treatment 
centres focus on selecting ‘appropriate’ patients. Selecting appropriate patients is not 
only important for efficiency purposes but also because it ensures quality. Treatment 
centres are not equipped, nor staffed, for when procedures go wrong. As a result, 
selecting appropriate patients is the method used for minimising clinical risk.
There is evidence that case mix is an important determinant of inter-hospital 
variation in average cost, utilization of ancillary services, and mean length of stay 
(Feldstein 1967; Evans 1971; Evans and Walker 1972; Feldstein and Schuttinga
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1977). A failure to recognise case mix can lead to serious omission of key variables 
and biases.
Already back in the 1960s Martin Feldstein suggested that if health authorities 
could specify a preference function indicating the relative weights attached to 
different health service outputs (i.e., mix of cases), economic analysts would suggest 
an appropriate optimising model (Feldstein 1967). The subsequent development of the 
hospital case mix measure in England goes back to the early 1980s and has been a 
direct result of the creation of the HRGs. Although there is a case mix classification 
system in England, it is used less than expected, primarily because hospitals are not 
funded on the basis of their case mix adjusted activity. Instead, case mix information 
has mainly been used in benchmarking exercises, such as the government's use of 
HRG costs to set hospital efficiency targets (Street and Dawson 2002).
To date an agreed case mix method of adjustment has not been developed in the 
UK. Researchers have adjusted for case mix using a variety of methods. The most 
common case mix adjustment factor used in the UK is reference costing. In reference 
costing case mix complexity is taken into account in the following way. First, the 
average cost for each HRG is calculated, based on HRG price information provided 
by each hospital in the sample. Second, these average HRG costs are standardised 
around 1, to create an index of case mix complexity, with 1 indicating the HRG with 
average complexity. Third, actual activity in HRG is multiplied by the case mix index 
and these values are summed to derive the number of case mix weighted patients 
treated in each specialty. Thus, a hospital that treats 1,000 patients who are 2% more 
complex than the average for the sample is assessed as having treated 1,020 case mix 
weighted patients (Harper, Hauck, & Street, 2001). There are recognised weaknesses 
with the use of reference costing based on tariff levels. The most important weakness 
is that these reference costs may be inaccurate.
However, even though the HRGs are designed to account for individual case mix 
complexity, the HRG groupings themselves are not well enough refined to account for 
variations in complexity in the individual patients. For example, some patients may 
have a number of co-morbidities which are not accepted or considered appropriate for 
either a treatment centre or a private hospital, and as a result, must be treated in an 
NHS Trust Hospital by default. As a result of this resultant weakness in the HRG 
methodology we also use age and deprivation to account for case mix complexity.
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Older patients are likely to have above average care requirements. The age of the 
patient on the date of admission is defined by the age of the patient when admitted. 
For case mix adjustment 5-year age bands (0*, 1-4, 5-9 ,..., 90+) are used, which 
amounts to 20 age groups (Dr Foster 2008). Appendix A provides a summary of the 
age bands.
Patients from areas with greater income deprivation may also have above average 
care requirements and it may also be more difficult to arrange timely discharge. The 
deprivation indicator is based on Carstairs scores, which provide an index of 
deprivation at ward level based on an unweighted combination of four census 
variables: unemployment, overcrowding, car ownership and social class. This data is 
based on 2001 census data (National Statistics Office 2001). The deprivation codes 
are as follows: 1 = Least deprived; 2 = Below average; 3 = Average; 4 = Above 
average; 5 = Most deprived.
3.2.5 Processing the Data
Before the data can be properly analysed, it must be processed. An important 
aspect of the research was knowing whether the provider site codes were NHS or 
Private, and treatment centre or General Hospital. The researcher received site codes 
for the location of the provider. The site codes beginning with R are NHS, those 
beginning with N are Private Hospitals and those beginning with R and ending with 
TC should be NHS TCs. ISTCs had their own site codes and had to be assessed 
separately. The data was imported into and processed with a computer software 
package and, using Microsoft Excel, a simple formula was used to separate the sites 
by their codes. The sites were then coded accordingly with dummy variables.
In case of disagreement between the identification criteria, further assessment had 
to be conducted. For example, patients treated at the Kidderminster Treatment Centre 
(Site Code: RWPTC) would normally be considered to have been treated at an NHS 
TC. However, Kidderminster ISTC (Site Code: NTD01) was reporting some cases to 
the NHS TC site code. The researcher manually separated out procedures areas by 
HRG. For example, Kidderminster NHS TC did not undertake major joint procedures 
(until end of 2007). These HRG groups were then allocated to Kidderminster ISTC.
As Kidderminster ISTC only focuses on orthopaedic procedure areas, all cataracts and 
hernias remained under the Kidderminster NHS TC site code. This is the same
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methodology used by the York University assessment (Mason, Miraldo et al. 2007) as 
well as the recommended approach by Dr. Foster (Jones 2008).
For the actual quantitative analysis, SPSS was chosen as the best software to use.
It is the most simple software package to use, as it does not require technical skills in 
computer programming. The goal was to maintain simplicity, both to minimise 
interpretation problems in the analysis, and to maximise usefulness for general policy­
makers.
3.2.6 Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis is undertaken to provide an initial assessment of 
performance and initiate the hypothesis that there are differences in performance 
between the Treatment Centres. This analysis is not to explain causation or 
prediction, but rather to obtain initial correlations and ensure that there are differences 
in performance and thereby justify the rest of the thesis through ensuring that there is 
a difference to explain.
To ascertain the relationship between the type of provider and performance, as 
well as the provider’s ownership and performance, three approaches are used. Basic 
descriptive statistics are assessed to initiate the analysis. This is followed by a 
weighted mean difference analysis. A multivariate regression methodology is then 
used. The basic premise with the multivariate regression methodology is to explore 
the effects of other variables on the dependent variables (efficiency and quality) 
studied.
Descriptive Analysis
To initiate the quantitative work, basic statistical analysis is conducted. For 
efficiency indicators inpatient cases and day cases are assessed. For quality indicators 
death rates and readmission rates are assessed.
For inpatient cases, the number of cases in each procedure area, mean, median, 
standard deviation and range are assessed. For day cases, the number of cases and day 
case rate are assessed by each procedure area. Day case rate is the proportion of day 
cases to the total number of cases within a procedure area.
For death, the number of total cases by procedure area, number of deaths and 
death rates (per 1,000) are assessed. For readmission, the number of total cases by
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procedure area, number of readmissions and the readmission rate (per 100) is 
assessed.
Weighted Mean Difference
The quantitative analysis is then conducted by pooling the mean difference of the 
HRGs. The pooled estimates are based on the weighted mean difference (WMD) 
statistic. The WMD, or ‘difference in means’, measures the absolute difference 
between the mean values between two groups. These groupings consist of:
1. ISTC vs NHS TCs
2. ISTC vs NHS
3. ISTC vs. IS Providers
4. NHS TC vs IS Providers
5. NHS vs IS Providers
6. NHS vs NHS TCs
Patients are grouped by HRGs and a number of indicators have been assessed. 
These indicators include:
1. Length of stay in days (ALOS)
2. Proportion of day cases of total discharges
3. 30 day death rates
4. Inpatient readmissions
5. Age in years
6. Deprivation (IMD) score
Results are presented using forest plots (see figure below), a common 
methodology used in meta-analysis to compare results across different clinical trials 
(Mason, Miraldo et al. 2007). The y-axis shows the HRG being assessed (one of the 
six from above): for example, ALOS. The x-axis shows the mean difference 
(difference between the means) between the two groups assessed. For each indicator, 
the figures plot the mean difference (represented as a square) and 95% confidence 
interval (horizontal line through each square). Where a confidence interval crosses the 
y-axis (i.e. spans zero), the difference in effect is not significant. Confidence intervals 
are calculated assuming that patients are a random sample from an underlying 
population. The 5% level has been selected as the alpha level (p<0.05). The weight 
per centage is the weighting of the total number of cases. This is important as it
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illustrates where a case (e.g. B13 cataracts) may have a disproportionate impact on the 
total pooled effect.
Figure 3.2: Forest plot for ALOS (Days):
ISTCs vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Comparison: ISTCs vs. NHS TCs 
Outcome: ALOS
Study or sub- WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
category 95% Cl % g5%c|
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H10
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
-10 -5.0 0.0
ISTCs
5.0 10
NHS TCs
6.90 -0.95 (-120, -0.71)
8.56 -1.24 (-1.47, -1.00)
0.77 -3.73 (-9.77, 2.32)
0.44 -0.22 (-0.51, 0.08)
0.31 -0.34 (-0.71, 0.03)
34.95 -0.07 (-0.16, 0.02)
20.14 -1.09 (-126, -0.92)
3.03 -0.11 (-0.21,-0.01)
0.44 -0.50 (-0.84, -0.16)
1.17 -0.73 (-1.01,-0.44)
0.40 -1.69 (-2.80, -0.57)
22.89 0.01 (0.00, 0.01)
i r  i
15
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 
-0.46; 95% confidence interval -0.54 to -0.33
Multivariate Regression
Multivariate regression analysis has been chosen as the tool to explore the 
relationships between multiple variables and efficiency and quality. As opposed to a 
bivariate analysis, where an analysis is conducted on two variables, the multivariate
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analysis is a statistical technique that considers multiple variables simultaneously 
(Robson 1993; Bryman and Cramer 2005).
The difference in means analysis merely shows that there is a difference in 
performance. By using multivariate regression analysis to complement the difference 
in means analysis one can begin to explore the relationships of multiple variables; 
most importantly in this case, one can explore the impact of ownership and treatment 
centre focus.
Finally, using multivariate regression analysis allows for the discounting of 
alternative explanations for a relationship found when a retrospective design has been 
employed. In a quasi-experimental design, a researcher can discount alternative 
explanations for a relationship by using a control group, an experimental group and 
employing random assignment. The absence of these characteristics, in a retrospective 
design, means that a number of potentially confounding factors may exist (Bryman 
and Cramer 2005).
The Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) method is used. This is the 
simplest and most common of regression methods. By using multiple regressions we 
can establish the relative importance of independent variables on the dependent 
variable. The regression model uses several independent variables from the patient 
record. Because the dependent variable, average length of stay, is skewed and not 
normally distributed, a logarithm of (ALOS) was used. The equation below is the 
model used for the analysis:
log (El) = a + biO + b2T + b^A + b4D
log = logarithm of El.
El = Efficiency Indicator 
O = Ownership (Private = 0, Public =1)
T = Type of Facility (Treatment Centre = 0, Hospital =1)
A = Age 
D = Deprivation
The Efficiency Indicator (‘E l’) is the ALOS in hours/days (measured from time of 
admission to the time of discharge) and this is used as a measure of performance. As 
discussed in section 3.2.4, there are limitations to the use of ALOS as a measure of 
efficiency but, in general, ALOS is a readily available measure that can be used to
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compare efficiencies in procedures that may be conducted by different types of 
provider.
The independent variable ‘O’ is used to differentiate provider ownership. 
Ownership (‘O’) is defined as public (NHS) or private (Independent Sector). There 
are certain cases where public and private are mixed. For example, BUPA Redwoods 
is a private facility that uses NHS physician staff. BUPA Redwoods is classified as 
private. The Nuffield hospitals have been classified as private unless they are 
classified as Nuffield NHS hospitals, where they are then classified as public.
The independent variable ‘T’ differentiates treatment centre and hospital. The goal 
of this independent variable is to control for performance based on whether care is 
provided by a treatment centre or hospital, and whether we see significance in 
efficiency differences between a facility with a focused approach and one that 
provides general services.
We have also assessed potential differences in age and deprivation, with a view 
that these may point to differences in case mix. The independent variable ‘A’ 
differentiates age groupings. As discussed in section 3.2.4, this variable consists of 20 
different five-year bands. The independent variable ‘D’ differentiates between 
deprivation levels. As discussed in section 3.2.4, this variable takes values between 1 
and 5, with 1 the least deprived and 5 the most deprived. There is a category 6, which 
is unknown. This is taken out of the analysis. The goal of using age and deprivation 
levels as independent variables was to control for differences in age and deprivation, 
which may account for above average care requirements or increased difficulty in 
arranging timely discharge (e.g. higher ALOS).
3.3 Research Methodology: Qualitative
The quantitative analysis simply tells us something about correlation, not 
causation. Also, a key weakness with a purely focused quantitative analysis approach 
is that a number of the ISTCs are just coming on line and are therefore not fully 
operational. Furthermore, often the NHS TCs are not seen as independent units, and 
as a result, are incorporated operationally and statistically into the entire Trust 
Hospital. Therefore, there is a danger that the quantitative data by itself may not 
permit meaningful conclusions. For that reason it is necessary to assess the evidence 
more deeply.
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Therefore the quantitative analysis is complemented by a supporting qualitative 
analysis. Adamson (2005) uses the term ‘complementarity,’ with the general goal 
being that the strengths of one method is used to enhance the other. The qualitative 
approach relies on multiple sources of evidence to ‘triangulate’ research questions 
(Yin 1994; Adamson 2005); these sources include a review of relevant literature, 
documentary analysis, and primary sources of data such as interviews with 
Department of Health and private sector operators. The use of a qualitative approach 
to support evidence and conclusions made from the quantitative approach minimises 
threats to internal validity and external validity (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Cook 
and Campbell 1979), ensures generalisability (O’Rourke 2005) and, ultimately, helps 
draw out meaningful conclusions.
This approach is not solely limited to confirming the relationships suggested by 
quantitative analysis, but is also intended to shed light on the relationships in the 
provision of care within treatment centres. A case study approach is appropriate here, 
to understand not only whether ownership in fact matters, but also, if it does, how and 
why it does - specifically if the ISTCs exhibit higher efficiency and quality, how and 
why they do so.
3.3.1 Comparative Case Study Design
The comparative case study design has been chosen as the primary approach for 
qualitative research (Ragin 1987; Ragin and Becker 1992; Robson 1993; Stake 1994; 
Yin 1994). The case study approach is an “empirical investigation o f a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources o f  
evidence” (Robson 1993). George and Bennett (2005) define this approach as the 
comparative method or ‘within-case analysis.’ Typically, the case study method is 
used as an initial exploratory inquiry prior to embarking upon quantitative research 
(Robson 1993). However, another role of the case study methodology is to provide a 
confirmatory role (Robson 1993) and this is the purpose for which the case study 
methodology is used in this research, as quantitative analysis suggests a strong 
relationship between efficiency and the ownership variable. Yin (1994) argues that 
case studies are generally the preferred research approach when the research questions 
are of a ‘how’ and ‘why’ type and address real-life set of events, which the researcher 
has ‘no control,’ and confirm suggested relationships.
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Stake (1994) identifies three distinct categories of the case method study: the 
intrinsic case study is to learn more about a particular case; the instrumental case 
study provides insight into a particular issue; and the collective case study, in which 
instrumental study is extended to several cases in a collection of individual cases 
which may or may not be known in advance. The qualitative comparative case study 
approach was decided on as a follow up method of assessing the quantitative evidence 
and in recognition of the limitations in further conducting detailed analysis of the 
quantitative data. In this research, the instrumental study and collective case study are 
emphasised. The instrumental study is important with the particular issue being the 
Treatment Centre Programme with an emphasis on how ownership matters in 
performance. The collective case study allows for a cross comparison between 
differing Treatment Centres: ISTCs and NHS TCs. The specific cases were not known 
in advance, but it was known that they would be a portion of the total number of 
ISTCs and NHS TCs that were operational.
3.3.2 Existing Case Study Methodologies
The researcher’s initial interviews were conducted with a consultant of the NHS 
Elect during two-day site visits and this allowed the researcher to narrow the scope of 
questions that were essential in subsequent site visits and interviews. These initial site 
visits included NHS Trust Hospitals. Though the principal focus of this qualitative 
analysis was to assess the evidence for differences found between IS and NHS 
Treatment Centres, these initial interviews allowed for comparison between NHS 
Trust Hospitals and NHS Treatment Centres.
In conducting qualitative research on treatment centres the research was guided by 
and benefited from the NHS Elect, the NHS Elect blue print, the NHS Elect treatment 
centre evaluations as well as an Australian group that provided a valuable third 
country view outside of the US and UK of how a treatment centre should be operated. 
These are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.
NHS Elect: Background
The work of the NHS Elect played an important role in identifying NHS TCs, and 
formulating site visits and evaluation methodology. NHS Elect was founded by 
Professor Ara Darzi (now Lord Darzi) and four NHS Chief Executives in 2003 to 
support the transformation of elective care delivery.
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Early on, the NHS Elect’s members were NHS treatment centres and day surgery 
facilities. However, the network has grown and evolved each year to meet its 
members’ changing needs although the aim has remained the same: the 
transformation of service delivery and commissioning.
The most recent evolution of the NHS Elect’s responsibilities is via the service 
level agreement with the Department of Health’s 18 Week programme to help put the 
UK government policy of meeting 18 week waiting list targets into practice. The 18 
week waiting list is a result of the NHS Improvement Plan, which set out with the 
goal that, by 2008, no one will wait longer than 18 weeks from GP referral to hospital 
treatment (Reid 2004). As a result of this stated policy, the NHS set out to create an 
implementation framework to realise this goal. This framework, or pathway, set out a 
high-level implementation plan and timetable to achieve the 18 week goal, clarifying 
the different contributions required of all those involved on converting to day case, 
improving discharge processes, preoperative assessment and getting theatre efficiency 
right (Reid 2004).
As a result of this service level agreement, the NHS Elect has broadened its 
responsibilities to assisting NHS organisations achieve the 18 week elective surgery 
targets. Because of this broadening of responsibilities, NHS Elect’s clients now 
include all types of NHS Service Providers, as well as Primary Care Trust 
Commissioners. Today, NHS Elect’s primary focus is working with its members to 
respond to their needs in implementing 18 week pathways and in improving services 
for patients in view of other related policy imperatives like patient choice and 
plurality.
NHS Elect: Blue Print
Today, the NHS Elect’s work is to provide NHS service providers and 
commissioners with an overview of specific performance indicators and to help them 
understand where they stand in the entire 18 week pathway. If requested by the 
service provider or commissioner, the NHS Elect conducts an evaluation along 
specific segments of the pathway. Common pathways link clinical best practice, 
benchmarking, audits, primary care commissioning with the aim of supporting GPs, 
commissioners and trusts in delivering care pathways that demonstrate high quality 
and value for money.
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These evaluations were conducted as part of the NHS’s plan to create a draft ‘blue 
print’ of a single ‘model of care’ that could be implemented across all NHS Elect 
member TCs. The theory was the NHS Elect members would benefit by sharing 
common approaches and protocols, as far as possible. The final blueprint, when 
refined and finalised, would form the basis of the model of care to be implemented in 
each NHS Elect treatment centre. These treatment centre teams and NHS Elect 
members will then be ‘performance managed’ by the Elect Board on their progress in 
implementing this model of care, with any variation in practice explained and 
approved by the Board (NHS Elect 2007).
This blue print was based upon an evaluation by a US team that was invited to 
visit a number of the treatment centres and provide recommendations. These 
recommendations were based upon specific evaluation components which included: 
the management team and medical leadership; scheduling and pre-operative 
preparation; anaesthesia service; surgical service, recovery and post-operative care; 
and follow-up and rehabilitation (NHS Elect 2007).
NHS Elect: Treatment Centre Evaluations
Also important for guiding the researcher’s qualitative methodology were 
individual assessments of treatment centres. In addition to the general evaluation, the 
NHS Elect conducted evaluations, or assessments, of individual NHS Treatment 
Centres. These evaluations were based upon the requests of the respective Treatment 
Centres, which had recognised that they were not hitting their performance targets. 
The evaluations would help identify specific areas within the Treatment Centres that 
could be improved upon. Here we go into this in some detail because it directly led to 
forming our own interviews and resultant analyses.
The general evaluation assessed aspects that were specific to individual treatment 
centres. First, a general overview of the facility would be conducted. This would 
include the number of beds, operating theatres, endoscopy rooms, and treatment 
rooms there were, as well as the case mix and average length of stay. The consultant 
would then evaluate the scheduling of the treatment centre. They would examine how 
the patients were referred to the treatment centre, when the consultants first would see 
the patient, which procedures were done as day cases, which procedures were done as 
overnight, one-day inpatients and any specific exclusion criteria that the facility might 
have had (Douthwaite 2007). The evaluations developed by these consultants made
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explicit the qualitative factors which affect provider performance and greatly guided 
the researcher’s own evaluation of reasons for variance in performance between 
providers.
The general evaluation would be followed by a pre-operative assessment, as this 
determines whether appropriate patients are being selected and admitted to the 
treatment centre. Non-appropriate patients could not only reduce operational 
efficiency, but also increase clinical risk and thus overall quality. This assessment 
would include how, when, and by whom pre-operative assessment was done, if it was 
done at all. The pre-operative process would be thoroughly evaluated, noting what 
types of tests were ordered and whether there were specific exclusion criteria. MRS A 
screening was an important question and if it was conducted, the evaluation would ask 
how many MRSA prone patients were identified (Douthwaite 2007). It was important 
to see whether the treatment centre had a nurse-led pre-assessment process and 
whether the entire staff was all working off the same pre-assessment. The research 
found that in a number of treatment centres, different doctors had their own pre- 
assessment evaluation form. This fostered extreme inefficiency, since each patient 
pre-assessment had to be matched to the physician planning to perform the procedure. 
It was also recommended that the Anaesthesia Department at each treatment centre 
comes up with guidelines that the nurses can use for their preoperative assessments, as 
well as for any preoperative testing that is needed. These guidelines need to be 
forwarded by the medical director at the treatment centre and accepted by all 
anaesthesia staff members so there are no delays or cancellations on the day of 
surgery. The use of a telephone pre-assessment programme for the day surgery 
patients was also reviewed. Under such programs, all patients are not brought in for 
pre-assessment. This is important, as it lightens the load on the staff, potentially 
reducing the number of staff required (NHS Elect 2007).
For out of area work, occupational therapists also need to be selective about 
potential patients that are going to have surgery in TCs. If too many social issues are 
identified during the phone assessment, the patient should be referred back to the host 
trust (Douthwaite 2007; NHS Elect 2007).
The evaluation also noted that during pre-assessment patients should be informed 
of their expected length of stay. This sets patient expectations and gets the patients 
thinking and planning for post TC care. Time and time again patients at NHS Trust 
Hospitals cannot be discharged from the facility because family and friends are not
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readily available for after discharge care; there were even instances of family and 
friends planning holidays around this time. For the orthopaedic centres, total joint 
patients should have assistance at home arranged before the day of surgery. This 
ensures discharge in an appropriate length of time. Furthermore, lack of appropriate 
post discharge care is one of the most common reasons for readmissions. Patients 
were found not to be ensuring appropriate wound care, leading to infection, or lacking 
in physiotherapy (NHS Elect 2007).
The day of surgery would then be assessed. Patient’s arrival time was an 
important indicator of operational flows and ‘did not attend rates’ (DNA). Key 
questions included whether patients arrived the night before, or the morning of, 
whether in groups or individually staggered, and when the anaesthetist first saw the 
patient (Douthwaite 2007). The NHS Elect TCs recommend that patients be prepared 
for surgery before admission to the theatre complex. Specifically, patients should all 
be cannulated before going to theatre, with the nurses on the ward or in theatre 
undertaking this task (NHS Elect 2007).
The patient surgery was the next important aspect of the treatment centre. How 
anaesthetic rooms were used would be assessed. The use of anaesthesia would be 
noted, as the type and how much regional anaesthesia is used are important factors in 
recovery time. Whether patients walk to theatre is also very important. Besides 
eliminating the need to wait for a porter, lessening the chance of delays, having the 
patient walk to surgery also sets up the psychologically important idea that the patient 
is in charge. The average turnover time would also be assessed. Most of the NHS 
facilities had this information, but this data is not reported outside of the hospital 
(Douthwaite 2007; NHS Elect 2007).
The treatment centre model requires strong surgical as well as anaesthetic 
leadership, and the leadership dynamic would also be assessed. Anaesthetic leadership 
can be more difficult to achieve, as surgeons may operate on a number of sites and are 
often a less permanent presence within a treatment centre than an anaesthetist might 
be. Furthermore, each treatment centre needs to ensure they have an experienced 
theatre nurse to manage the theatre complex. As part of this work, the nurse needs to 
be aggressive in the daily case management. The nurse manager must be cognizant 
that the treatment centre is different from a hospital in the sense that the operating 
theatre schedule must be based upon a system where surgical procedures are
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scheduled by time rather than by a certain number of cases in a session (Douthwaite 
2007; NHS Elect 2007).
Following completion of the surgical procedure, in the operating theatre, the 
patient is either in the post anaesthesia care unit (PACU) or moves directly into 
recovery. This is dependent on the surgical procedure and the type of anaesthesia 
given. The consultant assessed how long patients were kept in PACU or recovery, 
what the discharge criteria were and whether discharge procedure was nurse led. 
Traditionally consultants made the decision on recovery. However, if this was the 
case, consultants usually only came by in the evening, rather than continuously 
throughout the day (Douthwaite 2007; NHS Elect 2007).
Also assessed was the use of protocols. All the TCs should be moving towards a 
position where the most common procedures are all covered by protocol and where 
these protocols are common across the TCs. The most common procedure areas 
should all have protocols in place, including hernias, varicose veins, cataracts, knee 
and hip replacements, tonsillectomies (children and adults), arthroscopies, 
laparoscopic cholesytectomies, and anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) tears. All 
protocols should include details of expected recovery time, to avoid causing any block 
to rapid throughput. Average lengths of stay should be tracked and the recovery team 
should be constantly looking for ways to improve throughput (Douthwaite 2007; NHS 
Elect 2007).
Following discharge, follow up is essential. Evaluations also ascertained whether 
post operative (post op) phone calls were done, and whether protocols were 
benchmarked with similar UK NHS and private facilities.
Austin Health Surgery Centre: Treatment Centre Evaluations
In conducting case studies, the researcher was also guided by an evaluation 
conducted by Australian Group, Austin Health Surgery Centre development group. 
The NHS blueprint and evaluation methodology is similar to the lines of evaluations 
conducted by this Australian Group (McDonald and O’Leary 2008), which provided 
additional support from a third country for how treatment centre evaluation are 
conducted.
Austin Health Surgery Centre development group report details each site visited 
and rates each site against a set of predetermined criteria, in order to provide key 
lessons and applications for future surgery centre development in Australia. The
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Australian evaluations were more focused, however, on gaining insight into both the 
daily operational challenges and provision of service, including protocols, procedures 
and staffing. The criteria used to evaluate each site included whether the site was 
welcoming, how much certainty and comfort the treatment centre provides to patients 
and the staff, and the staffs approach and relations. The Australian Group’s 
assessment was based more on quality as defined by the patient and staff experience.
The Austin Health Surgery Centre development group felt that the main strength 
of the surgery centre was the fact that it could provide the vital separation of elective 
and emergency demand and create a standalone facility. To be successful, the group 
thought that there should be incentive based funding for the volume of work 
completed and flexibility in sessional allocation to ensure the efficiency and effective 
capacity management necessary to meet demand (McDonald and O’Leary 2008).
Their research method of the Australian group is broadly consistent with the 
methodology chosen in this dissertation. The Australians visited two local sites to test 
the visit methodology and evaluation criteria. This was found to be an extremely 
valuable experience and enabled them us to test the questioning, how much they could 
achieve within given time frames, how the evaluation criteria could be applied and 
how they could best use their experience to inform their questioning. These site visits 
helped the group learn the following key lessons: develop key areas for exploration 
and questions first; create a template with questions and themes to record findings; 
allow approximately two hours for each site visit; ensure a tour is included in the site 
visit (McDonald and O’Leary 2008).
3.3.3 Qualitative Research Methodology
There are many forms of data collection in qualitative research. Qualitative data 
collection methods can include: in-depth structured or unstructured interviews; focus 
groups or group discussions; participant and non-participant observation studies; and 
analysis of documents and materials such as reports, diaries, letters and film or 
television (Robson 1993; Carter and Henderson 2005). The methods of qualitative 
research are particularly useful for exploring more fully any insights generated by 
quantitative methods (Carter and Henderson 2005).
The case study research in this dissertation was conducted via interviews with a 
number of ISTCs, NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals. The researcher chose the 
interview format to allow for asking both closed-ended questions as well as open-
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ended questions. As a general interview tactic, questions should be simple, meanings 
should be clear and biases avoided. These questions were also piloted, with the initial 
site visits and interviews with the NHS Elect consultant, to allow for narrowing the 
focus of the research questions. Closed-ended questions were asked for specific 
quantifiable questions (e.g. staffing numbers), where as open-ended questions were 
used when asking about more political sensitive issues (e.g. perception of 
management control over consultants) (Bowling 2005).
Additional sources of evidence used to support the interview research 
methodology include official and non-official publications from the Government, 
press material and media broadcasting, as well as interviews with key decision­
makers and policy-makers. These interviews include members of the NHS Elect (2 
interviews), Commercial Directorate (4 interviews) and the Department of Health (1 
interview).
Method of Selection o f Case Studies
The selection of the case studies was based upon two criteria. First, an ISTC from 
each of the major groups, or chains, owning and operating the treatment centres in 
England, were to be interviewed. Second, due to the broad variety of NHS TCs that 
were in operation, both stand-alone and NHS Trust Hospital integrated treatment 
centres were to be selected.
The selection of different providers allowed for a broad geographical spread 
throughout all of England, in the North and South of the country and included 
facilities located in urban as well as rural areas. The interviews and site visits included 
facilities that were day case and inpatient within all clinical specialty areas. National 
data as well as research conducted by the Commercial Directorate and NHS Elect 
matches characteristics of those case studies chosen.
A quality assessment of the site visits was also conducted through the interviews 
at the Commercial Directorate and NHS Elect. This is to ensure that the findings were 
generalisable when all studies are included or when the individual cases are analysed 
separately (Cullinan 2005; O'Rourke 2005). Ragin and Becker have argued that in 
selecting the cases strong preconceptions are likely to hamper conceptual 
understanding of the evidence and that their final conclusions about the nature of the 
cases ‘‘'may be the most important part o f  the interaction between ideas and evidence” 
(Ragin and Becker 1992).
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In addition, interviews were conducted with the Commercial Directorate (CD) of 
the Department of Health, the NHS Elect, a consortium of NHS elective care 
providers, and managers of other facilities to provide a bigger picture of the on-going 
operations within treatment centres and hospitals. This was to further confirm the 
general findings, thus mitigating threats to validity.
Method of Data Collection: Semi-structured Interview
The method of data collection was primarily through semi-structured interviews 
(See Appendix B: Interview Questions -  Treatment Centres and Hospitals). The 
interview design, was partly based on some of the basic phases of a narrative 
interview, with the initiation of the discussion, the main narration, the questioning 
phase, and finally, the concluding talk (Dexter 1970; Jovchelovitch 2000).
The schema involved the compilation of a set of questions in advance, the order of 
which was then modified based upon what seemed most appropriate in the context of 
an informed conversation (Robson 1993; Bowling 2005). After a short introduction in 
which the interviewees were informed in more general terms about the main subject 
of this research, the interviewees were all asked the same initial questions about the 
Treatment Centre Programme with respect to their facility.
Site visits and interviews were held in 2007 and 2008. The initial interviews were 
conducted with a consultant of the NHS Elect during two day site visits. This allowed 
the researcher to narrow the scope of questions that were essential to this topic for 
subsequent site visits and interviews. These initial site visits included NHS Trust 
Hospitals. Though the scope of this qualitative analysis is to assess the evidence for 
differences found between IS and NHS Treatment Centres, these initial interviews 
allowed for comparing NHS Trust Hospitals and NHS Treatment Centres.
A systematic approach was followed, though the interviews were semi-structured. 
The researcher worked out a questionnaire in advance, but modified the order based 
upon the context of the conversation. This technique was used to allow for a less 
formal approach, allowing the interviewee, and others individuals that were 
encountered during the tour, to speak freely (Robson 1993). The initial interviews 
were two frill day interviews with management and clinical staff. The follow on site 
visits could last anywhere from 90 minutes to a one-half day. Typically, the site visit 
would commence with the interview questionnaire, which would on average last 60 
minutes followed by a walk through the facility. On a number of occasions, the
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facility walk through was conducted during the interview to allow for a better 
understanding on how the facility was organised and operated.
The primary interviewees were typically the facility manager or the nurse 
manager. Typically, in the ISTCs, the primary interviewees were the general manager 
and the finance director or chief medical officer. During the NHS TC site visits the 
primary interviews were with the nurse managers.
The facility walk through allowed for meeting with both operational and clinical 
staff as well as senior managers and directors. The variety of staff involved in the 
visits provided information on challenges and successes from multiple levels within 
each organisation. Nursing staff talked of equipment and patient issues, whilst 
managers and directors were able to describe the funding models and efficient 
systems and processes crucial to their success.
The number of additional interviews varied as this depended on the facility size as 
well as availability of staff. This approach of using the walk through for conducting 
additional interviews allowed for repeating the interview questions and attempting to 
explore deeper on previous responses provided. The interview would conclude with 
the primary interviewee and follow up with questions not yet answered.
Many of the questions are deemed to be quite sensitive. Over the past few years, 
there has been much scrutiny placed upon the provisioning of health care within the 
NHS, both political and from the media, such as the BBC documentary, ‘Can Jerry 
Robinson fix the NHS (Lambert 2007)?’ There also appears to be high scrutiny placed 
on the independent sector (especially the ISTCs) as well as the NHS (Royal College 
of Physicians 2003; British Medical Association 2005; Health Committee 2006).
Therefore, within this politically sensitive environment, the semi-structured 
approach was deemed the most appropriate method of interviewing. A varied question 
order allowed for capitalising on the responses made by allowing for the most 
relevant follow-up question to be asked. As a matter of tactic, this approach would 
allow for greater freedom in the sequencing of questions, in their exact wording and 
in the amount of time and attention dedicated to different parts of the interview 
(Robson 1993). Missed topics would be returned to at a later stage, such as in the 
closing discussion. Sometimes the more difficult and sensitive questions, especially 
on consultant and management relationships, would be asked at this time, if they had 
not been yet discussed. Further, because the researcher is a non-clinician, outstanding 
clinical questions were cross checked with experienced medical personnel. Because of
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the sensitivity of the topic, it was determined best to not tape-record the interviews. 
However, notes can be supplied upon request.
3.3.4 Qualitative Case Studies
Site visits and interviews were conducted with seven (7) ISTCs and nine (9) NHS 
TCs. This amounted to approximately one-third of the ISTCs that were fully 
operational in England at the time and one-quarter of the NHS TCs. Two (2) NHS 
Trust Hospitals were also visited in the process to differentiate NHS TCs from NHS 
Trust Hospitals and thus provide a fuller picture. In total, 18 site visits were conducted 
in different treatment centres and hospitals (see table below). The following 
paragraphs provide an overview of each facility visited and interviewed.
Table 3.4 Interview Sites
ISTC NHS TC NHS Trust Hospital
Shepton Mallet ISTC Royal Hampshire NHS TC Royal Hampshire NHS Trust 
Hospital
Interhealth Canada Chesire and 
Merseyside ISTC
Ravenscourt Royal Marsden
Medway Mercury Health ACAD
Bodmin NHS Treatment Centre Brunei Treatment Centre 
(Swindon)
Greater Manchester ISTC* Hinchingbrooke
Peninsula ISTC Lewisham
Kidderminster ISTC Kidderminster
Weston-super-Mare
Chichester
* Interviewed in London office. Site visit not conducted.
Shepton Mallet NHS Treatment Centre is a stand-alone facility located in 
Somerset operated and managed by UK Specialists Hospitals. The facility opened in 
July 2005 as a purpose built 34-bed facility providing inpatient, outpatient and 
diagnostic services. Clinical services include orthopaedics, ophthalmology, general 
surgery and endoscopy as well as imaging and diagnostics. The facility has its own 
self-contained diagnostic unit.
The Cheshire and Merseyside NHS Treatment Centre is a stand-alone facility 
operated and managed by Interhealth Canada. The facility opened in June 2006 as a 
purpose built 44-bed orthopaedic facility, which includes four operating theatres and
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diagnostic and outpatient services. The facility has its own self-contained diagnostic 
unit.
The Medway Mercury Health ISTC, as known also the Will Adams NHS 
Treatment Centre is a stand-alone facility located in Gillingham owned by Mercury 
Health, but at the time operated by a US company, Health Inventures. The facility 
opened in October 2005 as a purpose built facility providing day-surgery procedures 
and related out-patient appointments for patients within the Medway and Swale PCTs. 
The surgical specialties include urology, gynaecology, general surgery, 
gastroenterology and orthopaedic services. The facility has its own self-contained 
diagnostic unit.
The Bodmin NHS Treatment Centre is a stand alone purpose built facility 
designed to provide diagnosis and treatment of conditions on a day case basis. The 
facility opened in January 2006. The centre is on the site of the Bodmin NHS Trust 
Hospital. The treatment centre provides general surgery including endoscopy and 
colonoscopy, ophthalmology including cataracts and gynaecological procedures. The 
facility has its own self-contained diagnostic unit.
Netcare’s NHS Treatment Centre, the Greater Manchester Surgical Centre, is a 
stand alone newly built 48-bed facility. The facility opened in 2005. Greater 
Manchester provides inpatient and outpatient services. The facility primarily 
emphasises ear, nose and throat surgery, and orthopaedic surgery. The facility has 
three operating theatres, a rehabilitation department and its own self-contained 
diagnostic unit.
The Peninsula NHS Treatment Centre is a stand-alone purpose-built surgical 
facility serving the populations of Devon and Cornwall. The Peninsula NHS 
Treatment Centre is owned and operated by Care UK. The Peninsula NHS Treatment 
Centre opened in April 2005 and provides inpatient and outpatient orthopaedic 
services. The facility has two operating theatres, 28 beds, and a small critical care 
unit. Diagnostic imaging support to the centre is provided at the facility by another 
private company, Alliance Medical.
The Kidderminster Treatment Centre is situated within the Kidderminster 
Hospital. Kidderminster ISTC provides inpatient and outpatient orthopaedic services 
as well as diagnostic services. The Treatment Centre is a unique model as it is situated 
within the Kidderminster Hospital and adjacent to the Kidderminster NHS TC. The 
ISTC leases one operating theatre from the Trust and all pre-operative and post-
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operative care is provided by Kidderminster NHS TC, a separately run facility. The 
diagnostic are outsourced to the Trust under contract.
The Kidderminster site was a full service general hospital. The recent history of 
the facility is quite interesting to note, as this has determined the unique relationship 
of the Kidderminster ISTC and NHS TC. The hospital was due to close, but a local 
physician ran on a single issue campaign to keep the facility open. As a result, the 
Kidderminster site has become a unique NHS facility. The Kidderminster site has a 
minor injuries unit, a primary care centre, an oral, facial and orthodontics clinic, 
dialysis services, an NHS TC as well as the above mentioned ISTC. The 
Kidderminster NHS TC provides cardio-pulmonary services, urology and orthopaedic 
services. The facility has three operating theatres and has some diagnostic services. 
MRI services are provided by the Trust Hospital at a different location.
The Winchester NHS Treatment Centre is located within the Royal Hampshire 
County Hospital in Winchester. The treatment centre is located within a wing of the 
Trust Hospital and opened in November 2005. Though the wing is purpose built, it is 
physically part of the old hospital. The facility has three pre-assessment rooms, three 
operating theatres, four endoscopy suites and a 28 beds inpatient unit designed for up 
to 23-hour stays. Diagnostic services are shared with the Trust Hospital. The site visit 
was conducted over two days to both the treatment centre as well as the Trust 
Hospital.
Ravenscourt Park NHS Treatment Centre was part of Hammersmith NHS 
Hospitals Trust. It was a stand-alone NHS specialist centre for hip and knee 
operations situated within an old art-deco style building. Aside from Kidderminster, it 
was the only site visited not situated within a NHS Trust Hospital site. Diagnostic 
services were a self-contained unit with the treatment centre. The facility is now 
closed as it was incurring losses and the referrals were insufficient to justify its on­
going operations.
The Ambulatory Care and Diagnostic Centre (ACAD) at Central Middlesex 
Hospital, is part of the North West London Hospitals NHS Trust. The Treatment 
Centre opened in 1999 was the first treatment centre in England dedicated to elective 
procedures (Health Committee 2006). ACAD provides the full range of elective day­
care and inpatient care services as well as emergency inpatient services. Diagnostic 
services are a self-contained unit with the TC.
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The Brunei Treatment Centre is part of the Great Western Hospital in Swindon. 
The centre opened in October 2005 as a new wing connected to the main Hospital. 
The treatment centre has five main operating theatres, two minor operating theatres 
and 23 inpatient beds. The treatment centre uses the diagnostic facilities available in 
the Great Western Hospital.
Hinchingbrooke NHS TC is part of Hinchingbrooke Healthcare NHS Trust. The 
new facility opened in November 2005 and is situated adjacent to the Trust Hospital. 
Clinical services include gynaecology, gastroenterology, vascular, ENT, orthopaedics 
and ophthalmology. Diagnostic services are a self-contained unit with the TC.
Lewisham Treatment Centre is situated alongside the Lewisham NHS Trust 
Hospital. The wing was built in 2007. The architectural planning is a combination of 
various plans over the years as the facility was intend first for day case procedures. 
Later, the orthopaedics were added and then endoscopy. Today, clinical services 
include general surgery, vascular, ENT, gynaecology, trauma and orthopaedic 
surgery. The Treatment Centre does not have inpatient beds but mixes patients within 
the treatment centre from the hospital. The treatment centre uses the diagnostic 
facilities available within the main hospital.
Weston-super-Mare Treatment Centre is situated on the second floor of the 
Weston General Hospital. The wing was built in 2002. The Weston-super-Mare 
Treatment Centre is unique as it is built as a dedicated day case unit within the 
hospital. The Treatment Centre is clearly different than other NHS TCs. Rather than 
focus on a core set of treatment centre procedures, they do nearly all types but only 
day case procedures. Clinical services include ENT, oral surgery, urology, 
gynaecology, general surgery, orthopaedic surgery, pain management, biopsies and 
bronchoscopies. The hospital even accepts pre-op and post-op patients that are day 
case but will be operated on in the main theatre. The treatment centre uses the 
diagnostic facilities available within the main hospital.
Chichester NHS TC, part of St. Richard’s NHS Trust Hospital, opened in March 
2006. The hospital is situated adjacent to the main hospital. The Chichester NHS TC 
facility includes four operating theatres, four endoscopy rooms, an angiography suite, 
a 22-bed ward with four en suite rooms for 23-hour stay, pre-operative assessment 
and outpatient facilities. The facility also has a cardiac cathetherisation laboratory, 
where special diagnostic x-rays of the heart are carried out. The treatment centre uses 
the diagnostic facilities available within the main hospital.
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The Royal Marsden Hospital is an NHS Foundation Trust Hospital dedicated to 
cancer treatment and research. The Trust provides inpatient, day care and outpatient 
services for all areas of cancer treatment. In April 2004, the hospital became one of 
the country’s first NHS Foundation Trusts. This new status has provided the financial 
freedom and greater flexibility to focus on allowing more patients to access the 
facility’s expertise. In 2007, the Royal Marsden was awarded the highest score of 
‘excellent’ by the Healthcare Commission, for both quality of services and use of 
resources for the second year running - the only NHS trust to do this. The Royal 
Marsden asked the NHS Elect to conduct an evaluation of their day case centre. 
Though the hospital is outside of the NHS Treatment Centre programme, the 
opportunity provided an additional case study from one of the best hospitals 
clinically, operationally and financially in the UK.
3.3.5 Qualitative Data
A matrix was put together to facilitate comparison of the responses vis-a-vis 
facility type and to help assess relationships between the different facility types (See 
Chapter 5 in Annex A). Certain question areas allow for grouping between these 
facility types, and for drawing inferences (cross-case comparison) (George and 
Bennett 2005). This led to further exploratory work in the follow up interviews. The 
researcher found that more complete inferences could be drawn from the qualitative 
analysis chapters. These inferences will be discussed in the Conclusions and Policy 
Analysis Chapter (Chapter 7).
The use of a qualitative data analysis tool (e.g. NVivo) to assist in the analysing of 
the qualitative data was assessed. However, the use of a software package was 
determined as inappropriate with respect to the cross-cultural nature of this research. 
The researcher felt that the qualitative data analysis tool would not have captured the 
entire range of cross-cultural attitudes driving question responses; nor would it have 
allowed the researcher to depart from the interview questions when additional 
information was needed to flesh out a response to the respective subject matter as 
responses to questions often were not of a binary (Yes/No) nature. The researcher felt 
that the more optimal approach chosen by the researcher would allow for departing 
from a rigid program of interview questions to press subjects for clarification and 
elaboration as the evidence is much more complex and demands interpretation. This
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interpretation is set out in the case study interview matrix (See Chapter 5 in Annex 
A).
3.3.6 Other Qualitative Data Sources
To provide support to the qualitative and quantitative analysis, the researcher 
additionally drew on information collected from the following sources:
o Official publications. These included government white papers, consultation 
papers, annual reports, policy statements and press releases (Commercial 
Directorate 2005; Department of Health 2005; Utley and Gallivan 2005; 
Health Committee 2006; Delivery of the 18 week patient pathway 2007; 
Healthcare Commission 2007). 
o Other documents. These included reports and press releases from interest 
groups, and hospital board meetings, interim reports and policy proposals as 
well as ministerial communications, such as from within the Department of 
Health, the respective Treatment Centres, NHS Elect, which may or may not 
have been published (Audit Commission 2000; Dexter and Traub 2002; 
Anastasiou 2005; Dexter, Ledolter et al. 2005; Anderson 2006; Bannister 
2006; Douthwaite 2007; Moss and McCarthy 2007; CBI 2008). 
o Press material and media broadcasting. These included newspaper articles and 
other media reports (Carvel and Tomlinson 2005; Timmins 2005; Timmins 
2007).
o Interviews with key decision-makers and stakeholders. This included 
interviews at the Department of Health, Commercial Directorate and the 
treatment centre providers (Longhi 2005; Anderson 2007; Douthwaite 2007; 
Parker 2008).
3.4 Key Limitations
This section examines some of the limitations of the methodologies employed.
3.4.1 Quantitative Methodology and Data
First, there are obvious limitations posed by using ALOS as a proxy for 
performance. However, as discussed, other methods of performance measurement are 
not reported to a central NHS database that might allow for comparison between the 
four groups. As result, ALOS has been determined to be the best indicator to broadly
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assess differences in performance, while keeping in mind the above mentioned 
limitations. However, ALOS is very highly positively skewed and there are 
significant outliers, or extreme values, in the dependent variable that can exert an 
excessive influence on the results. Some may argue that using median and inter­
quartile range data may be better statistical measures to use. The median and inter­
quartile range is cross-checked with the evidence with detailed analysis provided in 
the relevant appendices.
Another potential limitation to the findings is that the difference in means analysis 
between individual HRG comparisons does not account for the number of cases 
within each provider comparison. For example, in a comparison between a private 
hospital with a low number of cases with a lower than expected ALOS and a NHS 
Trust Hospital with a high number of cases, the outcomes may be biased.
Furthermore, the lack of comprehensive set performance metrics means that the 
data do not provide a complete performance picture in terms of efficiency and quality. 
It also means that there are gaps and inconsistencies between providers with respect to 
the data.
Another problem is ISTC and NHS central data systems are not currently able to 
provide robust data. For example, ISTCs are not reporting consistently into the NHS 
central database, some ISTCs have not reported data accurately for some KPIs, NHS 
TCs are not reporting into the NHS database and NHS Trusts are having problems 
separating out their data from the treatment centre and the Main Hospital (Health 
Committee 2006; Healthcare Commission 2007; Mason, Miraldo et al. 2007; Pollock 
and Godden 2008; The Information Centre 2008).
This last point is of great interest and significantly underestimated so far in the 
general research. Currently, there are over 60 NHS TCs, but in any given case a 
maximum of 7 NHS TCs are shown to be reporting. Clearly, the majority of NHS 
Trust Hospitals do not separate out the Trust Hospital discharges vis-a-vis the NHS 
TC data. Because the NHS TC data is embedded within the overall Trust data, the 
evidence suggests that by separating out the current reported data, NHS Trust 
Hospital performance could be even lower than the evidence suggests.
In view of these limitations, a data request was made directly to more than a dozen 
NHS TCs. Only one response was attained. In a similar study, the National Audit 
Office (NAO) received some data from the NHS TCs, which the researcher obtained
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for use. However, this data was virtually unusable as there was no complete set of 
data for comparison between providers, HRG discharges and average length of stay.
Another important limitation is that the HRGs have not been linked to financial 
remuneration for the majority of providers assessed. The only providers which have a 
direct linkage between HRG reporting and reimbursement would be the NHS Trusts 
under Foundation Status. The ISTCs themselves are paid under take-or-pay contracts. 
Therefore, aside from the Foundation Trust Hospitals, there is little financial incentive 
to report data accurately. In reality, reporting the data accurately is a cost, as it takes 
more time, and there is no financial remuneration for better data reporting.
Another weakness of the HRG methodology at its current status is that the 
groupings are not refined enough to account for variations in complexity in the 
individual patients and the total case mix of the respective facilities. As discussed in 
Section 3.2.3, there is evidence that case mix is an important determinant of inter­
hospital variation in average cost, utilization of ancillary services and mean length of 
stay (Feldstein 1967; Evans 1971; Evans and Walker 1972; Feldstein and Schuttinga 
1977). Unfortunately, an agreed case mix method of adjustment has not been 
developed in the UK. Case mix complexity in this chapter is adjusted for by using 
reference costing and adding age and deprivation variables.
The indicator used for deprivation, however, also is associated with some 
problems. The index of multiple deprivation (IMD) is widely used as a measure of 
socio-economic status. IMD scores assigned to local areas were ranked from the least 
to most deprived fifth of the population, and, for each procedure, patients were 
assigned to a relevant fifth on the basis of their postcode. For most procedures, NHS 
acute trusts had the highest proportions of patients in the most deprived fifth of the 
population, higher than in both ISTCs and NHS TCs. This may reflect: the catchment 
populations of the local areas where ISTCs and NHS treatment centres have been 
sited; inequity of access to ISTCs and NHS treatment centres for patients from 
deprived areas; that patients from deprived areas are likely to have more complex 
health needs which make them unsuitable for referral to treatment centres; or some 
combination of these factors. This could have a negative impact in terms of race 
equality, as higher proportions of people from minority ethnic groups live in deprived 
areas. More generally, this pattern in the provision of services indicates the need for 
further investigation in the context of the Department of Health’s goals of, and 
policies for, reducing inequalities in health and access to health care.
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Finally, findings are based on point in time analysis; they therefore do not capture 
prospective performance of these new treatment centre. These are in fact start-up 
businesses which take years to build up. Furthermore, these facilities are not receiving 
the expected referrals, with many operating at below 50% occupancy. Therefore, there 
is little incentive from the volume side to discharge patients quickly, though these 
facilities are still showing a lower ALOS.
Validity is concerned with whether the findings are really about what they appear 
to be about. In recursive studies there is always the risk that apparently causal 
relationships could, in fact be caused by a third, unknown factor. Poor data could 
exacerbate this problem and, in addition to the reasons detailed in Section 3.4.1, the 
data could be unreliable for other reasons. One is usually termed subject error. It is 
possible that the included cases were chosen not because they are currently operating 
and the omitted cases left out because they are not yet on line, but because the ones 
operating are the best ones and the cases not studied are poor operators. More 
problematic from a validity point of view are sources of subject bias. It could be that 
the case studies chosen, and those that were responsive to sending in the data were 
responsive because they knew that they were good operators.
Internal validity is concerned with the extent to which a study establishes that a 
factor or variable has actually caused the effect that is found. This term was 
introduced by Campbell and Stanley (1963), who provided an analysis of eight 
possible threats to internal validity. Cook and Campbell (1979) extended this analysis, 
providing an additional four threats. These threats are: History, Testing, 
Instrumentation, Regression, Mortality, Maturation, Selection, Selection by 
maturation interaction, Ambiguity about causal direction, Diffusion of treatments and 
Compensatory rivalry.
There are two primary strategies for dealing with these threats in the design. The 
first strategy is to understand the threat, or, conversely, knowing where a threat does 
not apply. This is applicable to the qualitative case studies. The second strategy is 
randomisation. This is applicable to the quantitative work using data from Dr. Foster
External validity, or generalisability, is the degree to which findings can be 
generalised from the specific sample in the study to some target population (Robson 
1993). For example, a researcher needs to ask whether the findings of the enquiry can 
be generally applicable, in other contexts, situations or times, or to persons other than 
those directly involved (Robson 1993). There are four threats to external validity:
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selection, setting, history, and construct effects. For example, because randomisation 
is not part of the empirical analysis, selection of the cases is an issue of major 
concern. Selecting the cases that are up and running, may create a self-selecting bias 
in itself. These are valid arguments and need to be responded to in the analysis.
Cause should be taken to mean that variation in the dependent variable is 
affected by variation in the independent variable. In order to establish a causal 
relationship, three criteria have to be fulfilled. First, it is necessary to establish that 
there is an apparent relationship between two variables. Second, the researcher must 
show that the relationship is non-spurious. A spurious relationship occurs when there 
is not a ‘true’ relationship between two variables that appear to be connected. Third, it 
is necessary to establish that the cause precedes the effect. The time order of the two 
related variables is important. For example, a researcher must establish that 
aggression is a consequence of watching televised violence and not the other way 
around (Bryman and Cramer 2005).
The researchers must be continuously aware of these threats to internal and 
external validity in quantitative data analysis to guard against faulty conclusions or 
potential bias. Though bias can never be completely avoided, an awareness of where 
bias is likely to occur and how it may influence the results, can significantly minimise 
the risk in the threats to validity (Robson 1993; Bowling 2005).
There is also a danger of cross-causation or simultaneity in the model. For 
instance, ALOS and ownership may be linked. However, the researcher feels that the 
correlation between ALOS (efficiency) and ownership is one directional and that it is 
ownership driving ALOS (efficiency), rather than ALOS driving ownership. For 
ALOS to affect ownership, we would expect to see facilities with an established 
ALOS changing ownership. However, as most treatment centre are new, ownership 
has tended to precede the establishment of average ALOS levels.
3.4.2 Qualitative Methodology and Data
Selection bias is also a potential limitation in the qualitative data used. While, 
selection bias in statistical studies typically understates the strength of the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, in case studies selection bias may 
overstate the relationship (George and Bennett 2005). This would mean that the 
selection of ISTCs is not adequately uncorrelated with performance, but rather that
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only well performing ISTCs have been able to open so far. Thus selection bias may 
overstate the relationships found; in this case higher performance would be found.
The researcher gained access to the NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals as they 
had asked to have their performance appraised. As a result, the NHS TCs chosen to be 
interviewed are likely to have been selected because of a recognised 
underperformance in their operational approach. In this case, it would appear that 
these facilities are performing more poorly. Moreover, it is possible these facilities 
were willing to be more open about the clinical operations in order to obtain the 
appropriate feedback. In the case study qualitative work, for the most part, the 
evidence suggests that the NHS TCs are not operating as intended. They are not 
selecting appropriate elective surgical patients. Bias is minimised due to the fact that 
the sites chosen were fairly representative of all of the NHS TCs (Douthwaite 2007). 
Further, the findings were found to be consistent with the work of the NHS Elect 
(Parker 2008).
Furthermore, the facilities chosen were facilities that were both operational and 
reporting to the NHS during the period January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007. The 
facilities that were operational may, in fact, always have better indicators than the 
facilities not yet open due to their operational know-how. This selection bias would 
then be in effect for both the ISTCs and NHS TCs. As the NHS-run treatment centre 
program was launched a few years prior to the ISTCs, there may have been a 
smoothing effect already in place between the respective facilities. Therefore, even if 
there is selection bias, this would not affect the results by ownership, rather only by 
facility type. Undoubtedly, over time the issue of selection bias will lessen.
The enquiry also found that England’s NHS was undergoing immense pressure at 
the time of study. The on-going changes, which may be the greatest since the 
inception of the NHS, undoubtedly have some effect on the findings. Further, a 
number of the NHS TC interviews took place during the end of the fiscal year, as the 
Trusts were attempting to meet wait list targets so to not be in breach. As a result, 
there is a cyclical aspect to the operations of NHS facilities.
Observer error is another possible source of unreliability. For example, the 
interviewer does not have a medical background. As a result, the discussions with 
anaesthetists and consultants may not have been as detailed as with someone with 
formal medical training. This was mitigated by the fact that a number of the site visits 
were conducted with an independent consultant for NHS Elect, an operations expert
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in the field, and a nurse. As a result, the medical background of the co-interviewer 
allowed the research to pay attention to greater medical detail than if the researcher 
had conducted all the interviews alone. Additionally, outstanding questions were 
cross-checked with other medical personnel.
Observer bias is also possible, and like subject bias, causes greater problems in 
interpretation. For example, the manner in which the quantitative analyses were 
chosen could show more favourable results than other statistical methodologies 
(Robson 1993). Within the NHS there were clearly many issues, as it was undergoing 
radical transformation. Many of these issues had been discussed openly in the media. 
However, within the ISTCs there was less conflictual information garnered. For 
instance, from the interviews, a number of the NHS consultants mentioned that at the 
ISTCs, the provisioning was not always as good as one would expect. This could not 
be verified. The interviewer certainly spent less time with consultant staff within the 
ISTCs than within the NHS. This could be due to the fact that the ISTCs were more 
sensitive about information and the potential for negative information being 
published.
There may also be some endogeneity with respect to the use of consultants. The 
ISTCs were not allowed to hire consultants that had worked for the NHS within the 
past six months. As a result, most, if not all, of the ISTC consultants were from 
overseas. On the other hand, the NHS TCs used NHS consultants. As a result, some of 
the findings may be specific to the types of consultants that are on staff.
Finally, there is also the potential that while the NHS may underperform on some 
criteria; its overall social utility is compensated for by its outstanding performance on 
other criteria. The researcher was focused on internal efficiency, a criterion by which 
the independent sector is clearly performing very well. However, the NHS has a 
larger role to play in society. The researcher may have missed some of the bigger 
issues that the NHS struggles with that intervene in day-to-day operations.
3.5 Summary
This chapter explains the research design, describes in more detail the quantitative 
and qualitative research methodologies used and addresses some key limitations to the 
research. This research method appears to be best suited for the goal of analysing the 
potential causes and effects for variances in health service quality and efficiency using 
the Treatment Centre Programme as the research emphasis.
105
Matthias Loening Part II: The Evidence Reviewed -  Quantitative Analysis
PART II
The Evidence Reviewed -  Quantitative Analysis
Chapter 4: Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency 
and Quality
106
Matthias Loening Chapter 4 Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
Chapter 4 
Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
The most pernicious doctrine in health services research, the greatest impediment to 
clear thought and successful action, is that health care is different.
Robinson, J
4.0 Introduction
This chapter will use a quantitative methodological approach, with the intention of
conducting an initial assessment on the specific issue of treatment centre performance in 
England. The purpose of the analysis is to initiate the hypothesis that there are differences 
in performance between the treatment centres, not to explain causation or engage in 
prediction. This chapter is to support the initial hypothesis and justify the rest of the thesis 
through ensuring that there are differences to explain between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in 
terms of efficiency and quality.
Because the Treatment Centre Programme in England encompasses not only ISTCs, 
but also NHS Treatment Centres (NHS TCs), we have an opportunity quantitatively to 
assess the performance of IS and NHS Treatment Centres alongside NHS Trust Hospitals 
and Independent Sector General Hospital Providers and as a result uncover whether there 
are advantages in terms of efficiency and quality that may be associated with differing 
ownership structures (public or private) and facility type (treatment centre or hospital).
An initial descriptive analysis is undertaken to look at a number of basic statistical 
values. This is followed by pooling the mean differences between groups. Multivariate 
regression analyses are then undertaken in order to assess the predictive value of these 
mean differences, to control for potential confounding factors and to determine the 
significance of variables such as ownership status, treatment centre focus, age and 
deprivation.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.1 provides a brief review of 
efficiency and quality within the context of this dissertation. Section 4.2 briefly reviews
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the research methodology and data used. Section 4.3 reviews the results found from the 
statistical analysis using the differences in means and regression analysis. Section 4.4 
discusses the findings in more detail and addresses some key limitations. Section 4.5 
follows with concluding remarks.
4.1 Efficiency and Quality of Outcomes: A Brief Review
The evidence will be assessed as to whether there are differences in performance
between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of efficiency and quality. We include data 
from NHS Trust Hospital Providers and Private Hospitals to draw out the evidence as to 
whether these differences are due to treatment centre focus or ownership. The efficiency 
analysis will be primarily technical in nature, rather than allocative. A technically 
efficient firm produces as much output as possible from a given amount of inputs, or 
produces a given output with the minimum possible quantity of inputs (Vickers and 
Yarrow 1988; Le Grand, Mays et al. 1998; Hensher 2001). Allocative efficiency is where 
the ‘best’ mix of outputs across different services areas is selected (Vickers and Yarrow 
1988). Though the conclusions would be stronger if they could include allocative 
efficiency, a method of quantifying allocative efficiency is quite difficult to formulate. 
Therefore, for this analysis we will focus on technical efficiency.
The evidence will also be assessed as to whether there are differences between the 
ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of quality outcomes. General economic theory would state 
that repetition breeds competence (Skinner 1974). In theory then, treatment centres 
should exhibit higher quality outcome levels than general hospitals because of their more 
focused approach. As a result, again, we include data from NHS Trust Hospital Providers 
and Private Hospitals to draw out the evidence as to whether these differences are due to 
treatment centre focus or ownership.
However the theory may not easily apply. Health care is a highly complex industry 
and even though there may be increases in quality at the unit level within a facility, these 
may be accompanied by decreases in quality at the level of the overall health system. 
Increased capacity means that volume levels are spread more thinly amongst the 
competing providers in a market. Therefore, when more providers compete for the same 
or lower volume of services, quality may decline and per-case costs may actually increase 
as capacity becomes not fully utilised (Robinson and Luft 1985; Herzlinger 2004; 
UNISON 2005). Consequently, finding the optimal level of volume of the specific 
procedures vis-a-vis number of competitors is difficult to balance.
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Whether the change in ownership of a firm from public to private (e.g. privatisation) 
actually leads to an improvement in performance -  measured by efficiency and quality 
outcomes -  has been the subject of a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical 
research. The literature review in Chapter 2 assessed the existing research and concluded 
that, broadly speaking, and controlling for other factors such as the level of regulation and 
competition in the market, ownership does matter, in the sense that changes in the 
structure of property rights are likely to have significant effects on firm behaviour.
Further, general economic theory would state that there are also advantages to 
specialisation, in terms of efficiency and quality of output. In theory, treatment centres 
should exhibit higher levels of productivity and quality outcomes than general hospitals, 
because of their more focused approach.
4.2 Research Design and M ethodology
The primary emphasis is geared to providing answers to whether there are differences
in performance in terms of efficiency and quality between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. 
However, to draw out the evidence on differences in performance we include NHS Trust 
Hospital Providers as well as Private Hospitals. In total there are four categories of 
providers compared: ISTCs, NHS TCs, NHS Trust Hospitals and Private Hospitals. A 
number of PCTs also provide health service provision. These providers are incorporated 
into the NHS Trust Hospital category.
Table 4.1 Four Categories of Providers Compared
Facility Type / Ownership Private Public
Treatment Centre ISTC NHS TC
Hospitals IS Hospital Providers NHS Trust Hospital (and PCTs)
Information as to whether variations in quality and efficiency are due to ownership 
status (public or private), treatment centre focus (treatment centre or general hospital) or 
other variables are drawn out using basic descriptive statistics, followed by weighted 
mean difference and then multivariate regression analyses (See Chapter 3 for a more 
detailed description of the research methodology).
4.2.1 Data and V ariables
The data used is individual patient records -  defined as a Finished Consultant Episode
(FCE) - o f every NHS patient treated as a day case or inpatient in England between 
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007. Each patient record includes a number of data
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‘fields’, containing demographic (e.g. age, gender) and clinical information (e.g. 
diagnosis, procedures performed). The patient population studied will be those patients 
that receive elective care within specific Health Resource Groups (HRGs -  see Chapter 
3). The top HRGs contracted by the Commercial Directorate (CD) are cataract surgeries, 
hernia repair and hip and knee procedures. In total, over 480,000 patient records have 
been selected for study within these HRGs (see Chapter 3 for listing of number of 
providers by HRG category). These top HRGs account for 10% of the total elective 
surgical procedures (Dr Foster 2008). These HRGs were chosen because they are the 
highest volume procedures within the ISTCs and NHS TCs, generating a significant 
number of cases for statistical analysis.
4.2.2 Descriptive Analysis
To initiate the analysis, a basic statistical analysis is conducted. We look at the
number of cases in each procedure area and the mean. Where appropriate, the median, 
standard deviation and range are also assessed. The descriptive analysis is used to initiate 
the analysis prior to conducting the mean difference and regression analysis.
4.2.3 The Model: Mean Differences
As discussed in Chapter 3, an initial analysis was conducted pooling the mean
differences of the HRGs. The pooled estimates are based on the weighted mean difference 
(WMD) statistic. The WMD, or ‘difference in means’, measures the absolute difference 
between the mean values between two groups. This method was used to see if there was a 
clear difference in the average length of stay (in days), age, rate of death and other 
variables, between different provider types for different surgery types. A ‘pooled effect’ 
is also assessed. This provides an indication of the effect size across the HRGs assessed.
V
The pooled effect is the calculated weighted mean difference of all the comparisons 
between providers. The confidence interval for the weighted mean difference is also 
calculated for the pooled effect.
4.2.4 The Model: Regression Analysis
Multivariate regression analysis was then conducted to explore the weighting of these
relationships in comparison with other potential variables. A standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression was used, with one regression run for each HRG type. Average 
length of stay by HRG was regressed against ownership of the facility (public of private), 
the type of facility (TC or hospital), the age of patient and a proxy for the individual’s
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socio-economic status with the length of stay to draw out these relationships. Because 
average length of stay is skewed and not normally distributed, a logarithm of ALOS was 
used. A non-logged OLS regression was also conducted and can also be found in 
Appendix H.
4.3 Results
The results from the descriptive analysis and difference in means are suggestive of 
differences between ISTCs, NHS TCs, NHS Trust Hospitals and Private Hospitals. A 
regression analysis is then conducted to assess the weighting of these differences by the 
variables used vis-a-vis other unexpected reasons.
4.3.1 Basic Descriptive Analysis
A basic descriptive analysis was conducted for the inpatient cases assessed between
ISTCs, NHS TCs, NHS Trust Hospitals and Private Hospitals. In all cases ISTCs have the 
lowest ALOS, followed by Private Hospitals, NHS TCs and then NHS Trust Hospitals. 
These differences are less when assessing the median values. This is due to the large 
variance and a number of significant outliers in the NHS Trust Hospital and NHS TC 
cases. For example, for a Primary Knee Replacement (H04), we see that a NHS Trust 
Hospital had an inpatient stay of 152 days and for a Primary Hip Replacement (H80), we 
see an ALOS of 372 days. This is unlikely due to purely coding errors as there are a 
number of outliers. Box plots have been drawn up and depict the large variation in ALOS 
by HRG by provider (See Appendix I: Box Plots).
I l l
Matthias Loening Chapter 4 Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
Table 4.2 Descriptive Analysis: ISTCs, NHS TCs, NHS Trust Hospitals and
Private Hospitals
HRG Facility Type N Mean Median
Std.
Deviation Range
H04 ISTC 2,076 4.75 5.00 1.740 31
NHS-Run TC 2,160 5.83 5.00 3.594 61
NHS Trust Hospital 46,948 7.10 6.00 5.331 152
Private Hospital 1,132 4.90 5.00 1.944 26
Total 52,316 6.91 6.00 5.157 152
H71 ISTC 31 6.77 5.00 4.248 19
NHS-Run TC 128 11.01 6.00 17.494 144
NHS Trust Hospital 4,693 13.42 9.00 16.646 249
Private Hospital 22 7.27 6.00 3.120 12
Total 4,874 13.29 8.00 16.598 249
H80 ISTC 1,181 4.81 5.00 1.545 17
NHS-Run TC 620 6.03 5.00 3.552 41
NHS Trust Hospital 22,524 7.71 6.00 6.945 372
Private Hospital 712 5.01 5.00 1.920 23
Total 25,037 7.46 6.00 6.673 372
H81 ISTC 517 4.30 4.00 1.675 21
NHS-Run TC 931 5.25 5.00 2.611 24
NHS Trust Hospital 12,191 6.56 6.00 5.158 154
Private Hospital 122 4.85 4.00 2.479 24
Total 13,761 6.37 5.00 4.948 154
The differences in the ALOS are more clearly seen below in bar chart format. At the 
top of the charts are error bars (5%). The error bars show the variability in the measures 
which are plotted in the chart. Again, in all cases ISTCs have the lowest ALOS, followed 
by Private Hospitals, NHS TCs and then NHS Trust Hospitals.
Figure 4.1 ALOS - HRG 04 -  Primary Knee Replacement
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Figure 4.2 ALOS -  HRG 71 -  Revisional Procedures to Hips
HRGH71 - Revisional Procedures to Hips
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Figure 4.3 ALOS - HRG 80 -  Primary Hip Replacement Cemented 
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Figure 4.4 ALOS -HRG 81 -  Primary Hip Replacement Uncemented
HRG H81 - Primary Hip Replacement Uncemented
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The above ALOS analysis shows only four (4) HRG procedure areas. This is due to 
the fact that a large proportion of the procedures conducted in Treatment Centres are day 
cases. Data by the hour or minute is not available. Therefore, per cent of day case out of 
total procedures was used for the respective HRGs. The results illustrated below are 
different. In four out of eight cases, ISTCs have the largest day case rate, three of the 
eight the NHS TCs and in one procedure area the NHS Trust Hospital and Private 
Hospitals have the highest day case rate.
114
Matthias Loening Chapter 4 Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
Table 4.3 Provider Day Case Rates
HRG Facility Type N Mean Median
B13 ISTC 3,196 89% 1.00
NHS-Run TC 1,666 100% 1.00
NHS Trust Hospital 233,504 97% 1.00
Private Hospital 870 42% 0.00
Total 239,236 97% 1.00
F71 ISTC 23 35% 0.00
NHS-Run TC 63 25% 0.00
NHS Trust Hospital 3,427 8% 0.00
Private Hospital 7 0% 0.00
Total 3,520 8% 0.00
F72 ISTC 109 68% 1.00
NHS-Run TC 140 56% 1.00
NHS Trust Hospital 8,223 37% 0.00
Private Hospital 22 18% 0.00
Total 8,494 37% 0.00
F73 ISTC 34 76% 1.00
NHS-Run TC 59 47% 0.00
NHS Trust Hospital 2,589 33% 0.00
Private Hospital 8 13% 0.00
Total 2,690 33% 0.00
F74 ISTC 379 69% 1.00
NHS-Run TC 264 81% 1.00
NHS Trust Hospital 11,703 70% 1.00
Private Hospital 58 21% 0.00
Total 12,404 70% 1.00
H10 ISTC 4,734 65% 1.00
NHS-Run TC 2,692 67% 1.00
NHS Trust Hospital 80,435 75% 1.00
Private Hospital 2,658 87% 1.00
Total 90,519 75% 1.00
H19 ISTC 24 83% 1.00
NHS-Run TC 42 69% 1.00
NHS Trust Hospital 913 49% 0.00
Private Hospital 15 7% 0.00
Total 994 50% 1.00
H21 ISTC 43 14% 0.00
NHS-Run TC 50 4% 0.00
NHS Trust Hospital 1,895 17% 0.00
Private Hospital 38 3% 0.00
Total 2,026 16% 0.00
The differences are more clearly seen below in bar chart format. Again, we use error 
bars (5%), to the show variability in the measures.
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Figure 4.5 Day Case Rate - HRG B13 - Cataracts
HRGB13 - Cataracts
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Figure 4.6 Day Case Rate - HRG 71 -  Abdominal Hernia Procedures >69 or w cc
HRG F71 - Abdominal Hernia Procedures >69 or w cc
40%
35%
30%
25%
25%
20%
15%
10% 8%
5%
0%
NHS-Run TC
0%
ISTC NHS Trust Hospital FVivate Hospital
116
Matthias Loening Chapter 4 Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
Figure 4.7 Day Case Rate - HRG 72 -  Abdominal Hernia Procedures <70 
or w/o cc
HRGF72 - Abdominal Hernia Procedures <70 w/o cc
NHS-Run TC NHS Trust Hospital Rivate Hospital
Figure 4.8 Day Case Rate - HRG 73 -  Inguinal Hernia Procedures >69 or w cc
HRGF73 - Inguinal Hernia Repairs >69 or w cc
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Figure 4.9 Day Case Rate - HRG 10 -  Arthroscopies
HRG H10 - Arthroscopies
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Figure 4.10 Day Case Rate - HRG 19 -  Soft Tissue Procedures <70 w/o cc
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Figure 4.11 Day Case Rate - HRG 21 -  Muscle, Tendon or Ligament Procedures
HRG H21 - Muscle, Tendon or Ligament Procedures
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Death rates and patient readmission rates are detailed in the patient record data and 
therefore have been used as measures of quality outcomes. Clearly, any changes in death 
rates and readmissions with the advent of the Treatment Centre Programme can thus be 
assessed. The death rate indicator used is patient deaths within 30 days of hospitalisation. 
Patient readmission rates are defined as patients readmitted to the hospital within 30 days 
following discharge.
We examined these to assess if the death rates were higher in the treatment centres 
and more specifically within the ISTCs. Clearly, this is not the case. The bar charts are 
not shown below as all the death rates are significantly below 1 per 1,000.
119
Matthias Loening Chapter 4 Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
Table 4.4 Provider Death Rates
HRG Facility Type N
Number
Deaths
Rate per 
1000
B13 ISTC 3,196 1 0.003
NHS-Run TC 1,666 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 233,504 3 0.000
Private Hospital 870 0 0.000
Total 239,236 4 0.000
F71 ISTC 23 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 63 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 3,427 10 0.029
Private Hospital 7 0 0.000
Total 3,520 10 0.028
F72 ISTC 109 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 140 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 8,223 0 0.000
Private Hospital 22 0 0.000
Total 8,494 0 0.000
F73 ISTC 34 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 59 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 2,589 3 0.012
Private Hospital 8 0 0.000
Total 2,690 3 0.011
F74 ISTC 379 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 264 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 11,703 0 0.000
Private Hospital 58 0 0.000
Total 12,404 0 0.000
H04 ISTC 2,100 2 0.010
NHS-Run TC 2,179 2 0.009
NHS Trust Hospital 47,064 111 0.024
Private Hospital 1,138 0 0.000
Total 52,481 115 0.022
H10 ISTC 4,734 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 2,692 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 80,435 0 0.000
Private Hospital 2,658 0 0.000
Total 90,519 0 0.000
H19 ISTC 24 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 42 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 913 0 0.000
Private Hospital 15 0 0.000
Total 994 0 0.000
H21 ISTC 43 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 50 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 1,895 0 0.000
Private Hospital 38 0 0.000
Total 2,026 0 0.000
H71 ISTC 33 0 0.303
NHS-Run TC 130 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 4,703 71 0.051
Private Hospital 22 0 0.000
Total 4,888 71 0.051
H80 ISTC 1,192 0 0.000
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NHS-Run TC 627 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 22,563 19 0.031
Private Hospital 716 0 0.000
Total 25,098 19 0.028
H81 ISTC 526 0 0.000
NHS-Run TC 940 0 0.000
NHS Trust Hospital 12,225 19 0.016
Private Hospital 123 0 0.000
Total 13,814 19 0.014
We then looked at hospital readmission rates. In seven (7) out of twelve (12) 
procedure areas, the ISTCs had the lowest readmission rates. In two (2) procedure areas 
ISTCs were tied with the NHS and in another procedure area (1), ISTCs were tied with 
the Private Hospitals. In one (1) procedure area, the Private Hospitals had the lowest 
readmission rate (0 per cent) but these facilities reported only 7 cases.
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Table 4.5 Provider Readmission Rates
HRG Facility Type N Per cent
B13 ISTC 3,196 0.91%
NHS-Run TC 1,666 0.78%
NHS Trust Hospital 233,504 1.61%
Private Hospital 870 1.03%
Total 239,236 1.60%
F71 ISTC 23 4.35%
NHS-Run TC 63 4.76%
NHS Trust Hospital 3,427 9.22%
Private Hospital 7 0.00%
Total 3,520 9.09%
F72 ISTC 109 1.83%
NHS-Run TC 140 4.29%
NHS Trust Hospital 8,223 6.49%
Private Hospital 22 9.09%
Total 8,494 6.40%
F73 ISTC 34 2.94%
NHS-Run TC 59 5.08%
NHS Trust Hospital 2,589 4.71%
Private Hospital 8 0.00%
Total 2,690 4.68%
F74 ISTC 379 1.85%
NHS-Run TC 264 1.89%
NHS Trust Hospital 11,703 3.20%
Private Hospital 58 6.90%
Total 12,404 3.14%
H04 ISTC 2,100 2.90%
NHS-Run TC 2,179 4.82%
NHS Trust Hospital 47,064 5.85%
Private Hospital 1,138 4.83%
Total 52,481 5.66%
H10 ISTC 4,734 0.68%
NHS-Run TC 2,692 1.45%
NHS Trust Hospital 80,435 1.29%
Private Hospital 2,658 0.83%
Total 90,519 1.25%
H19 ISTC 24 0.00%
NHS-Run TC 42 4.76%
NHS Trust Hospital 913 2.30%
Private Hospital 15 0.00%
Total 994 2.31%
H21 ISTC 43 0.00%
NHS-Run TC 50 0.00%
NHS Trust Hospital 1,895 2.43%
Private Hospital 38 2.63%
Total 2,026 2.32%
H71 ISTC 33 3.03%
NHS-Run TC 130 6.92%
NHS Trust Hospital 4,703 8.21%
Private Hospital 22 4.55%
Total 4,888 8.12%
H80 ISTC 1,192 3.69%
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NHS-Run TC 627 4.63%
NHS Trust Hospital 22,563 6.39%
Private Hospital 716 5.17%
Total 25,098 6.18%
H81 ISTC 526 3.99%
NHS-Run TC 940 5.11%
NHS Trust Hospital 12,225 5.81%
Private Hospital 123 6.50%
Total 13,814 5.70%
The differences are more clearly seen below in bar chart format below. 
Figure 4.12 Readmission Rates -  HRG B13 - Cataracts
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Figure 4.13 Readmission Rates - HRG 71 -  Abdominal Hernia Procedures 
>69 or w cc
HRG F71 - Abdominal Hernia Procedures >69 or w cc
12.00%
10.00%
8 .00%
6 .00%
4.00%
2 .00%
0 .00%
9.ZZ%
4.35%
1
4.76%
1 . 1 0.00%
ISTC NHS-Run TC NHS Trust Hospital Private Hospital
123
Matthias Loening Chapter 4 Initial Assessment of Performance: Efficiency and Quality
Figure 4.14 Readmission Rates - HRG 72 -  Abdominal Hernia Procedures <70 
or w/o cc
HRG F72 - Abdominal Hernia Procedures <70 w/o cc
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Figure 4.15 Readmission Rates -  HRG B73 -  Inguinal Hernia Repairs >69 
or w cc
HRGF73 - Inguinal Hernia Repairs >69 or w cc
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Figure 4.16 Readmission Rates -  HRG F74 - Inguinal Hernia Repairs <70 
or w/o cc
HRGF74 • Inguinal Hernia Repairs <70 w/o cc
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Figure 4.17 Readmission Rates -  HRG H10- Arthroscopies
HRG H10 - Arthroscopies
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Figure 4.18 Readmission Rates -  HRG H I9 -  Soft Tissue Procedures <70 w/o cc
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Figure 4.19 Readmission Rates -  HRG H21 -  Muscle, Tendon or Ligament 
Procedures
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Figure 4.20 Readmission Rates -  HRG H04 -  Primary Knee Replacement
HRGH04 - Primary Knee Replacement
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Figure 4.21 Readmission Rates -  HRG H71 -  Revisional Procedures to Hips
HRG H71 - Revisional Procedures to Hips
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Figure 4.22 Readmission Rates -  HRG H80 -  Primary Hip Replacement 
Cemented
HRGH80 - Primary Hip Replacement Cemented
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Figure 4.23 Readmission Rates -  HRG H81 -  Primary Hip Replacement 
Uncemented
HRG H81 - Primary Hip Replacement Uncemented
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In summary, there is a difference in the ALOS of facilities. The differences are not as 
strong when assessing die day case rates. However, what is clear is that ISTCs have better 
efficiency indicators, followed by Private Hospitals, NHS TCs and then NHS Trust 
Hospitals.
From the quality outcomes standpoint, there is very little difference in the death rates. 
Readmission rates are lower in the ISTCs. The NHS TCs were slightly better than in the 
Private Hospitals (by number of procedure areas). NHS Trust Hospitals had the highest 
readmission rates within these HRGs. This is to be expected, as the NHS should see a 
higher case mix of patients.
There are a number of issues with the basic analyses conducted. For example, private 
hospitals have a very low number of cases, the NHS Trust Hospitals provide a large 
proportion of the total cases assessed (75 per cent) and one procedure area, cataracts, 
account for over 52% of the total day cases accessed. The difference in means analysis 
conducted in the following section will attempt to account for these weaknesses by 
weighting these differences.
4.3.2 Difference in Means Analysis
In the WMD analysis six different comparisons were made. These consisted of:
1. ISTC vs NHS TCs
2. ISTC vs NHS
3. ISTC vs. IS Providers
4. NHS TC vs IS Providers
5. NHS vs IS Providers
6. NHS vs NHS TCs
Patients are grouped by HRGs and a number of indicators have been assessed. These 
indicators included:
1. Length of stay in days (ALOS)
2. Proportion of day cases of total discharges
3. 30 day death rates
4. Inpatient readmissions
5. Age in years
6. Deprivation (IMD) score
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The initial analysis assesses the length of stay in days (ALOS) for the cataracts, 
hernias and orthopedic procedures studied. It was found that the mean length of stay for 
an ISTC was significantly lower than the other facility types (See figures below). The 
average length of stay (when all procedures were pooled together) at an ISTC was 0.16 
days less than at an IS Provider (Pooled effect: WMD = -0.16; 95% confidence interval 
-0.31 to -0.01). At the same time, the average pooled length of stay at an IS Providers was 
0.75 days less than the average stay at an NHS TC (Pooled effect: WMD = -0.75; 95% 
confidence interval -0.99 to -0.51). The average pooled length of stay at an NHS TCs was 
0.36 days less than at an NHS Provider (Pooled effect: WMD = -0.36; 95% confidence 
interval -0.52 to -0.21). An NHS Trust Hospital had a significantly higher average length 
of stay than the other facility types.
Length of Stay in Days (ALOS) -  All Cases
Figure 4.23: Forest plot for ALOS (Days): Figure 4.24: Forest plot for ALOS (Days):
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Figure 4.25: Forest plot for ALOS (Days): 
ISTCs vs. IS Providers (2007)
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An important limitation to the initial assessment in the above figures is that a number 
of the HRGs are predominantly outpatient (OP) procedures. For example, cataracts (B13) 
accounted for over 50% of the total procedures, and this procedure was predominantly 
provided by the NHS. This has a significant impact on the pooled effect.
Therefore, a follow up analysis was conducted that only assesses HRG procedures 
that are typically undertaken on an inpatient basis (see below). The analysis shows the 
same order of outcomes by provider with the ISTCs having the lowest WMD, followed 
by private hospitals, NHS TCs and then NHS Trust Hospitals. However, the evidence in 
this subset of HRGs is even more profound, with the mean differences greater between 
groups and the confidence interval narrower and further from zero. In this analysis, ISTCs 
again had the lowest average length of stay. On average, the pooled length of stay for 
inpatient procedures at an ISTC was 0.20 days less than at an IS provider (Pooled effect: 
WMD = -0.20; 95% confidence interval -0.39 to -0.02), while IS providers tended to have 
an average length of stay 1.73 days less than NHS TCs (Pooled effect: WMD = -1.73; 
95% confidence interval -2.20 to -1.25) and NHS TCs had an ALOS 1.44 days less than 
NHS Providers (Pooled effect: WMD = -1.44; 95% confidence interval -1.90 to -0.97).
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Length of Stay in Days (ALOS) -  Inpatient Cases Only
Figure 4.29: Forest plot for ALOS (Days): 
ISTCs vs. NHS TCs (2007)
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Figur* 4.33: Forest plot for ALOS (Days): 
IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
Figure 4.34: Forest plot for ALOS (Days): 
NHS TCs vs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
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For day case procedures, the mean difference analysis by ALOS does not work very 
well, because effectively all day cases have an average length of stay of zero (0). As a 
result, procedures that are typically one-day procedures were removed from the previous 
analysis and analysed as a proportion of day cases of total procedures (See Appendix C). 
In this case, the higher the number, the more often a procedure results in the patient being 
released the same day as the procedure.
Upon initial analysis, the evidence here is different. In this case the NHS Trust 
Hospitals and NHS TCs had the highest day case per centage of the assessed procedure 
groups that were day cases (with no statistical difference between each other), followed 
by ISTCs and then the Private Hospitals. The differences here, from the initial statistical 
analysis, are due to a disproportion of cases in a certain number of procedure areas (e.g. 
cataracts and arthroscopies).
On average, NHS TCs had a day case rate of 0.80% more than NHS Providers, but 
not significant (Pooled effect: WMD = 0.80%; 95% confidence interval -0.80 to 2.40). 
ISTCs had a day case rate of 5.10% less than the NHS TCs (Pooled effect: WMD = 
-5.10%; 95% confidence interval -7.90 to -2.40) and a day case rate of 6.60% less than 
the NHS Trust Hospitals (Pooled effect: WMD = -6.60%; 95% confidence interval -8.00 
to -5.20). The day case rate at an ISTC was 5.20% higher than at an IS provider (Pooled 
effect: WMD = 5.20%; 95% confidence interval 2.00% to 8.40%).
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For quality outcomes data, we use two points of measurement: death rates during 
hospitalisation (in hospital mortality) and patient readmission data.
The death rate does not show evidence of differing quality outcomes (See Appendix 
D) between any of the provider groups (Pooled effect: WMD = 0.00; largest 95% 
confidence interval -0.10 to 0.00). Because different providers had different case loads, 
death rate was used, rather than raw deaths. The evidence is per cent differences in the 
death rate between providers. However, the lack of any difference between providers is 
interesting in itself. While the evidence does not suggest that quality is better in any of the 
facilities, at the same time, the level of quality appears to be equally good at TCs as it is 
at NHS Trust hospitals.
Further, with respect to patient readmission rates, only in the case of ISTCs versus 
NHS Trust Hospitals, is there a statistically significant difference (See Appendix E). On 
average, ISTCs readmitted patients 1.30% less often than NHS Trust Hospitals (Pooled 
effect: WMD = -1.30; 95% confidence interval -2.20 to -0.30). In all the other 
comparisons, the confidence interval includes 0 and is therefore not statistically 
significant -  however, it is important to note that the data does not include information on 
whether patients were readmitted to a different provider. Again, to facilitate comparison, 
readmission rates were used, rather than raw readmission numbers. The evidence is per 
cent differences in the readmission rate between providers.
A potential factor affecting ALOS is patient case mix. There are two indicators that 
we can use to assess possible differences in case mix. These indicators are patient age 
(Appendix F) and patient income deprivation, or IMD (See Appendix G).
In theory, the older the patient, the higher the co-morbidities are to be expected. If the 
treatment centres are cream skimming, or actively selecting less difficult patients to treat, 
we would expect patient age to be lower in treatment centres than in General Hospitals.
The evidence for discrimination by age is slightly more difficult to interpret as age is 
organised by age band (categorical data) rather than year. Because the age bands are 5- 
year intervals, differences in the average age selected by each provider are difficult to 
determine and must be larger than five years to be apparent. Nevertheless, one can 
broadly surmise that the average age for different facilities is not greater than five years, 
because in all comparisons, except for the comparison of IS Providers and NHS Trust 
Hospital, the data is statistically insignificant (the confidence intervals cross zero). All the 
weighted mean difference comparison analyses are significantly less than 0.50, meaning 
that the comparison providers are more likely to be in the same band than in different
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ones. There is only a slight differential in the confidence interval away from zero when 
comparing IS Providers and NHS Trust Hospitals, but the WMD is still less than 0.50 
(Pooled effect: WMD = 0.41; 95% confidence interval 0.12 to 0.70).
With respect to deprivation, the evidence suggests that deprivation scores also differ 
very little. There is only a statistically significant difference when comparing ISTCs and 
NHS TCs, and when comparing all three providers with NHS Trust hospitals. This is not 
especially surprising.
Again, the evidence is slightly more difficult to interpret because deprivation scores 
are categorical data. As a result, the mean difference estimates the difference between the 
categorical means. All the weighted mean difference are significantly less than 0.50, 
meaning the averages are more likely to share a category, than to not. What the data does 
not tell us is the mean deprivation scores of the providers. However, this is not 
specifically relevant for this analysis. Here we intend to assess merely whether there are 
significant differences in the deprivation scores as a proxy for potential case mix 
differentials between providers. Further, the evidence here is consistent with a recent 
study by York University which found no evidence of differences in case mix between 
providers (Mason, Miraldo et al. 2007).
Table 4.6 Summary of Main Direction of Findings Across HRGs
Indicator Direction of Findings
Length of stay in days 
(ALOS) - All
ISTCs < IS Providers < NHS TCs < NHS Trust Hospitals
Length of stay in days 
(ALOS) - Only inpatient
cases
ISTCs < IS Providers < NHS TCs < NHS Trust Hospitals
Proportion of day cases 
of total discharges
NHS Trust Hospitals = NHS TCs < ISTCs < IS Providers
30 day death rates No difference
Inpatient readmissions ISTC < NHS Trust Hospitals. No significant difference 
for other comparisons.
Age in years IS Providers < NHS Trust Hospitals. No significant 
difference for other comparisons.
Deprivation (IMD) score ISTCs = IS Providers < NHS TCs < NHS Trust Hospitals
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In sum, the evidence is indicative of significant differences in performance with 
respect to efficiency, when ALOS is used as a proxy. Generally speaking we see that the 
efficiency performance indicators are highest for ISTCs, followed by IS Providers, NHS 
TCs and lastly NHS Trust Hospitals. When we use proportion of day cases of total 
discharges to measure efficiency, the evidence is different. We see that the efficiency 
performance indicators are highest for NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals, where there is 
no difference between the two facility types, followed by ISTCs and then Private 
Hospitals. There are no significant differences in patient outcomes data when 30 day 
death rates and patient readmission rates are used as proxies for quality. We have also 
assessed potential differences in age and deprivation, with a view that these may point to 
differences in case mix. We found very little, if any, difference between providers.
Theory suggests that we should see differences in efficiency and quality that result 
from differences in ownership. Theory also suggests that facilities providing a more 
focused approach should have better performance. With respect to efficiency, as 
measured by ALOS, the evidence is suggestive that this is true. The evidence is less clear 
when assessing day case rate evidence. With respect to quality outcomes, we see very 
little evidence of differences. However, at the same time, we can say that, while quality 
outcomes may not be better, they are certainly no worse, as was feared when the 
Treatment Centre program was initially proposed. Generally, there is a stronger 
association between efficiency when looking at ALOS and ownership than between 
efficiency and type of facility. However, what we do not know is how much the 
differences in efficiency are due to ownership and how much are due to the type of 
facility. To better investigate this, the researcher conducted basic regression analysis.
4.3.3 Regression Analysis
The regression model uses several independent variables from the patient record. The
equation below is the model used for the analysis.
log (El) = a + b]0  + b2T + bsA + b4D
The logarithm of the dependent variable (El) is used as the variable is skewed. El is 
the Efficiency Indicator (ALOS in this instance), O is Ownership (Private = 0, Public =
1), T is type of facility (Treatment Centre = 0, Hospital = 1), A is age (as determined by
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the five year age bands), and D is deprivation (as determined by the relative deprivation 
index).
The regression analysis was conducted to assess in more detail the relationships 
between average length of stay and the independent variables. The regression was run 
once for each type of inpatient procedure and showed varying levels of explanatory 
power for different procedures. Because the dependent variable, average length of stay, is 
skewed and not normally distributed, a logarithm of (ALOS) was used.
When using a log ALOS as the El, the model gives an R2 of 6.1% for Primary Knee 
Replacement (H04), an R2 of 7.4% was obtained for Revisional Procedures to Hips 
(H71), an R2 of 8.4% was obtained for Primary Hip Replacement Cemented (H80) and an 
R of 8.7% was obtained for Primary Hip Replacement uncemented (H81). Generally 
speaking higher R2 values were obtained for procedures with longer average ALOS 
values, such as Hip Replacement Procedures (H80, H81). While these are not strong 
indicators, the results are not that insignificant for cross-sectional data.
Table 4.7 Model Summary___________________________________________________
HRG Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
H04 1 .272(a) 0.074 0.074 0.19806
H71 1 .247(b) 0.061 0.060 0.32033
H80 1 .296(a) 0.087 0.087 0.20332
H81 1 .290(b) 0.084 0.084 0.19083
a. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, Facility Type, ageBand, Ownership Status 
(private, public)
b. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, Ownership Status (private, public), ageBand, 
Facility Type
Other indicators show that, while the model is not able to predict ALOS with a high 
degree of accuracy, the underlying model still has significant explanatory power. The 
ANOVA table shows an F-ratio varying from 75.161 to 1,047.303 with all cases being 
significant (p<0.05). The F-ratio is used to test the joint significance of all independent 
variables -  a significant result at p<0.05 indicates that the model’s explanatory power is 
better than chance. The F-ratio shows that the model is significantly better at predicting 
the outcome than using the ALOS mean as guess. While the F-ratio varies, depending on 
the HRG, it generally supports the model’s explanatory power.
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Table 4.8 ANOVA(c)
HRG Model
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
H04 1 Regression 164.332 4 41.083 1,047.303 .000(a)
Residual 2,048.925 52,232 0.039
Total 2,213.257 52,236
H71 1 Regression 30.850 4 7.713 75.161 .000(b)
Residual 475.923 4,638 0.103
Total 506.774 4,642
H80 1 Regression 98.851 4 24.713 597.780 .000(a)
Residual 1,033.103 24,990 0.041
Total 1,131.954 24,994
H81 1 Regression 46.003 4 11.501 315.821 .000(b)
Residual 500.238 13,737 0.036
Total 546.241 13,741
a. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, Facility Type, ageBand, Ownership Status 
(private, public)
b. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, Ownership Status (private, public), ageBand, 
Facility Type
c. Dependent Variable: ALOSLOG
The coefficients table illustrates the parameters of the model. The b-values indicate 
the individual contribution of each predictor to the model. The independent variable for 
ownership is significant in three out of four of the regressions, and is positive in all of the 
regressions. Because this variable takes the value of 0 under private ownership and 1 
under public ownership, a positive value indicates a higher length of stay at public 
facilities. The highest coefficient was obtained for hip-replacement H80, with a value of 
0.106 -  although, with low R2 values, the direction (positive or negative) is more 
important than the actual figure.
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Table 4.9 Coefficients Table
Unstandardised Standardised Collinearity
Coefficients Coefficients Statistics
Std. Std.
HRG Model B Error Beta t Sig. B Error
H04 1 (Constant)
Ownership
0.324 0.007 45.268 0.000
Status
(private, 0.090 0.004 0.105 21.135 0.000 0.719 1.391
public)
Facility Type 0.056 0.004 0.074 14.910 0.000 0.719 1.390
ageBand 0.018 0.000 0.209 49.597 0.000 0.999 1.001
deprivationID 0.012 0.001 0.076 18.004 0.000 0.998 1.002
H71 1 (Constant)
Ownership
0.316 0.053 5.991 0.000
Status
(private, 0.083 0.047 0.027 1.778 0.075 0.891 1.123
public)
Facility Type 0.130 0.027 0.071 4.738 0.000 0.892 1.121
ageBand 0.027 0.002 0.224 15.659 0.000 0.990 1.010
deprivationID 0.017 0.004 0.067 4.714 0.000 0.991 1.009
H80 1 (Constant)
Ownership
0.341 0.010 34.803 0.000
Status
(private, 0.106 0.006 0.131 17.192 0.000 0.627 1.595
public)
Facility Type 0.060 0.006 0.073 9.581 0.000 0.628 1.594
ageBand 0.018 0.000 0.220 36.377 0.000 0.998 1.002
deprivationID 0.011 0.001 0.069 11.464 0.000 0.997 1.003
H81 1 (Constant)
Ownership
0.295 0.013 22.125 0.000
Status
(private, 0.070 0.009 0.073 7.750 0.000 0.743 1.346
public)
Facility Type 0.078 0.006 0.120 12.670 0.000 0.742 1.347
ageBand 0.019 0.001 0.222 27.048 0.000 0.990 1.010
deprivationID 0.014 0.001 0.093 11.329 0.000 0.989 1.011
a. Dependent Variable: ALOSLOG
Facility type is significant in four out of four regressions, at p<0.05, and is positive in 
all four regressions. Again, because the variable is 0 when the facility is a treatment 
centre, and 1 when the facility is a hospital, we see that, on average, a hospital is 
associated with a longer length of stay.
The control variables, age and deprivation, are also significant in all four regressions 
respectively. The coefficients on age were positive, indicating that a higher age
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corresponds to a longer length of stay (as expected). The coefficient on deprivation, a 
proxy for socio-economic status where 0 is least deprived and 5 was most deprived, was 
also always positive, indicating that higher levels of deprivation are accompanied by 
higher ALOS, again as expected.
Broadly, we can say that ownership is an important predictor. In three out of the four 
cases, ownership is significant (p<0.05) and in two out of four cases ownership is the 
strongest predictor. Facility type (Treatment Centre or Hospital) is a stronger predictor in 
one case and in one case it is nearly equal with ownership. Again, as we more closely 
assess cases that are inpatient cases with a longer ALOS, we begin to see significant 
differences in the coefficients for ownership and facility type. While the control variable 
of age and income deprivation are generally significant, the size of the coefficient is 
usually smaller than ownership and facility type, indicating they play a smaller role in 
determining ALOS than these other factors.
Overall, the model does not appear to be successful in predicting length of stay as 
there is well over 90% of the variation in length of stay unaccounted for (i.e., predicted by 
other factors than ownership, facility type, age and deprivation). However, the regression 
analysis does support the difference in means analysis that ownership indeed is the 
important difference in performance in terms of efficiency and quality between hospitals 
and treatment centres. Moreover, the results from the non-logged regression analysis are 
analogous to the results from the logistic regression analysis (See Appendix H:
Regression Analysis for full output analysis).
4.4 Discussion
This section will discuss the overall findings, the key limitations and proposes further 
research in this area.
4.4.1 Overall Findings
Overall, in the basic descriptive analysis, there is a difference in the ALOS of
facilities. The differences are not as strong when assessing the day case rates. Broadly, 
the data is indicative that ISTCs have better efficiency indicators, followed by Private 
Hospitals, NHS TCs and then NHS Trust Hospitals. From the quality outcomes 
standpoint, there is very little difference in the death rates. Readmission rates are lower in 
the ISTCs. The NHS TCs were slightly better than in the Private Hospitals (by number of 
procedure areas) with NHS Trust Hospitals having the highest readmission rates within 
these HRGs.
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The difference in means analysis suggests that ISTCs tend to have higher performance 
levels (as measured by lower ALOS) than all other providers. NHS Trust Hospitals have 
the lowest performance. IS Providers perform better than NHS TCs. The evidence is even 
more profound when limited to inpatient cases (and taking out outpatient procedures).
Provider day case rates were also assessed. We see that the day case rates are highest 
for NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals, followed by ISTCs and then Private Hospitals. 
However, there are significant limitations to this analysis. Cataracts and arthroscopies 
account for 90 or more per cent of the total cases. There are significant differences when 
comparing providers and their number of cases. Lastly, the day case rate only estimates 
whether the procedure was a day case or not. This dampens the actual range and variance 
between providers.
As proxies for quality, 30 day death rates and inpatient readmission rates were 
examined. With respect to 30 day death rates, outcomes were found to be no better, nor 
worse, by type of provider. The evidence from inpatient readmission rates suggests 
similar results. Inpatient readmission rates were found to be no better, nor worse, by type 
of provider. Results are only significant when ISTCs are compared to NHS Trust 
Hospitals (ISTC < NHS Trust Hospitals).
The ALOS and quality outcome analysis was unadjusted for case mix. As a result, 
there was concern that differences in case mix may skew the initial findings. As a result, 
patient age and patient income deprivation, or IMD, were used to assess for these possible 
differences in case mix. With respect to age, broadly, there is very little difference 
between the providers. In all comparisons, except for the comparison of IS Providers and 
NHS Trust Hospitals, the data is statistically insignificant, with the confidence intervals 
crossing zero.
Further, the initial findings suggest that deprivation scores differ very little between 
providers. The evidence is only statistically significant when comparing ISTCs and NHS 
TCs (ISTCs have lower deprivation levels) and when comparing NHS Trust Hospitals 
with all the other provider types (NHS Trust Hospitals tend to have slightly higher 
deprivation scores).
The regression analysis was undertaken to assess the strength of these relationships. It 
is important to reemphasise that the purpose of the analysis is to initiate the hypothesis 
that there are differences in performance between the Treatment Centres and not to 
explain causation or prediction, but rather to obtain initial correlations and ensure that 
there are differences in performance. Broadly, we see that, when significant, ownership is
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the strongest predictor in the model, as it tends to have the highest coefficient in the 
majority of these cases. This evidence is more prevalent when using non-logged ALOS 
(see Appendix H). We do not see much difference in age nor deprivation that would 
suggest that there are significant differences in case mix complexity between facility 
types. As a result, the regression analysis seems to support the difference in means 
analysis which suggests that ownership is the reason for the difference in performance 
between treatment centres.
4.4.2 Key Limitations
There are several key limitations to the approach used and the quality of the data.
Some of the broader short-comings of the data are discussed in Chapter 3, and as such, 
this chapter will limit itself to specifically quantitative issues.
Without a doubt, as we have seen above (Chapter 2) there are limitations to using 
ALOS as a proxy for efficiency. Other potential efficiency components, such as operating 
room (OR) time, OR’s used-per-day versus number of OR’s in total, and surgeries per 
doctor per shift, may be better measures of efficiency. However, this data is not reported 
to a central NHS database. Attempts to assess individual performance were made through 
the calculation of staffing numbers alongside volume figures. However, in the end this 
proved impossible due to the various nature of surgeries and limitations on case mix 
adjustment, as well as the absence of good staffing data at the ISTCs and NHS facilities. 
As a result, ALOS has been selected because it is the best indicator available to broadly 
assess differences in performance, while keeping in mind the previously mentioned 
limitations. Median and inter-quartile range was cross-checked (see Appendix I: Box 
Plots). The results are broadly consistent with the findings in this chapter.
The researcher felt that keeping the outliers was important, as it would be difficult to 
justify where any cut-offs should be. It is clear from the data that there are significant 
quality issues both with the coding and data reporting. However, we make the assumption 
that these quality-reporting issues are consistent between providers, and that therefore, 
they should cancel out when comparing different facilities. Moreover, the median and 
inter-quartile range provides the ability to cross validate whether the outliers skew the 
results towards one provider or the other. Clearly, they do not.
Another potential limitation to the findings is that the difference in means analysis 
between individual HRG comparisons does not account for the number of cases within 
each provider comparison. For example, there were a total of 4,888 patient cases for HRG
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H71 (Revisional Procedures to Hips). Thirty-three (33) of these cases were provided by 
the ISTCs (0.7%), 130 provided by NHS-Run TCs (2.7%), 4,703 provided by NHS Trust 
Hospitals (96.2%) and 22 cases provided by Private Hospitals (0.5%). As a result, a 
comparison between a low number of cases with a lower than expected ALOS by the 
Private Hospital providers and high number of cases by the NHS Trust Hospitals may 
result in an unfair comparison.
The lack of comprehensive set performance metrics means that the data does not 
provide a complete performance picture. It also means that there are gaps and 
inconsistencies between providers and with respect to the NHS. The quality of the data 
that is being reported is another potential limitation to the findings (Health Committee 
2006; Healthcare Commission 2007; Mason, Miraldo et al. 2007; Pollock and Godden 
2008). Evidence of misclassification of cases could have introduced a major distortion 
into the reported differences. Further, only seven (7) of the 60 NHS TCs are reporting to 
Dr Fosters. As a result, NHS TC data for the other 53 cases is incorporated statistically 
into the Trust Hospital data which may significant affect the findings, thereby improving 
the data (e.g. ALOS, day case rates, etc.) reported by the NHS Trust Hospitals.
Another limitation, and significantly underestimated so far in the general research, is 
that the majority of NHS Trust Hospitals do not separate out the Trust Hospital discharges 
vis-a-vis the NHS TC data. This impacts not only the robustness of the NHS TC data but 
also the quality of the NHS Trust Hospital data. Because the NHS TC data is embedded 
within the overall Trust data, the evidence from this chapter suggests that NHS Trust 
Hospital performance is higher than truly the case if NHS TC reported data were to be 
separated out.
There may be threats to the validity of the data (Robson 1993) with selection bias in 
the cases. The facilities chosen were facilities deemed operational and reporting to the 
NHS during the period January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007. These facilities that were 
operational may in fact always have better indicators than the facilities not yet open due 
to their operational know-how. This selection bias would then be in effect for both the 
ISTCs and NHS-run TCs. As the NHS-run TC program was launched a few years prior to 
the ISTCs, there may have been a smoothing effect already in place between the 
respective facilities. Undoubtedly, over time the issue of selection bias will lessen.
A weakness of the HRG methodology at its current status is that the groupings are not 
refined to account for variations in complexity in the individual patients and total case 
mix of the respective facilities. There is evidence that case mix is an important
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determinant of inter-hospital variation in average cost, utilisation of ancillary services, 
and mean length of stay (Feldstein 1967; Evans 1971; Evans and Walker 1972; Feldstein 
and Schuttinga 1977). Unfortunately, an agreed case mix method of adjustment has not 
been developed in the UK. Researchers have adjusted for case mix using other methods to 
get around this issue. Case mix complexity in this chapter is taken into account by using 
age and deprivation.
However, the limitations to the case mix adjustment factor should be recognised. 
Beyond the operation (HRG) itself, only two types of variables are used for assessing 
provider case mix (age and deprivation). A recent study of the outcomes of ISTCs and 
NHS providers comprised of six ISTCs and 20 NHS hospitals and TCs, that took into 
account nine (9) pre-operative characteristics including age, duration of symptoms 
(years), socioeconomic status (deprivation score), EQ-5D score, disease-specific score 
(disease severity), sex, any comorbidities, previous similar surgeries and general health 
(Brown, et al. 2008). Despite the increase in the number of variables used, the authors 
still had reservations on whether their research had adequately adjusted their results for 
case mix due to their risk adjustment models having a poor predictive power.
Furthermore, Brown et al (2008) study recognised limitations on the findings due to 
the small number of ISTC patients in the study, which is also reflective of this 
dissertation. The adequacy for any potential case mix adjustment is particularly important 
given that the sample sizes differ so much between provider types with many more cases 
in the NHS Trust category than the other three provider types.
However, even given the limitations, it is to be noted that the authors did find 
differences in case mix between the ISTCs and NHS providers. This was certainly to be 
expected due to the inherent nature of the contracts. What would have been valuable is if 
the authors could have separated out the evidence between the NHS hospital providers 
and TCs to ensure applicable comparisons, as this dissertation attempts to do. In fact the 
authors group the NHS Trust Hospital and TC providers and compare this to the ISTCs. 
More pertinent would be to compare the NHS TC providers with the ISTCs because of 
the same target patient case mix.
There is concern that the TC Programme may also affect quality outcomes. Though, 
the evidence suggests that ISTCs have lower ALOS, there are may be linkages between 
ALOS and readmission rates. In this study the research did not track individual patients 
that were readmitted and hence cannot adjust for this potential limitation. However, the 
literature on this is discussed in Chapter 2, with the balance of evidence suggesting no
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evidence that providers with lower than average lengths of stay for first admission have 
higher readmission rates.
Multicollinearity between two or more of the predictors presented a major concern. 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between two or more 
independent variables in the regression model. In the OLS regression, the individual 
correlations between different variables were checked, and none had an especially high 
correlation. The variance inflation factor (VIF) from the coefficients table can be used to 
assess whether a variable has a strong linear relationship with the other variable(s). All 
the VIF numbers were around 1, well below the value of 10, which is a value at which to 
be concerned (See Appendix J).
There was also concern that the model might suffer from heteroscedasticity. This 
occurs when the variance of the residuals is not constant, but is instead correlated with 
one or more variables. To test for normality of residuals in the regression analyses, 
histograms and normal probability plots (P-P Plots) were drawn up and assessed (See 
Appendix K)1. Non-linear relationships between a predictor and the outcome variable are 
much more predictable using these types of plots. The Histograms show normality in the 
plots. Broadly, the P-P Plots are acceptable. A straight line in this plot represents a normal 
distribution and the points represent the observed residuals. Clearly, the residuals are 
close to a normal distribution.
The above weaknesses, along with those listed in Chapter 3, limits the comparability 
between the ISTCs, NHS TCs, NHS Trust Hospitals and Private Hospitals from a purely 
quantitative standpoint. However, it does justify the hypothesis that there are differences 
in performance between the Treatment Centres. As a result, the qualitative analyses in 
Chapters 5 and 6 will attempt to ascertain why the evidence suggests ownership is an 
important explanatory variable in the results.
Additional research should be conducted on the quality outcomes. The analyses that 
can be drawn from the NHS patient records cannot illustrate the full extent of quality 
outcomes. The initial findings of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which are 
reported by the ISTCs to the Central Contract Management Units (CCMU) on a monthly 
basis, were quite positive. The evidence suggests that there is a robust quality assurance 
system in place, more ambitious and demanding than that for National Health Service 
(NHS) organisations. The KPI data to be collected and provided by the ISTCs extends
1 Note that the histogram for H04 is not included. This is due to insufficient computer memory to complete 
the graphic. An alternative analysis was conducted with the results showing a normal distribution.
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beyond that used by the NHS and early quality monitoring results are encouraging 
(National Center for Health Outcomes Development 2005). However, KPIs are not 
reported by the NHS.
Further, the quantitative analysis does not assess potential cost differentials between 
the various facilities. Cost data are not possible to attain as these are not reported to Dr. 
Fosters. Further, there are commercial confidentiality reasons for not sharing this 
information to the public by the ISTCs. Even if this data were attainable, the NHS Trust 
Hospital and TCs also do not report this information. There has been some work 
undertaken in ccomparison of annual contract referrals and the value of the contracts 
(Pollock and Kirkwood 2009). However, a key limitation of this research is that the 
authors estimate of the cost per patient is based upon the number of these referrals from 
the total value of the contracts. Ignoring the fact that it is the responsibility of the GPs and 
PCTs in generating these referrals, it is clear that the ISTCs are nascent facilities, 
operational ramp up takes time and as a result the cost using this calculation would be 
quite high in the first months of operations. As a result, additional research in these areas 
would be welcomed now that nearly all the facilities are operating at high levels of 
capacity (Le Grand, 2009).
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter provides quantitative evidence on efficiency and quality outcomes within 
a number of elective care procedures. The purpose of the quantitative analysis is to obtain 
initial correlations and to test the hypothesis of whether there are differences in 
performance between the Treatment Centres in England. The ISTCs and NHS TCs have 
been compared to NHS Trust Hospitals and Independent Sector General Hospital 
Providers. As measures of efficiency, average length of stay and proportion of day cases 
have been used as a proxies. Quality outcomes have been measured using hospital death 
and readmission rates.
Theory suggests that ownership structure should lead to differences in performance. 
Theory also suggests that facilities with a more focused approach should have better 
performance. With respect to efficiency, as measured by average length of stay, the 
evidence suggests this to be true. However, when comparing the proportion of inpatient 
procedures which were completed in one day, NHS Trust Hospitals and NHS TCs were 
ranked highest, followed by ISTCs and the Private Hospitals. However, there are 
significant limitations to this analysis. Cataracts and arthroscopies account for 90 or more
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per cent of the total cases. There are significant differences between providers and their 
number of cases and the actual number of providers. Lastly, the day case rate only 
estimates whether the procedure was a day case or not. This dampens the actual range and 
variance between providers.
With respect to quality outcomes, we see very little, if any, differences between the 
providers. Though, we are not able to say that quality outcomes are better within the 
ISTCs and NHS TCs, at the same time the data suggests that they do not appear to be 
worse. Generally speaking, we see that ownership plays a stronger role in determining 
performance than the type of facility. However, the weighted mean difference analysis 
does not provide information on the relative weights we should put on the ‘type of 
facility’ and ‘ownership structure’ variables, when evaluating their roles in improving 
performance. As a result, the researcher conducted basic regression analysis.
The regression model helps clarify this issue. Broadly, we can say ownership is the 
strongest predictor in the model. In the majority of cases where there is statistical 
significance, ownership is the strongest predictor. In the cases where type of facility is a 
stronger predictor, ownership is not significant. In the fourth case, ownership and facility 
type are nearly equal. Age and deprivation, though usually significant variables, do not 
have very high coefficients, indicating they are not especially important, at least 
compared to the type and ownership of a facility.
There are key limitations to the quantitative approach, because of the data available. 
These limitations could throw the comparability and validity of the findings into question, 
so the following chapters will attempt to assess from a qualitative standpoint the general 
evidence found in this chapter. The qualitative approach will look more deeply into the 
Treatment Centre Programme to further investigate the causes for the differences in 
performance between the treatment centres and between the different ownership 
structures.
Notwithstanding the evidence, there are larger policy issues in the assessment of the 
data. Opponents of the Treatment Centre Programme in England, more specifically the 
ISTCs, may argue that even though there may be evidence of an increase in technical 
efficiency, the fragmentation of health service leads to allocative inefficiency through the 
duplication of services and loss in economies of scope. Thus the net effects to the entire 
health system are not so clear and are not assessed here.
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Chapter 5 
Treatment Centres: Independent Sector and NHS
I  cannot say whether things will get better i f  we change; what I  can say is they must 
change i f  they are to get better.
G. C. (Georg Christoph) Lichtenberg
5.0 Introduction
This chapter is the first of two chapters that will add to the research literature on 
England’s Treatment Centre Programme by providing qualitative evidence on the 
differences in performance between the Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTC) 
and NHS Treatment Centres (NHS TCs) and to offer some explanations for these 
differences. From the evidence provided in the previous chapter, the data indicates 
that differing performance in terms of efficiency is correlated with private versus 
public ownership and management. The evidence in these two chapters will be further 
assessed to ascertain why ownership matters, or, at a minimum, why differences in 
ownership may account for differences in organisational and operational approach 
between these facilities. The purpose of this chapter and the next is to explore these 
relationships that cannot be picked up by quantitative measures.
This chapter assesses the Independent Sector and NHS Treatment Centres. The 
main emphasis of this work is to review differences in the actual organisational 
structure and operations of these treatment centres, while the following chapter will 
examine the effects of ownership structures in ISTCs and NHS TCs. The originality 
of this research is that unlike much other research, the evidence is assessed by going 
into the ‘black box’ of these organisations and assessing why there were differences 
in performance.
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 5.1 provides a brief review of 
the research methodology used for this chapter and the evidence used supporting this 
analysis. Section 5.2 reviews the evidence found from the qualitative analysis. Section 
5.3 discusses the findings in more detail. Section 5.4 provides concluding remarks.
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5.1 Research Design and Methodology: Qualitative Case Study 
Approach
The research methodology in this chapter is a qualitative case study approach. The 
primary method of qualitative research was conducted through interviews with a 
number of ISTCs, NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the researcher chose the interview format to allow for 
asking both closed-ended questions as well as open-ended questions. Closed-ended 
questions were asked for specific quantifiable questions (e.g. staffing numbers), 
whereas open-ended questions were used when asking about more politically sensitive 
issues (e.g. perception of management control over consultants) (Bowling 2005). The 
semi-structured approach was deemed the most appropriate method of interviewing 
within this politically sensitive environment. A varied question order allowed for 
capitalising on the responses made by allowing for the most relevant follow-up 
question to be asked
The qualitative case study approach is not to be limited solely to confirming the 
relationships suggested by the quantitative analysis, but is also intended to shed light 
on the causal relationships concerning the provision of care within treatment centres. 
The case study approach is appropriate here to understand, not only whether there are 
differences in the manner in which IS and NHS Treatment Centres operate, but why 
those differences exist.
5.1.1 Case Studies: Facilities Chosen To Assess
Site visits and interviews were conducted at seven ISTCs and nine NHS TCs in
England. This amounted to approximately one-third of the ISTCs that were fully 
operational at the time and one-quarter of the NHS TCs. Two NHS Trust Hospitals 
were also visited to differentiate NHS TCs from NHS Trust Hospitals and thus 
provide a fuller picture. In total, 18 site visits were conducted.
The selection of the case studies was based upon two criteria. First, an ISTC from 
each of the major groups, or chains, owning and operating the treatment centres in 
England, was to be interviewed. Second, due to the broad variety of NHS TCs which 
were in operation, a number from both stand alone, as well as NHS Trust Hospital 
integrated, were selected as case studies. Finally, the selection of different providers 
allowed for a broad geographical spread throughout all of England, located in urban 
as well as rural areas and within a broad array of clinical specialty areas.
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The primary method of data collection was the semi-structured interview format 
(See Appendix B: Interview Questions -  Treatment Centres and Hospitals). Site visits 
and interviews were conducted in 2007 and 2008. The initial interviews were 
conducted with a consultant of the NHS Elect during two day site visits. These initial 
interviews provided background so that subsequent interviews with treatment centre 
staff could be narrowed to the essential issues pertinent to the research. These initial 
site visits included the two NHS Trust Hospitals. Though the purpose of this 
qualitative analysis was to assess the evidence for apparent differences found between 
IS and NHS Treatment Centres, these initial interviews also allowed for comparison 
of NHS Trust Hospitals with NHS Treatment Centres.
The interviewees were generally with the general manager or the nurse manager 
within the respective facility. Typically, in the ISTCs the interviews included the 
general manager accompanied by the finance director or chief medical officer. In 
general, the NHS TC site visit interviews were with the nurse managers, as this was 
the highest level manager available within the facility.
The interviews were conducted using a systematic semi-structured approach. The 
researcher worked out a questionnaire in advance, but modified the order of questions 
based upon the context of the conversation. This technique permitted a less formal 
approach, allowing the interviewee, and others individuals that were encountered 
during the visit, to speak freely (Robson 1993). Furthermore, since many of these 
questions are deemed politically sensitive, the semi-structured approach allowed for 
broaching sensitive subjects at appropriate points in the interviews.
The initial interviews were two full day interviews with management and clinical 
staff. The follow on site visits could last anywhere from 90 minutes to a one-half day. 
Typically, the site visit would commence with the interview questionnaire, which 
would on average last 60 minutes followed by a walk through the facility. On a 
number of occasions, the facility walk through was conducted during the interview to 
allow for a better understanding on how the facility was organised and operated.
The walk through was also important as it allowed for additional interviews with 
staff and painted a broader picture. The number of additional interviews varied as this 
depended on the facility size as well as on the availability of staff. This approach 
allowed for repeating the interview questions and exploring previous responses in 
further detail. The interview would conclude with the primary interviewee and follow 
up with questions not yet answered.
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5.2 Evidence
Evidence from the previous chapter suggests that the observed differences in 
performance are a result of differences in ownership. This section examines whether 
there are differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in their use of technology, 
organisational methods, staff skill mix and management practices. The next chapter 
considers whether any such differences ultimately are attributable to differences in 
ownership or to other explanatory factors.
5.2.1 Technology
Technology and how it is used can play an important role in facility performance.
From the site visits, the researcher found that there were no great differences in the 
use of technologies between the independent sector and NHS. However, there were 
key differences in the location of the technology and how it was purchased, which did 
impact on facility performance. In general, the ISTCs were found to be 
technologically integrated. On the other hand, the NHS TCs were not.
An initial, broad description of a treatment centre is necessary to understand the 
importance of technology within these facilities. There are two main components to 
the treatment centre, the outpatient clinic and the surgery centre. The outpatient clinic 
is where the patient is first referred in the treatment centre. The consultant surgeon 
meets with the patient and then diagnostic images are typically taken (e.g. ultrasound, 
CT). The consultant reviews the images and makes the final decision based upon the 
diagnostics and then the patient is preassessed. The pre-assessment, or pre-screening, 
is to ensure that the patient is appropriate for the facility. This is typically undertaken 
by nurses. If the patient is deemed appropriate for the treatment centre, the patient is 
booked for the procedure, which is generally held on a different date. Typically, the 
initial visit can be undertaken in one visit (one morning or afternoon). However, this 
necessitates coordination between the pre-assessment nurses, the radiology unit and 
the consultants within the respective clinical area.
The second main component to the treatment is the surgery centre itself. The 
diagram below illustrates at the most basic level the lay-out of a treatment centre and 
the basic operational flow.
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Figure 5.1 Day Case Patient Flow
Day Case Patient Flow
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The patient enters the day surgery centre (Step 1). Patients and family members 
then enter the surgery waiting room, which is designed as a reception area (Step 2). 
The patient proceeds to registration desk to register for surgery (Step 3). The nurse 
leads the patient to the pre-operative area, where the patient changes and Intravenous 
(IV) lines are initiated (Step 4). The circulating nurse or anaesthesiologist guides 
patients to an operating theatre (Step 5). After surgery, a nurse receives the patient 
and moves the patient to the recovery unit (Step 6). The patient is then discharged 
from day surgery (Step 7) and family members meet the patient in the lobby.
PACS System
At all the ISTCs visited a picture archiving and communication systems (PACS) 
system was in place, where the images could be viewed from many different locations 
within the facility1. The PACS system allows for medical images to be digitised and 
thus easily stored, retrieved, distributed and presented. PACS systems replace hard­
copy means of managing medical images, such as film archives. It expands on the
1 Two of the ISTCs visited outsourced this function and would have patient scans completed within 1-3 
weeks.
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possibilities of these conventional systems by providing capabilities for off-site 
viewing and reporting (distance education, tele-diagnosis). Additionally, it enables 
practitioners at various physical locations to access the same information 
simultaneously. With the decreasing price of digital storage, PACS systems provide a 
growing cost and space advantage over film archives.
The PACS system also helps treatment centres conduct the initial patient visit in 
one day and enables the information from the preassessment to be readily assessable 
for the day of surgery. Further, they allow a significant proportion of preassessments 
to be conducted via the telephone. This allows for increased efficiency, in terms of 
time, but also has the potential for fewer cancellations.
Unlike the ISTCs, not all of the NHS facilities had PACS capability. Even within 
those NHS facilities that had this capability the ability to use this technology was not 
uniform within the facilities. Therefore there was a significant limitation on usage.
For example, the site visits found that not all of the consultant assessment rooms had 
computer monitors or intranet connection to upload the information. Also not all of 
the operating theatres had a computer screen to view the scans. Therefore many of the 
x-rays and scans had to be printed. In such cases due to the distance and coordination 
needs between the hospital and the treatment centre, it was found to be difficult to 
transfer images back and forth in an efficient and effective manner. This increased the 
potential for information to go missing or become lost, in turn causing further delays. 
It is ironic that the ISTCs display better integration, as an important argument by 
some health economists, as well as those fearing that the ISTC programme, was that 
the programme would fragment health care delivery, increasing costs. Further, this is 
consistent with the research literature that found no evidence of economies of scope in 
health care.
In sum, the ISTCs were found to be technologically integrated, whereas the NHS 
TCs were not. The main reason for the NHS TCs not being technologically integrated 
was paradoxically because of the organisational integration with the NHS Trust 
Hospital. This organisational integration created problems in being able to integrate 
fully technologically. As a result, organisational integration of the NHS TCs with the 
NHS Trust Hospitals in fact led to technological disintegration. The facilities would 
not be fully PACS integrated, resulting in initial patient visits often not being able to 
be conducted in one day. Further patient information not all being stored digitally and 
retrievable from multiple locations increased the potential for information to become
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lost or missing. The evidence suggests that integration is one potential factor in 
explaining differences in performance. Integration can possibly affect operational 
efficiency in multiple ways. Better integration would also suggest that quality should 
be better. There is less chance for medical errors when patient information is readily 
available, for instance. Another indicator of quality is patient satisfaction. Patients not 
having to return to the treatment centre would suggest higher patient satisfaction 
levels. It is therefore not surprising that the Healthcare Commission (2007) found that 
patient satisfaction rates within ISTCs were significantly higher than within the NHS.
Consultant Notes
Another important aspect of patient information is the consultant notes, which 
encompass previous patient history, the diagnostics and the preassessment. Broadly, 
notes were not an issue in ISTCs. However, in NHS TCs, evidence suggests that 
consultant notes are a significant issue.
One of the reasons why patient notes was an important issue within the NHS TCs 
is in relation to the lack of technological integration and digitising the patient 
information. Most of the notes at the NHS TCs were in a hardcopy format, rather than 
in softcopy (electronic) format, which necessitated significant coordination. The NHS 
consultants, whether in the NHS Trust Hospital or NHS TC, stated that their 
unwillingness to operate without ‘notes’ was due to patient safety concerns and the 
potential for liability in the event of a medical error. Due to the NHS consultants’ 
unwillingness to operate without consultant notes and the diagnostics being an 
important component of notes, any breakdown in the coordination of the notes could 
lead to cancellations or even medical errors.
The researcher encountered a number of cancellations due to the notes issues, but 
no evidence has been found that notes-related problems lead to medical errors. That 
said, fewer patient cancellations suggests not only better performance in terms of 
efficiency but also better quality. Accessibility of patient notes will lead to a 
likelihood of fewer medical errors, as well as patients being more satisfied with not 
encountering the cancellation of a procedure. Whether or not notes-related problems 
led to medical errors in the NHS TCs, notes were not an issue within the ISTCs 
visited. Patient information was typically put into the information management 
systems that the ISTCs had in place. As a result, the pertinent patient information 
could be found in nearly every part of the treatment centre. The importance of
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consultant notes is revisited again in relation to management practices (See Section 
5.2.4 Management Practices).
5.2.2 Differing Organisational Methods
A number of organisational aspects were reviewed to assess whether they could
engender a significant difference in performance within the facilities. These included 
the management structure of the facility, the method of consultant reporting, the 
perception of management’s control over consultants, the ability of administrators to 
incentivise consultants and the role of anaesthetists.
Management Structure
In general, within an ISTC, the interviews found there were four important
managerial positions: general manager, medical director, director of nursing, and 
business office manager. Interviews also found ISTC reporting mechanisms were 
relatively clear. NHS TCs presented a rather different picture. The staff within the 
NHS TCs typically reported to management which often had multiple roles within the 
NHS Trust, of which only one role pertained to the NHS TC. Because of the 
complexity of the structure, the reporting mechanisms were unclear. The researcher’s 
inability to track down the NHS TC management team is the reason why the majority 
of interviews in NHS TCs were with nurse managers. The following paragraphs 
provide specific examples of management structure and reporting mechanisms with 
the ISTCs and NHS TCs.
In six of the seven ISTC site visits there were four management positions, with 
ISTC G the lone exception. ISTC G is unique in the fact that it is a shared service 
with an NHS TC. There the staffing consists only of the operating theatre staff and 
three administrators. All pre-admission, pre-operation and post-operation functions 
are carried out by the NHS.
ISTC A was in the process of implementing a horizontal and vertical integration
scheme. Prior to implementation of the scheme, a small team was designated for
patient care. This team included an occupational therapist, a physiotherapist, a nurse
and the respective surgeon. The general manager of ISTC A commented that the
“emphasis was on orthopaedics and therefore physiotherapy played a key role The
general manager went on to say that
40 per cent o f outcomes were a result o f the surgery alone, and 60 per 
cent the result the post-surgery physiotherapy. As a result, intensive post­
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surgery collaboration was essential in getting the patient moving so that 
the patient could be discharged as quickly as possible.
In only three of the NHS TCs of the nine visited was it clear how many key
management positions there were within the facility. This was predominantly because
the NHS TC was part of a larger Trust Hospital and there was significant cross
staffing and shared responsibilities, as well as recent restructurings.
For example, in NHS TC AA there had been a number of recent lay-offs and the
treatment centre manager was one of the recently laid off individuals. As a result of
the lay-offs, the reporting scheme was now directed to the NHS Trust Hospital
administration. Another issue in NHS TC AA were the four nurse managers. These
nurse managers were managers of the treatment centre as well as the general hospital,
illustrating the treatment centre/Trust Hospital cross staffing. NHS TC HH had a part-
time manager, who was also responsible for two other hospitals. Only at the time of
the interview (Spring 2008) is this facility obtaining a dedicated facility manager.
NHS TC H’s story provides insight to how a treatment centre’s integration with
the Trust Hospital affects its operations. According to the general manager, “it
operated as a true treatment centres, but due to the Trust’s financial difficulties, the
treatment centre was absorbed into the Trust. ” The general manager went on to say,
the managers were let go or reallocated to other positions to cut costs.
However, the Trust recognised that length o f stay started increasing in the 
basket ofprocedures that they track fo r the treatment centre. As a result, as 
well as that the Trust is now doing better financially, NHS TC II is devolving 
back to its original treatment centre focus.
There is now one clinical head and a dedicated general manager who has three 
operations managers and one lead nurse underneath him.
NHS TC BB seemed to be the best in terms of a clear management structure, 
compared to other NHS TC site visits. The facility was relatively self-contained and 
isolated from Trust Hospital dynamics. Further, although the Trust was in financial 
difficulties, it did not have wait list problems.
In general, the interviews found that management in ISTCs was relatively clear, 
compared to NHS TCs, where departmental structures suffered from unclear reporting 
mechanisms. This is likely because all NHS TCs visited were part of an NHS Trust 
with significant cross staffing and shared resources. Furthermore, there have been a 
number of restructurings in NHS Trust Hospitals, many of which were ongoing at the 
time of interviews. Moreover, it was not always clear in the NHS whether treatment
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centre staff reported to a treatment centre manager or to the NHS Trust Hospital itself, 
implying the treatment centre was seen merely as another clinical department.
Consultant Reporting
The interviews found that in all seven ISTC case studies consultants reported to
the Medical Director, one of the four in the management team. As these organisations
are relatively flat, there is less hierarchy, resulting in what appeared to be more
individual accountability within the organisations.
Again, the NHS TCs presented a rather different picture. In general, NHS TC
consultants report to their clinical department head in the NHS Trust Hospital, who in
turn reports to the CMO. In only one of the nine NHS TCs visited was there reporting
to a NHS TC medical officer (NHS TC GG), indicating NHS TCs were organised
merely as an additional functional area of the NHS Trust Hospital. The exception was
the case where the NHS TC was a stand-alone facility. The nurse manager of the
facility commented,
because we are stand-alone, we have been able to allocate a dedicated 
consultant to our facility to manage the others. ” She went on to say, “I  am 
not sure i f  we would have this individual i f  we were more closely joined  
[physically] with an NHS Trust Hospital.
Perception o f  Management Control
The interviews found that in general within the ISTCs there is a fairly strong
perception and attitude that management is in control, with the exception being cases 
where ISTCs used NHS seconded staff. Conversely, management in the NHS TCs had 
a much lower perception of control. Though these responses are surprising, they must 
be understood in the context of how the NHS facility sees itself in comparison to 
other NHS facilities, not to the actual management control.
In four of the ISTCs management control was deemed high, in two it was deemed 
good and in one fair. ISTC B stated that they had "a well-developed, integrated 
approach and because o f this integration, management was in control”. There may be 
a few explanations for the lone ISTC which deemed management control of 
consultants as fair. The manager may have set high expectations as nearly all the 
indicators showed they were one of the best compared to other ISTCs in terms of 
KPIs. The respective manager’s high expectations were confirmed by follow on 
interviews within another ISTC with the same shareholder.
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Further, the ISTC used primarily Western European consultants. Most of the other
ISTCs used a mix of consultants, mostly from Eastern Europe. This suggests a key
factor in management control may be the perception of remuneration vis-a-vis the
consultant’s home country. A substantial raise in salary may drive consultant attitudes
and the relationship with the facility. These issues are addressed in section 6.3.5
discussing ownership. Alternatively, it may not just be the financial remuneration, but
the aspect of additionality in general.
ISTC D had the unique situation of being adjacent to an NHS TC. As a result of
their contract, they had two NHS consultants on secondment. The ISTC management
stated “these physicians most often called in late and missed scheduled lists. ” The
ISTC was unable to handle the situation effectively because, since they were NHS
employees, the ISTC could not use the threat of firing, or the possibility of further
financial remuneration to change their behaviour. Similar complaints were voiced by
another ISTC using NHS seconded staff. One of the managers commented, if  it was
his or her full decision, '7  would not bring in an NHS consultant again into the
facility” on secondment because of the inability to change their ‘NHS’ practices.
At ISTC C, management’s level of control was viewed as very good. There were
three areas that this facility focused on: general surgery, gynaecology and
ophthalmology. General surgery was run by a mix of Western and Eastern European
consultants. Gynaecology was run by a consultant of Western European origin and
ophthalmology was run by Western European consultants. These consultants had
already practiced in their native country in the private sector, using their own
techniques. The private clinic that these consultants worked for was bought out by the
current parent company some years ago. The general manager stated that
the transfer o f these consultants from their home country to the UK was 
merely a transfer in physical location, as the clinical techniques were 
unchanged. Because o f this, these consultants were already set in their ways 
with respect to the focused approach, making management much easier.
In the NHS TCs, consultants were employed by the respective Trust hospitals. In 
seven of the nine cases the perception of consultant control was average, one was 
good and another was “no control”.
That said, the answer to those questions must be viewed in relation to the 
respondent’s reference point, this being their experience in other NHS facilities. 
Delving deeper into this question, there was a general perception by managers that
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“no one is able to tell them [consultants] what to do. ” One NHS TC nurse manager 
remarked that the staff certainly had “trouble controlling them. ” “Some resent this, 
even though they are making more than ever before, ” continued the interviewee. The 
general perception from the consultant standpoint was that they were “not employees 
o f a specific hospital, but rather employees o f the NH S”. This alludes to the absence 
of any one individual to whom they were accountable.
Procedure cancellations provide a clear example of the lack of accountability 
within the NHS and the use of financial incentives by the ISTCs. Within the NHS, if 
there was a clinical cancellation, for whatever reason, there did not appear to be any 
repercussions for the NHS consultant. This was observed while interviewing for a 
number of hours in the consultant break-room. There appeared to be more 
accountability in the ISTCs. At ISTC B, it was said that if a consultant only did two 
cases in the morning, the administration would say, “I  will only pay you fo r  half a 
list. ” At ISTC C, the ophthalmology consultants were paid on a per case basis and 
would be rotated through once a week. As a result, if  the schedules were not full, 
while they were visiting, there would be considerable pressure put on the facility 
administrator. Financial incentives and remuneration will be further discussed in the 
following sections.
There appeared to be some exogenous factors within the NHS, such as the other 
important reforms that are concurrently being undertaken. This is clearly being felt at 
the facility level. At NHS Trust Hospital AAA and its adjacent treatment centre, the 
nurses stated that there had been a general decline in the ethos of the employees. This 
was a result of the enormous pressure put upon the hospital and its employees to 
reduce the wait lists and hit the end of the fiscal year targets. One comment from a 
nurse manager, who has been within the NHS for quite some time, was quite telling. 
She said, “before 1996, we would make the emergency patients wait and do the 
electives. ” In 1996, part of the NHS plan mandated a 4 hour emergency waiting 
period. “So, we would make the electives wait. That was the first squeeze. Now with 
the 18 week patient waiting list, we are being squeezedfrom both sides. ”
There may also be some endogeneity here. The ISTCs were not allowed to hire 
consultants that had worked for the NHS within the past six months. As a result, most, 
if not all, of the ISTC consultants were from overseas and there was a clear perception 
who their employer was. The NHS consultants, on the other hand, work in NHS Trust 
Hospitals as well as private ones. The contractual role of the NHS consultant between
161
Matthias Loening Chapter 5 Treatment Centres: Independent Sector and NHS
the NHS and the private hospitals is different and likely to be a key driver to the 
differing employment mentalities. The resulting differences in this contractual nature 
are likely to drive differing perceptions of management control.
There are clearly different perceptions of management’s level of control between 
ISTCs and NHS TCs. There was a perception of greater management control in the 
independent sector. This may be because the ISTCs seemed to have a much more 
integrative approach between the administration, nurses, surgical consultants and 
anaesthetist. On the other hand, the interviews found that with the NHS staff there 
was clear recognition that an integrative approach was needed and an area for much 
improvement. The perception of management control, or lack thereof, is consistent 
with the earlier topic of management structure and clear reporting mechanisms. 
Organisational integration will be discussed in a later section.
Anaesthetists
Anaesthetists play a very important role in health care facilities and an arguably 
even more important one in treatment centres; some even state that anaesthetists 
should play the leading role (Douthwaite and Wherry 2004; Douthwaite 2007). The 
anaesthetists have control over what type and how much anaesthesia is provided to 
the patient. The choice of appropriate anaesthesia is an important, perhaps the single 
most important, factor that allows for patients to be discharged on an outpatient or day 
case basis. Anaesthetists play a unique and independent role in the operating theatre, 
since there is little overlap in responsibility and accountability with other personnel.
In all the facilities, anaesthetists were employees of the facility. However, the 
perception of integration, coordination and management control differed. In general, 
anaesthetists in ISTCs were found to be part of an integrated team. In contrast, in the 
NHS TCs, anaesthetists were perceived to be practising independently and sometimes 
somewhat difficult to work with. The interviews suggest that the anaesthetists are 
territorial, believing specific patients belonged to them.
In six of seven ISTC cases the response was that the anaesthetists generally 
worked as a team. The one exception concerned ISTC D. Management of ISTC C felt 
that the reason was that the anaesthetist was an NHS consultant. The general manager 
at ISTC B commented “that there was a team approach to patient care and that the 
anaesthetists led the team Management at ISTC C did not feel so strongly noting 
“the anaesthetists had their own clique, which was difficult to break into. ”
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Nevertheless, management of this facility felt that anaesthetists were more closely 
integrated into the facility than in the NHS. So the response to this question may be 
relative to past experience.
At ISTC E, there was only one anaesthetist. This individual was rotated amongst 
other facilities owned by the parent company to ensure he or she did not lose his or 
her skills. Further, as the facility was only doing minor procedures, there was little 
need for more complex anaesthesiology. As a result, there was little discussion on the 
decision-making of type of anaesthesiology used.
In NHS TCs the response was overwhelmingly that anaesthetists were organised 
as a team (eight of nine cases), but how they practised in reality told a different story. 
Some interpretation is needed to show the differences between how anaesthetists 
practise in the NHS TCs and the ISTCs. This is typified by NHS TC AA. Within this 
NHS TC, the nurse manager commented, “each anaesthetist had his or her own 
choice o f anaesthesiology and pain blockers with respect to different procedures. ” 
Further, this individualistic practice was reinforced by the perception that 
anaesthetists should not be questioned on their medical practices by each other or by 
other NHS employees. Another NHS TC commented that the anaesthetists “were 
their own clique, ” the same word to describe these medical practitioners by one of the 
ISTCs.
Management within the ISTCs seemed to have better control over practices of the 
anaesthetists that lead to higher facility performance. For example, at the ISTC B the 
patient control anaesthesia (PCA) would be shut off at 24 hours post operation. The 
PCA is a device that allows the patient to self-regulate the level of morphine that is 
being fed into the IV, increasing patient comfort. However, evidence suggests that 
leaving patients too long on the PCA slows recovery as the morphine makes patients 
lethargic and less willing to move out of the recovery bed. Increasingly ‘best- 
practices’ point to getting the patients off the PCA as soon as possible, encouraging 
them to become mobile and thus be discharged from the facility. Another ISTC was 
attempting to get rid of allowing patients to self-regulate PCAs 24 hours post 
operation. However, the facility was having difficulty with the anaesthetists over the 
decision-making on this and what is ‘best’ for the patient. In none of the NHS 
facilities did the researcher hear about this practice. The attempts to implement ‘best- 
practices’ by ISTCs argues in favour of higher quality at these facilities. Furthermore,
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the fact that ISTCs allow patients to go home sooner suggests superior operational 
performance.
If we compare ISTCs to NHS TCs, it becomes clear that in most cases the NHS 
has merely transferred the same practices to a different facility. In NHS TC AA all the 
anaesthetists practised in the NHS Trust Hospital as well as the NHS TC. The reason 
was that, though the anaesthetists liked not being on call and the regular hours of the 
NHS TC, they also wanted to keep up their skills by working with the more complex 
patients in the main hospital. This was stated in a number of the NHS TCs including 
NHS TC AA and FF. Consequently, the anaesthetists practised in both facilities, 
indicating practice patterns were the same, whether the patient was a day case for the 
treatment centre or a long-term hospital patient.
5.2.3 Different Skill Mix in Staff
The interviews attempted to assess whether the skill mixes of staff in ISTCs and
NHS TCs were different, and whether this might drive differences in performance. 
Key aspects of skill mix assessed included staffing ratios, including physician-nurse 
ratio, type of nurses on staff, and nurse staffing ratio vis-a-vis beds. The role and 
experience of the consultant was also examined, including average experience in the 
operating theatre (in years) and the use of different types of consultant staff, including 
trainees.
Staffing Ratios
In general, there appeared to be less staffing in terms of nursing in ISTCs 
compared to NHS TCs. The most significant difference in staffing ratios was in the 
operating theatre. ISTCs are staffed with the same level of consultant surgeons (minus 
trainees), but in general are staffed with fewer nurses.
Prior to discussing specific ISTC and NHS TC case study examples, a few 
comments need to be made about staffing ratios. Lower staffing numbers point to two 
important items directly related to this research. First, lower staffing numbers can 
lower costs and thereby improve facility performance, but opponents of the ISTC 
programme point to the potential for lower staffing ratios to lead to lower quality. 
However, Chapter 4 presented evidence that demonstrates quality outcomes in ISTCs 
were no less than in the NHS. Patient satisfaction levels are also an important 
indicator of the perception of quality and the literature provides evidence that patient 
satisfaction rates are higher in ISTCs than in the NHS (Healthcare Commission 2007;
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C B I2008). It is important to note, though, that no study has been conducted 
comparing ISTC and NHS TC patient satisfaction levels.
Second, ISTCs are breaking with the tradition that UK medical associations define 
policy and are unquestioned. The National Association of Theatre Nurses (NATN), 
now called the Association for Perioperative Practice, recommended guidelines call 
for four staff members in an operating theatre. These four staff members include two 
circulating nurses, scrub nurse and an operating department practitioner (ODP), often 
referred to as an anaesthetic nurse (Association for Perioperative Practice 2007; 
Douthwaite 2007). The ODP’s responsibility is generally to help the anaesthetists; as 
a result they are often referred to as an anaesthetic nurse. The ODP’s tasks are 
primarily at the beginning and end of a procedure - in the middle there is not much 
support they provide. Therefore, during long procedures the ODP’s are significantly 
underutilised.
The Royal College of Anaesthetists calls for a trained anaesthetic assistant, or 
ODP, to be ‘available’ and on site (Royal College of Anaesthetists; Douthwaite 2007). 
However, typical staffing in a United States (US) ambulatory surgery centre includes 
two nurses, a scrub nurse and a circulating nurse. The function of the ODP, which 
does not exist in the US, is instead provided by the circulating nurse in the initial and 
final five to ten minutes of a procedure. This is being adapted by ISTCs, many of 
whom have incorporated US and Canadian practices in the operating theatre.
In all seven ISTCs’ cases, there was a physician/nurse staffing ratio of 
approximately one to four with four nurses in the operating theatre. However, the 
ISTCs stated that they did not want to deviate too much from UK practices. 
Nonetheless, there were specific examples of ISTCs questioning the status quo and 
introducing new practices to the NHS. For example, the general manager at ISTC B 
said that they “tended to interpret more widely the term ‘available' and ‘on-site ’ with 
respect to the use o f  an ODP” and ISTC B used the ODP for more than one running 
theatre at a time. At ISTC C, ODP’s were used only for specific general surgeries, and 
there seemed to be fewer innovative practice techniques in place than in other ISTCs 
visited; however, this may have been because the company had been an existing 
provider in the UK for quite some time and used existing anaesthetists.
Again, the NHS TCs presented a different picture. In general, site visits found that 
staffing ratios were higher, with a physician/nurse staffing ratio of approximately one
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to five. The number of nurses in the operating theatre varied from three (three cases) 
to five (one case) or more (two cases)
Specific to staffing mix, two of the NHS TC’s interviewed were quite innovative 
in their operating theatre staffing. NHS TC BB used only one anaesthetist per two 
operating theatres and used one medical anaesthetist per theatre. The result was 
significant cost savings, as two anaesthetists cost the same as one anaesthetist and two 
medical anaesthetists. Medical anaesthetists are trained technicians with an 
understanding of the functioning and monitoring of the anaesthetic equipment and 
clinical practice. They provide skilled assistance for the anaesthetist. The facility was 
attempting to use one anaesthetist and three medical anaesthetists for three operating 
theatres, but, according to the individual interviewed, this was meeting resistance 
from the Royal College of Anaesthetists. It was stated that, in Sweden, one 
anaesthetist for four operating theatres was the norm. A key factor in this resistance 
was the UK’s surplus, rather than shortage, of anaesthetists. Overcoming this barrier 
is likely to be difficult in the short term.
NHS TC EE was also using a differing mix in the operating theatre. In these 
operating theatres, there would be two theatre practitioners (trained as scrub and 
circulating nurses), one unqualified theatre support worker (trained in-house), the 
consultant surgeon, and one aesthetic practitioner (AP). An anaesthetist split his time 
between two operating theatres at once. The treatment centre stated the AP’s were a 
new introduction to the facility and this was still very sensitive. The plan was to use 
up to three AP’s per anaesthetist.
NHS TC HH is quite heavily staffed in the pre and post-op, but this is because of 
its unique status. It was set up as a day surgery centre back in 2002 and as a result, 
many of the day surgeries, regardless of whether they were conducted in the treatment 
centre or main hospital, come through the pre and post-operative care unit of the day 
surgery wing. This method of operating is quite different from the other facilities 
visited. Because there were no over-night beds, the treatment centre was able to 
ensure that non-appropriate patients from the hospital were admitted. The treatment 
centre was quite different from the other NHS TCs visited. Rather than focus on a 
core set of treatment centre procedures, NHS TC HH does nearly all cases but only on 
a day-case basis. The nurse manager commented that “there was a mix o f  stafffrom  
early on and it has taken 5 years to get where we are today. ”
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Interpreting the use of staff and staffing ratios at the ward level is more difficult. 
Nurse staffing at the treatment centre wards has less of an impact for elective patients. 
This is because the treatment centres do not typically have overnight beds or, if they 
do (e.g. orthopaedic patients), then these beds are within a focused clinical area for 
relatively short-stay patients (less than 5 days). Moreover, NHS TCs were staffed for 
treatment centre patients but often saw non-appropriate (e.g. non elective) patients. 
This made interpreting performance and cost effectiveness and the role nurse staffing 
played at the ward level more difficult.
In general, the site visits found that ISTCs operated at lower staffing levels than 
NHS TCs. Though most NHS TCs are practising in the same manner as the Trust 
Hospitals, there are some examples of NHS TCs experimenting with staffing skill 
levels, in line with the NHS goal that Treatment Centres bring innovation. However, 
these examples seem to be isolated cases, and did not represent a systemic shift of 
practise in the NHS. More often than not, the NHS TC had merely transferred the old 
ways of working in a Trust Hospital. The evidence suggests differences in 
performance in terms of efficiency, but there is nothing that would suggest lower 
quality of care.
Consultant Experience and the Additionality Rule
Initially, some feared ISTCs would poach NHS staff, and negatively impact the
goal of increasing the number of consultants practising in England. As a result, the 
policy of additionality came into effect for the ISTC program. Additionality meant 
ISTCs were not allowed to hire staff that had worked for the NHS within the past six 
months (Health Committee 2006), effectively meaning ISTCs had to recruit outside 
the country to staff appropriately. This has led to fears that ISTC consultant 
experience may be less than within the NHS TCs.
The interviews results of the research suggests there is a real mix of ISTC 
consultant experience level and utilisation. In four of the seven case studies, 
experience was deemed ‘high,’ meaning they had performed surgeries on their own 
for many years. In three of the cases, experience was deemed as varied.
Years of experience is one issue, but how the ISTCs used these consultants is 
another. For example, ISTC B had a number of Eastern European consultants. These 
consultants could perform surgery on their own in their home country, while, in 
England, they did more ward service or support work. The respective ISTC would not
167
Matthias Loening Chapter 5 Treatment Centres: Independent Sector and NHS
allow the consultant surgeons to operate until the treatment centre was comfortable 
with them working on their own.
At ISTC C, the consultants were primarily from Western Europe, with some of 
Eastern European origin. Management of the ISTC stated that they were 
accomplished physicians in their home country and could perform surgeries on their 
own. All consultants at ISTC C had 12-15 years experience. There were no trainee 
consultants used, though trainee nurses were used.
Use of consultants in NHS TCs varied in six of the nine cases. In one case the 
comment was that the consultants were young. The responses to this question were 
clearly a result of the utilisation of consultant trainees. Some NHS TCs were 
predominantly staffed with experienced practising consultants from the NHS Trust 
Hospital, while others used consultant trainees. For example, at NHS TC AA, the 
researcher spent a number of hours in the operating theatre and observed very little 
consultant effort. The operation was performed by the senior resident with an 
observer resident while the consultant checked his emails and used the mobile phone. 
At one point, the researcher counted ten individuals in the operating room, not 
including the researcher and another management consultant. Most were some form 
of consultant or nurse in training. In none of the ISTC operating theatres observed 
were there ever more than five clinicians at once.
There are two important but interrelated points. First, NHS TCs vary in their use 
of trainees (or, more generally, of inexperienced consultants). The use of consultant 
trainees relates back to staffing ratios and costs. The low ISTC staffing level in 
operating theatres can primarily be attributed to the fact that training programmes 
were not included in the initial period of the ISTCs programme (Wave 1) (Health 
Committee 2006). More recently, the ISTCs have begun to provide training 
opportunities, but it is too soon to assess the impact on productivity and the potential 
for significant increases in remuneration. As an illustration, for a functional 
endoscopic sinus (FES) procedure observed at NHS TC AA, the expected time was 2 
Vi to 3 hours. It was estimated that the procedure time for a senior consultant would be 
1 to 1 Vi hours (Douthwaite 2007). Clearly, training means more time in the operating 
theatre and use of existing staff is needed. On the other hand, the hospital 
remuneration for training vis-a-vis the cost of providing this training is unclear. As a 
result, whether training is a loss-making, or rather a financially lucrative endeavour is 
unclear.
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In general, evidence suggests there is a great variance of experience of consultants 
used by the ISTCs as well as in NHS TCs. However, there is no general evidence of 
‘ISTCs practising’ with lower skilled consultants than NHS TCs and thereby 
achieving lower quality results, as some opponents of the ISTC programme have 
suggested; indeed, if anything, due to the NHS use of trainees, the reverse was the 
case.
5.2.4 Management Practices
There are various aspects of management practice that make treatment centres
different from general hospitals. The operating theatre is where the majority of the 
treatment centre’s capital costs lie, as well as where the revenue generation is 
performed. In order to maximise throughput, patient selection and discharge practices 
are essential. How patients are transported to and from the theatre will be discussed, 
as well as the efficiency gains, permitted by more effective purchasing and materials 
management. Architectural design and the way it limits what the hospital managers 
can do to increase operating efficiency will also be briefly discussed. Lastly, the 
financial incentives that are in place will be assessed.
Operating Theatre Procedures and Time Scheduling
How an operating theatre is run and lists scheduled have an important impact on
the treatment centre’s overall cost and revenues. Key questions include: How many 
patients are scheduled in one list? At what time of day should the patients arrive?
How far in advance should they be scheduled? Other factors -  such as the necessity 
for consultants to have notes or the right to book patients themselves -  can also 
impact the flow of patients.
In general, ISTCs were much more effective at booking operating rooms to full 
utilisation. Time slots were booked two weeks in advance, on average. Since 
consultants were full-time staff expected to run an average of seven surgery lists and 
three clinical time lists per week, there was little variation in scheduling. NHS TCs, 
on the other hand, typically schedule patient surgeries the night before. The reasons 
for the NHS TCs’ relatively poor performance are many and include a lack of 
incentives to ensure patients do not cancel, the utilisation and level of experience of 
the scheduler and the reliance on physical copies of consultant notes, which may 
arrive late to the operating theatre or go missing. NHS TCs also need to ensure there
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are enough beds following discharge from post-op, taking into account the needs of 
the NHS Trust Hospital main operating theatre schedule.
Operating Theatre Lists
As discussed in 5.2.2, ISTCs are staffed with the same level of consultant
surgeons (minus trainees) as NHS TCs. However, the number of consultants that use 
an operating room in a given day varies between the independent sector and the NHS. 
In the NHS, it is rare to have more than two surgeons in an operating theatre during 
the course of a day, compared to up to five in the independent sector.
This points to an underlying difference in how operating theatre time is booked. 
The emphasis of the ISTC was to schedule the operating theatre and allocate 
consultants to the patient. In the NHS, the emphasis appeared to be geared more 
towards scheduling around the consultant’s time. Superficially, this may appear to be 
a minor difference, but one can infer that assets are more fully utilised when operating 
theatre use is maximised.
Further complicating scheduling is the fact that some consultants are quicker than 
others. Booking operating rooms efficiently may actually depend more on knowing 
how long a consultant takes to perform a procedure than how many procedures a 
consultant can do in a list (Dexter, Ledolter et al. 2005; McIntosh, Dexter et al. 2006). 
This implies the role of scheduler is a large one in determining operational efficiency.
To illustrate with specific examples, in ISTC B and ISTC C, there was only one 
scheduler. These schedulers were well acquainted with the efficiency of consultants 
and would schedule lists accordingly. ISTC G, due to its unique way of sharing 
services, used three schedulers from the adjacent NHS TC. It was stated that when the 
Did Not Attend (DNA) rate increased, staff knew this was because there were 
pressures from the NHS and schedulers were being pulled off to do other work.
Active use of the contract by the ISTC quickly resolved these issues and the DNAs 
would quickly revert back to normal.
Within nearly all the NHS TCs, the consultants do their own theatre scheduling 
and, as a result, the NHS TC often does not know the procedure and whether an 
inpatient bed will be needed in hospital until the day of surgery. This clearly affects 
the flow of the entire operation of the hospital.
In one of the NHS Trust Hospitals visited the consultants still scheduled patients 
in their own paper booklet. The comment was that scheduling nurses “don’t have a
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say how consultants book times The nurse manager went on to say, “the consultants 
have this authority. ” The information in this booklet would then be transferred into a 
computer. There are a number of potential problems that may arise from this process. 
First, the booklet must be retrieved from the physician. Second, the information must 
be read and typed into the computer system. Third, the physician’s booklet must 
continually be synchronised with the computer system and vice-a-versa. Fourth, there 
must be continual coordination with the other staff that will be necessary for the 
operating theatre time. Errors can occur at many stages in this process.
Two of the NHS TCs mentioned that they were moving towards dedicating 
operating theatre lists to specific procedures, not just clinical specialty areas (e.g. 
laproscopic-cholestectomies, arthroscopies). Though none of these dedicated 
operating theatre times had yet been implemented, it shows that the NHS has 
recognised the focused factory approach and is moving toward increased 
specialisation, in terms of theatre time scheduling and clinical staffing.
Most schedulers do not have a clinical background so there is a significant amount 
of clinical input, especially from the nurses, in the scheduling process. Moreover, it 
takes time for a scheduling team to know how a consultant practices. Schedulers need 
to understand how much time a given consultant needs for a procedure to know how 
many patients to book on a list. This is a problem that becomes more severe as the 
number of schedulers increases.
In all cases (ISTCs and NHS TCs), consultants struggled with their schedulers. 
Some consultants wanted more patients on a list than what the schedulers perceived as 
possible during a four-hour list period. Others wanted fewer patients. Either way, 
appropriate scheduling played an important role in operating theatre throughput 
efficiency.
From the interviews, it appeared that schedulers in all seven ISTCs had a fairly 
strong status amongst management. However, in all nine NHS TCs, schedulers were, 
broadly speaking, not deemed to be an integral part of the facility operation and thus 
did not receive support from management in the event of a disagreement with a 
consultant.
Patient Arrival Times
Scheduling patient arrivals also plays an important role in the operational flow of
a treatment centre. At ISTC F, the facility does four major joints per day, on average.
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The first two patients come the night before, so they are ready to start at eight AM in
the morning. The second group (two patients) come that morning. At ISTC B patient
admissions are staggered. However, at NHS TC AA patient arrival times are not
staggered, and so they arrive in large groups at 7:00am and 12:30pm. There are large
queues, since reception staff does not arrive until 7:30 and even larger queues at the
time of the interviews, as this was following reception staff lay-offs. Interestingly
enough, alongside the NHS TC, there is a self-contained endoscopy unit that was part
of the NHS TC. The endoscopy unit staggered admissions in 20-minute intervals.
Many of their admissions and discharge practices seemed to be functioning much like
a true treatment centre. There were neither cross-staffing nor shared resources within
the endoscopy unit of the NHS treatment centre.
The scheduling process also necessitates patient selection. Outpatient and day-
case patients are generally done in the mornings. NHS TC AA attempted to do day-
case patients in the morning to ensure afternoon discharge, while inpatients were
scheduled for the afternoon, since they would have to stay overnight regardless.
However, due to non-appropriate patients taking up beds, a significant number of
inpatient cases were being cancelled due to lack of bed space.
This was even more important when the period of time between the outpatient
clinic visit and the day of surgery was months, even years. Now the 13-week limit
between referral and discharge, makes this no longer necessary. However, the NHS
traditional approach of the NHS consultants and anaesthetists wanting to see a patient
prior to the procedure seems to be a residual practice. Clearly, this is another cultural
and behavioural issue the NHS TCs will need to overcome.
ISTC C was cognizant of morning lists running late, which was having the knock-
on effect of delaying the start of the afternoon list. The general manager stated
we are having list overruns fo r the morning session which is making the 
afternoon sessions start late. We are considering having one session all day 
andjust changing staff with no lunch break in the OR.
If these changes were implemented, the list time would change from four to eight 
hours. As this proposed theatre scheduling method had not yet been implemented, it 
was not possible to assess the results.
ISTC C primarily booked four hour lists in the mornings, Monday through Friday, 
because the facility was only operating at around 40% occupancy at the time of the 
site visit. The previous month, at the end of the NHS fiscal year, the facility was
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operating at 80% occupancy, because the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) were 
attempting to hit NHS targets and thus were actively referring patients to the ISTC. 
There were only six recovery beds and three to four recliners. With limited recovery 
beds, but fixed staffing costs, the ISTC scheduled ophthalmology patients in one 
operating theatre, and gynaecology in the other. This was to insure a mix of varied 
recovery patients, rather than mostly quick and easy cases. If the facility had been 
operating at full capacity, there would probably have been some operational flow 
issues if this practice continued. However, at the time this could not be assessed.
Operating Theatre Time Scheduling
How far in advance a schedule is set is also an important part of operational
efficiency. In all seven ISTCs, operating theatre time was scheduled weeks in 
advance. The inverse was found in the NHS TCs. Scheduling was done only days 
prior in eight of the nine NHS TCs, often the day before. Better planning lowers the 
need for flexible staffing but also decreases reliance on agency staff, who are more 
expensive and often deemed limited in their ability to provide support beyond the 
specific tasks they are assigned.
Consultant Notes
An important, though often overlooked, aspect of operational efficiency is the 
consultant information needed prior to an operation. This is often referred to as the 
consultant notes, or ‘notes.’
In the ISTCs notes were not an issue since they found preassessment sufficient. 
ISTCs received patient information from the GP or PCT upon referral, and they would 
make the appropriate annotations. During the patient’s visit he or she would be seen 
by the consultant surgeon, diagnostics would be undertaken, the surgeon would make 
the final decision and then the patient would be preassessed. This information would 
be computerised, giving the consultant easy access to the information on the day of 
surgery. The process could take up to four hours, but the patient would only have to 
come in once prior to surgery.
During the site visit at NHS TC AA, 11 patients were to be operated on, but the 
consultants had only three sets of notes. As NHS consultants are unwilling to operate 
without notes (see 5.2.1 Technology), eight of the eleven patient surgeries were 
cancelled. The notes issue tended to override every interview at NHS TC AA. Notes 
encompass previous patient history, diagnostics and preassessment, so they are an
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important part of the physician’s pre-surgery review. However, it is important to 
understand what the consultant actually reviews prior to a procedure. Some of the 
‘notes’ are very large binders a few inches in thickness. In reality, the consultant is 
merely checking that the operation is necessary and correct. Upon questioning 
whether the preassessment checklist would be sufficient, one urologist consultant 
responded it would be sufficient if he ‘just wanted to be a technician. But, I  don't 
want to be a technician. ” The response demonstrates the significant barriers to 
modifying existing cultural behaviour that might increase efficiency in this important 
aspect of facility operations.
In the case of NHS TC EE, the nurse manager commented that, even if the 
treatment centre did a pre-assessment, the consultants and anaesthetists still require 
patients to be seen by them the morning of surgery. This resulted in lists not starting 
on time. The nurse manager went on to say, "this is every day
At NHS TC GG, consultant notes was a big problem two years ago because 
medical records staff were let go, a similar story to NHS TC AA. The nurse manager 
commented, "now the situation is good. Not everything is computerised but we are 
getting there and there is no longer the issue with patient notes. ”
There is also an operational flow issue with notes. The NHS Trust Hospital, of 
which the treatment centre was a part, had just laid off the staff responsible for 
attaining the notes prior to a procedure. Since the notes could be located all over the 
treatment centre, as well as the general hospital, and since there is only one hard copy, 
there is significant potential for the notes to be misplaced which might affect the 
operational flow of the facility.
Cancellations also seemed to be a significant problem in the NHS, often because 
the consultant lacked the patient’s notes. Neither the consultants, nor the hospitals are 
incentivised to ensure that notes are available prior to a surgery, because a 
cancellation allows for the wait list period to start all over again. Further, there is no 
negative financial impact on consultants for cancellations (in reality it is less work). 
The administrator’s target is actually improved. In none of the ISTCs visited were 
cancellations a common phenomenon. This is likely because in the ISTCs all, or 
nearly all, patient information was in electronic format (the exception generally being 
referred, wait-listed NHS patients). As a result, this information could be accessed 
within multiple areas of the facility, including the operating theatre.
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Summary
In general, ISTCs were much more effective in booking operating room times to 
full utilisation than NHS TCs. This is because there are dedicated schedulers, with 
specific responsibilities, working in consort with the consultants, and time slots are 
booked in advance. Schedulers with the ISTCs appear to have a much more important 
say and role in the scheduling of operating theatre time. The NHS TCs, on the other 
hand, typically schedule patient surgeries the night before and there seems to be poor 
information flow between the consultants and schedulers with the schedulers having 
much less influence on booking time. A related component is consultant notes and the 
importance in the operational flow of the facility. Within the ISTCs, consultant notes 
do not play so much of a role, this is because they are primarily digitized (See Section 
5.2.1) and technologically integrated. As a result, the patient information could be 
readily retrieved in varying locations of an ISTC. However, within the NHS TCs, 
notes were primarily still hardcopy. As a consequence, significant coordination was 
needed to ensure that they were available prior to a procedure. As a result, 
cancellations seemed to be a significant problem in the NHS as a result of these 
consultant notes.
These differences suggest that ISTCs would not only have better operational 
performance but also patient satisfaction levels would be higher. Fewer cancellations 
would suggest fewer patients would have to return another day to the facility and 
staggered patient arrival times would allow for a smoothing of operations and 
minimal queuing time. We often forget that a surgery or potential cancer diagnosis 
can be a traumatic experience. As a result, differences in how health care is delivered 
can have an immense effect on the perception of the quality of care. This is consistent 
with the findings of the Healthcare Commission (2007).
Patient Selection and Admission Practices
The entire business model of a treatment centre revolves around selecting patients
that are appropriate for outpatient, day case or short-stay surgery. Certain exclusion 
criterion (e.g. Body Mass Index or BMI) are used to decide whether to admit.
Though exclusion criteria may vary from facility to facility, generally speaking, 
the specific criteria are relatively similar, with the emphasis on ensuring that the 
patient is appropriate for the treatment centre. Upon review, there was very little 
difference in the patient selection and admission documentation forms in the ISTCs
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and NHS TCs. In practice however, ISTCs and NHS TCs differed significantly. In 
general ISTCs selection criteria closely matched actual patient flows. NHS TCs were 
less successful. Time and time again, non-appropriate, non-elective patients were 
admitted through the treatment centre due to pressure from the Trust Hospital.
In all seven of the ISTC cases, appropriate cases were selected according to 
criteria which were broadly the same (e.g. elective patients within certain procedure 
areas). In ISTC B, for example, exclusion criteria were actually decided by the PCT. 
One of the main exclusion criteria was the body mass index. ISTC B performed 
procedures on patients with a BMI greater than 35 per cent on an exception only 
basis. The ISTC A and ISTC C facilities went up to a BMI of 40 per cent. ISTC F 
only did ASA ones and twos (see below), because the facility had been operating at 
near capacity since day one and thus decided not to go beyond their contractual 
obligations.
Another important exclusion is the potential use of anaesthetics. The American 
Society of Anaesthetists (ASA) classification methodology is a grading system 
designed to categorise physical status, to create a uniform system for statistical 
analysis. Many human scientific investigations relating to surgery and anaesthesia 
have used this classification to categorise patients according to their physical fitness 
for the purpose of audit and statistical analysis. The ASA scale is as follows 
(American Society of Anaesthesiologists 2007):
1) normal healthy patients;
2) patients with mild systemic disease (Pregnancy, NIDDM, well controlled
asthma, well controlled epilepsy);
3) patients with severe systemic disease that is limiting but not incapacitating;
4) patients with incapacitating disease that is a constant threat to life;
5) patients not expecting to live more than 24 hours.
Treatment centres were varied in the type of ASA patients they would see. 
Decision-making on the ASA would typically be by management, in close 
coordination with the medical staff. For example, ISTC A and ISTC Cs would do 
ASA one to ‘ASA three stable.’ On the other hand, ISTC B would do an ‘ASA one 
stable’ to an ‘ASA three not stable.’ ‘ASA 3 not stable’ is when the patient has high, 
but under control, blood pressure.
There were absolute exclusion criteria at ISTC A; for example patients under 18 
years old, requiring shoulder or spinal surgery, who were admitted to a hospital in the
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previous three months for an acute condition, who had an acute exacerbation of an
exiting condition from which they are still recovering and not yet deemed ‘stable’, or
who had known or suspected infection with MRSA were all excluded. At ISTC C, the
criteria were similar, with the age being 16 years.
At ISTC A, the facility pre-assessed not only the patient’s medical status but also
his or her social status, in order to ensure there was support at home, following
discharge. The main reason for this policy was that primary grounds for returns to
theatre were patients doing what they were not supposed be doing, generally due to
the lack of support at home. The emphasis on social status for ISTC A stems from the
orthopaedic nature of the facility. The nurse manager said,
we realised we would not get a lot o f home health...so we provide a lot o f  
education on the front end rather than on the back end... We set expectations 
in their head. When five days rolls around they know they are going home. We 
will make arrangements and have help at home when they get there.
ISTC C had a slightly different approach. Because of an effective pre-assessment 
process and clear communication with the local PCT, the treatment centre was 
generally able to provide appropriate patient care and discharge to the community.
The general manager commented that, “transfers have been low because we have 
been able to educate the community on what we can and cannot do within the 
treatment centre. ”
Clearly, integration with the community PCT is important. NHS TC II provided a 
comment along the same lines. “The back-up in the community is just not there, ” said 
the nurse manager. She went on to say, that “the treatment centre does nearly all 
procedures. But things like joints are a problem in getting patients out the door. ”
In five of the nine cases, the NHS TCs specifically stated that they were having 
difficulty in selecting appropriate patients for the facility. This was due to pressures 
from NHS Trust Hospitals and consultants scheduling patients as they wished.
However, the interviews found that a few NHS TCs were increasingly taking on 
more complex (up to ASA three unstable) patients. NHS TC II was doing up to ASA 
fours. At NHS TC AA, exclusion criteria were based on a BMI greater than 40, 
controlled hypertension (<180 systolic or <100 diastolic dwa), stable angina, evidence 
of respiratory issues, suspected difficulty with anaesthetics, on-going usage of a 
number of medications (e.g. MAOI, clopidogrel and ACE I), and haematological 
disorders (there was no age limit). The ability of the NHS TC to accept such cases
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underscore the benefits of having hospital operating theatres and an intensive care unit 
(ICU) next door, as well as any other support functions needed in of the event of an 
emergency. Though these cases were the exception rather than the norm, it does 
suggest that like the ISTCs, the NHS TCs are moving in the direction of accepting 
more complex elective care patients.
In all the treatment centres, anaesthetists played an important part in the pre­
assessment. While the resident medical officer is considered the ‘first line of defence,’ 
the ‘second line of defence’ is the anaesthetist. To determine whether the patient is 
appropriate for a treatment centre, the risks to the patient under certain anaesthesia, 
within the various guidelines discussed above, need to be assessed.
An important point of the ISTCs was that all worked off the same pre-assessment 
forms. However, this is not the case in all of the NHS TCs. For example, in NHS TC 
BBB the nurse manager commented that "we cannot get one pre-assessment sheet 
together. We are having difficulty in having them work together as a team. ”
One ISTC had a profound influence on NHS TC GG’s patient selection. As ISTC 
C was contracted to do orthopaedic procedures, the DH (Department of Health)
was bombarded with letters from the Royal Colleges that patients were going 
to die on the streets...because the ISTC just did it and ignored the consultant 
complaints this opened the door fo r  the NHS TC to begin doing these 
procedures. ” The interviewee went on to say, “this further reinforced the 
NHS TC to operate truly as a treatment centre rather than the Trust’s 
intention as a Day Surgery centre and operate merely an extension o f  the 
trust.
Apparently, now the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital is doing their care management 
program according to the respective ISTC’s guidelines.
There is also a qualitative component to patient selection. By selecting the 
appropriate patient, the treatment centre can control and minimise risks. Further, by 
not mixing with other types of patients that are meant for the traditional hospital, 
other risks are minimised (e.g. hospital acquired infections, etc).
In general, there was very little difference between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in 
patient selection criteria. Where differences were found was in the actual operations 
of patients flowing through the operating theatre. Time and time again non- 
appropriate, non-elective patients would be found in the treatment centre. Morning 
surgeries would have to be cancelled in the treatment centre, as beds were occupied 
from overflow of the main hospital. The emphasis of the treatment centre is
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maximising throughput. However, when one of the aspects of the operational flow of 
the treatment centre is not available, this stops the flow through the entire treatment 
centre. The evidence does suggest that the treatment centres were beginning to push 
the envelope in terms of patient selection criteria. However, these examples are 
exceptions rather than the rule.
Discharge Practices
There are two important parties responsible for discharge: the provider and the
patient. In general, ISTCs were found to be much better at educating the patient and 
setting patient expectations on the discharge date. NHS TCs were found to be less 
skilled at setting these expectations. This section will describe both who is responsible 
for discharge and how the concept of patient education in respective facilities differs.
In six of the seven ISTCs discharge procedures were nurse led on paper and in 
practice. The exception was the unique example of ISTC G, where the NHS had the 
actual responsibility of discharging the patient. Even here, the ISTC consultant 
provided the protocol and criteria for discharge.
ISTC B provides an excellent example of the independent sector’s delegation of 
responsibility for patient discharge and setting patient expectations on discharge date. 
The primary person responsible for discharging patients at ISTC B was the discharge 
nurse. When ISTC B first opened, the average length of stay (ALOS) was five (5.0) 
days2. The facility was able to reduce this to 4.8 days during the course of the first 12 
months. The chief nurse of the facility stated that “setting expectations had played a 
very important role in discharging patients.” The nurse continued, “we are trying to 
change the mentality o f putting the responsibility on the patients. ” The facility had a 
clear case management protocol system in place and told the patient from the 
beginning they would be discharged in five days time. By educating on the front, 
rather than the back end, patient expectations were managed early. Moreover, the 
ISTC expected no home health care for the patient, following discharge. Home health 
care is very important for patients that have had a major orthopaedic surgery. 
Typically home health care is supported by the local PCT, but coordination between 
the ISTC and PCT is essential. To ensure continuity of care with or without the local 
PCT, the ISTC emphasised to the patient throughout his or her stay that there should
2 Though ISTCs are for the most part, day case or short stay, some of the ISTCs contracts include 
orthopedic work (e.g. hip and knee replacements) that demand longer length of stays. This is a case 
were significant orthopedic work conducted.
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be support from family members and friends following discharge. Consequently, on 
the fifth day, arrangements were in place for discharging and the family home 
environment was ready.
At ISTC A, the general manager commented that “it took 6- 8 months to build this 
relationship with the PCT and social services. ” The PCT knows the ISTC will admit 
only if they have a post-discharge care slot agreement from the PCT. The ISTC is 
now able to contact the PCT as the patient surgery date becomes set and arrange a 
package of care that will be carried out upon discharge. The ISTC general manager 
continued to say that “the NHS still cannot do this because the PCT didn’t trust the 
providers. ” As a result, the PCT would only begin to put a package of care together 
upon the patient’s admittance to the NHS. Putting a package of care together after 
admittance creates issues of effective discharge planning, as the PCT may not have 
staff fully available on the anticipated discharge date.
At ISTC A, where 40 per cent of outcomes were a result o f surgery alone, and 60 
per cent the result of post-surgery physiotherapy, discharge practices were the 
responsibility of both the nurse and physiotherapist. If the patient was not ready to 
undertake the necessary physiotherapy or if support mechanisms were not in place 
there was a danger they would have to be readmitted. To counter this threat, the 
facility would plan interim care with the discharge coordinator, who works with 
physiotherapy and social services. Within 48 hours of discharge this is all closely 
coordinated.
At ISTC C discharge practices were nurse-led. Discharges were not a significant 
issue for nurses and physicians in this facility, because the case mix of the patients 
was very low, all day-case patients. The operating theatre worked primarily in 
mornings to allow patients sufficient time for recovery.
The ISTCs seem to be much better at setting expectations and they would 
emphasise repeatedly during site visits the most important aspect of their care was 
patient education and patient expectations. For a given procedure, the patient would 
be told well in advance of admission the patient care pathway and the expected date 
of discharge. This would also set the expectation for the family to provide someone to 
care for the patient in the home environment.
On the other hand, home health provided by a PCT was an expectation under the 
NHS. NHS TC’s and Trust Hospitals tended to educate patients following surgery and
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prior to discharge. There were cases where family members went on vacation and, as 
a result, patients were not discharged in the expected time frame.
In all nine of the NHS TC cases, the protocol was nurse led discharge. However, 
in practice, in two of the cases there were consultants or physiotherapists that had to 
sign off as well. For example, at NHS TC AA the lead discharge nurse stated there 
were two physicians who were still old fashioned and demanded that they determine 
the appropriate timing of discharge for the patient. These two consultants were 
accepted as outliers to the general discharge practices. There are cases where ISTCs 
generate best practices and influence how the NHS TCs discharge their patients. For 
example, NHS TC HH is now using the same discharge protocols as the adjacent 
ISTC.
In sum, the review of the discharge sheets among ISTCs and NHS TCs appeared 
to be quite standardised, with very little difference between the two types of treatment 
centres. The real difference in the discharge practices is when patient expectations are 
set, how closely coordinated post-discharge care is coordinated with the home 
environment and whether home environment support is ensured from the beginning. 
The ISTCs did better in all of these respects. This was further reinforced in the 
examples of the PCTs working with the ISTCs in setting discharge dates prior to 
admission for home support, whereas with the NHS TCs, the PCTs were unwilling to 
do this until after the patient was admitted. The integration of the PCT into the ISTC 
care process appears to have resulted in not only better operational flow -  since the 
ISTC has the ability to provide the full contract of care -  but also improved quality of 
care, since patients receive post-discharge care immediately.
Transporting patients to and from  the operating theatre
By whom and how patients are transported to and from the operating theatre plays
a very important role in treatment centres. In general, ISTCs used differing methods, 
depending on the treatment centre, for patient transports. On the other hand, the NHS 
TCs generally relied on porters to transport patients to and from the operating theatre.
In only two of the seven ISTC cases were porters used. This is because the ISTCs 
were designed as self-contained facilities where patients would be able to walk to the 
operating theatre and beds were only a few seconds way. At ISTC B this role was 
carried out by nurses while at ISTC A porters were used to help transport the patients. 
The porters used were from an outsourced company; the same company that provided
181
Matthias Loening Chapter 5 Treatment Centres: Independent Sector and NHS
security, parking and catering services. On the other hand, ISTC C was day-case only 
and did not conduct orthopaedic surgeries. Accordingly, most of the patients were 
able to walk themselves into the pre-op room. However, due to the footprint of the 
site, as it was situated on NHS land in between a number of NHS facilities, the ISTC 
was limited in building out. The operator had to instead build up and, as a result, the 
operating theatres and pre and post-op facilities were upstairs. Consequently, some 
patients needed assistance in getting up and down stairs, which was the responsibility 
of volunteer porters.
NHS TCs presented a different picture. In three of the nine cases NHS TCs used 
porters. In two of the cases the treatment centre used nurses to assist. However, in five 
of the nine cases, the NHS TCs were part of the NHS Trust Hospital, meaning often a 
significant amount of time was needed to transport the patient to the induction room. 
This implies the real question of not who was moving the patient but the distance 
between the ward and operating theatre, as well as the mode of transport (see next 
paragraph). NHS TC AA provides an excellent example. It was estimated that porters 
at NHS TC AA take ten minutes to get to the ward and ten minutes to return. Though 
the time to transport patients may seem insignificant, multiplied by the number 
entering and exiting the operating theatre per day, this time spent quickly multiplies. 
Further, the distance illustrates just another possibility for a delay.
How patients are transported also plays a very important role in the facilities. At 
ISTC B patients walk into the operating theatre or, at worst, are put into a wheelchair 
(which still encourages the patients to stay mobile). At NHS TC AA, patients were 
wheeled in a bed, which created a perception by the patients that they needed to be 
taken care of and looked after. This minor point of how patients are transported is 
important in setting patient expectations. These minor points are impossible to 
quantify but may play an important role in how a facility operates and how effectively 
it performs. At NHS TC HH, all patients walked into the theatre.
The transport of patients to and from the operating theatre was dependent on the 
type of facility. As the ISTCs are relatively small and self-contained facilities, it does 
not take more than a few minutes to get the patient from the ward to the induction 
room. In the NHS TCs, as part of the Trust Hospital, there was often a significant 
amount of time needed to transport the patient to the induction room.
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Purchasing and Materials Management
The purchasing and management of consumables plays an important role in any
health care facility. For instance, using the same product company allows a treatment 
centre to negotiate better prices which positively impacts costs and profitability. In a 
number of procedure areas (e.g. hip and knee replacements) the product amounts to a 
significant proportion of the total cost of surgery. In all seven cases, the ISTCs stated 
they were receiving much better prices than the NHS and NHS TCs.
Another benefit of simplified purchasing is the mitigation of delays in purchasing 
and shipping. It is much easier to coordinate one rather than multiple products for 
each respective consultant vis-a-vis the number of surgeries scheduled by a procedure. 
Even after receipt to the facility, the materials management department must 
coordinate with the operating theatre to ensure that the appropriate product is stocked 
on the surgical trays. As a result, there are any number of points where having 
multiple company products creates die potential for hampering effective performance.
To illustrate with examples, at ISTC A, the surgeons were using two hip products 
from the same company, and only one knee product. The general manager at ISTC A 
stated firmly that “our product costs are 40% less than the NHS. ” The findings were 
similar for ISTCs B and G. ISTC F said, “we decided not to use the NHS purchasing 
agency because we can get better prices. ” At ISTC C, as part of a larger network of 
facilities, purchasing was done at the corporate level. As a result, there were larger 
discounts and a larger ability to save. The respective administrator did not know the 
discounts, as this was dealt with at the corporate level. However, in a follow up 
interview with the corporate manager of the ISTC, the manager confirmed that the 
purchasing costs were significantly below the NHS purchase price. ISTC F uses one 
prosthetic manufacturer because they can get better prices. By attaining better pricing 
and less waste of products, again the ISTC felt that their costs are significantly lower 
than the NHS.
In eight of nine NHS TC cases, the facilities purchased from varying product 
companies. A lone exception was NHS TC HH where the researcher found that the 
facility was able to get the consultants to use one product company. Even at NHS TC 
BB, which is deemed one of the best run NHS TCs, 73 different kinds of surgical 
gloves were ordered in the previous year. The NHS TC has recognised this and was 
working towards more efficient purchasing and consultant product consolidation. ‘We 
are getting better but we still not as good as an ISTC’, the manager commented with
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respect to purchasing. NHS TC EE also commented that “purchasing is getting better. 
We have good staff... and they are empowered to do this ” One of the key aspects of 
negotiating with consultants was for them to provide evidence based medicine to 
prove that their more expensive product was indeed of better quality. The 
administrator of NHS TC has not had a case where the consultants followed up on this 
and thus slowly the facility was moving toward using one product company.
Most of the ISTCs were able to get the consultants using the same product 
company. From the interviews the researcher found it was much harder for the NHS 
TCs to get consultants to use one product company. Further, it was less clear whether 
the NHS TC actually had control over purchasing themselves or whether this was a 
responsibility of the Trust Hospital. As a result, this led not only to cost issues, but 
also to systemic delays in obtaining materials needed for the treatment centre to 
maximise operational flow throughout the facility.
Architectural Design
Though the architectural design may not fit within the management practices, this
sub-section has been added because of the recognition that this is a major aspect of 
differentiation between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. Architectural design is an important 
maximising, or limiting, factor for stream-lining treatment centre operational flow. In 
general, ISTCs visited were designed for the services in which they won tenders (e.g. 
elective outpatient and/or inpatient surgeries). Thus, these ISTCs were purpose built 
and operated on a stand alone basis. However, a number of the NHS TCs visited were 
poorly designed.
In five of seven of the ISTC cases, the facility was a self-contained unit. In the 
other two ISTC cases the facilities were part of an existing NHS building. One of the 
managers of an ISTC commented that “if  the facility is a properly designedfacility to 
sweat the asset” then they should be more productive.
In only three of the nine NHS TC cases, were facilities standalone. As this meant 
many of the NHS TCs were either designed to be located in the wing of an existing 
hospital (four cases) or were renovations of existing facilities (two cases), this may 
have limited the ability to design appropriately and contributed to the poor design of 
many NHS TCs. Moreover, the hospital planners and architects chosen did not have 
experience in designing these types of facilities for the intended purposes, further 
constraining good design. Finally, design plans have changed through the years and,
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as a result, the design has often become a patchwork of various plans for services, 
until the funding for the ‘treatment centre’ programme was in place.
In one of the NHS TCs visited, the design plans were for day case patients. These 
plans were changed over the years by the Trust to include orthopaedic services and 
then later endoscopy services. The resulting design forced patients to exit the 
operating theatre by way of the main corridor that all patients, employees and visitors 
used. The manager of the TC commented that “architectural planning was very 
poor. ” He went on to say that “the main reason is that the plans have changed over 
time. ” The interviewee went on to say “so it became a hodge-podge ofplans fo r  
services until finally complete. ”
In two of the NHS TCs, it was clear that all three of the reasons stated above were 
factors that led to the existing architectural design.
The ISTCs were purpose built facilities for the contract that was in hand.
However, in the NHS, the new treatment centres were not seen as an important and 
integral aspect of the redesign of the way health care services were to be delivered, 
but rather an expansion of existing services. Clearly, if the foundation of the treatment 
centre is its design and the way it is to operate is a limiting factor, then management 
can only do so much to maximise operational through-put. This was seen time and 
time again in NHS TCs
S.3 Discussion
There are clear differences between ISTCs and NHS TCs. There are a number of
overall conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. These differences and 
conclusions can be broadly categorised into four groupings: use of technology; 
differing organisational methods; different skill mix in staff; and management 
practices.
5.3.1 Use of Technology
There were differences found in how technology was used between the ISTCs and
NHS TCs. ISTCs were found to be technologically integrated, whereas the NHS TCs 
were not. The main reason for the NHS TCs not being technologically integrated was 
paradoxically because of the organisational integration with the NHS Trust Hospital. 
While all six (6) of the ISTCs had diagnostics units technologically and 
organisationally integrated within their facility, six (6) of nine (9) of the NHS TCs 
shared diagnostic services with the NHS Trust Hospitals. An example provided is the
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use of PACs and how it was, or was not, integrated into patient care. Further, 
consultant notes were not an issue within the ISTCs visited. This is because patient 
information was typically put into the information management systems that the 
ISTCs had in place. Consultant notes was a major issue within the NHS TCs and an 
important aspect of this was because these notes were not digitised and 
technologically integrated into the day to day operations of the facilities.
The better use of technology by ISTCs -  notably the ready availability in ISTCs of 
self-contained diagnostic equipment and the move towards digital notes -  may yield 
improved efficiency. Clearly keeping equipment readily available improves 
efficiency, since staff spends less time travelling, do not have to schedule use of the 
technology with other departments, and can keep equipment set up specifically for the 
purposes of the treatment centre. This may be one explanatory factor for the evidence 
suggesting superior performance of ISTCs in terms of efficiency.
There is also a quality of care element to this integration. Integration suggests a 
potential for higher quality, as loss of medical records and medical errors would be 
minimised. It would also suggest that patient satisfaction levels would be higher, since 
patients spend less time waiting to be moved to the site of diagnostic equipment, or 
waiting for consultants to find notes. As previously mentioned, this is consistent with 
the findings of the Healthcare Commission (2007).
5.3.2 Differing Organisational Methods
The interviews found that management structures in ISTCs were relatively
streamlined, whereas in NHS TCs, the departmental structures were under the NHS 
Trust Hospitals. Within the ISTCs, management reporting was clear. But it was not 
always clear within the NHS whether staff reported to a treatment centre manager or 
to the NHS Trust Hospital itself, implying that the treatment centre was seen merely 
as another clinical department.
There are clearly differing perceptions and attitudes toward management control 
in the different facilities. ISTC staff perceived that management had a higher degree 
of control than NHS TCs. Also, the evidence suggests there was much more of an 
integrative approach between the administration, nurses, surgical consultants and 
anaesthetist. This integration created the ability to incentivise the consultants much 
better than in NHS TCs.
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Again, the perception of integration, coordination and management control over 
anaesthetists differed between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. ISTCs seemed to have 
greater control over their anaesthetists than the NHS. The reporting structure of the 
ISTCs suggests gains to efficiency for several reasons. First, assuming management is 
incentivised to maximise the efficiency and quality outcomes of the treatment centre, 
better control over staff would help keep staff incentives in line with management 
objectives.
Second, since management at ISTCs is dedicated to the task of operating the 
treatment centre, and is not split between operating the treatment centre and operating 
a Trust Hospital -  as was often the case in the NHS TCs -  management was able to 
completely direct its resources towards maximising the performance of the TC. 
Finally, the clarity of ISTC reporting structures means staff will be likely to have 
more clearly defined tasks and goals, and can more easily address problems that arise, 
since there is a clear hierarchy. These same dynamics are also likely to help boost 
quality of care. The fact that ISCTs implement ‘best-practices’ also supports higher 
quality outcomes and improved efficiency, since patients are able to leave the 
treatment centre earlier. Earlier exits are also likely to improve patient satisfaction.
5.3.3 Different Skill Mix in Staff
In general, there is less staffing in ISTCs than NHS TCs. Though the treatment
centre operational cost data was not assessed, evidence suggests that the ISTC cost 
structure is lower.
There was concern that ISTCs would use less experienced consultants, but no 
difference was found between the independent sector and NHS. Given the lack of 
evidence for a shortfall of experience in ISTCs relative to NHS TCs, we would not 
expect staff experience to have an effect on quality outcomes. Indeed, we would lean 
towards the opposite conclusion, that ISTCs may exhibit better quality outcomes since 
they generally do not make use of consultant trainees, and may have a higher quality 
staff-mix, even if they have less staff overall.
Maximising the use of a treatment centre’s assets depends on how operating 
theatre time is scheduled. Conflicts between schedulers and consultants were 
observed in all facilities, but generally ISTCs seemed to make more efficient use of 
their operating rooms and staff.
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5.3.4 Management Practices
Upon review of the patient selection and admission documentation forms from
ISTCs and NHS TCs, there was very little difference, but in practice, ISTCs and NHS 
TCs differed significantly. The overwhelming evidence found that ISTCs were much 
better at selecting appropriate patients and were much more effective in booking 
operating rooms to full utilisation. NHS TCs were found mixing non-appropriate 
patients and practising in the same manner as a general hospital. These differences 
suggest that ISTCs would not only have better operational performance but also 
differences in quality. Mixing non-appropriate patients is bad clinical practice which 
can lead to medical errors as well as the inability to treat patients appropriately if 
back-up medical support is needed. Fewer cancellations would suggest fewer patients 
having to return another day to the facility and staggered patient arrival times would 
allow for a smoothing of operations and not wait in line, suggesting higher patient 
satisfaction levels.
Discharge practices were relatively similar, both in theory and practice, though 
ISTCs were more effective at setting patient expectations early as well as having post­
discharge care booked. This suggests that due to better ISTC integration with the 
PCTs, there is not only better operational flow, due to the ability of providing the full 
continuum of care, but also better quality with patients immediately receiving post­
discharge care. It is clear that quality outcomes are heavily dependent on the result of 
the post-surgery physiotherapy. As a result, post-surgery collaboration with the PCTs 
is essential so that patients could be discharged as quickly as possible and begin 
rehabilitation without delay.
Transporting patients to and from the operating theatre is also an important part of 
ensuring proper flow in and out of the operating theatre and ensuring maximum 
throughput. Since the ISTCs were relatively small and self-contained facilities, it did 
not take more than a few minutes to get the patient from the ward to the induction 
room, but in the NHS TCs, this was not always the case.
Differences were also found in the areas of purchasing and materials management. 
Most ISTCs were able to get consultants to use the same product company, permitting 
larger discounts and a greater ability to save on purchasing. NHS TCs had difficulty 
getting consultants to use the same product company. It was stated in the interviews 
that purchasing costs at ISTCs were significantly below the NHS purchase price.
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Differences were also found in the architectural design of the facilities. The ISTCs 
visited were designed for the services they were to provide (purpose built). This was 
not the case in a number of the NHS TCs, and was an important limiting factor in 
stream-lining TC operations. Furthermore, this physical organisation has an important 
drawback on the actual operations. Rather than bringing innovation to the NHS, as 
was the stated goal, there seems to be merely transference of existing organisation 
structures and the accompanying NHS organisational culture. This is a phenomenon 
the researcher noted in many instances.
5.3.5 Discussion Summary
Clearly, in all the categories above, there are differences between the ISTCs and
NHS TCs. A matrix was created to allow for comparability of the responses vis-a-vis 
facility type. This matrix also allowed easier assessment of the relationships between 
the different facility types (See Annex A: Interview Results Matrix -  Treatment 
Centres and Hospitals).
In the use of technology, better integration by ISTCs is suggestive of superior 
efficiency. To the extent that integrated technology helps ISTCs avoid medical delays 
and mistakes, technology can also help improve the quality of care and patient 
satisfaction, relative to NHS TCs.
In organisational methods, the ISTCs were found to have better integration, 
coordination and management control, all of which are conducive to maximising both 
efficiency and the quality of care. The ISTCs successful implementation of ‘best- 
practice’ is another means by which the ISTCs are likely to improve quality of care 
and patient satisfaction.
In terms of skill mix, ISTCs and NHS TCs are relatively similar, although ISTCs 
were, in general, found to have less staff. However, ISTCs were not found to be using 
less experienced consultants, as had been feared. Accordingly, there is nothing to 
suggest that different experience levels between NHS TCs and ISTCs will lead to a 
divergence in the quality of care.
While skill mix was relatively similar, management practices were found to be 
significantly different. The ISTCs were much better at selecting appropriate patients 
and were much more effective in booking operating rooms to full utilisation. This 
contributed to their greater efficiency. Further, the fact that ISTCS were better at 
selecting appropriate patients, and not mixing non-appropriate patients, suggests that
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ISTCs not only have better operational performance but may also exhibit better 
quality in terms of outcomes and patient satisfaction levels. For example, the process 
for discharging patients at ISTCs was better integrated with the PCTs than in NHS 
TCs. This helped patients to receive post-discharge care immediately, which is 
important for the recovery process.
Differences were also found in the areas of purchasing and materials management, 
as well as in the architectural design of the facilities -  all suggesting higher levels of 
operational performance.
The qualitative analysis in this chapter outlines reasons why operational 
efficiency, quality of care, and patient satisfaction might be higher in ISTCs. That 
ISTCs do indeed exhibit stronger performances in terms of efficiency (as measured by 
ALOS) is indicated by evidence from the quantitative analysis chapter. Quantitative 
evidence that quality of care -  as measured by death rates and 30 day readmission 
rates -  is superior in ISTCs was not found. However the qualitative evidence in this 
chapter suggests that there may be significant differences in this area as well.
The differences discussed, however, are not randomly distributed, but arguably 
determined, at least to some extent, by the impact ownership has on the facility’s 
conventions. The differences between ISTCs and NHS TCs can be broadly collected 
into four groupings: use of technology; organisational methods; staff skill mix; and 
management practices. Indeed, the specific, individual differences found in each of 
the various case studies are discussed under the framework of these four groupings. 
However, what is important to recognise is that beyond the individual differences 
found, much of the variation is associated with ownership.
It is not just a question of whether the centre’s ownership is private or public and, 
additionally, how one owner uses technology, organises the facility, allocates staff 
and manages the facilities. Rather, it is necessary to recognise that ownership has an 
important impact on the incentive structure, which in turn influences the policies and 
processes adopted by the facility. The ownership structure drives differences in 
incentives, as well as motivations and behaviours, since changes in property rights 
alter the incentives faced by decision makers in the firm. As discussed in the literature 
review, this is the underlying premise in property rights theory; that changes in 
property rights alter the structure of incentives faced by decision makers in a firm. 
There is no reason to believe these effects will not be present in the context of health 
care.
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To the extent that decision-makers face differing incentives, and to the extent that 
they have the freedom to organise and develop processes in response to those 
incentives, the organisational model adopted can differ dramatically. This is still the 
case when the public and private providers are intended to deliver the same service, as 
in the case of England’s treatment centre programme. As argued above, the impacts of 
a change in the incentive structure can be myriad. In the case of England’s Treatment 
Centres, a divergence of incentives has likely played a role in the observed differences 
in organisational and operational approaches of the facilities. Because the type of 
ownership is significantly related to the other differences observed, ownership should 
be viewed as part of a ‘package’ that consists of itself as well as the previously 
delineated individual differences.
The researcher acknowledges, however, that though there are differences in the 
manner that the ISTCs and NHS TCs are organised and operate, there are certainly 
larger pressures placed upon the NHS TCs which tend to constrain efforts to insulate 
the elective work from larger organisational pressures. These are pressures which the 
ISTCs did not have. Accordingly, it is important to recognise that some of the 
differences observed are likely to be context-specific. For example, public ownership 
influences the incentive structure in one way, but a separate issue may be related to 
the exact policies of the NHS. Some of these pressures include the NHS Trust 
attempting to meet wait list targets as well as financial pressures within the larger 
Trust Hospital organisation. To the extent that these policies could be revised, or the 
NHS TCs could be better insulated from the impact of the policies, changes in the 
four groupings highlighted may result without a shift in the form of ownership.
5.4 Summary
The main emphasis of this chapter has been to review differences in the actual 
organisational structure and operations between ISTCs and NHS TCs. The originality 
of this research is that unlike many economic papers, the evidence was assessed by 
going into the ‘black box’ of these organisations and assessing why there were 
differences in performance.
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Though the evidence by its nature cannot be conclusive, differences in the 
organisational and management practices in the ISTC and NHS TCs that affect 
performance suggest that there is a clear divergence in operating practice between the 
ISTCs and NHS TCs. The next question is why? Answering this question is the task 
of the next chapter.
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Annex A: Interview Results M atrix -  Treatm ent Centres and Hospitals
ISTCs
ISTC A ISTC B ISTC C ISTC D ISTC E ISTC F ISTC G
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y
Different
Procedures/T echniques
No No No No No No No
Diagnostics Self-Contained. Labs and 
pharma outsourced to trust
Self-Contained Self-Contained Self-Contained Self-Contained Outsource CT/MRI who 
come by in a mobile 
truck one day a week.
Outsource to 
neighboring hospital.
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l
M
et
ho
ds
Management Structure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 (shared services with 
NHS)
Physician Reporting CMO CMO CMO CMO CMO CMO The only employees are 
in the OT.
Management Control Fair High High Good Good High High
Incentives Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anesthesiologists
organized
Team. Employee. Team. Employee Team. Employee NHS Consultant Team. Employee Team. Employee Team. Employee
Sk
ill
 M
ix
Physician/Nurse Ratio Vi + y* y* V4 + y* % Vi
Nurses in OR 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Type o f Consultant Staff Varies Varies Varies Varies Varies Varies Varies
Consultant Trainees No No No No No No No
OR Staff mix/make-up Vi only 1 nurse '/« Vi Vi + shared ODP % Vi + ODP 1 /6 (1 + than NHS). This 
is because they do not 
have any backup staff 
outside o f the OR.
Avg years experience of 
consultant in OR
High Varies High Varies Varies High High
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OR Time Scheduling Consultants are to work 7 
theatre sessions and 3 
clinical sessions. A list is 4 
hours.
Scheduler (1 will be 2) 8 hours lists. Tried to 
book list by day.
2-3 weeks on and 1 
week off. No OP 
requirement.
4 hour lists Physicians work 4 days 
a week all day. Plan 
8am -  5pm but if  finish 
early then they are 
finished for the day. 
Debating whether to add 
a evening list 5:30 -  
9:30 and work on 
Saturdays.
Considering adding 3rd 
session every day (5:30- 
9:30pm) and Saturdays.
Block scheduling o f 
physician time
Yes Yes Yes. 7 OR lists/week Yes Yes No No
Parallel theatres No No No No No No No
How are patients selected? ASA scores, social 
exclusions. No BMI limit
1-3 or stable 4 ASA 1-3.3 stable. Look at 
socio as well
ASA stable 3 and 
18+ years. BMI 
assessed on a patient 
basis.
ASA scores -  only 
select 1-3.
ASA 1-2. Don’t need to 
do ASA 3’s because 
they have been at 
capacity since day one.
ASA 1-3.
60
4>
Ur
«
Discharge practices? Nurse led. Physiotherapist Nurse led Nurse/Physiotherapist Nurse led Nurse led Nurse led NHS nurse led but ISTC 
consultant has provided 
discharge 
protocol/criteria.
fik
H
4>
E
4>
Role o f porters Outsourced. None Yes. Outsourced 
company.
No. Walk with assist 
o f nurse
No. Use own staff b/c did 
not want to rely on 
NHS.
C8e
2
Are there specific 
physician incentive 
structures?
Yes Yes Yes. To be a fixed and 
variable component.
No No Yes. 2 types.
3
5us
-btZ) 
4) 
>  
■ c a
4>
<J
How structured? Financial. Company 
incentive scheme. Based 
upon KPI quality 
indicators.
By volume KPIs N/A N/A 1) 1 surgeon is self- 
employed -  paid session 
rate + paid by going 
over and above (e.g. 3 
procedures instead o f 2 
per session).
2) Company incentive 
scheme. Based upon 
KPI quality indicators.
jg
'3aa
Incentive structures in 
place non-consultant 
physicians?
Yes No No No No. Yes
to General perception o f these 
financial incentive 
structures
Good Good Not yet implemented. 
Likely poor.
Good Under discussion. Good
194
Matthias Loening Appendices
NHS TCs
NHS TC AA NHS TC BB NHS TC  CC NHS TC DD NHS TC EE NHS TC  FF NHS TC  GG NHS T C  HH NHS T C  II
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y
Different
Procedures/
Techniques
No No No No No No No No No
Diagnostics Part o f Hospital Self-Contained Self-Contained Self-
Contained
Part o f Hospital Part o f Hospital No. Have a CT and MRI 
(mobile) one week per 
month. Also MRI in sister 
hospitals. Wait time is 6-8 
weeks while adjacent ISTC 
wait time is 1-3 weeks.
Use the main 
hospital’s 
diagnostics. Also, 
there is a 
Independent 
Sector mobile 
diagnostics unit 
that comes in 
every 2 weeks
Use main 
hospital’s. IS 
mobile
lithotripsy unit 
comes once a 
month.
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
M
et
ho
ds
Management
Structure
Unclear. Part of 
Trust. Never 
TC focused
Unclear. Some 
cross-staffing
4. Self- 
contained
Unclear. 
Some cross- 
staffing
Part o f Trust. Never 
TC focused
Unclear. Part o f Trust. 
Never TC focused
Previously, hospital 
director shuttling between 
3 hospitals (so 1/3"* time 
dedicated). Now have 
dedicated manager
3 nurse managers 
report to head of 
theatres
There is a 
general 
manager, 
clinical
director. Under 
the GM there 
are 3 operations 
managers and 
one lead nurse.
Physician
Reporting
Unclear To hospital 
department 
heads
Medical
Director
Unclear Unclear To hospital department 
heads
RMO. Case mix is 
increasing so need to have 
a doctor on site.
To hospital 
department heads
To hospital 
department 
heads
Management
Control
None Average Average Average Average Average Good. Because coming 
from outside and thus seen 
as contractors
Average Average
Incentives Yes to do 
another list but 
no link between 
utilization and 
efficiency
Yes No No Yes No No No No
Anesthesiologists
organized
Self-contained Team.
Employee
Team.
Employee
Team.
Employee
Team. Employee Team. Employee Team. Employee Team. Employee Team.
Employee
.* .X — Physician/Nurse 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 N/A
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Ratio
Nurses in OR 5+ 3 4 3+ 3 5 5+ N/A
Type o f
Consultant Staff
Varies Varies Varies Varies Young Varies Varies Varies N/A
Consultant
Trainees
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes. Use them 
very much.
N/A
OR Staff 
mix/make-up
1/5+ 1/5+ 1/5+ 1/5+ 1/5+ 1/5+ 1/5+ 1/5+ N/A
Avg years 
experience of 
consultant in OR
Mix. ENT 
procedures 
heing led by 
high ranking 
resident while 
consultant 
checks
hotmail/mobile.
Varies Varies Varies Young Varies Varies Varies N/A
OR Time 
Scheduling
5 different 
people. 
Physician 
focused not OR 
focused.
Scheduling is 
based upon 
demand. Let 
consultants 
decide.
Lists (4-8 
hours)
4 Hour lists. Moving toward 
‘greenlists’ Common 
characteristics 
include: the same 
number and type of 
cases; the same 
Theatre Team; 
patients have fulfilled 
pre-assessment 
criteria; etc.
3 types o f scheduling: 
-a ll d ay -8 :3 0 -4 :3 0  
-Vi day -8:30-12:30, 
1:30-5
- Evening -  5pm-7pm 
only ortho for this. No 
private patients
2 times 3 Vi hour sessions. 
Adjacent ISTC has 2 times 
4 hour sessions.
9:00-12:30; 1:30- 
5:00. 2 lists o f 3 'A 
hours and 
occasional/ few 
Saturdays.
9:00-12:30; 
1:30-5:00.2 
lists o f 3 Vi 
hours. Used to 
do nights but 
too costly.
Block scheduling 
o f  physician time
Some Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. But
shifting to
clinical
scheduling
rather than
consultant
scheduling.
M
4)fj
*X3
u
Au
Parallel theatres No No No No No No No No No
B
4)
s
4)
8P
8
2
How are patients 
selected?
Preassessment 
for Ortho and 
TC
ASA. Getting 
better at 
selecting 
appropriate 
patients.
ASA ASA ASA. But cannot 
control who is 
admitted b/c o f Trust 
Hospital.
All patients added to the 
wait list are screened 
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Chapter 6
Does Ownership Matter?
Any change, even a change fo r the better, is always accompanied by drawbacks and 
discomforts.
Arnold Bennett, "The Arnold Bennett Calendar"
6.0 Introduction
This chapter is the second of two that addresses the differing performance of 
England’s Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) and NHS Treatment 
Centres (NHS TCs) using qualitative evidence. The quantitative analysis of Chapter 4 
indicated that better efficiency and quality outcomes were associated with private, 
rather than public, ownership and management, and Chapter 5 applied qualitative 
analysis in an attempt to open up the ‘black box’ of institutions and explain the 
divergence of outcomes. Technology, organisational methods, staff skill mix, and 
management practices differences were identified as the likely proximate factors that 
explained the differences. This chapter takes the argument a step further by trying to 
identify the causes of those differences -  and in particular to explore the role of 
ownership. In this way, it is hoped the tangled correlations identified in the 
quantitative results can be unraveled and genuine insight into the causal relationships 
found.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 6.1 provides a brief overview of 
ownership within the context of this dissertation. Section 6.2 describes in more detail 
the research methodology used for this chapter and the evidence used supporting this 
analysis. Section 6.3 reviews the evidence found from the qualitative analysis. Section
6.4 discusses the findings in more detail and addresses some key limitations. Section
6.5 provides concluding remarks.
6.1 Ownership: Overview
Governments are increasingly contracting with the private sector for health care
services and England is no exception. The NHS, historically an almost exclusively
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public sector enterprise is now contracting with the private sector, commonly referred 
to as the independent sector, more and more. The independent sector was expected 
eventually to provide nearly 10 per cent of all elective surgeries for England’s NHS 
patients, the majority of which would be delivered through the ISTC programme 
(Health Committee 2006). It is therefore important to determine whether the 
performance levels of the independent sector are higher than public sector entities 
and, if so, whether the NHS should increase the potential role of the private sector in 
health care service provision.
Whether or not privatisation actually leads to an improvement in performance has 
been the subject of a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical research. The 
literature review has demonstrated that efficiency and the incentives within each firm 
are not solely dependent on changes in ownership structure. Efficiency and incentives 
also depend on the level of competition and the regulatory environment in which a 
given firm operates. Caves and Christensen (1980) have argued that public ownership 
is not inherently less efficient than private ownership. Rather differences in efficiency 
levels can stem from a lack of effective competition in the market rather than from 
public ownership itself. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) even argue that the degree of 
competition and the effectiveness of regulatory policy typically have larger effects on 
performance than ownership. Therefore policy-makers must assess ownership in 
conjunction with the level of competition and regulation in the market.
Accordingly, in assessing the organisational and managerial differences between 
ISTCs and NHS TCs, we will also examine various other potential variables that may 
account for these differences and the associated differences in performance. Only by 
eliminating all the other potential confounding factors, can we determine whether 
differences in ownership, as theory predicts, do have significant effects on treatment 
centre behaviour and performance.
6.2 Research Design and Methodology: Qualitative Case Study 
Approach
The research methodology in this chapter is a qualitative case study approach. The 
primary method of qualitative research was interviews with a number of ISTCs, NHS 
TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals in England.
This chapter follows the previous one in assessing the differences in Treatment 
Centres in England. The approach of this chapter is to use the same qualitative data,
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but from an ownership perspective. This approach is not intended solely to confirm 
the suggested relationships, but also to shed light on the relationships in the provision 
of care by ownership. The case study approach is appropriate in this case to 
understand not only if ownership matters, but also, if so, how and why it does - 
specifically how and why it contributes to the ISTCs exhibiting higher efficiency and 
quality.
6.3 Evidence
There are a number of potential explanatory variables that must be discounted 
before it can be asserted that ownership is indeed the primary explanatory variable for 
differences in performance. Other explanatory variables that could account for the 
differences in performance are competition, type of payer and method of 
reimbursement, case mix selection, physical and organisational integration and 
differences in ownership. The graphic below provides a summary of the potential 
explanatory variable for differences in performance which will be discussed in the 
following sections.
20 0
Matthias Loening Chapter 6 Does Ownership Matter?
Figure 6.1 Possible Explanatory Framework
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6.3.1 Com petition
Efficiency and incentives in a market often depend on the level of competition in
the environment in which a given firm operates. A key lesson from the conservative 
government’s internal market reforms of the 1990s to the NHS was that incentives 
must be sufficiently strong before providers actually change their behaviour (Le 
Grand, Mays et al. 1998; Le Grand 1999). The failure of the reforms to achieve their 
goals was due to the weakness of the internal market’s incentives. Consequently, the 
view emerged that the healthcare system needed a competitive market for the entire 
health delivery system, in addition to an expansion of capacity (Commercial 
Directorate 2005; Anderson 2006). These two goals are seen to be mutually 
reinforcing, since a competitive market would add capacity and added capacity would 
create a competitive market.
The level of competition is important to consider as it can be argued that public 
ownership is not inherently less efficient than private ownership if the differences in 
efficiency levels stem from a lack of effective competition in the market rather than
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public ownership itself. Therefore, competition could be an alternative explanatory 
variable for the difference between Treatment Centres in England.
There are three ways in which competition could affect differences in 
performance between ISTCs and NHS TCs. First, there could be direct competition 
for the same service between them. Second, there could be indirect competition, or 
peer effects. Third, there could be no direct or indirect competition between the 
treatment centres (IS or NHS), but there could be differences in the competitive 
pressure they face from other sources -  in particular, from NHS Trust hospitals.
It is worth noting that although each of these types of competition could affect 
performance, they will not necessarily all go in the same direction. If  the theory is 
correct, direct or indirect competition between ISTCs and NHS TCs is more likely to 
lead to an equalisation of performance between them rather than creating differences 
in performance. Only if ISTCs were subject to more competitive pressure than NHS 
TCs from any other source would this lead to differences in performance.
Competition: Quantitative Case Studies
A geographical analysis was conducted using NHS patient discharge records to
assess the extent of competition for ISTCs and NHS TCs (See graphic below). A key 
indicator of competition is the number of firms within a market area. This implies 
that, to measure competition, the market area’s size and boundaries must be 
determined. One of the main strategies used is to identify a geographic market area. 
Standard geographic market areas can be based on political boundaries like counties 
or Strategic Health Authorities (SHA's). With geographic market area defined for 
each firm, the set of competitors can be established by simply identifying all potential 
competitors whose market areas overlap with the market area of the firm in question. 
However, if an area is too small relevant competitors will be excluded, while if an 
area is too large, unrealistic market competitors will be included (Baker 2001).
One way to improve on the use of the geographic area strategy is to define an area 
of a fixed size around each firm to be the geographic market. One common method is 
to draw a fixed radius of some length around each firm. In studies of hospitals, for 
example, researchers have considered geographic markets with radii ranging from 15 
miles (Robinson and Luft 1985) to 35 miles (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Kessler 
and Geppert 2005). However, hospitals in rural areas may compete over larger
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distances than urban hospitals, but fixed radius market areas assume the same radius 
for both.
Initial analyses included the fixed geographic market strategy using a 20 mile 
radius for each ISTC and NHS TC in England. However, it was determined that too 
many providers would come into the competition area in London (e.g. >50) and too 
few outside London (e.g. 0). Therefore, a variable methodology was used, following 
an analysis of the catchment areas. It was determined that a 10 mile radius would be 
used for London and a 30 mile radius for the rest of England (note that the graphic 
below only shows 30 mile radii). The red dots demarcate the ISTC sites, and the green 
dots the NHS Trusts and NHS TCs (See Appendix M for table showing total number 
of providers per each competition area).
Figure 6.2 Competition Mapping
€>
The postcodes and the latitude and longitudes (lat-longs) were extracted using 
Mapquest Business Software. With these lat-longs, this data were incorporated into 
Arcview, a mapping software, and the service catchments radii drawn out. The types 
of procedures offered by facilities in a given competitive area were then assessed to 
delineate the ‘service area’. The assumption was that individuals are potential patients 
of any NHS Trust Hospital or NHS TC that offers the same services as the ISTC in 
whose service catchment they fall.
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From the analysis, using the methodology as stated above, it is clear that virtually 
none of the ISTCs directly compete with NHS TCs. For the most part, ISTCs have 
been situated in areas outside of major cities, whereas the NHS TCs are situated in 
and around major cities. The only instance from the research where an ISTC competes 
directly with an NHS TC would be ISTC D and NHS TC GG; this is discussed further 
in the next section.
If there is competition, then it is ISTCs that compete against NHS Trust Hospitals. 
This was, in fact, what was intended to happen (Anderson 2007). At present, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that ISTCs have had a significant effect on the behaviour 
of NHS Trust Hospitals (e.g. changing the types of services they provide). However, 
the one year cross sectional analysis cannot tell us whether ALOS is changing as a 
result of the introduction of the ISTCs.
We can also assess the number of competitors in a competition area. On average, 
there were 9 competitors in a competition area for an ISTC and 17 competitors in an 
NHS TC competition area. With nearly two times as many competitors, we can 
assume that if there was competition, then the respective NHS TC market areas would 
be much more competitive.
In any case, there is nothing to suggest ISTCs and NHS TCs face significantly 
different competition, even if they do not compete against each other, such that it 
could explain the differences found in the performance of NHS TCs and ISTCs. 
Indeed, for the most part, ISTCs have been situated in areas outside of major cities. 
For example, none of the ISTCs have been situated in the London Strategic Health 
Authority (SHA) where there is a very high concentration of competitors. This is in 
contrast to 8 out of 27 of the NHS TCs being situated in the London SHA. Therefore, 
ISTCs should in fact face less competition than the NHS TCs.
Competition: Qualitative Case Studies
From the site visits conducted, the only instance where there may be some
competition between an ISTC and an NHS TC was ISTC D and NHS TC GG. 
However, there is little overlap in the specialty areas between the two providers, 
which are co-located within the same facility. The one exception is orthopaedic 
surgery. However, even here the NHS TC did not undertake any major inpatient 
procedures (such as joint replacement surgeries) until the last few months of 2007, 
further reducing the potential overlap of procedure areas offered by the ISTC and
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NHS TC. As a result, there was very little, if any direct competition between the two 
facilities during the period for which data was collected (March 2008).
It can be argued, however, that indirect competition, or peer effects, did take 
place, and this can be an important determinant of hospitals’ efficiency (Baumol, 
Panzar et al. 1982; Iglehart 2005; Bian and Morrisey 2006). Ferrier and Valdmanis 
(2005) provide evidence that the more efficient a hospital, the greater the average 
efficiency of its peers.
In this case, from the assessment, there was no perception that the ISTC competed 
with the NHS TC. However, it is important to note that there was a perception, 
commonly recognised by both facilities, that the performance of the ISTC was higher. 
As a result, there was a perceived effect of the ISTC on the NHS TC. The NHS TC 
stated that its performance had risen in response to the peer effects of the adjacent 
ISTC. It would have been desirable to check this statement alongside the actual 
performance of the TCs over time. Unfortunately there were various data 
complications that prevent this. For instance, Kidderminster ISTC was reporting some 
cases to the NHS TC site code.
Further, the NHS TC felt that they would not have been allowed to undertake a
number of major joint procedures if the ISTC had not broken down barriers with the
consultants and Royal College of Orthopaedics. The ISTC manager stated
i f  the TC was working 25% correctly, this would have a positive 
influence on the other 3 OTs[operating theatres] run by the TC.1
NHS TC GG was increasingly taking on more complex patients, even doing ASA 
3 unstable patients, after starting with only ASA 1 ’s and 2’s. The NHS TC was also 
undertaking more complex procedures such as joint replacements. This is a direct 
result of the adjacent ISTC performing these same procedures, even while the Royal 
College of Orthopaedics complained about patient safety and quality of care. The 
ISTC was thus able to break the monopoly of the British consultants’ influence over 
what could and could not be undertaken in treatment centres and hospitals. As a 
result, the respective ISTC has had a strong influence on the confidence and ability of 
the NHS TC increasingly to take on more complex patients and procedures, which the 
evidence suggest they would not have done on their own.
1 This reflected the fact that the ISTC operated one operating theatre, while the NHS TC operated the 
other three.
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In short, both, the quantitative and qualitative case study evidence suggest that 
competition cannot explain differences in performance. The quantitative evidence 
suggests that there is very little, if any overlap and, there is nothing to suggest ISTCs 
and NHS TCs face significantly different competition. The qualitative evidence 
suggest that there was only one case found where competition between an ISTC and 
an NHS TC took place, and in this case there was still very little overlap in 
procedures. There may have been a peer effect, but this would have brought about an 
equalisation of performance and therefore could not explain a difference.
6.3.2 Payment Methodology
An alternative explanation for the differing performances could be that there are
varying payers or differences in the method of payment to the respective providers. 
Differing funding arrangements or structures of flows from the funder, or payer, to the 
provider could create different incentives, which could in turn explain differences in 
performance (rather than ownership).
Of these possibilities, varying payers cannot be an alternative explanation since 
English NHS patients are generally the payers for both types of facilities. ISTCs are 
exclusively for NHS patients and in none of the cases studied were there private 
insured patients in the ISTC facilities. Private patients do make use of NHS facilities, 
and it is therefore possible they were treated in NHS TCs. Indeed, the interviews 
suggested that in some of the NHS TC cases there were attempts to attain additional 
revenues from private patients. However, these were minimal. More importantly, such 
private patients would not be considered as NHS patients and their patient discharge 
records would therefore not have been reported to the dataset used.
Differences in the method of payment are another potential explanation for 
differences in performance. The NHS focus on ‘outputs’, of which one important 
component is the HRG system (Payment by Results), is an important and related 
component in contracting with the independent sector. In the past, the method of 
purchasing was primarily budget-based, without an emphasis on performance. 
Government policy is that gradually all providers will be paid on the Payment by 
Results methodology, which will ensure a level playing field.
However, the Wave 1 tenders for the ISTCs were based upon five year guaranteed 
revenue contracts at a higher than tariff price to encourage new market entrants in 
England. The Parliamentary Report pointed out that the ISTC tariff price was on
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average 11.2% above the NHS Equivalent Cost2, though lower than the historical 
‘spot-purchasing’ price in which was thought to be in excess of 40% of the NHS 
Tariff (Health Committee 2006). Effectively, this payment is a fixed budget 
methodology with some penalty charges incurred if the ISTCs’ contractual obligations 
are not fulfilled. The premium in the tariff price was to attract new market entrants to 
the sector. NHS Trust Hospitals are paid on a budget methodology as well, with the 
NHS Trusts then allocating a budget to the respective Treatment Centres. In effect, 
the incentives work in the opposite direction, encouraging inefficiency. Based on the 
superior performance of all treatment centres over the trust hospitals, clearly, this is 
not the case.
Some could argue that the ISTCs have an unfair advantage receiving a 11.2% 
premium above the NHS Equivalent Cost. However, the ISTCs needed to not only 
cover their operational costs with this payment, but also their capital costs (capex). 
The ISTCs did not receive an additional budget allocation for capex like the NHS 
TCs. The general industry benchmark for the capex component is 10%-15% of the 
total annual costs of an ISTC, which matches closely with the ISTC premium 
payment.
There are a number of other items which could be argued as to why the ISTCs 
should receive a premium payment. The contracts are only five years with no 
commitment to renewal at the end of the contract period, unlike the NHS, where these 
contracts are open ended. This ignores other issues such risk transfer of capital costs 
which the NHS TCs did not have to consider. And there are certainly tax issues, 
which the NHS does not have to consider. Because of the confidential nature of these 
contracts we cannot construe whether the premium payment matches with the actual 
capex commitments (which vary dependent on the contract and the type of procedures 
to be provided) and other risk factors. But considering the above mentioned risk 
factors, it is likely that this premium is not excessive.
NHS Trusts under Foundation Trust status have a portion of their payment based 
on the HRG system. However, of the NHS TCs case studies, none were under 
Foundation Trust status. The number of NHS TCs under Foundation Trust status 
could not be determined, as the specific providers were blinded. However, we can 
fairly assume that the number is inconsequential, as the Foundation Trust process is a
2 The NHS Equivalent Cost is a calculation of the amount of money that would be paid to an NHS 
provider for delivering a certain activity with the same care pathway (Health Committee, 2006).
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fairly recent phenomenon. Furthermore, even if a Trust was under Foundation Trust 
status, the respective treatment centre would still be receiving a budget payment from 
the Trust due to the organisational integration of the facility (Organisational 
integration as a separate item will be more fully discussed in Section 6.3.4.). As a 
result, neither varying payers, nor the payment mechanism can be alternative 
explanations for differences found in the evidence.
6.3.3 Case Mix Selection
An alternative explanation for the differences in performance could be that the
independent sector may actively select (e.g. age, severity, etc.) patients with lower 
risk than the NHS TCs. The business model of both kinds of Treatment Centre 
involves selecting patients that are appropriate for outpatient, day case or short-stay 
surgery. However, in practice the actual case mix of the patients between ISTC and 
NHS TC providers may differ.
In Chapter 5, the researcher reviewed the admissions policy and then the actual 
practices of the ISTCs and NHS TCs. Certain exclusion criterion (e.g. Body Mass 
Index or BMI) were used to decide whether to admit. Though the exclusion criteria 
varied slightly from facility to facility, generally speaking, the specific criteria were 
relatively similar, with the emphasis on ensuring that the patient was appropriate for 
the treatment centre. Upon review, there was very little difference in the patient 
selection and admission documentation forms in the ISTCs and NHS TCs.
The quantitative as well as the qualitative evidence suggests that elective care 
patients appropriate for the NHS TCs (e.g. cataracts, hips, knees and hernias) are no 
different in case mix complexity than within the ISTCs. Therefore, it cannot be 
argued that ISTCs are actively selecting patients with a lower case mix complexity. 
However, at the same time, it was also apparent that NHS TCs mixed non-appropriate 
patients with appropriate ones and used the same staff from the Trust Hospital. The 
NHS TC staff then proceeded to practise in the same manner as in the general 
hospital, undermining the treatment centres’ goals of differentiating themselves from 
NHS Trust hospitals. Time and time again it was found that the NHS TCs were 
admitting non-appropriate, non-elective, patients to the treatment centre. The ISTCs 
neither accepted non-elective surgical patients, nor did they accept medical patients 
(which we found in one NHS TC).
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It should be added that a number of the ISTCs were in fact beginning to admit 
more complex patients (ASA 3’s, even ASA 3 unstable patients), even though their 
original patient selection criteria and contract with the NHS did not include this. Early 
in the Treatment Centre Programme, many of the ISTCs were not getting the referrals 
needed to operate at 100% of the negotiated contract. Although the ISTCs were paid 
whether they undertook these volumes or not, a number of the ISTCs chose to begin 
admitting these more complex patients in order to get closer to operating at their 
contractual volumes.
The qualitative data shows that there is very little, or no difference, in case mix of 
appropriate patients for the facility (e.g. cataracts, hips and knees). As a result, the 
evidence suggests that there is no proof that ISTCs are actively selecting patients with 
a lower case mix than NHS TCs. However, clearly, the NHS TCs, due to pressures 
from the NHS Trust Hospital and scheduling of the consultants, allowed for non- 
appropriate patients to enter the facility.
However, the fact that non-appropriate patients were admitted to NHS TCs cannot 
explain the differences in performance identified in the earlier chapters. In theory, the 
older the patient, the higher the co-morbidities are to be expected. Therefore, if there 
is a difference in the case mix of patients, we would expect patient age to be lower in 
treatment centres than in General Hospitals. Of the elective HRG admissions policies 
from the qualitative analysis and discharge records from the quantitative analysis, the 
patient cases are very similar with little significant differences in age and deprivation 
(IMD) scores.
6.3.4 Organisational Integration
From the evidence in Chapter 5, it is clear that there are differences in 
organisational and management practices between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. Some of 
these arise from organisational integration factors. As a result, these organisational 
integration factors could provide an alternative explanation for the differences in 
performance.
The entire business model of a treatment centre revolves around selecting patients 
that are appropriate for outpatient, day case or short-stay surgery and maximising 
throughput of the facility. The entire facility needs to be operating in an integrated 
manner. It is important for the facility to be a self-contained unit so as to minimise 
disruptions in the operational flow and therefore maximise throughput. From the site
209
Matthias Loening Chapter 6 Does Ownership Matter?
visits a key differentiating factor was the technological and organisational integration 
o f the diagnostics unit within the treatment centre; or lack thereof. All six (6) of the 
ISTCs had integrated diagnostics units, whereas six (6) of nine (9) of the NHS TCs 
shared diagnostic services with the NHS Trust Hospitals.
During the patient’s visit at ISTC A, the patient would be seen by the consultant 
surgeon, diagnostics would be undertaken, the surgeon would make the final decision 
based upon the diagnostics, and then the patient would be preassessed. This could 
take up to four hours, still short enough to be completed in a half-day, and the patient 
would only have to come in one time prior to surgery. All of the ISTCs visited had 
this capability and were operating in this manner. In contrast, at the NHS TCs visited, 
even if the facility had this capability, more often than not they were unable to operate 
in this manner.
Most of the NHS TCs had their diagnostic facilities located in and shared with the 
NHS Trust Hospital. As a result, patients would need to be transferred outside of the 
treatment centre and into the hospital. This created the potential for delay. Of the NHS 
TCs visited, only one had a self-contained radiology unit and thus was not dependent 
on the nearby Trust Hospital.
There were other potential issues when diagnostics were provided by the NHS 
Trust Hospital and were not physically located in the treatment centre. For example, 
there were significant wait lists on MRI scans, which impacted elective patients 
referred from the treatment centre. Operational flow is essential for a treatment centre.
One of the most compelling cases in differentiating diagnostic wait time was the 
case of an NHS TC and ISTC situated adjacent to each other. Both outsourced this 
function, though the NHS TC also used the MRI unit of a neighbouring hospital. The 
NHS TC’s wait list period for a scan was six to eight weeks, whereas the ISTC had a 
scan wait-list period of one to three weeks while using an MRI unit from the same 
NHS Trust.
The overriding conclusion is that the diagnostics within the NHS TCs were not 
thought of as an important component of the treatment centre and their impact on the 
facility’s operational flow was not properly considered. Systemic delays within the 
entire NHS Trust Hospital trickled down to delays within the treatment centre.
Overall the lack of a self-contained diagnostic imaging unit affected the elective 
surgery wait lists and how quickly these patients could gain access to surgery. If the 
treatment centre had to compete with the other demands of the Trust then this flow
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was broken and the inherent efficiencies of a treatment centre could not be fully 
utilised. This last point raises the question of whether the evidence found was a result 
of simply integration or ownership. The following section will seek to further answer 
this question.
Beyond the diagnostics unit, evidence showed there is a close physical and 
organisational integration of the NHS TCs with the respective NHS Trust Hospital in 
operations and staffing. All of the ISTCs visited were stand alone centres that were 
entirely self-contained operationally. Of the nine NHS TCs assessed, only three were 
physically self-contained. Of these three, one is now closed and the other two had 
some cross staffing. The other six NHS TC facilities were never stand alone and thus 
fully integrated into the NHS Trust Hospital. Clearly, the close, or even physical, 
integration of NHS TCs with Trust Hospital facilities may impact on the operations of 
the treatment centre.
The first ramification of integration with Trust Hospitals is that most NHS TCs 
are not being used as intended, that is, as treatment centres. The evidence suggests 
that the ISTCs are not actively selecting patients with a lower case mix than the NHS 
TCs. However, the evidence does indicate that NHS TCs mix appropriate patients 
with non-appropriate ones, and mix dedicated treatment centre staff with staff from 
the Trust hospital (the latter tend to operate in the same manner as they would in the 
general hospital). The evidence also suggests that NHS TCs that are physically linked 
to NHS Trust Hospitals have more difficulty operating in the way intended and thus 
have poorer performance levels.
The ISTCs are predominantly stand alone entities with dedicated staffing and 
patients. These ISTCs do not accept non-elective surgical patients, nor do they accept 
medical patients, which we found in one NHS TC. Particular emphasis was given to 
comparing ISTCs and NHS Treatment Centres, as both types of facilities attempt to 
select the same type of patient.
The case studies provide significant supporting evidence for this. NHS TC EE’s
nurse manager’s comment sums up quite well the issue with the NHS TCs
we have 5 operating theatres in the treatment centre and 15 in total. In 
reality the 5 operating theatres act as an extension o f  the hospital and 
have never operated in the way they were intended to operate - a s  a 
treatment centre. They mix and match main operating theatre patients 
with treatment centre patients.
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NHS GG seemed to be uniquely insulated from the Trust Hospital, but this is 
almost certainly because of the adjacent ISTC. The nurse manager commented that 
the facility
is becoming a true treatment centre because ofpressure from the ISTC 
and that contract ...This positive influence has made us become a true 
treatment centre, more independent from the NHS.
The nurse manager went on to say that “the NHS still wants to put non- 
appropriate patients within the facility, ” but the physical distance from the Trust and 
the fact that “we are becoming more business oriented due to the contract with the 
ISTC has made us become more focused. ”
Another important reason for this unique physical relationship with the ISTC has 
been the recognition that a business manager is needed at the site. The nurse manager 
commented that
an important point is that we have spent a lot o f  time needing a person 
to manage the contract with ISTC. We do not have that capacity here 
to manage the contract, but the ISTC is pushing us become more 
contractually focused, which is good. This creates tension but the 
results have been positive.
Many clinicians, economists and policy-makers have commented that fragmenting 
the health care delivery system will reduce efficiency, increase costs and decrease 
quality. However, evidence here suggests the close physical integration with the Trust 
Hospital facility may have some negative impact upon the operations of the treatment 
centre.
The ISTCs were found to be technologically integrated, whereas the NHS TCs 
were not. The researcher found that there were not great differences in the use of 
technologies between the independent sector and NHS. The main reason for the NHS 
TCs not being technologically integrated was in fact because of the organisational 
integration with the NHS Trust Hospital. This organisational integration, allowed for 
various NHS Trust problems and pressures emanate from the Hospital to the treatment 
centre, creating problems in being able to integrate fully technologically.
The ISTCs were found to be better operationally integrated to function as a 
treatment centre than the NHS TCs. An important ramification of the operational 
integration with Trust Hospitals is that most NHS TCs are not being used as intended, 
that is, as treatment centres. As a result, the evidence suggests that the NHS TCs have
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more difficulty operating in the way intended and thus have poorer performance 
levels.
These organisational integration factors could provide an alternative explanation 
for the differences in performance. However, though this may explain some 
differences in performance, it cannot explain all of them. From the research, stand 
alone NHS TC facilities were still similar to the NHS TC facilities that were 
integrated to the NHS Trust Hospitals in their organisational structure, skill mix, 
staffing ratios and management practices. As a result, one cannot argue that if the 
NHS TCs were all stand alone facilities, we would see an equalisation of 
performance. Therefore, we cannot say that this by itself is an explanation for the 
differences in performance.
6.3.5 Ownership
There are three important factors that differentiate private ownership from public 
ownership: the degree of autonomy, residual claimant status and accountability. By 
virtue of their different ownership, ISTCs have more autonomy, more internal 
accountability of employees to management and can claim residuals. These all create 
a difference in culture of the organisation, which also comes out in a number of 
difference cases. These three important factors will be discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. It is also useful to provide additional information on the 
individual owners of the ISTC case studies and some indication as to how the various 
owners themselves might have shared management decision-making and working 
patterns observed. Detail and motivations of these various owners are described in 
more detail in this section.
Though there are varying types of public and private ownership (Busse, Van der 
Grinten et al. 2002; Harding and Preker 2003; Deber, Topp et al. 2004), and it is 
important to recognise these when assessing the evidence, for the purposes of this 
research we merely differentiate between two types of ownership: public and private. 
Public ownership is a set of arrangements where the government or state owns the 
asset. In this case the National Health Services and the employees within a publicly 
owned entity are public sector employees and are bound by public sector employment 
regulations.
This sub-section will use the Preker and Harding framework (2002) and assess 
how, within the framework, the impact of changes in the market environment is
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determined by the combined influence of a number of critical determinants of the 
hospital’s incentives. These critical determinants include the allocation of decision 
rights; distribution of residual claims; and structure of accountability mechanisms.
Decision or Management Rights (Autonomy)
It has been argued that independence or autonomy of management rights is an 
important factor in determining performance (Preker and Harding 2002; Deber, Topp 
et al. 2004). Many attempts to address problems in publicly run health care delivery 
systems have been made through management reforms. Managerial behaviour can be 
influenced by expanding manager autonomy or rights to make decisions. Thus, each 
reform can be characterised by the magnitude of control shifted from the hierarchy, or 
supervising agency, to the hospital. Some indeed have argued that autonomy, rather 
than ownership, is the overriding determinant of performance (Chubb and Moe 1990). 
Therefore it is possible that autonomy, rather than ownership itself, is the primary 
explanation for differences between the NHS TCs and the ISTCs.
There was some evidence that the relative autonomy of the NHS TCs was leading 
to changes in management practices. One NHS TC has had its staff trained by the 
local Marriott on customer service. This same NHS TC was hiring a number of 
individuals from outside of the industry. Recently, a logistics person was hired that 
had experience in the manufacturing industry and was active in using the NHS 
Gateway program which provides financial support to hiring highly experienced 
people outside of NHS (NHS Gateway Programme 2008). Two of the NHS TCs 
(NHS TC BB and DD) were in the process of purchasing a patient booking system; 
the same system that airlines use. The use of the patient booking system will 
deemphasise the need for nurse schedulers finding available staff to fill in gaps at the 
last minute. Another NHS TC recently hired a new individual responsible for 
materials with the result of inventory being reduced by 50% over the course of the 
past year. Further, the same treatment centre succeeded in getting much of the 
inventory from one product company, and thus attain better pricing, further reducing 
costs.
However, those examples aside, the research evidence showed that, if we compare 
ISTCs to NHS TCs, broadly we see that within the NHS TCs, there has been merely a 
transfer of the same NHS practices to a different facility. Further, we found that a 
critical barrier to applying ’best practice’ principles from the private sector was the
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broad lack of control that NHS managers have over factors of production, especially 
labour, or in this case NHS consultants. Thus, although methods for reinvigorating 
NHS organisations were sometimes successfully transferred to NHS TCs, more often 
than not, the common constraints generated by public sector control structures have 
frustrated these attempts.
In summary, autonomy could explain some aspects of performance, as none of the 
case study Treatment Centres were under Foundation Trust status. However if the 
associated NHS Trust Hospital was under Foundation Trust status, it is far from 
certain the autonomy would necessarily trickle down to the Treatment Centre level. 
Just because a hospital comes under FT status, would we find a manager running the 
treatment centre? Would we find that the managers have control over the inputs, 
labour, scope of activities, and clinical management? Though the evidence suggests 
this is not the case, we cannot answer this question without completing the picture, 
which we intend to do in the following sections.
Residual Claimant Status
Ownership is important because having private residual claimant status on 
revenues gives managers the ability to use additional incentive mechanisms. It is clear 
that the public sector and independent sector use different methods of financial 
remuneration vis-a-vis performance. In the ISTCs consultants are paid on a salary 
basis, but there are strict controls to ensure throughput levels necessary to achieve the 
contract’s objectives are reached. The consultants are paid for overtime as well. This 
resulted in better scheduling, lower did not attend (DNA) rates and lower cancellation 
rates. It was apparent that consultants were being utilised in the theatre at a higher rate 
than the NHS.
When a hospital has ‘residual claims,’ it is allowed to keep resources that it has 
not used to meet its objectives, rather than return them to the treasury or local 
government. These residual claims can then possibly be distributed as financial 
remuneration to the employees. However, just because hospitals and managers are 
given additional autonomy, it does not necessarily follow that they will use their 
added discretion productively. To achieve this, managers must be provided with the 
tools to incentivise employees and maximise productivity, along with their greater 
autonomy. The linking of these incentive factors is an important component of 
property rights theory (as discussed in Chapter 2), which emphasises the importance
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of aligning revenue flows and decision rights appropriately to bring about the right 
decisions. Residual rights and returns not being aligned can cause serious problems. 
The literature review showed that the method of financial remuneration creates certain 
incentive mechanisms. The evidence shows how this theory is realised in practice.
The ISTCs must report 26 key performance indicators (KPIs) to the Commercial 
Directorate on a monthly basis. ISTC A stated that they were not happy with the 
performance of their consultants, with respect to achieving these minimum quality 
outcome thresholds. Up until the interview, consultants had been paid their salary 
whether the KPI thresholds had been reached or not. The new planned scheme was 
intended to incentivise the consultants so that their salary was more closely aligned 
with achieving KPI thresholds.
ISTC C was unique in the fact that it focused on three clinical specialty areas, 
each of which had a different fmancial remuneration structure. For ophthalmology, 
the operator used rotating consultants, who were paid on a per case basis, 
incentivising the administrator to fill the operating list as much as possible. The 
general manager pointed out that the consultants were complaining that they were 
unable to fully book their list, since the facility was not operating at full capacity. The 
gynaecology services were paid on a list basis. In this case, the administrator was 
incentivised to fully book the list, as the consultants were paid the same regardless of 
the number of patients on the four hour list.
General surgery consultants and the anaesthetist within ISTC C were full-time 
employees. There was no variable incentive component in place. However, due to the 
fact that the operating capacity of the facility was so low, management felt that 
financial incentives for the consultants would be of limited value.
ISTC H had a two component incentive system. First, if the surgeon was self- 
employed, the individual was paid a session rate plus a fee for going over and above 
the expected number of procedures during a session. Second, there was in place a 
company incentive scheme. The incentive scheme was based upon KPI quality 
indicators reached.
NHS TC incentive schemes were the same as for the NHS as a whole. An outlier 
case was NHS TC BB in implementing ‘flex’ (e.g. flexible) scheduling for all staff, 
not just consultants. The employees were paid for hours worked, regardless of time 
during the work week. The flex scheduling was likely due to the immense pressure 
put upon the NHS Trust Hospital to achieve waiting list targets. To achieve these
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targets, the hospital and treatment centre added evening and weekend lists. At the 
same time, budgets had been cut. The facility had implemented these new methods of 
scheduling and incentivising their employees in response to the competing pressures 
to decrease wait lists and control costs.
The flex scheduling was also likely the result of a number of clinical 
cancellations. The NHS TCs that only scheduled procedures the day before were more 
likely to see a higher per centage of clinical cancellations than NHS TCs (e.g. NHS 
TC BB) and ISTCs that planned surgeries weeks in advance.
At the same time, there are few, if any, incentive mechanisms in place for NHS 
consultants to bring down Did Not Attend (DNA) and cancellation rates. The NHS 
consultant is paid for a certain number of hours worked per week and assessed by 
operating theatre utilisation, not performance. However, operating room utilisation 
fails to reflect genuine service efficiency or quantitative aspects of theatre output 
(Faiz 2007).
NHS TC BB found that they could incentivise the theatre staff through a shared 
bonus scheme. One per cent of cost savings from procurement and productivity would 
be shared by the theatre staff. It was stated that £5m were saved in the previous year 
and they expected improved savings in this fiscal year.
NHS TC BB and EE incentivised staff by scheduling operating theatre time for 
private patients. One of the treatment centres, and the respective Trust Hospital, did 
not have wait lists, whereas the other one did. This indicates there are likely some 
longer-term policy issues, such as cream skimming and the use of public assets for 
private patients, which need to be addressed.
NHS TC EE was not yet under Foundation Trust status and thus was limited in its 
ability to give pay raises. Therefore, the Trust Hospital and treatment centre 
emphasised a staff retention scheme. Under the scheme, a £50 additional payment 
would be paid to staff who had worked for the Trust for a certain period of time. 
Further, for other staff, a 0% interest loan towards the purchase of a property or 
financial support for rental accommodation was available.
Within all the facilities it was clear that there was some tension between the 
administrators and consultants. The administrators were attempting to create the 
appropriate incentives for maximising consultant utilisation. The consultants, on the 
other hand, would continuously push back, to maintain their independence. In the 
NHS, however, this tension was much more apparent. NHS TC consultants cited any
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number of reasons for not being able to perform (e.g. notes) and repeatedly stated that 
using various incentives for maximising consultant utilisation within NHS was not the 
NHS they knew.
Broadly, it is clear that there are differing methods of financial remuneration 
between the independent sector and the NHS vis-a-vis performance. The 
remuneration within the ISTCs is more closely linked to performance. While within 
the NHS TCs, there are numerous benchmarks that the organisation attempts to 
achieve as a whole, these benchmarks are not closely aligned with the financial 
remuneration of the employees.
With respect to the residual claims of the treatment centre, there is a difference. 
ISTCs are given a material interest in maximising productivity. Residual claims are 
distributed to their shareholders and as stated in die previous paragraph, residual 
claims can be, and are, distributed within the ISTCs as financial remuneration to the 
employees. Though typically the variable component is not more than 10% of the 
total financial remuneration, the evidence suggests that this is sufficient to motivate 
the staff. Broadly, the NHS TCs are merely a budgetary unit of an NHS Tmst 
Hospital. As a result, with the NHS TC, excess resources, if any, are rolled up into the 
NHS Trust.
Accountability Arrangements
Reform attempts in countries are also characterised by the degree of 
accountability for achieving objectives. As these reforms delegate some decision 
rights to the hospitals, the government’s ability to assert direct accountability (through 
the hierarchy) diminishes. Thus reform plans included a range of accountability 
mechanisms that would work in the new environment. Most reforms relied at least 
partially on market pressures to create accountability, as markets were perceived to 
provide an evaluation of performance that was neither political nor arbitrary. In some 
cases, where the capacity of government funding authorities was higher, efforts were 
made to move toward purchasing with these funds. These countries intended to rely 
on this purchasing (and the contracting and monitoring process) to generate 
accountability. In England, two examples are Payment by Results and the KPIs used 
for the ISTCs.
The clearest example within this dissertation focused on England’s experience is 
transparent management accountability within the organisation. The management
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structure of the facility, consultant reporting, perception of management control over 
the consultant, the ability of administrators to incentivate the consultants and the role 
of anaesthetists within a facility, were all reviewed in the previous chapter. There was 
a clear difference between ISTCs and NHS TCs.
To further quantify, in all seven (7) ISTCs, these was a fairly flat organisational 
structure. In all of the ISTCs there was a clear cut delineation of management 
responsibilities. There was a general manager in each and every facility. Further, in 
eight of nine of the facilities the consultants reported to the Medical Director of the 
respective facility. The lone exception was due to the unique structure of a shared 
facility with the NHS. In this case, there was only the operating theatre staff and three 
support staff. As a result, the consultants reported to the Medical Director of the 
organisation.
The NHS TCs provide an entirely different picture. In only two (2) of the nine (9) 
NHS TCs was there a dedicated facility manager. Within the nine (9) NHS TCs, 
consultant reporting was unclear in three (3) of the facilities and in a further four the 
reporting was to the department head of the Trust Hospital.
These findings are consistent with the perception of management control. The 
perception of management control within the ISTCs was clearly higher. It is 
interesting to note though that within the NHS the perception of management control 
was ‘good.’ The interviewer had to tease out additional information based on the 
positive response on management control. Clearly, management control of good 
meant the same as within the NHS Trust Hospital or no less. As a result, what ‘good’ 
means to the NHS is different than ‘good’ to the ISTC, implying that there were 
different standards, or level of expectations, between the NHS and ISTCs. Though 
this cannot be quantified, time and time again, this information was teased out from 
the qualitative research.
Ownership and Motivation o f  the ISTCs
Within the private sector, individual owners face differing motivations and 
employ differing methods. Beyond private versus public ownership, these unique 
characteristics within the private sector can drive management decision-making and 
working patterns, and this may impact the evidence observed. Some background 
information on the different owners of the ISTCs is presented here. The different 
owners include Care UK (originally Partnership Health Group), UKSH, Mercury
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Health, which was run by Ascent Health under management contract, Interhealth 
Canada, Netcare and Capio.
Partnership Health Group was a joint venture between UK-based Care UK and 
Life Health Care (formerly Afrox) from South Africa set up to bid on the ISTC 
Programme. Care UK, a local UK operator of over 90 nursing and residential homes 
for older people, partnered with Life Health Care, an experienced hospital provider 
which was seeking access to the UK market. In August 2008, Care UK acquired the 
remaining 50% share of Partnership Health Group (PGH) from Life Health Care of 
South Africa. Currently, Care UK is the largest ISTC operator in the UK, operating 10 
facilities within every SHA in the country. Care UK also operates GP practices, NHS 
Walk-in Centres and GP out-of-hours services, as well as highly innovative Clinical 
Assessment and Treatment Services (CATS). The strategy for the joint venture 
partners was that both wanted access to the UK market. Care UK desired a presence 
in the clinical side, in addition to its existing expertise in nursing homes, whereas Life 
Health Care wanted to grow outside of the Africa market. Life Health Care, sought 
access to the UK market specifically due to linguistic and cultural similarities with the 
South African market, and also because of the lower cost of labour, a similar strategy 
as the one Netcare adopted (see below).
UK Specialist Hospitals (UKSH) was set up by OR International (ORI), a US- 
based developer of specialty hospitals, and New York Presbyterian Healthcare 
System, a comprehensive university hospital affiliated to both Columbia University 
and Cornell University. Prospect Investment Management, a venture capital 
investment company is also a shareholder in the partnership. UKSH currently operates 
the Shepton Mallet ISTC in Somerset, which opened in July 2005.
Mercury Health was set up by UK-owned Tribal Group to bid on the ISTC 
Programme. Tribal, a listed company on the London Stock Exchange, is a public- 
sector consulting and outsourcing group. Tribal works with a wide range of 
organisations across the public sector, including schools, colleges and universities; the 
NHS and primary care trusts; local authorities and housing associations; central 
government departments and government agencies; and third sector organisations.
Mercury Health contracted with Ascent Health, a US investor and operator of 
treatment centres. Ascent Health was interested in expanding internationally and 
using its experience in the US as a basis for international expansion, in line with the 
the global trend of shifting patients away from inpatient hospital care. The private
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management contract was seen as a low risk strategy to attain local market expertise 
and gain a foothold for expansion in the UK.
In April 2007, Tribal sold Mercury Health at a profit of £77 million. The strategy 
from the sale was to reduce debt and allow the company to focus on its core education 
and public-sector consultancy business. The ISTC business was seen as a highly 
capital intensive and Mercury needed additional capital for investment to build more 
clinics. As a result of Tribal’s strategy of paring down debt, Mercury’s ISTCs were 
sold to Care UK.
Interhealth Canada is a Canadian-based operator that initially won two contracts 
to treat patients in the Midlands and Merseyside. Interhealth is purely an international 
operator that seeks to leverage Canada’s expertise in health to provide similar 
healthcare experiences in the international environment. Interhealth currently operates 
in various countries in the Gulf, and recently won a contact to manage the entire 
health system of the Turks and Caicos Islands. Interhealth Canada was originally set 
up by the Canadian government, as part of its export promotion strategy. Currently, it 
is still partly owned by the Canadian government with the remaining shares owned by 
individual private investors. It is important to recognise that Interhealth Canada’s 
ownership has an impact on its motivations and time frames for a return on 
investment, which may differ from the others such as the private equity firms.
Netcare UK, a subsidiary of Network Healthcare, South Africa's biggest health 
care provider, runs mobile cataract surgery units as well as the Greater Manchester 
Surgical Centre, which performs surgical procedures in a variety of clinical areas3. 
Netcare’s key motivation for entering the UK was the limited market expansion 
opportunity in South Africa, as well as the African market in general, and the 
recognition of a competitive advantage it would have from being able to use 
consultants and nurses from South Africa in England. This is because, while there are 
many similarities between the UK and South Africa in terms of language and medical 
practices (South Africa is a former British colony and its health system is set up along 
similar lines to the UK’s) labour costs of South Africa’s consultants and nurses are 
much lower. As a result, the UK was seen as the key country for market expansion out 
of Africa.
3 This dissertation focuses on England in the Treatment Centre Programme. However, it is noteworthy 
to mention that Netcare also operates an ISTC in Scotland.
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Capio is a Swedish provider of healthcare services for both public and private 
customers via its acute general hospitals, diagnostic centres and private psychiatric 
hospitals. It is active in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, France, Spain, Germany 
and the UK. Capio UK has nine treatment centres throughout England, in addition to 
its chain of over 20 private hospitals. In May 2004 it was awarded a £25m short term 
contract to treat 9,000 NHS patients over the following year. The contract covered 
mainly orthopaedic surgery as well as a mix of other specialties including ENT, 
general surgery, urology, and plastic surgery. These NHS operations were conducted 
in 15 existing Capio hospitals in the following eight NHS Strategic Health Authority 
regions: Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire, Cheshire & Merseyside, Greater 
Manchester, London North East, London North West, London South East, London 
South West and South Yorkshire. Capio also won contracts to build and operate a 
number of treatment centres.
Following the private equity buying spree, Capio was acquired by Apax. At the 
same time, Apax teamed up with Netcare to buy General Healthcare Group, the UK's 
largest private healthcare provider, Apax was forced to sell Capio UK as a result of 
that deal to appease antitrust regulators. In 2007, Capio UK was sold to Ramsay 
Healthcare, Australia’s largest health care provider.
The US and Canadian operators (Ascent Health, OR International) saw in the 
ISTC programme the opportunity to leverage their experience in the UK. The South 
African providers (Life Health Care and Netcare) were primarily hospital operators 
but saw the opportunity to expand out of the Africa market, as well as leverage the 
lower cost of labour which was in relatively abundant supply as compared to the UK. 
Care UK, a local UK provider as well as Mercury did not have experience nor 
expertise in the treatment centre market and as a result partnered with those operators 
that did have this business expertise.
While it is important to recognise the diversity of private owners, it is perhaps 
more notable that the providers are more similar than different in their organisational 
and operational approaches. The owners originate from a wide range of countries -  
the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, Sweden and South Africa -  and a 
correspondingly wide range of health care systems. They are also comprised of a 
different sizes and experience levels, and distinct ownership structures, ranging from 
private equity firms to partial government ownership. These differences could be
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expected to contribute to a much larger diversity of operational approaches than those 
that were observed.
This is not to say there are not differences among the operations of the private 
companies. The types of scheduling employed differed, some ISTCs outsourced their 
diagnostics, while others had self-contained units, and some ISTCs employed 
physician incentive structures, and others did not, for example. Still, on the whole, 
the differences were less prevalent than the similarities, especially given the different 
backgrounds of the ISTCs.
This similarity is an important point. When comparing the different providers 
from various countries and regions, it is notable that they are more similar than 
different in their organisational and operational approach. All of these providers have 
their own way of operating, are characterised by distinct educational and training 
background for the clinicians, and are regulated by different sets of rules in their 
originating countries and this may may drive differences in their approaches, beyond 
the public versus private ownership divide. However, a very important finding is that 
these operators were more similar in their approach than different. This reinforces the 
argument that it is ownership that is a key determinant of operational success, since 
such a heterogeneous group of ISTCs arguably exhibit more similarities as a group, 
than the NHS TCs, which are all operated by the same institution, the NHS.
A summary of the benefits brought by the new market entrants and various private 
operators is taken up and expanded in the final chapter, with particular reference to 
the ISTCs’ ability to recruit new clinical staff, set clear management expectations and 
care processes, among others.
6.4 Discussion
There are a number of overall conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. 
However, due to the nature of the recent introduction of the ISTCs and the method in 
which the NHS tendered for the treatment centres there may be significant limitations 
to die findings. The findings and limitations will be discussed in this section. This 
section will conclude with suggestions for further research in this area.
6.4.1 Overall Findings
There is no doubt that competition, the method of reimbursement and the level of 
integration exert a powerful influence on the behaviour of hospitals as well as the 
management and staff within them. However, because of their complexity and
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interconnectedness, it is often hard to tease apart the different sources of influence. 
The researcher theorises that there are five potential rationales for these differences.
Rationale 1: Competition May Explain the Difference in Performance
From the quantitative and qualitative analysis there is very little, or no, direct
competition between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in England. There could be indirect 
competition, or peer effects, which can be an important determinant of a facility’s 
efficiency. However, again, the ISTCs are not in competition with the NHS TCs. The 
NHS TCs may in fact feel more competitive pressure, because ISTCs have better 
performance than NHS TCs. This would more likely to lead to an equalisation of 
performance between them rather than creating differences in performance. Further, 
there is no evidence that ISTCs are under greater competitive pressure than NHS TCs. 
For the most part, ISTCs have been situated in areas outside of major cities, whereas 
the NHS TCs are situated in and around major cities, suggesting that ISTCs should 
face less competition than the NHS TCs. Therefore competition does not explain the 
differences in performance between the ISTCs and NHS TCs.
Rationale 2: Payment Methodology May Explain the Differences in 
Performance
We cannot say that differences in payment methodologies account for differences 
in performance. ISTCs and NHS TC providers both treat NHS patients and as a result, 
the payer (NHS) is the same. Further, both IS and for the most part NHS facilities are 
paid via a budgetary payment. None of the NHS TC case studies from the qualitative 
analysis were under Foundation Status. However, there may be some cases of NHS 
Trust Hospitals under Foundation Status. If so, we would expect to see higher 
performance at the associated NHS TCs, as these would presumably be paid based on 
the HRG, or prospective payment methodology. This is not the case.
The ISTCs are receiving a l l  .2% premium above the NHS Equivalent Cost. Some 
could argue that the ISTCs have an unfair advantage from this extra payment. 
However, unlike the NHS TCs, ISTCs need to not only cover their operational costs 
with this payment, but also their capital costs (capex). Further, this extra payment 
ignores other issues such risk transfer of capital costs which the NHS TCs did not 
have to consider and tax issues.
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Rationale 3: ISTCs Lower Case Mix Selection May Explain the Difference in 
Performance
Another explanation for the differences in performance is that the independent 
sector actively selects patients with lower risks than the NHS TCs. The researcher 
concludes that this explanation cannot be correct. The entire business model of the 
treatment centre, IS and NHS, revolves around selecting patients that are appropriate 
for outpatient, day case or short-stay surgery. The researcher reviewed the admissions 
policy and then the actual practises of the ISTCs and NHS TCs. The admissions 
policies were more or less the same between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. The evidence 
suggests that elective care patients appropriate for the NHS TCs (e.g. cataracts, hips, 
knees and hernias) are no different in case mix complexity than within the ISTCs. 
Therefore, it cannot be argued that ISTCs are actively selecting patients with a lower 
case mix complexity. However, the NHS TCs, due to pressures from the NHS Trust 
Hospital and scheduling of the consultants, allowed for non-appropriate patients to 
enter the facility. Time and time again it was found that NHS TCs were admitting 
non-appropriate patients to the treatment centre. The ISTCs did not accept non­
elective surgical patients, nor did they accept medical patients, which were found in 
one NHS TC.
However, the qualitative evidence supports the findings from the quantitative 
analysis in Chapter 4. Of the elective HRG admissions policies from the qualitative 
analysis, and the discharge records from the quantitative analysis, the patient case mix 
is similar. As a result of this evidence, the researcher concludes that the allegation that 
ISTCs perform better by actively selecting lower case mixes within the specified 
HRGs cannot be true, nor did they actually treat less complex cases. The interview 
results do show that NHS TCs were admitting non appropriate patients; however, 
these are patients not within the specified HRGs (e.g. medical patients and not 
elective patients within the specified HRGs) for which the research was focused.
Rationale 4: Integration May Explain the Differences in Performance
The importance of integration was made clear during the site visits. Technology
and the role it plays in the organisation’s integration were discussed in Chapter 5, as 
well as how important integration is in determining facility performance. From the 
site visits, the researcher found that there were not great differences in the use of 
technologies between the independent sector and NHS. However, there are clear 
differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in how technology is organised in daily
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operations. These differences include the location of the technology and how it was 
integrated into the operations of the facility. Specific examples are provided with the 
PACS, consultant notes and the diagnostic imaging facilities. Electronic record 
keeping, via the use of the PACS, was better positioned and utilised in ISTCs than in 
NHS TCs. In the ISTCs these were typically located within the facility, whereas 
within the NHS TCs these were often located inside the NHS Trust Hospital.
Diagnostics in NHS TCs were not thought of as an important component of the 
treatment centre and their impact on the facility’s operational flow was not properly 
considered. Six (6) of the nine (9) NHS TCs shared diagnostic services with the NHS 
Trust Hospitals, whereas all of the ISTCs had their own self-contained unit. Systemic 
delays within the entire NHS Trust Hospital trickled down to delays within the 
treatment centre. Overall the lack of a self-contained diagnostic imaging unit affected 
the elective surgery wait lists and how quickly these patients gained access to surgery. 
Operational integration is essential for maximising operational flow.
There are clear differences in the issue of consultant notes. In the ISTCs, patient 
notes were typically in electronic format so that if physicians needed to refer to them, 
they were readily accessible. Furthermore, what the patient notes contain and what the 
consultants feel they need for information was also different. Within the ISTCs, 
patient notes were systematic records of a patient’s diagnosis and procedure. Within 
the NHS, patient notes contained entire patient records and often solely in hard-copy. 
This, as well the perception that an entire patient’s history was required prior to a 
procedure, created coordination problems and could lead to delays and cancellations.
Further, the ISTCs were set up to function as operationally stand alone facilities. 
Six of the nine NHS TCs facilities were physically integrated with the NHS Trust 
Hospital and in all but one of the NHS TCs, the organisation was beset by cross- 
staffing and shared resources with the Trust Hospital. As a result, the close, or even 
physical integration with the Trust Hospital facility may impact the operations of the 
treatment centre.
However, though this may explain some differences in performance, it cannot 
explain all of them. Stand alone NHS TC facilities were still similar to the integrated 
NHS TC facilities in their organisational structure, skill mix, staffing ratios and 
management practices. The interview results suggest that consultants are using the 
treatment centre operating theatres in the same manner and for the same types of 
patients as the main hospital operating theatre. Anaesthetists are using the same
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anaesthesiology, irrespective of whether the surgery could be done on a day case or 
inpatient basis. A CEO of one of the ISTC operators stated that additionality was 
actually a good thing for the ISTCs and NHS. He likened the experience to the 
expansion of BMW and Mercedes into the US. The German car manufacturers did not 
set up their automobile plants in Detroit, but rather they went to Alabama and South 
Carolina. This allowed them to start fresh by hiring new employees not part of the 
existing culture. In contrast, the NHS appears to be merely transferring old habits and 
views to the new facilities. If this is the case, then the culture is relatively unchanged 
in the NHS Treatment Centres, meaning the healthcare system has actually seen very 
little transformation. Without a change of culture, treatment centres are little more 
than an extension of the existing hospital. Further evidence supporting this conclusion 
will be provided in the following section on ownership.
Rationale 5: Ownership May Explain the Difference in Performance
The evidence suggests that the fifth reason - differences in the organisational and
operational approach between the ISTCs and NHS TCs - is the most likely reason for 
differences in performance. If so, then ownership is the important distinction. The 
evidence suggests that there are differences between the ISTCs and the NHS TCs in 
their use of technology, integration of the patient pathway, organisational methods 
such as management structure, consultant reporting, perception of management 
control, the skill mix in staff and staffing ratios, as well as the management practises 
in terms of admission to discharge.
How Ownership Matters: Autonomy, Accountability and Residual Claimant 
Status
ISTCs have more autonomy by way of greater flexibility on salaries, staffing 
make-up and ratios, less pressure from the NHS Trust Hospital operations and from 
the NHS Trust needing to hit targets. In general, there is less staffing in ISTCs than 
NHS TCs with evidence showing that ISTCs use lower staffing levels for the 
operating theatres. Further, the ISTCs were set out to function as operationally stand 
alone facilities. Six of the nine NHS TCs facilities, on the other hand, were physically 
and organisationally integrated into NHS Trust Hospitals, and all but one of the NHS 
TCs was beset by cross-staffing and shared resources. Clearly, the close, or even 
physical integration of NHS TCs with Trust Hospital facilities may impact the 
operations of the treatment centre, resulting in the fact that most NHS TCs are not
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being used as intended, that is, as treatment centres. The evidence overwhelming 
indicates that NHS TCs mix appropriate patients with non-appropriate ones, and mix 
dedicated treatment centre staff with staff from the Trust hospital.
There appeared to be a significant amount of political pressure within the NHS 
while the research was being conducted. This pressure emanated from the mandate to 
hit wait list targets. A number of NHS staff stated that operations had been recently 
oriented as a reaction to this directive. All pro-active planning was being set aside for 
the time being, in order to get patients through whatever operating theatre was 
available on a given day.
ISTCs have more internal accountability by way of clear management structures 
and reporting mechanisms within the ISTC, how patients are selected and operating 
theatre time is scheduled. The NHS TCs provide a completely different picture in 
terms of who is in charge (e.g. facility manager) and consultant management. In only 
two (2) of the nine (9) NHS TCs was there a dedicated facility manager. Within the 
nine (9) NHS TCs, consultant reporting was unclear in three (3) of the facilities and a 
further four the reporting was to the department head of the Trust Hospital.
It is clear that there are differing methods of financial remuneration between the 
independent sector and the NHS vis-a-vis performance. ISTCs have greater claims 
over residuals and these residuals are linked with facility performance resulting in 
incentives are aligned with performance. In the ISTCs the consultants are paid on a 
salary basis with strict controls to achieve necessary throughput levels or even on a 
contractual basis and paid on a per procedure basis. From the evidence on volume 
figures, it is clear that ISTC consultants had much higher performance levels than 
NHS consultants. Broadly speaking, ISTCs are not paid a higher salary. However, 
there are certain financial incentive mechanisms in place appropriately aligned to hit 
performance targets. NHS consultants do not have these financial incentives to hit 
targets. The NHS consultants were paid on a 40-hour week based upon clinic time and 
operating theatre utilisation, but not performance. Clearly, utilisation is not strictly 
aligned with performance.
How Ownership Matters: Other Supporting Evidence
Beyond the specific evidence found in the interviews, there are a number of other
findings from the research which further suggest that ownership is the most important 
factor for the differences found between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. These findings
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involve setting patient expectations, incentive structures to lower the average length 
of stay, political pressure on the NHS from the stakeholders and the overall distortion 
in incentive structures.
It is important to set patient expectations upon their entering a facility. The ISTCs 
seemed to be much better in this regard; these facilities repeatedly emphasised that the 
most important aspect of their care was patient education and setting patient 
expectations. The patient would be told well in advance of admission for a procedure 
the intended patient care pathway and the expected date of discharge. This would also 
set the expectations of the family, who would need to provide the appropriate support 
in the home environment following discharge. In more than one NHS facility, the 
interviews found that patients were not able to be discharged, due to the family 
member responsible for home care going on holiday. This implies that either the 
patients and family were not properly educated and/or the NHS is perceived as a 
hotel.
As a result, there may be some endogeneity here, with NHS patients self-selecting 
a NHS facility as opposed to an ISTC. NHS patients selecting an NHS facility may, in 
reality, want to stay longer. A number of NHS staff stated that they were fighting a 
preset patient mentality, that the patients have paid into the NHS and therefore feel 
they deserve to stay longer.
There is an important counter argument to this. NHS patients do not directly pay 
into the NHS, as there are no premiums within a tax-based health financing system. It 
is the private paying patients who pay a premium, directly or through their employer. 
Moreover, private insurers are paying the private hospitals a daily rate to a specified 
number of days. Therefore, if this argument is true, we would expect to see private 
hospital patients having a much longer ALOS. However, from the evidence found in 
Chapter 4, it is clear that, though private hospital stays are longer than ISTCs, they are 
similar to the NHS TCs and much less than NHS Trust Hospitals.
The NHS has never been truly incentivised to get patients out of the hospital, as 
the Trust Hospitals have traditionally been paid on a hospital budget. The wait lists 
have been used as a policy tool to improve access to the NHS. NHS patients were 
supposed to be discharged more rapidly, thus lowering the ALOS and increasing 
capacity. However, it is not so clear that this has transpired.
Wait-lists targets and the financial incentives that drive the larger NHS Trust 
organisation have number of implications for how the treatment centres are managed.
229
Matthias Loening Chapter 6 Does Ownership Matter?
The nurse manager at NHS TC EE commented, when asked how many beds the 
facility had,
I  don’t know because they have opened and closed so many due to 
budget constraints and then hitting the wait list targets.
She went on to say,
it is peak and trough. In the fa ll [we] run short o f budget so lay o ff 
staff. Then in February-March we need to achieve wait lists to hire 
temp staff which costs more and they do only their job because they 
cannot provide cross support.
The nurse manager continued,
word was that the PCT said they didn’t have the money this past fa ll 
fo r  all the procedures (in deficit). Then in January, they said that they 
had the money (or breach would cost more) so the hospital started 
operating at fu ll tilt, including Saturdays, to hit the wait list 
targets...Here we have the dual problem o f deficit and wait list. One or 
the other could be manageable but both together are deadly.
The ISTCs have differing financial incentives. In the initial period of ramping up 
volumes, the facilities were operating at very low capacity. Due to the structure of the 
ISTC contracts, these facilities would be paid whether volume targets were met or 
not. However, even during this period we saw lower ALOS when compared to the 
NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals for certain procedure areas. This evidence is 
supported by a McKinsey analysis for the Department of Health’s Commercial 
Directorate (McKinsey 2005).
Many of the ISTCs are now operating at very high occupancy levels. Therefore, to 
attain patients above the contracted volume, these facilities are incentivised to get the 
patients discharged as quickly as possible. A number of the ISTCs interviewed stated 
that they were receiving additional contracts from other NHS Trusts, with wait lists 
the driving force. Most of the contracts were at NHS tariff. One facility commented 
that they were being paid by the Trust the NHS tariff plus 10 per cent. From the 
Trust’s perspective, this still may be less than the penalties incurred, if the wait list 
targets were not met.
There appears to be a significant amount of political pressure within the NHS at 
this moment. This pressure is felt at the facility level, with the focus on achieving wait 
list targets. A number of NHS staff stated that facility operations have now become 
reactive to achieving the waiting list targets. As a result, all pro-active planning has
230
Matthias Loening Chapter 6 Does Ownership Matter?
been put aside for the time being, and the facilities are just trying to get patients 
through whatever operating theatre was available for the day.
The ISTCs were even feeling some of this sense of urgency from the NHS. One 
ISTC even commented that they were receiving calls on a weekly basis from the 
Commercial Directorate. The ISTCs visited were achieving their volume contracts 
and were even adding contracts and volumes. The ISTCs seemed to be somewhat 
insulated from politics since they are not affiliated with an inpatient hospital and since 
they had dedicated treatment centre staff that would remain focused on ramping up 
volume levels.
Another problem with public ownership is that the incentive structures in place are 
distorted. This may be one of the most important underlying reasons for the difference 
in performance. In general, the incentive structures in place within the independent 
sector are stream-lined, while in the NHS, the entire system is beset by cross- 
incentives, or even disincentives. An example is the role of the consultant who is paid 
for a certain number of hours worked per week instead of genuine service efficiency. 
An often used example is two consultants performing a four hour list. Consultant A 
performs one hernia during the four hour list. Consultant B performs 8 hernias during 
the four hour list. Both consultants are performing at 100 per cent utilisation.
However, a more appropriate method of measurement would be theatre efficiency. By 
measuring theatre efficiency, rather than theatre utilisation, we see that Consultant B 
is 8 times more efficient, holding case mix equal (Dexter and Traub 2002; Dexter, 
Ledolter et al. 2005; McIntosh, Dexter et al. 2006).
Further, many of the NHS consultants perform surgeries in private hospitals and if 
the NHS consultants perform too well this may result in reducing their private patient 
revenues. This is because the primary reason for private insurance take-up is the long 
wait lists in the NHS (Mossialos and Dixon 2002), so a decline in private insurance 
would lead to a decline in private patient care. As a result, there is a disincentive for 
NHS consultants to improve their wait-list performance.
One of the most important findings from the interviews was the influence of ISTC 
H, which was housed within an NHS TC. This is a unique co-location with a 
significant amount of shared services. Initially, when the ISTC was contracted to do 
orthopaedic procedures, the Department of Health was bombarded with letters from 
the various Royal Colleges with respect to concerns about patient safety and quality 
of care. The ISTC’s success opened the door for the adjacent NHS TC to begin doing
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these same procedures. Also, the NHS’s Royal Orthopaedic Hospital is now doing the 
ISTC’s care management program. Further, success of the ISTC reinforced the 
argument for the NHS TC to operate truly as a treatment centre rather than the Trust’s 
intention for it to serve as a day surgery centre and an extension of the trust designed 
to alleviate their wait list pressures.
Most importantly is the ISTC’s contract with the NHS TC. The ISTC uses the 
NHS TC’s pre-admission services, pre-assessment and post-operative care, and so the 
NHS true costs had to all be calculated and included in the contract. The comment 
was that the NHS now even knows how much it costs to send out a letter to the ISTC 
patient, as this all had to be calculated and included in the contract. For once the NHS 
knows their costs in detail. As a result, while there was a lot of front end work on the 
contract as well as managing of the contract during the initial period when there were 
delays or problems, at the same time the NHS TC and NHS Trust has been forced to 
become more business focused. The NHS TC is now even using the same admission 
and discharge criteria that were put together by the respective ISTC.
6.4.2 Discussion Summary
The graphic below provides a summary of the actual explanations that lead the 
researcher to conclude that ownership is the determining factor for differences that 
drive performance.
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Figure 6.3 Actual Explanations
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6.4.3 Key Lim itations
Though the evidence is not conclusive, the general findings above suggest that
ownership is ultimately responsible for fostering the differences in culture, 
operational management and financial management that in turn explain the superior 
performance of ISTCs over NHS TCs in England. These findings are in line with 
economic theory. The literature review showed that a transfer of ownership from the 
public to the private sector, or vice-versa, is generally associated with some change in 
the types of incentives a firm and its employees face. These differing incentives, in 
turn, have a significant impact on firm behaviour and performance.
However, there are a number of potential limitations to these findings. The 
enquiry found that, at the time of study, England’s NHS was undergoing immense 
pressure. The on-going changes, which may be the greatest since the inception of the 
NHS, undoubtedly had some effect on the findings. Further, a number of the NHS TC 
interviews took place during the end of the fiscal year, as the Trusts were attempting
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to meet wait list targets so as not be in breach. As a result, there is a cyclical aspect to 
the operations of NHS facilities which may not have been captured.
We should also caution that the differences may lie in the fact that ISTCs have not 
yet had time to develop an entrenched culture. As a result, cultural practices are still 
quite fluid, whereas, within the NHS, practices have been ingrained overtime. It is 
likely that as the ISTCs come of age, medical practices may shift more toward 
ingrained behavioural patterns. This suggests that the comparison may not be 
unbiased.
There may also be some endogeneity with respect to the use of consultants. The 
ISTCs were not allowed to hire consultants that had worked for the NHS within the 
past six months. As a result, most, if not all, of the ISTC consultants were from 
overseas while NHS TCs used NHS consultants. As a result, some of the findings may 
be specific to the types of consultants that are on staff.
The literature suggests that the level of regulation and competition in the market 
may actually intervene in the relationship between ownership and efficiency. We have 
highlighted the differences in regulation between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. It can be 
argued that the regulatory environment in which the ISTCs must operate is more 
onerous (e.g. additionality, performance reporting, etc). Further, with respect to 
competition, the ISTCs were implemented to add capacity in certain areas, as well as 
bring competition to the market. The NHS TCs were merely intended to add capacity. 
As a result, if anything, the ISTCs should be operating in more competitive markets.
There is also the potential that issues within the NHS are much more complex 
than what can be observed. The researcher was focused on internal efficiency, which 
the independent sector is clearly handling very well. However, the NHS has a larger 
role to play in society and it is possible the researcher missed some of the bigger 
issues that the NHS struggles with in its day-to-day operations. An example would be 
an NHS directive from London that emergency patients need to be seen within a 
certain time period and as a result this affects the priority level of elective patient care.
Another issue is that, while ownership may be public or private, the respective 
organisation’s employees may not be the same. For example, in a number of ISTCs, 
there are NHS consultants on secondment. Within the NHS facilities, there are NHS 
consultants seeing private patients. Here the incentives are not aligned with the 
organisations. However, broadly from the evidence there are very few private patients 
within the NHS Tmst Hospitals and Treatment Centres seen by NHS consultants
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practising in their off-hours as private consultants. Furthermore, NHS consultants on 
secondment are a minority within the ISTCs.
This relates to the issue of access to consultant employment contracts in the ISTCs 
and NHS TCs. These employment contracts, as well as any other related service 
contracts associated with these facilities, would be a valuable information source for 
assessing provider incentives and performance. At a minimum further information on 
the variable payment component between the consultants and the providers would 
allow for further detail on various incentive structures that may or may not be in place 
within these various facilities.
And lastly, we have peripherally discussed culture, often termed organisational 
culture. Clearly, if physical capacity was the only issue that mattered, it is likely the 
government would have continued to merely increase funding for NHS Trust 
Hospitals or even further contract with the incumbent private hospital market (BMI, 
BUPA, Nuffield, etc.) to deliver the care needed. However, as a strategy, the 
Department of Health’s treatment centre program has encouraged new market entrants 
and these entrants are an integral part of the NHS decentralisation process.
Broadly, whether or not it was intended to do so, the decentralisation of health 
care provisioning seems to be breaking up the traditional command and control health 
care economy and, with it, the NHS organisational culture. Further, the policy of 
additionality seems to be an accidental policy driver of breaking up the traditional 
NHS consultant monopoly.
6.4.4 Further Research
The above weaknesses may limit the comparability between the ISTCs and the
NHS TCs in England. Further research is welcome in this area on a number of fronts: 
the actual medical provisioning and quality outcomes; the various incentives or 
disincentives that drive the NHS and its consultants; a survey of patients who have 
received care within the independent sector and how their attitudes have changed; and 
research on the impact of the independent sector on the organisational culture of the 
NHS.
Given that the qualitative analysis indicates one very important issue with respect 
to the NHS TCs is the extent of their integration with the workings of the parent NHS 
Trust Hospital, and the attendant pressures (e.g. waiting list and financial concerns), 
further research should be conducted in this area. Specifically, the research should
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analyse further the activity and performance of the NHS TCs which are stand alone 
versus the less autonomous NHS TCs that more physically and operationally 
integrated with the respective NHS Trust Hospitals. Important performance indicators 
to assess would be data on case mix, staffing ratios, management practices and ALOS. 
Then by comparing the differences, if any, not only do we have like for like 
comparisons between the NHS TCs and ISTCs but also we can then assess how much 
of a difference this physical and organizational integration impacts upon performance 
of the NHS TCs.
6.5 Summary
The evidence from the previous chapters suggests that the differences in the
findings are a result of ownership. However, the issue is not simply that ownership 
matters, but how it matters. Ownership in health care organisations is different than in 
other sectors because of the nature of health systems. The researcher theorises that 
there are a number of potential reasons for these differences: the competitive effects 
in the market; different payers and payment methodologies; the independent sector 
may actively select patients with lower risk than the NHS TCs; the physical and 
organisational integration or the lack thereof; or in fact ownership itself.
Though the evidence is not entirely conclusive, differences in the operational and 
financial management practices of the ISTCs and NHS TCs suggest that ownership is 
the determining factor for these differences. By virtue of their different ownership, 
ISTCs have more autonomy, more internal accountability of employees to 
management and can claim residuals. These all create a difference in culture of the 
organisation, which also comes out in a number of difference cases. This conclusion 
is in line with economic theory. The literature review showed that a transfer of 
ownership from the public to the private sector, or vice-versa, is generally associated 
with some change in the types of incentive a firm and its employees face. These 
differing incentive, in turn, have a significant impact on firm behaviour and 
performance.
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Some may still argue whether these differences are really due to ownership - the 
NHS has a significant number of additional responsibilities and pressures that the 
ISTCs do not have. Clearly, it can be argued that the NHS has responsibility over the 
public health system in general. However, if the basic premise is that ISTCs and NHS 
TCs are intended to select and admit the same types of patients, use the same 
technology and offer the same treatments, then why do they not operate in the same 
manner?
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
I  am as old as the NHS... and I  am going to outlive it.1
NHS Registration Clerk, March 2007
7.0 Introduction
The comment above illustrates the scale of the changes currently taking place 
within England’s NHS. The English NHS is undergoing massive reforms, some of 
which people fear will make the NHS unrecognizable. While the comment is one of 
exasperation, it also demonstrates that the government’s reforms are shaking things 
up, a view supported by the conclusions of this dissertation. In many of the 
interviews, NHS staff and employees recognised that, while change was difficult, it 
was also necessary and many held the long-term view that the reforms will take hold 
and the ideals of the NHS will stand.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 7.1 provides a brief review of 
the research questions and England’s on-going reform efforts in this area. Section 7.2 
provides a summary of the principal results. Section 7.3 discusses the policy 
implications of the results. Section 7.4 discusses the key limitations of the research 
and suggests areas for further research. Section 7.5 discusses the next steps in the 
government reform efforts.
7.1 The Context and Review of the Research Questions
The dissertation assesses the Treatment Centre Programme as part of England’s 
NHS reform efforts. Though the Treatment Centre Programme plays a relatively 
minor role in England’s NHS in terms of patient volume and spending (both <1%), 
the attention drawn to it has been immense and the initial impact has been quite 
substantial. It should be noted that while there are Treatment Centres in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, this dissertation focuses on the Treatment Centre
1 Personal Communication, March 2007
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Programme in England. Therefore, references to the NHS are intended to refer to the 
English NHS.
The Treatment Centres are overtly touted as part of a government strategy to add 
capacity, as well as improve quality and access to care (Department of Health 2005). 
The Treatment Centre Programme in England focuses on elective short-stay surgeries. 
Supporters of these types of facilities argue that the focused approach can improve 
quality and reduce costs. Opponents argue that these facilities will significantly 
impinge on the continuity of care, increasingly fragmenting the health system and 
reducing training opportunities for the next generation of medical practitioners (Royal 
College of Physicians 2003; UNISON 2005; 2006). Most, if  not all, of these concerns, 
have been directed especially at the inclusion of the independent sector.
There are two types of treatment centres in England: Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISTCs) and the NHS Treatment Centres. The first wave of ISTC 
tenders is eventually projected to deliver care to an additional 250,000 patients each 
year. In addition to these ISTCs, there NHS Treatment Centres, managed by the 
National Health Service (NHS) which are projected to deliver care to an additional
170,000 patients each year (Commercial Directorate 2005; C B I2008); Department of 
Health 2005; Timmins 2005; UNISON 2005; Department of Health 2009).
The Treatment Centre Programme should not be regarded as merely the ‘topic du 
jour.’ The programme is emblematic of an emergent, and increasingly conflictual, 
intersection of policy, economics and business. From a policy standpoint, questions 
arise over efficiency, equity, quality and choice, even as the government faces 
pressures to keep costs to a minimum. From an economic standpoint, questions arise 
over new and increasingly market-oriented ways to finance increasing demand, 
largely via the pricing mechanisms of competition and choice. From a business 
standpoint, questions arise over whether the exact nature of the relationship between 
the public and private sector. Because the treatment centre programme touches on all 
these issues, it has received a disproportionate amount of attention, relative to its size.
7.2 Summary of the Principal Results
This dissertation focuses on whether the Treatment Centre Programme can be an 
effective policy mechanism for attaining a national health system’s goals and 
objectives. The overriding theme of this dissertation has been the assessment of the 
evidence related to the Treatment Centre Programme in England with the view to
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determining whether the Independent Sector Treatment Centres deliver higher 
performance than the NHS Treatment Centres and, if so, why.
The research is geared to providing answers to the following sub-questions:
- Are there differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of efficiency? 
Are there differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of quality?
Are there differences in the organisational, managerial and technological 
approach between the ISTCs and NHS TCs?
- If such differences exist, how can they be explained? In particular how does the 
difference in their ownership structure relate to the differences in performance 
found between the ISTCs and NHS TCs? Or could there be various alternative, or 
even confounding influences (such as competition), which may affect the 
conclusions suggested by the evidence?
7.2.1 Quantitative Evidence
Chapter 4 uses a quantitative methodological approach, with the intention of 
conducting an initial assessment on the specific issue of treatment centre performance. 
The purpose of the analysis is to test the hypothesis that there are differences in 
performance between the Treatment Centres. This analysis is not to explain causation 
or attempt prediction, but rather to obtain initial correlations and establish whether 
there are differences in performance. This chapter is to support the initial hypothesis 
and justify the rest of the thesis through ensuring that there are differences to explain 
between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in terms of efficiency and quality.
Because die Treatment Centre Programme encompasses not only ISTCs, but also 
NHS Treatment Centres (NHS TCs), we have an opportunity quantitatively to assess 
the performance of IS and NHS Treatment Centres alongside NHS Trust Hospitals 
and Independent Sector General Hospital Providers and as a result uncover whether 
there are advantages in terms of efficiency and quality that may be associated with 
differing ownership structures (public or private) and facility type (treatment centre or 
hospital).
An initial analysis was undertaken by reviewing basic descriptive statistics 
(number of cases, mean, median, etc.) and then by pooling the mean differences 
between groups. Multivariate regression analyses were then undertaken in order to 
assess the predictive value of these mean differences, to control for potential
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confounding factors and to determine the significance of variables such as ownership 
status, treatment centre focus, age and deprivation.
The descriptive analysis indicates that there are differences in the ALOS between 
facility types. The differences are not as strong when assessing the day case rates. 
Broadly, the data suggests ISTCs have better efficiency indicators, followed by 
Private Hospitals, NHS TCs and then NHS Trust Hospitals. From the quality 
outcomes standpoint, there is very little difference in the death rates between all 
providers. Readmission rates are lower in the ISTCs. The NHS TCs were slightly 
better than in the Private Hospitals (by number of procedure areas) with NHS Trust 
Hospitals having the highest readmission rates within these HRGs.
From the difference in means analysis, the data suggests that there are differences 
in efficiency performance. Broadly, we see that ISTCs tend to have higher 
performance levels (as measured by lower ALOS) than all other providers. NHS Trust 
Hospitals have the lowest performance. IS Providers perform better than NHS TCs. 
The data indicates that the evidence is even stronger when limited to inpatient cases.
The difference in means analysis suggests that ISTCs tend to have higher 
performance levels (as measured by lower ALOS) than all other providers. NHS Trust 
Hospitals have the lowest performance. IS Providers perform better than NHS TCs. 
The evidence is even more profound when limited to inpatient cases (and taking out 
outpatient procedures).
Day case rates were also assessed. We see that the day case rates are highest for 
NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals, followed by ISTCs and then Private Hospitals. 
However, there are significant limitations to this analysis in that two procedure areas 
account for 90% of the number of cases and significant differences when comparing 
providers and their number of cases. Further, the day case rate only estimates whether 
the procedure was a day case or not, dampening the actual range and variance 
between providers.
With respect to quality outcomes, we see very little, if any differences, between 
the providers. Though we are not able to say that quality outcomes are better in the 
ISTCs and NHS TCs, they do not appear to be worse. Thirty day death rates and 
inpatient readmission rates are used as proxies for quality outcomes. We see no 
statistically significant difference in 30 day death rates. Also, broadly we see no 
statistically significant differences inpatient readmission rates. The results are only
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significant when ISTCs are compared to NHS Trust Hospitals (ISTC < NHS Trust 
Hospitals).
We have also assessed potential differences in age and deprivation, with a view 
that these may point to differences in case mix. We found very little, if any, difference 
between providers. Broadly, there is very little difference between the providers in the 
age of their patients. In all comparisons, except for the comparison of IS Providers 
and NHS Trust Hospitals, the data is statistically insignificant, with the confidence 
intervals crossing zero. Deprivation scores differ very little as well. The evidence is 
only statistically significant when comparing ISTCs and NHS TCs (ISTCs have lower 
deprivation levels) and when comparing NHS Trust Hospitals with all the other 
provider types (NHS Trust Hospitals tend to have slightly higher deprivation scores).
Theory suggests that we should see differences in performance arising from 
differences in ownership. Theory also suggests that facilities providing a more 
focused approach should have better performance. With respect to efficiency, as 
measured by ALOS, the evidence indicates this to be true. There are differences in 
ALOS based upon facility ownership. With respect to quality outcomes, we see very 
little evidence of differences. However, at the same time, we can say that, while 
quality outcomes may not be better, they are certainly no worse, as was feared when 
the Treatment Centre program initially proposed. Generally speaking, that evidence 
indicates that ownership structure plays a stronger role in determining performance 
than the type of facility when looking at ALOS as a proxy for efficiency. However, 
the weighted means difference analysis does not provide information on the relative 
weights we should put on the ‘type of facility’ and ‘ownership structure’ variables, 
when evaluating their roles in improving performance. As a result, the researcher 
conducted a basic regression analysis to assess in more detail the relationships 
between average length of stay and the independent variables.
The regression was run once for each type of procedure and showed varying 
levels of explanatory power for different procedures. Broadly, we find ownership to 
be the strongest predictor in the model. In three out of the four cases, ownership is 
significant and in two out of four cases ownership is the strongest predictor. Facility 
type (Treatment Centre or Hospital) is a stronger predictor in one case and in one case 
it is nearly equal with ownership. As we more closely assess cases that are inpatient 
cases, we see significant differences, and that ownership has the largest coefficient. 
While the control variable of age and income deprivation are generally significant,
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they do not have very high coefficients, indicating they are not especially important, 
at least compared to the type of and ownership of a facility.
Overall, the model does not appear to be successful in predicting length of stay as 
there is well over 90% of the variation in length of stay unaccounted for (i.e., 
predicted by other factors than ownership, facility type, age and deprivation). 
However, the regression analysis does support the evidence from the difference in 
means analysis that ownership indeed is an important difference in performance 
between hospitals and treatment centres.
There are key limitations to the quantitative approach, such as the data available, 
gaps and inconsistencies in reporting between IS and NHS providers, the methods 
used, HRGs not being directly linked to financial remuneration for the majority of 
providers assessed and the HRG groupings not sufficiently refined to account for 
variations in complexity in the individual patients and total case mix of the respective 
facilities. However, as noted in Chapter 4, there are certain limitations to the case mix 
adjustment with only two types of variables being used for assessing provider case 
mix. As a result of these limitations, the qualitative chapters look more deeply into 
the Treatment Centre Programme to further investigate why there may be differences 
in performance between the treatment centres and between the different ownership 
structures.
7.2.2 Qualitative Evidence
Based on the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, it can be argued the form of 
ownership is an important determinant of treatment centre performance. The two 
qualitative analysis chapters attempt to ascertain why ownership matters, or, at a 
minimum, why the predictive power of ownership is strongest amongst the 
independent variables assessed.
The first o f the qualitative analysis chapters assessed the performance of 
Treatment Centres over traditional facilities in the independent sector and NHS, while 
the following chapter examined the effects of ownership structures in ISTCs and NHS 
TCs. Rather than leaving the mechanisms that explain why ownership is correlated 
with performance in a ‘black box’, as is common in statistical analyses, this 
dissertation has conducted original qualitative research in a bid to better our 
understanding of the links between ownership and performance outcomes.
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Treatment Centres -  Independent Sector and NHS
The first qualitative analysis chapter, Chapter 5 tried to identify exactly what were 
the proximate factors that explained the differences in outcomes. It identified 
organisational, managerial and technological differences between the treatment 
centres.
Site visits and interviews were conducted at seven ISTCs and nine NHS TCs in 
England. This amounted to approximately one-third of the ISTCs that were fully 
operational at the time and one-quarter of the NHS TCs. Two NHS Trust Hospitals 
were also visited to differentiate NHS TCs from NHS Trust Hospitals and thus 
provide a fuller picture. In total, 18 site visits were conducted.
The selection of the case studies was based upon two criteria. First, an ISTC from 
each of the major groups, or chains, owning and operating the treatment centres, was 
to be interviewed. Second, due to the broad variety of NHS TCs which were in 
operation, a number from both stand alone, as well as NHS Trust Hospital integrated, 
were selected as case studies.
The primary method of data collection was the semi-structured interview format. 
Site visits and interviews were conducted in 2007 and 2008. The initial interviews 
were conducted with a consultant of the NHS Elect during two day site visits. These 
initial interviews provided background so that subsequent interviews with treatment 
centre staff could be narrowed to the essential issues pertinent to the research. These 
initial site visits included the two NHS Trust Hospitals. Though the purpose of this 
qualitative analysis was to assess the evidence for apparent differences found between 
IS and NHS Treatment Centres, these initial interviews also allowed for comparison 
of NHS Trust Hospitals from NHS Treatment Centres.
The evidence suggests that there are clear differences between ISTCs and NHS 
TCs. These differences can be broadly categorised into three groupings: differing 
organisational methods; different skill mix in staff; and management practices.
The interviews found that management structures in ISTCs were relatively 
streamlined, whereas in NHS Trust hospitals, the departmental structures were 
relatively top heavy. In the ISTC management reporting was clear; but it was not 
always clear in the NHS whether staff reported to a treatment centre manager or to the 
NHS Trust Hospital itself, implying that the treatment centre was seen merely as 
another clinical department.
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In general, there is less staffing in ISTCs than NHS TCs, which suggests higher 
efficiency on a staff per patient basis. One could also infer overall lower staffing 
costs. However, it must be noted that treatment centre operational cost data was not 
assessed due to the confidentiality of these figures.
There was concern that ISTCs would use less experienced consultants, but no 
difference was found between the independent sector and NHS. Maximising the use 
of a treatment centre’s assets depends on how operating theatre time is scheduled. 
Generally ISTCs seemed to make more efficient use of their operating rooms and 
staff.
Though the intent of how ISTCs and NHS TCs were to operate was relatively 
similar (e.g. admission criteria and discharge policies), in practice, ISTCs and NHS 
TCs differed significantly. The overwhelming evidence found that ISTCs were much 
better at selecting appropriate patients and were much more effective in booking 
operating rooms to full utilisation. NHS TCs were found mixing non appropriate 
patients and practising in the same manner as a general hospital. ISTCs were more 
effective at setting patient expectations early, thus allowing for the patients, their 
families, and the PCTs to plan for discharge at, or even prior to, admission.
Transporting patients to and from the operating theatre is also an important part of 
ensuring proper flow in and out of the operating theatre and ensuring maximum 
throughput. Since the ISTCs were relatively small and self-contained facilities, it did 
not take more than a few minutes to get the patient from the ward to the induction 
room, but in the NHS TCs, this was not always the case.
Differences were also found in the areas of purchasing and materials management. 
Most ISTCs were able to get consultants to use the same product company, permitting 
larger discounts and a greater ability to save on purchasing. NHS TCs had difficulty 
getting consultants to use the same product company. It was stated in the interviews 
that purchasing costs at ISTCs were significantly below the NHS purchase price.
Differences were also found in the architectural design of the facilities. The ISTCs 
visited were designed for the services they were to provide (purpose built). This was 
not the case in a number of the NHS TCs, and was an important limiting factor in 
stream-lining treatment centre operations. Furthermore, this physical organisation 
with the NHS Trust Hospitals has an important drawback on the actual operations. 
Systemic delays within the entire NHS Trust Hospital trickled down to delays within 
the treatment centre. This is a phenomenon the researcher noted in many instances.
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Though the evidence cannot be conclusive by its nature, differences in the 
organisational and management practices in the ISTC and NHS TCs that affect 
performance in terms of efficiency and quality suggest that there is a clear divergence 
in operating practice between the ISTCs and NHS TCs.
Ownership: How Does Ownership Matter?
Chapter 6 took the argument a step further by trying to identify the causes of those 
differences -  and in particular the role of ownership. By doing so, it was hoped to 
disentangle the correlations identified in the quantitative results and to gain insight 
into the causal relationships involved.
Economic theory gives us a number of possible explanations for the differences 
identified in the previous chapter. These differences may be due to the competitive 
effects in the market. They may be due to differences in payers and payment 
methodologies. The independent sector may actively select (e.g. age, severity, etc.) 
patients with lower risk than the NHS TCs. Physical and organisational integration 
may account for differences in performance.2 And lastly, the operational and financial 
management practices within ISTCs and NHS TCs may differ because of ownership. 
If these last factors do help explain differences in performance, then private 
ownership generates greater productive efficiency, as theory would predict.
Rationale 1: Competition May Explain the Difference in Performance
Direct competition between ISTCs and NHS TCs does not explain the difference
in performance. From the site visits conducted, the only instance where there may be 
competition between an ISTC and NHS TC would be between ISTC D and NHS TC 
GG. However, in this case, the only overlap in procedures provided was orthopaedic 
surgeries. As a result,, there is very little, if any direct competition. Also, from the 
geographic competition analysis we cannot say that competition is a potential 
confounding factor to the evidence between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. And further, the 
ISTC and NHS TC competition areas do not overlap.
Further, there is nothing to suggest ISTCs and NHS TCs face significantly 
different competition, even if they do not compete against each other, such that it 
could explain the differences found in the performance of NHS TCs and ISTCs. For
2 For historical reasons, a significant proportion of NHS TCs are physically as well as organisationally 
integrated with an NHS Trust Hospital, while ISTCs are, for the most part, stand alone centres 
(physically and organisationally). In this case, ownership is simply a proxy for this history.
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the most part, ISTCs have been situated in areas outside of major cities, whereas the 
NHS TCs are situated in and around major cities. Therefore ISTCs should face less 
competition than the NHS TCs.
Still, it could be argued that the ISTCs are under more competitive pressure 
overall due to the inherent nature of contracting with the Commercial Directorate as 
well as that they compete against NHS Trust Hospitals for patients. However, then we 
would have to then assume that the NHS Trust Hospitals are under this same 
competitive pressure which should be reflected in their performance indicators. This 
is not the case as NHS Trust Hospital performance indicators, broadly, are lower than 
the NHS TC indicators.
Rationale 2: Payment Methodology May Explain the Differences in
Performance
We cannot say that differences in payment methodology account for differences in 
performance. ISTCs and NHS TC providers both treat NHS patients and as a result, 
the payer (NHS) is the same. Further, both IS and for the most part NHS facilities are 
paid via a budgetary payment.
The ISTCs are receiving a l l  .2% premium above the NHS Equivalent Cost, 
however, the ISTCs need to cover both their operational as well as capital costs with 
this payment. The ISTCs do not receive an additional budget allocation for capex like 
the NHS TCs.
There are a number of other reasons for why the ISTCs should receive a premium 
payment. These include the fact that the contracts are only for five-years with no 
commitment for renewal, unlike the NHS, where these contracts are open ended.
There is no risk transfer in capital costs to the NHS. And there are tax issues, which 
the NHS does not have to consider. As a result, considering the above mentioned risk 
factors, the premium is not excessive.
Rationale 3: ISTCs Lower Case Mix Selection May Explain the
Difference in Performance
Another explanation for the differences in performance is that the independent 
sector actively selects patients with lower risks than the NHS TCs. The researcher 
concludes that this explanation cannot be true. The entire business model of a 
treatment centre revolves around selecting patients that are appropriate for outpatient, 
day case or short-stay surgery. The researcher reviewed the admissions policy and
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then the actual practices of the ISTCs and NHS TCs. The admissions policies were 
more or less the same between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. The evidence suggests that 
elective care patients appropriate for the NHS TCs are no different in case mix 
complexity than within the ISTCs. As a result, it cannot be argued that ISTCs are 
actively selecting patients with a lower case mix complexity.
However, from the qualitative evidence it is clear that the NHS TCs, due to 
pressures from the NHS Trust Hospital and scheduling of the consultants, allowed for 
non-appropriate patients to enter the facility. Time and time again it was found that 
NHS treatment centres were admitting non-appropriate patients to the treatment 
centre. The ISTCs did not accept non-elective surgical patients, nor did they accept 
medical patients, which were found in one NHS TC. However, the fact that non- 
appropriate patients were admitted to NHS TCs cannot explain the differences in 
performance identified in the quantitative chapter. Of the elective HRG admissions 
policies from the qualitative analysis and discharge records from the quantitative 
analysis, the patient cases are very similar with little significant differences in age and 
deprivation (TMD) scores.
Rationale 4: Integration May Explain the Differences in Performance
The researcher found that there were not great differences in the use of
technologies between the independent sector and NHS. However, there are clear 
differences between the ISTCs and NHS TCs in the how technology was organised in 
daily operations. These differences include the location of the technology and how it 
was integrated into the operations of the facility. Specific examples are provided with 
the PACS, consultant notes and the diagnostic imaging facilities.
Diagnostics in NHS TCs were not thought of as an important component of the 
treatment centre and their impact on the facility’s operational flow was not properly 
considered. Six (6) of the nine (9) NHS TCs shared diagnostic services with the NHS 
Trust Hospitals, whereas all of the ISTCs had their own self-contained unit. Systemic 
delays within the entire NHS Trust Hospital trickled down to delays within the 
treatment centre.
Further, the ISTCs were set up to function as operationally stand alone facilities. 
Six of the nine NHS TCs facilities were physically integrated with the NHS Trust 
Hospital and in all but one of the NHS TCs, the organisation was beset by cross- 
staffing and shared resources with the Trust Hospital. The close, or even physical
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integration with the Trust Hospital facility may impact the operations of the treatment 
centre.
However, though this may explain some differences in performance, it cannot 
explain all of them. Stand alone NHS TC facilities were still similar to the integrated 
NHS TC facilities in their organisational structure, skill mix, staffing ratios and 
management practices. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that consultants are 
using the treatment centre operating theatres for the same patient case mix as in the 
NHS Trust Hospital operating theatre. Anaesthetists are using the same 
anaesthesiology, irrespective of whether the surgery could be done on a day case or 
inpatient basis. The use of anaesthesia, and the potential for using different types 
based upon whether a patient is a day case or inpatient, is important to how quickly 
patients recover and can be discharged from the facility.
Rationale 5: Ownership May Explain the Difference in Performance
The evidence suggests that the fifth reason - differences in the operational and
financial management of the ISTC and NHS TCs - is the most likely reason for 
differences in performance. If so, then ownership is the important distinction. For 
ownership is intimately related to those differences. The evidence suggests that there 
are differences between the ISTCs and the NHS TCs in their use of technology, 
integration of the patient pathway, organisational methods such as management 
structure, consultant reporting, perception of management control, the skill mix in 
staff and staffing ratios, as well as the management practices in terms of admission to 
discharge.
It must be noted that all the private operators were new market entrants. It is 
therefore important to disentangle the various owners’ differences in terms of their 
strategies and motivations since these drive management decision-making and 
working patterns, which may, in turn, impact the evidence observed. In all cases, 
either the UK was a new market, as in the case of the foreign owned firms, or the 
sector was a new one, as in the case of the UK operators. In the latter, instance, the 
UK operators (Care UK and Mercury) then partnered with sector specific operators to 
better leverage their respective expertise for operating a treatment centre.
It is also important to note that the ownership structures of the ISTCs researched 
have changed since the projects were tendered. Changes in ownership were 
accelerated with the advent of private equity taking a particular interest in health, with
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ownership changes further accelerated by the liquidity in the markets, which 
facilitated major health deals. For example, Apax Partners, a private equity firm, 
bought Capio in 2007 and they were a major investor in Netcare. The motivation for 
the private equity firm was to gain access to the market and create economies of scale.
This is consistent both with the Department of Health Commercial Directorate’s 
strategy to build a competitive market and is in line with the planned size and scope of 
the Wave 2 tenders. In evaluating the size of the ISTC market required to create and 
sustain a competitive market in terms of both price and quality, the Commercial 
Directorate looked at two key aspects: the number of competitors required in a given 
market and the minimum size that a provider would need to be to provide national 
coverage.
Though the providers may have had differing competitive advantages, all the 
strategies adopted had to incorporate the necessity of entering the UK market for the 
long-term. All the operators saw that a 5 year contract would only break-even on their 
return on investment. They sought to increase the contract value, and as a result, the 
strategy was longer term. With that said, the entry of the private equity providers 
(Apax partners), may have altered the incentives. Though the private equity firms 
were also profit maximising, which was almost certainly the same goal as the other 
firms, the time-frame for private equity players is typically much shorter (5 years or 
less).
As a result, the dynamic and the incentives of the private equity players must be 
taken into context alongside the other private operators. However, the influence of the 
private equity firms cannot be said to affect the results of the research, since these 
purchases, liquidity has dried up in the markets and a number of private equity firms 
are having to sell or consolidate, and the exit time frame may now be different than 
originally envisioned. The differing time-frames for investment, as well as other 
differences are important, if ‘under the surface’, and a recognition of these 
motivations is important if one is to disentangle the contribution of private sector 
ownership from, for instance, the importance of being able to insulate elective 
surgical work from other pressures.
All the ISTC owners were new market entrants with various competitive 
advantages. The US and Canadian firms had particular expertise in operating 
treatment centres from the management as well as clinical side. The South African 
firms had the ability to recruit staff at a lower cost of labor. Capio, a Swedish firm,
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had both operator experience as well as the ability to recruit staff from Sweden. All 
had the ability to set clear management expectations due to the inherent structure of 
these facilities and the use of staff from outside of the NHS. Finally, The UK firms 
had local market expertise, but not sector specific expertise.
Yet, despite the potential for differing firms to exploit unique comparative 
advantages, the strategies adopted were more similar than different, especially when 
compared to the NHS TCs. Property rights theory argues that the incentive structure is 
importantly impacted by property rights, and the similarity of the strategies adopted 
by the privately owned ISTCs may indicate that ownership is a more important factor 
than the geographic, regulatory, and experience contexts of the firms.
Summary
The evidence from the previous chapters suggests that the differences in the 
findings are a result of ownership. However, the issue is not simply that ownership 
matters, but how it matters. The qualitative evidence shows that there are differences 
in the actual organisational structure and operations of these treatment centres which 
affect performance and suggests that ownership is indeed the determining factor for 
these differences. Due to the methodological approach of the dissertation, and the 
limitations of the quantitative data, the evidence cannot be entirely conclusive as to 
how and to what extent this links back to differences in the quantitative evidence.
This conclusion is in line with standard economic theory. The literature review 
showed that a transfer of ownership can be expected to be associated with some 
change in the types of incentives in a firm, and these different incentives are likely to 
have significant effects upon firm behaviour and performance.
Some may still argue whether these differences are really due to ownership - the 
NHS has a significant number of additional responsibilities and pressures that the 
ISTCs do not have. It can be argued that the NHS has responsibility over the public 
health system in general. However, if the basic premise is that ISTCs and NHS TCs 
are intended to select and admit the same types of patients, use the same technology 
and offer the same treatments, then why do they not operate in the same manner?
7.3 Policy Implications of the Results
There are two kinds of policy implications uncovered from the research that must 
be put into perspective as the NHS moves forward with its reform efforts:
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Those arising directly from the research results:
o Private ownership can and does improve performance; if performance 
improvement is the aim, private sector participation in public health 
service provision should be expanded; 
o NHS TCs should be physically and organisationally independent of NHS 
Trust hospitals;
o Clinical staffing policy and the additionality principle should be improved 
to remedy skill shortages; 
o Benefits of new entrants to the NHS market should be encouraged; 
o Independent Sector Innovations Should Be Encouraged and Important 
Lessons Should Be Drawn for How NHS Providers Implement these 
Innovations such as in the Treatment Centres; 
o The ISTC programme should be continued or expanded because of its 
ability to change the existing NHS organisational culture.
Those that are not a direct outcome of the research results, but became apparent 
from conducting the research:
o Performance monitoring should emphasise outputs and outcomes; 
o National data needs to be improved so that public and private facilities 
can be more easily compared; 
o Incentives in the NHS should be better aligned; 
o Competition should continue to be promoted, to incentivise providers.
7.3.1 Policy Implications: Directly Related to the Research Results
Policy Proposal 1: Private Ownership Can and Does Improve Performance; Private 
Sector Participation in Public Health Service Provision Should Be Expanded.
Policymakers should consider increasing private sector participation in the 
provision of public health care delivery. The evidence in this dissertation suggests that 
ISTCs have superior performance relative to NHS TCs. The evidence also suggests 
that even if the NHS TCs were operating in the manner they were intended to operate, 
there would still be differences in performance based upon facility ownership.
Private ownership can encompass not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit entities. The 
important distinction is that these entities are fully responsible for financial and 
operational performance. In theory, incentives are aligned to earn revenues, monitor
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and maintain performance, and expand or at least retain market share (Harding and 
Preker 2003). Depending on the country, NFP hospitals can pay an important role in 
the provisioning of care. In the US, for example, NFP hospitals account for 70.3% per 
cent of beds in the health system (AHA 2005), whereas in the UK, for-profit and non- 
for-profit (voluntary) beds amount to only 11% of total acute care beds, of which the 
majority are under the management of the for-profit acute care facilities (Hensher and 
Edwards 1999).
The UK government already recognises that ownership matters, or at minimum, 
recognises the basic characteristics of the how differences in ownership structures 
matter in performance outcomes (e.g. clear management accountability, decision 
rights, etc). Already, we see that there are changes in the ownership structures of NHS 
Trust Hospitals that become Foundation Trust status, and thus becoming corporatised 
units. Corporatization refers to the adoption of management structures or other 
features and behaviours employed by corporations, while the state, not investors on 
the stock market, retains ownership of the company's shares. Foundation Trust status 
allows hospitals a significant amount of managerial and financial freedom, when 
compared to existing NHS Trust Hospitals.
As discussed in the literature review, the evidence makes clear that ownership of a 
firm has significant effects on a firm’s behaviour and performance. The effect of a 
change in ownership is driven by a change in the objectives of the owners of the firm 
(public or private) and the incentive arrangements in place for management. However, 
it is important to note that efficiency and the incentives within each firm are not solely 
dependent on changes in ownership structure. Efficiency and the incentives are also 
dependent on the level of competition and the regulatory environment in which a 
given firm operates. Policy suggestions on competition and the regulatory 
environment will be made in the following sections.
Policy Proposal 2: NHS TCs Should Be Physically and Organisationally 
Independent of the NHS Trust Hospitals.
In order for NHS TCs to ring-fence their services and focus exclusively on 
elective care, they need to be physically and organisationally separated from NHS 
Trust Hospitals. The ISTCs were set out to function as operationally stand alone 
facilities. Six of the nine NHS TCs facilities, on the other hand, were physically and 
organisationally integrated into NHS Trust Hospitals, and all but one of the NHS TCs
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were beset by cross-staffing and shared resources. The close, or even physical 
integration of NHS TCs with Trust Hospital facilities may impact the operations of 
the treatment centre.
The first ramification of integration with Trust Hospitals is that most NHS TCs 
are not being used as intended, that is, as treatment centres. The evidence 
overwhelming indicates that NHS TCs mix appropriate patients with inappropriate 
ones, and mix dedicated treatment centre staff with staff from the Trust hospital (the 
latter tend to operate in the same manner as they would in the general hospital). The 
evidence also suggests that NHS TCs that are physically linked to NHS Trust 
Hospitals have more difficulty operating in the way intended and thus have poorer 
performance levels.
The ISTCs are predominantly stand alone entities with dedicated staffing and 
patients. These ISTCs do not accept non-elective surgical patients, nor do they accept 
medical patients, which we found in one NHS TC. Particular emphasis was given to 
comparing ISTCs and NHS Treatment Centres, as both types of facilities attempt to 
select the same type of patient.
Second, the NHS is transferring old habits and mindsets to the new, renovated 
facilities. Because of this, the culture in the NHS TCs is very similar to the culture of 
the general NHS, constraining the ability of the treatment centre to transform the 
system. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that consultants are using the 
treatment centre operating theatre for the same patient case mix as in the main 
hospital operating theatre. Anaesthetists are using the same anaesthesiology, 
irrespective of whether the surgery could be done on a day case or inpatient basis. 
There are some instances of NHS TCs attempting to transform themselves and operate 
as they were intended. However, these cases have been very limited. Broadly, the 
NHS is merely transferring old habits and views to the new facilities, resulting in very 
little transformation of the system.
Third, there appeared to be a significant amount of political pressure within the 
NHS while the research was being conducted. This pressure emanated from the 
mandate to hit wait list targets. A number of NHS staff stated that operations had been 
recently oriented as a reaction to this directive. All pro-active planning was being set 
aside for the time being, in order to get patients through whatever operating theatre 
was available on a given day.
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The ISTCs were even feeling some of this sense of urgency. One ISTC even 
commented that they were receiving calls on a weekly basis from the Commercial 
Directorate. The ISTCs visited were achieving their volume contracts and were even 
adding contracts and volumes. The ISTCs seemed to be somewhat protected from 
NHS politics, since they were not affiliated with an inpatient hospital and because 
they had dedicated treatment centre staff who remained focused on ramping up 
volume levels.
Further, it was found that NHS Trust Hospitals in breach, or close to breaching, 
their wait list targets, put further pressure on the NHS TC to admit non-appropriate 
patients, so that they could meet their year-end targets. As a result o f the close 
physical integration with an NHS Trust Hospital and the pressures to achieve wait list 
targets, these treatment centres were the most poorly run.
And lastly, in only two of the nine NHS TCs was there a dedicated facility 
manager. Within the nine NHS TCs, consultant reporting was unclear in three of the 
facilities and in a further four the reporting was to the department head of the Trust 
Hospital. The evidence suggests that the correlation between NHS TC integration and 
accountability was strongly negative.
It can be argued then that there are two important reasons for ‘ring-fencing’ the 
treatment centres within the NHS. First, this allows for the treatment centre to remain 
focused on their operational and clinical approach. Secondly though, it keeps the 
treatment centre insulated from the on-going NHS Trust tensions, which would 
otherwise overflow into the treatment centres as a result of the need to meet 
benchmarks and implement new policy.
Policy Proposal 3: Clinical Staffing Policy and the Additionality Principle Should 
Be Improved To Remedy Skill Shortages.
More can be done to ensure the treatment centre programme alleviates the 
shortage of skilled staff that the public demands. Adequately skilled ISTC staff is vital 
to the quality of care that these facilities provide to the NHS patients.
An interesting component of the ISTC programme is that the ISTCs were subject 
to the Department of Health’s ‘additionality’ policy. The overriding concern was that 
the ISTCs would merely poach NHS consultants from the NHS Trust Hospitals, 
undermining the NHS’ goal of adding capacity to the health system in order to reduce 
wait lists. To mitigate against this concern, the Wave 1 tenders mandated that ISTCs
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could not hire consultants who had worked for the NHS within the past 12 months. As 
a result of this limitation, ISTCs had to seek out consultants from outside of England 
in order to maintain adequate staffing levels. It must be noted that this was not a 
requirement for NHS TCs.
The policy of additionality within the ISTC programme has had a number of 
important knock-on effects, one of which has been to break up the NHS consultants’ 
traditional monopoly. The policy of additionality has had the effect of not only 
bringing in new cultures and ways of providing health care services, but also of 
upsetting the traditional dynamic of the NHS consultant. Traditionally, NHS 
consultants would work a number of operating theatre sessions totalling 40 hours in a 
week, for which they would be paid a fixed salary by the NHS. In off hours, NHS 
consultants could work for the private sector. Such an arrangement is beset with 
cross-incentives or even disincentives.
Although it is too early to say that the NHS consultant power structure has been 
broken up, the research indicates that this is underway. The researcher views these 
new entrants as competitors to the status quo. Accordingly, it is important to 
recognise that the additionality policy affects not just the operational side of health 
care culture, but also the clinical side.
However, there are a number of policy issues that need to be addressed with the 
hiring of new staff from outside England. For example, recruitment processes in 
ISTCs are different from those in the NHS. Each ISTC has its own policies and 
procedures for the recruitment of different positions. For example, the employment 
status of the surgeons varies significantly. Some ISTCs use wholly seconded NHS 
medical staff, whose arrangements for employment, appraisals and continuous 
professional development remain with the NHS, while other use an employed 
workforce or even a third-party contracting arrangement.
Further, the recruitment procedures for specialists that ISTCs use are different 
from those used in the NHS. ISTCs are not required to use formal advisory 
appointments committees with royal college representation, while the NHS requires 
input from royal colleges and review by colleagues from within the same professional 
group (Healthcare Commission 2007) for its specialists.
There is also the issue of being able to compare the clinical skills of staff working 
in ISTCs. Staff recruited from different countries come with different training and 
experience, and the response of ISTCs to these differences varies. Some ISTCs try to
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standardise practices, while others allow consultants to practice in their preferred 
manner (Healthcare Commission 2007).
There have also been concerns raised about the nature of short-term contracts held 
by overseas staff. Some clinical associations have suggested that these short-term 
contracts limit the ability of staff to become accustomed to standard UK practices, to 
establish the necessary relationships with NHS colleagues, and to be aware of 
postoperative complications in their patients (Healthcare Commission 2007).
There are also the questions of whether staff in the ISTCs have the same avenues 
for professional development as staff in the NHS. The continuing professional 
development at ISTCs varies (Healthcare Commission 2007). Furthermore, the short­
term nature of a number of the consultant contracts may limit the interest in 
continuing professional development.
The policy of ‘additionality’ evidently has had a direct effect on ISTC staffing. 
‘Additionality’ has created a barrier to integration by preventing the flow of staff 
between ISTCs and the NHS. There is an alternative model, using secondment of 
NHS consultants, but this model is not without its own problems. From the 
interviews, the ISTCs that used seconded staff stated that the poorest performing staff 
members were the NHS seconded consultants. The reasons were two-fold: NHS 
culture and inability to incentivise.
Policy Proposal 4: Benefits of new entrants to the NHS market should be 
encouraged.
The benefits of new entrants to the NHS market should be encouraged, in 
particular the ability to recruit new clinical staff, set clear management expectations 
and care processes, etc.
The ISTCs, as new market entrants, brought new clinical staff to the NHS.
Though there was concern that ISTCs would use less experienced consultants, no 
differences in this regard were found between the independent sector and NHS. In all 
cases, the ISTCs hired only consultants which had experience for the procedures 
which they were contracted to provide. It must be stated that ISTCs may have more 
experienced staff since they generally do not make use of consultant trainees and hire 
consultants with little or no experience.
However, bringing in new clinical staff not only performs the function of adding 
additional capacity, but also the function of transforming existing practices and the
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implementation of ‘best practices’ to ensure improved provision of care. A cited 
example was the use of patient control anaesthesia (PCA). The PCA would be shut off 
at 24 hours post operation as evidence suggests that leaving patients too long on the 
PCA slows recovery. Increasingly ‘best-practices’ point to getting the patients off the 
PCA as soon as possible, encouraging them to become mobile and thus be discharged 
from the facility. A number of the ISTCs were implementing this practice whereas the 
NHS TCs were merely transferring the same practices (e.g. the manner in which they 
treat inpatients) to a different facility.
In all seven ISTCs’ cases, management and clinicians stated that they did not want 
to deviate too much from UK practices. Nonetheless, there were specific examples of 
ISTCs questioning the status quo and introducing new practices to the NHS in terms 
of differing mix of staff in the operating theatres. The use of differing mix of staff in 
the operating theatres has the direct impact of differing roles and responsibilities 
representing a systemic shift of practise, rather than merely transferring the old ways 
of working in a Trust Hospital.
Further, the new market entrants used other clinical and non-clinical staff in 
important ways that were essential to the operational performance of the treatment 
centres. For example, schedulers for operating theatre time were empowered in their 
positions, unlike within the NHS. This implies that the role of scheduler is a large one 
in determining operational efficiency. Another example is the use of operating 
department practitioners (ODPs). Typical staffing in a United States (US) ambulatory 
surgery centre includes two nurses, a scrub nurse and a circulating nurse. The function 
of the ODP, which does not exist in the US, is instead provided by the circulating 
nurse in the initial and final five to ten minutes of a procedure. The use of circulating 
nurses is being adopted by ISTCs, many of whom have incorporated US and 
Canadian practices in the operating theatre.
The ISTCs performed better in setting clear management expectations. The 
qualitative evidence found that management structures in ISTCs were relatively 
streamlined, whereas in NHS TCs, the departmental structures were under the NHS 
Trust Hospitals. Within the ISTCs, management reporting was clear. But it was not 
always clear within the NHS whether staff reported to a treatment centre manager or 
to the NHS Trust Hospital itself. The clarity of ISTC reporting structures means staff 
will be likely to have more clearly defined tasks and goals, and can more easily 
address problems that arise, since there is a clear hierarchy
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There are evidently differing perceptions and attitudes toward management 
control in the different facilities. ISTC staff perceived that management had a higher 
degree of control than NHS TCs. Also, the evidence suggests there was much more of 
an integrative approach between the administration, nurses, surgical consultants and 
anaesthetist. This integration created the ability to incentivise the consultants much 
better than in NHS TCs.
The ISTCs evidently had much better care processes than were in place for a 
treatment centre. Upon review of the patient selection and admission documentation 
forms from ISTCs and NHS TCs, there was very little difference, but in practice, 
ISTCs and NHS TCs differed significantly. The qualitative evidence found that ISTCs 
were much better at selecting appropriate patients and were much more effective in 
booking operating rooms to full utilisation. NHS TCs were found mixing non- 
appropriate patients and practising in the same manner as a general hospital. Mixing 
non-appropriate patients is bad clinical practice which can lead to medical errors as 
well as the inability to treat patients appropriately if back-up medical support is 
needed. Fewer cancellations would suggest fewer patients having to return another 
day to the facility and staggered patient arrival times would allow for a smoothing of 
operations and not wait in line, suggesting higher patient satisfaction levels.
Discharge practices were relatively similar, both in theory and practice, though 
ISTCs were more effective at setting patient expectations early as well as having post­
discharge care booked. This suggests that due to better ISTC integration with the 
PCTs, there is not only better operational flow, due to the ability of providing the full 
continuum of care, but also better quality with patients immediately receiving post­
discharge care.
Since the ISTCs were relatively small and self-contained facilities, it did not take 
more than a few minutes to get the patient from the ward to the induction room, but in 
the NHS TCs, this was not always the case. Transporting patients to and from the 
operating theatre is also an important part of ensuring proper flow in and out of the 
operating theatre and ensuring maximum throughput.
However, care processes cannot often be assessed in a vacuum. The care 
processes is not merely when a patient is admitted and then discharged within a 
specific facility. Therefore, policymakers should consider greater integration of the 
independent sector into the health system, at least for certain aspects of the system. At
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the same time, we must be cognizant that a balance be struck in this integration, as 
independence from the NHS is arguably what makes ISTCs so successful.
The integration of treatment should include the actual provisioning of care, such 
as patient discharge, follow-up and after-care. For example, for total joint 
replacements there is significant physiotherapy needed. The ISTC must work closely 
with the local PCT for rehabilitation services. Furthermore, there may be some further 
care in NHS hospitals required.
ISTCs discharge patients with information about how they should look after 
themselves, and with a contact telephone number that they can use for problems and 
queries. However, if patients experience problems after they have been discharged, 
their course of action is not straightforward. Day units at ISTCs are not staffed out of 
hours, and mobile units may have moved elsewhere. As a result, the better integration 
of the ISTC after patient discharge with the local provider network is essential.
Up to this point, most of the evidence has been focused on processes as they are 
intended to operate. However, what do ISTCs do when things go wrong? What are the 
systems in place for patients to be transferred to NHS facilities? Unsurprisingly, this 
is a question often asked by the government and NHS officials, and this was a concern 
expressed. It must be stated that there have been few validated adverse incidents 
reported by ISTCs.
Irrespective of the current outcomes, this has been a cause of resentment among 
some NHS staff, who felt that NHS hospitals would be ‘picking up the pieces’ when 
ISTC care went wrong. From the interviews it was clear that there was hostility 
towards ISTCs from both the NHS and the local press. It must be noted, again, there 
was very little hostility to the NHS TCs. Because of the hostility between ISTCs and 
the NHS, communication between ISTCs and clinicians working in the NHS was 
hampered. As a result the communication links are weak, which makes it difficult for 
ISTCs to establish themselves in the local healthcare system.
Ideally, such hostility would simply indicate healthy competition in the 
marketplace. However, competition does not negate the ability to collaborate and 
provide a continuum of care to the patient. The current environment clearly impinges 
on the flow of information between ISTCs and the NHS, as well as the integration of 
this information.
Policymakers should determine who should have this responsibility. If there is a 
role for the PCTs to play, this role should be one of a facilitator and honest broker
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between the NHS providers and independent sector. It is not clear whether PCTs can 
play this unbiased role, as was evidenced in the Wave 1 contracts (Anderson 2007).
Alongside the encouragement of new market entrants, policymakers should 
consider the promotion of regulatory policies on a number of different levels to insure 
a level playing field for IS and NHS providers alike. Specifically, the overall 
regulation of the independent sector needs to be standardised with regulation of the 
public sector.
Policymakers should consider aligning the regulatory frameworks of the 
independent sector and the NHS. At present, care for NHS patients which is provided 
by the independent sector is regulated by different legislation than is care provided by 
the NHS (Healthcare Commission 2007). This means that different standards are 
applied depending on where a patient's care is delivered. These differences result in a 
number of gaps and inconsistencies with respect to national minimum standards, 
which regulators use to inspect the independent sector. The Department of Health 
should align regulatory requirements across the two sectors, as they provide services 
to the same patients (NHS patients).
Policy Proposal 5: Independent Sector Innovations Should Be Encouraged and 
Important Lessons Should Be Drawn for How NHS Providers Implement these 
Innovations such as in the Treatment Centres.
There are a number of important lessons for how Independent Sector and NHS 
providers implement innovations such as in the treatment centres. One of the most 
compelling outcomes of the research is the fact that the NHS TCs were often used as 
an extended ward for the NHS Trust Hospital rather than a true treatment centre. One 
of the stated goals of the TC Programme was to bring innovation for new standards of 
care. Though there were some isolated cases of innovation and implementing new 
models of care, more often than not, the NHS TC had merely transferred the old ways 
of working in a Trust Hospital. The evidence suggests that past policies and practices 
tended to dilute the full implementation of innovations.
While none of the ISTCs had problems with consultant notes, this was a common 
issue that interrupted the operational flow of the NHS TCs. The NHS consultants, 
whether in the NHS Trust Hospital or NHS TC, stated that their unwillingness to 
operate without ‘notes’ was due to patient safety concerns and the potential for 
liability in the event of a medical error. Due to the NHS consultants’ unwillingness to
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operate without consultant notes and the diagnostics being an important component of 
notes, any breakdown in the coordination of the notes could lead to cancellations or 
even medical errors. The NHS still uses handwritten and paper documentation which 
is more easily lost or misplaced. The ‘notes’ were not an issue within the ISTCs 
visited. Patient information was typically put into the information management 
systems that the ISTCs had in place. As a result of the fact that the information was in 
electronic format, the pertinent patient information were readily accessible in nearly 
every part of the treatment centre.
Another example is the case of one ISTC having a profound influence on an NHS 
TC’s scope of services. This respective ISTC and NHS TC are unique in the fact of 
their co-location and sharing of services. The ISTC’s staffing consists only of the 
operating theatre staff and three administrators. All pre-admission, pre-operation and 
post-operation functions are carried out by the NHS. As the respective ISTC was 
contracted to do joint replacement procedures, and continued to do these while there 
were complaints from the Royal Colleges, this opened the door for the NHS TC to 
provide these types of procedures. It could be argued that the stand-alone NHS TC 
would never have ventured to provide these types of services without the adjacent 
ISTCs influence. However, as the NHS TC was already supporting the pre-operative 
and post-operative care for the joint replacement procedures for the ISTC, it was a 
relatively small step to begin these replacement procedures themselves within the 
NHS TC’s operating theatre.
It must be stated that in the first instance upon learning about this unique co- 
location and sharing of services, the original view was that this would not be a 
pertinent case study for research purposes. However, due to their close physical as 
well as operational relationship, it became clear to the researcher that there was a 
profound influence of the Independent Sector upon the NHS and thus the ability to 
break through the barriers of the ‘old way of doing things.’
Innovation however transcends to beyond just the practices of the NHS providers. 
Another example is setting patient and family expectations and the relationship of the 
PCTs in post-discharge patient care with the ISTCs. The ISTCs emphasised setting 
patient expectations, how closely coordinated post-discharge care is coordinated with 
the home environment and whether home environment support is ensured from the 
beginning. The qualitative research provides evidence of a number of examples of the 
PCTs working with the ISTCs in setting discharge dates prior to admission for home
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support, whereas with the NHS TCs, the PCTs were unwilling to do this until after the 
patient was admitted. The integration of the PCT into the ISTC care process appears 
to have resulted in not only better operational flow -  since the ISTC has the ability to 
provide the full contract of care -  but also improved quality of care, since patients 
receive post-discharge care immediately.
NHS TC’s, like the Trust Hospitals tended to educate patients following surgery 
and prior to discharge. There were cases where family members went on vacation 
and, as a result, patients were not discharged in the expected time frame. The history 
of these types of examples have led the PCTs unwilling to schedule post-operative 
care with the NHS providers unlike after discharge since the actual discharge date was 
deemed to be unreliable until the event had taken place.
Though the integration between ISTC and PCT for discharge care seems to be 
much better than between the NHS TCs and PCTs, still there needs to be improved 
integration between the ISTCs, PCTs and NHS facilities if further attention is needed 
(beyond physiotherapy) within one of the TCs or hospitals. What do ISTC patients do 
when things go wrong? If patients experience problems after they have been 
discharged, their course of action is not straightforward as day units at ISTCs are not 
staffed out of hours, and mobile units may have moved elsewhere. There should be 
systems in place for patients to be transferred to NHS facilities. As a result, the better 
integration of the ISTC after patient discharge with the local provider network is 
essential.
Policy Proposal 6: The ISTC Programme Should Be Continued or Expanded 
Because o f Its Ability To Change the Existing NHS Organisational Culture.
Policymakers should continue to use the ISTC Programme as an agent of change 
for the NHS organisational culture. The ISTC programme is not merely about 
privatising health, but also challenging die NHS status quo and organisational culture.
If physical capacity was the only issue that mattered, it is likely the government 
would have continued to merely increase funding for NHS Trust Hospitals or even 
further contract with the incumbent private hospital market (BMI, BUPA, Nuffield, 
etc.) to deliver the care needed. However, as a strategy, the Department of Health’s 
treatment centre program has encouraged new market entrants and these entrants are 
an integral part of the NHS decentralisation process.
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Whether or not it was intended to do so, the decentralization of health care 
provisioning seems to be breaking up the traditional command and control health care 
economy and, with it, the NHS organisational culture. Further, the policy of 
additionality seems to be an accidental policy driver of breaking up the traditional 
NHS consultant monopoly. Though the Treatment Centre Programme plays a 
relatively minor part in the overall NHS in terms of patient volume and spending 
(both <1%), its initial impact on the entire NHS seems to have been quite substantial. 
We are seeing new market entrants, the entrance of non-NHS consultants into the 
market and PCTs contracting with facilities outside of their local trust area.
In reality, the answers to this dissertation’s research questions may be much more 
complex than merely who owns what facility. Rather, ownership should be viewed as 
part of a ‘package’ where decision-makers face differing incentives, and to the extent 
that they have the freedom to organise and develop processes in response to those 
incentives, the organisational model adopted can differ dramatically as in the cases 
within this dissertation where public and private providers alike are intended to 
deliver the same services.
As a result of changes in the incentive structure, the research suggests that the 
differences in ownership type (public and private) has played a role in the observed 
differences in organisational and operational approaches of the IS and NHS Treatment 
Centres. Accordingly, policymakers should consider the continued implementation, 
and even expansion, of the TC programme, to ensure that continuous change is 
implemented within the organisational culture of the NHS.
7.3.2 Policy Implications: Those That Became Apparent from Conducting the 
Research.
There are a number of policy implications that became apparent from conducting 
the research. Performance monitoring should be changed from an input to an output 
and outcome based measure, national data should be improved and information shared 
so that public and private facilities can be more easily compared, incentives in the 
NHS should be better aligned, competition should continue to be promoted to 
incentivise providers, and the ISTC programme itself should be continued or 
expanded because of its ability to change the existing NHS organisational culture. 
These policy proposals will be further explained below.
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Policy Proposal 7: Performance Monitoring Should Emphasise Outputs and 
Outcomes.
In the past, hospitals often complained that, because health was complicated, they 
did not know their costs. This excuse effectively devolved accountability from 
financial and operational management of public resources. However, the treatment 
centre programme has demonstrated that health can be quantifiable. There are certain 
products, such as elective surgeries, that are discrete, and where one can draw 
boundaries around the service with respect to cost and quality. The clearest example is 
with NHS TC GG, which had to cost out areas of the treatment centre in order to 
contract with the adjacent ISTC.
The treatment centre programme is an important component of a larger structural 
shift in the NHS’ thinking. Health is no longer ‘different,’ and unquantifiable. The 
treatment centre programme illustrates that we can measure and quantify a product for 
the policy outcomes that a government seeks to achieve.
A significant aspect of this will be monitoring the quality and costs of care 
provided for public patients. There should be greater clarity and consistency over the 
roles and responsibilities for monitoring the quality of care. It is the responsibility of 
ISTCs to demonstrate to their sponsoring Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and prospective 
patients that they are providing high-quality services. Yet it is also important that the 
NHS organisations have mechanisms in place to ensure consistent monitoring of 
clinical outcomes for both public and private organisations.
However, there are complex contractual and reporting requirements for ISTCs. 
There is significant confusion regarding the relative roles and responsibilities of the 
Department of Health and sponsoring PCTs (Healthcare Commission 2007). If 
nothing else, the treatment centre programme, specifically the ISTC programme, has 
highlighted the need for accountability and data reporting to ensure value for money 
is received in terms of cost and quality of a product the NHS is purchasing on behalf 
of the public. Data and information is increasingly recognised as important in order 
for the public authorities to monitor contracts and performance.
NHS contracting with private providers is viewed as an important step in ensuring 
value for money (Commercial Directorate 2005). The NHS focus on outputs, of which 
one important component is payment by results (PBR), or the HRG system, is an 
important component of the NHS’ contracts with the independent sector. In the past,
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the method of purchasing was primary budget based without an emphasis on 
performance. Gradually, all providers will be paid on the payment by results 
methodology which will emphasise output and performance.
As a result of contracting with the independent sector, there are much stronger 
control mechanisms now in place, not just for services provided by the independent 
sector, but also the NHS. For years NHS providers have been protected from scrutiny, 
as they were assumed to be motivated purely by the interests of the people they served 
and thus delivered public services at the optimal quantity and quality. However, in 
recent years NHS performance has been increasingly questioned. With the increasing 
emphasis on output based performance measurement, there has been significant 
pressure on the NHS to increase its performance. The desired effects are only now 
beginning to be seen.
Policy Proposal 8: National Data Needs To Be Improved.
Policymakers should consider improving the quality of national data and how 
such data is shared. The traditional Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data is often out 
of date and only reported once a year. The Dr. Foster’s data that is now available to 
providers is updated on a monthly basis. These data sets are important because they 
can be used to monitor and assess the care patients receive, to compare care provided 
in the independent sector with the NHS, and to track patients as they move between 
the NHS and the independent sector. Up until now, submissions to these systems have 
not been robust or enforced (Healthcare Commission 2007).
There is definitely room for improvement. The majority of the NHS Treatment 
Centres do not report directly to the national statistical database, making it very 
difficult to ascertain the operations of these facilities. The NHS Tmst Hospitals have 
not been accountable for accurate and full reporting. An important aspect to this is the 
linkage between data reporting and financial remuneration. For the most part, such a 
linkage does not exist. However, under the Payment by Results (PbR) system, it is 
expected that data reporting and quality will improve.
It was clear from the Health Select Committee hearings that independent sector 
and NHS data reporting were not consistent and therefore not comparable (Health 
Committee 2006). As a result, there has been very little quantitative research 
comparing the performance between the independent sector and NHS. ISTCs are 
required to report their performance to a number of different organisations. It is
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recommended that these requirements be streamlined. Further, the ISTC contracts 
were not all standardised early on. Though the Commercial Directorate has sought to 
standardise at least the reporting requirements, it is still not consistent with the 
reporting of the NHS facilities. With respect to the NHS providers, the independent 
sector cannot be expected to force the public sector to comply with consistent data 
reporting; rather, the responsibility for ensuring that data from public and private 
providers is comparable falls to the public authorities.
Policy Proposal 9: Incentives in the NHS Should Be Better Aligned,
Policymakers should reconsider the existing incentive structure of the NHS, which 
is beset by cross incentives, even disincentives. An appropriate alignment of the 
incentives in the system will allow for greater efficiency, improved quality, greater 
access to care (through reduced wait lists) and, in the end, ‘value for money.’
For example, the tradition of paying NHS consultants a fixed salary but allowing 
them to work in the private sector while off-duty is beset by perverse incentives.
There is no financial incentive to strive to deliver the maximum volume of care in the 
NHS. In fact, because an increase in the NHS’ overall performance would negatively 
impact demand for private practice services, there is actually a financial disincentive 
to improve NHS care too dramatically.
NHS consultants have recently received a 25% increase in their wages between 
2004 and 2007, while seeing their workload fall (National Audit Office 2007).
Patricia Hewitt said it best when she stated “for all the extra money, all the extra staff 
and extra patients treated, NHS productivity remains almost unmoved (Hewitt 2007).”
In comparison, the ISTC consultants are paid on a salary basis with strict controls 
to achieve necessary throughput levels. Broadly speaking, ISTC consultants are not 
paid a higher salary. However, there are certain financial incentive mechanisms in 
place appropriately aligned to hit performance targets. NHS consultants do not have 
these financial incentives to hit targets. The NHS consultants were paid on a 40-hour 
week based upon clinic time and operating theatre utilisation, but not performance. 
Utilisation is not always aligned with performance.
Furthermore, the consultants working for the ISTCs were typically employees of 
the facility and could not work for other organisations. This employment structure 
allowed incentives to be more clearly aligned with the mission and vision of the 
organisation and the public patients for whom they provided care. The NHS could
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learn much from the stream-lined incentive structures and exclusive consultant 
relationship found in the independent sector. The NHS should reassess its policies 
allowing employees to work for other organisations or have a private practice, or re­
examine the way consultants are paid.
Policy Proposal 10: Competition Should Continue To Be Promoted,  To Incentivise 
Providers.
Policymakers should continue to emphasise increasing competitive forces in the 
NHS marketplace. An important aim of the government’s plans for the NHS has been 
to cut the time that patients wait for care. It has aimed to do this, in part, by 
encouraging the emergence of a wider range of healthcare providers, so as to increase 
capacity, encourage innovation and improvement in services, and provide patients 
with more choice. An important element of this policy was the creation of the 
treatment centres.
Wave 2 of the ISTC Programme, originally meant to provide contracts worth 
£700m a year, now seems likely to be more than halved. If the threat of competition is 
to remain real, however, there has to be a large enough NHS market to keep the 
private sector investing in it -  and interested. Tony Blair’s original goal was to give 
independent providers about £1.2bn worth of business a year -  or £6bn over five 
years -  through centrally negotiated contracts. But the first £500m wave of treatment 
centres proved to be more than a third smaller than planned, at a value of only about 
£280m a year, according to the health department. The second wave and diagnostics 
now look likely to amount to £200m to £300m a year, rather than the £700m planned. 
Therefore, the whole programme -  in which the private sector has invested millions of 
pounds in bid costs over five years -  may turn out to be less than half the amount 
originally promised (Timmins 2007).
The qualitative analysis does not show the effect of greater competition between 
the ISTCs and NHS TCs, however, because there is little, if any overlap in 
competitive market areas. That said, from the literature review, there is evidence from 
other sources that peer effects are imposing some competitive pressures on the NHS.
A key change in the provider reimbursement policy is the manner in which the 
contracts and providers (NHS and independent sector) are reimbursed. This change 
makes the linkage between money flows and the patient more explicit. In Wave 1, the 
ISTC providers receive a budget payment with a guaranteed floor payment. NHS TC
269
Matthias Loening Chapter 7 Conclusions
providers also receive a budget, albeit from the NHS Trust Hospital. The NHS Trust 
Hospitals, for the most part also receive a budget payment.
Choice is one of the core principals of the Government’s approach to reforming 
the way health care is delivered by the NHS. While allowing patient choice is 
presumably better than not allowing them choice, the government is hoping that 
choice will also deliver some of the desirable effects of market competition (e.g. 
increased equity, quality, etc.). The policy of choice, however, only works if money 
follows the patient. A significant portion of the NHS hospitals were not yet 
reimbursed in this manner as the Payment by Results was to be only fully 
implemented as of April 2008 (Department of Health 2008). ISTCs are not either, as 
the current contracts are fixed volume contracts. As a result, the current 
reimbursement mechanisms in the system breaks the direct link between choice and 
money (which should follow the patient), the link which leads to the desired 
competitive effects.
Furthermore, a key aspect of choice is the referral process to the treatment centres, 
specifically the ISTCs. Virtually all of the ISTCs visited were not receiving the 
expected referrals and were thus operating at below capacity of utilisation, even 
carrying out less activity than they were originally contracted for. However, the most 
recent evidence does show that ISTC utilisation of capacity is increasing markedly.
Referrals typically come either from the General Practitioners (GPs) or the PCTs. 
GPs will only refer a patient to an ISTC if they are aware of its existence, know what 
it provides and have confidence in its provision of care. While these issues may 
explain some of the missing referrals, there appears to be a certain hostility from the 
GPs to the independent sector (CBI2008).
From the PCT side, referral patterns vary from one PCT to another. This is caused 
largely by variations in the strength of support for the ISTC from PCTs themselves. A 
number of the contracts were forced upon local PCTs by the central government. As a 
result, there has been significant residual hostility -  these PCTs feel the independent 
sector has been forced on them.
That said, ISTCs and PCTs are dealing with the lack of referrals in a variety of 
ways. Some have chosen to accept patients whose profile and condition puts them on 
the very edge of the ISTCs’ remit (e.g. ASA 3 unstable, even ASA 4). This extends 
the number of patients who can be treated in the ISTCs, but it involves additional
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risks and increases the likelihood of complications. In others, the solution has been to 
market the ISTCs to a wider geographical area.
Despite these issues, there is evidence that competition has been effective. There 
has been some evidence that private hospitals are lowering their spot purchase price 
for NHS patient services (Health Committee 2006). Though ISTCs have so far had 
only a limited effect in volume terms (2006; Health Committee 2006), they have had 
a major effect on the behaviour of providers (Timmins 2005). The mere arrival of an 
independent treatment centre in an NHS facility’s marketplace has suddenly made 
conversations with NHS consultants about how services are organised and how 
waiting times can be cut much easier (Smith 2006). Simon Stevens, Tony Blair’s 
former health adviser, put it bluntly, stating that if NHS consultants did not perform 
the operations, there would be "a bunch o f Germans coming round the comer who 
would (Timmins 2005).”
The Wave 1 tenders introduced new market entrants to the U.K. The existing 
private operators (e.g. BUPA, BMI) from the initial Wave 1 tenders chose either not 
to participate, or if they did, their bids were not successful. As a result, the winners 
from Wave 1 were all new market entrants.
The new market entrants have impacted health delivery in England via three 
ways3. First, as we have seen, there is some initial evidence that the new market 
entrants are having an impact on the NHS Trust Hospitals. Second, there has been an 
effect on the traditional private providers who contract with the NHS via spot 
purchase prices, which have come down. Third, since Wave 1, the traditional private 
operator market has undergone significant changes. BMI was acquired by Netcare, a 
new market entrant, with support from a private equity group. BUPA set up a 
subsidiary to bid on Wave 2 contracts. This subsidiary is to have an emphasis on 
providing services to NHS patients. More recently, BUPA Hospitals has been 
acquired by another private equity group. Private equity and other private operators 
have seen that the traditional private operators have not maximised the value of their 
organisations and have therefore been acquired to increase shareholder value.
Another important aspect of the Wave 1 tenders was the ability of die new market 
entrants to enter the NHS market through the structure of the contracts. The five year
3 The BUPA Redwoods case has been used as a case study example for the Wave 1 tenders (Health 
Committee, 2006), but this is an anomaly for two reasons. First, the BUPA contract was given prior to 
the Wave 1 tender. Further BUPA uses NHS consultants.
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guaranteed revenue contracts at a higher than tariff price (though lower than the spot 
purchase price) encouraged new market entrants, by removing the upfront capital 
costs of development treatment centres, a significant barrier to market entry.
A less obvious barrier to market entry concerns traditional GP referral patterns 
and patient habits. Consultants and patients are used to being referred to their local 
hospital, and this habit may be slow to change (Le Grand 2007). This aspect became 
clear in the initial period of the Wave 1 contracts. The ISTC providers were operating 
at very low volumes due to the lack of referrals from the local GPs and PCTs (Health 
Committee 2006). It appears that referral volumes are now increasing and that Wave 2 
will be able to remove the guaranteed revenue stream from the contracts.
The Government feels that the ISTC programme is driving a dramatic shift in 
private provision (Commercial Directorate 2004). Prior to the ISTC programme, the 
Private Medical Provider market in England could have been characterised as a 
somewhat niche high-cost, low-throughput business with the Private Medical Insurers 
the primary customers. As a result, the NHS was typically paying in excess of 40% 
over its current HRG tariff prices to augment local capacity, commonly referred to as 
the spot purchase price. There is now have a ‘mid-tier market’ beginning to arise with 
the independent sector providers on a high-throughput, low-cost business model with 
the NHS the primary customer. There is also evidence that the incumbent providers 
are re-evaluating their business strategy to be far more competitive (Commercial 
Directorate 2004). Even UNISON concedes that if the ISTCs have accomplished 
anything, they have driven down the cost of private hospital services to the NHS 
(UNISON 2005).
7.4 Key Limitations of Research and Suggestions for Further Research
There are a number of potential limitations to the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence. These will be reviewed in the following sub-sections.
7.4.1 Quantitative Work
There are several key limitations to the approach used and the quality of the data 
used. These limitations include sample size, comprehensiveness of the data, data 
robustness, time-frame of the cases researched as well as the independent variables 
themselves.
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A main issue of concern is the sample size in the regression models, as small data 
samples may mean that findings are not always statistically robust. A minimum 
acceptable sample size is important in testing the overall fit of the regression model as 
well as in testing the individual predictors within the model.
The HRGs analysed were hip and knee replacement surgeries, hernias and 
cataracts. Though these account for the largest proportion of elective cases, they only 
account for a small proportion of the varying HRG procedure areas. Arguably, the 
researcher could have included all HRG discharges within a facility. However, the 
individual HRG sample sizes would have been significantly smaller and there would 
have been fewer facilities for cross case comparison purposes.
Another limitation is that hernias and cataracts are conducted primarily on an 
outpatient basis, but the data is reported in days, not minutes or hours. Consequently, 
the smallest unit of analysis is one day. The researcher attempted to overcome this 
issue by using the total per centage of patients that were discharged within one day. 
The theory is that if a treatment centre is selecting appropriate patients, then nearly 
all, if  not all, patients should be discharged on the same day, when adjusting for case 
mix. However, poor data means a complete picture of performance is not available. It 
also means that there are gaps and inconsistencies between providers and with respect 
to the NHS and the reporting of data.
An additional issue of major concern is the selection of the case studies. Selecting 
cases that are fully operational may create a self-selecting bias in itself. These are 
valid arguments. However, the researcher assumes that the number, in relative terms, 
of ISTCs fully operational should be equal to the NHS TCs fully operational. 
Therefore, even if there is selection bias this would not affect the regressions by 
ownership, only those by facility type. Furthermore, the facilities chosen were 
facilities deemed operational as of January 2006. The facilities that were operational 
may, in fact, always have better indicators than the facilities not yet open due to their 
operational know-how. This selection bias would then be in effect for both the ISTCs 
and NHS TCs. As the NHS TC program was launched a few years before the ISTC 
program, there may have been a smoothing effect already in place between the 
respective facilities. Undoubtedly, over time the issue of selection bias will lessen.
There are significant outliers, or extreme values in the data which can exert an 
excessive influence on the results of the regression. Within the NHS, as well as the 
NHS TCs, there were more outliers than in the ISTCs and Private Sector Hospitals.
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In this research we assess efficiency with average length of stay (ALOS) in 
hours/days (measured from time of admission to the time of discharge) but there are 
obvious limitations to the use of ALOS as a proxy for performance. Other potential 
efficiency components, such as operating room (OR) time, OR’s used-per-day versus 
number of OR’s in total, and surgeries per doctor per shift, may be better measures of 
efficiency. However, this data is not reported to a central NHS database. Individual 
attempts were made to estimate staff performance via calculating staffing numbers 
alongside volume figures. However, this was not possible due to the diverse nature of 
surgeries and limitations on case mix adjustment, as well as limitations on attaining 
staffing data at the ISTCs and NHS facilities. As result, ALOS has been determined to 
be the best indicator to broadly assess differences in performance, while keeping in 
mind the limitations detailed in Chapter 4. However, ALOS is very highly positively 
skewed and there are significant outliers, or extreme values, in the dependent variable 
that can exert an excessive influence on the results. Some may argue that using 
median and inter-quartile range data may be better statistical measures to use. Median 
and inter-quartile range were cross-checked with the evidence.
With respect to the quality outcomes data assessed, there is some evidence in the 
literature of that suggests for potential linkages between a lower ALOS and a resultant 
increased chance for readmission. Though researcher was cognizant o f this, the 
research did not track individual patients that were readmitted and adjust for this 
potential limitation.
In this respect, there was anecdotal evidence provided to the Parliamentary Health 
Select Committee Hearings in the summer of 2006 which alluded to the fact that the 
NHS Trust Hospitals were seeing a number of readmissions from initial surgeries at 
ISTCs. It is important to note that none of evidence was substantiated, which the 
Committee themselves commented upon in their final report (Health Committee 
2006). Since the Health Select Committee reports, a study was published by 
orthopaedic surgeons in Cardiff found that patients of hip operations on patients sent 
from their NHS trust to Weston-super-Mare NHS Treatment Centre between 2004 
and 2006 were more likely to be readmitted to an NHS Trust Hospital for repair work 
(Lister, 2009). However, the study has come under quite some scrutiny as the 
publishers of this study had a financial interest in these poor outcome results due to 
loss of revenues from patient referrals. Therefore, to date, there has not been a
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credible study with evidence that shows any linkages between ALOS and readmission 
rates within IS and NH TCs.
Another potential limitation to the findings is that the difference in means analysis 
between individual HRG comparisons does not account for the number of cases 
within each provider. For example, in a comparison between a private hospital with a 
low number of cases with a lower than expected ALOS and a NHS Trust Hospital 
with a high number of cases, the outcomes may be biased.
Another problem is ISTC and NHS central data systems are not currently able to 
provide robust data. For example, ISTCs are not consistently reporting to the NHS 
central database while NHS TCs are not reporting to the database at all, some ISTCs 
have not reported data accurately for some KPIs, and NHS-Trusts are having 
problems separating their treatment centre data from the Main Hospital data (Health 
Committee 2006; Healthcare Commission 2007; Mason, Miraldo et al. 2007; Pollock 
and Godden 2008).
This last point is of great interest and significantly underestimated so far in the 
general research. Currently, there are over 60 NHS TCs, but in any given case a 
maximum of 7 NHS TCs are shown to be reporting. The majority of NHS Trust 
Hospitals do not separate out the Trust Hospital discharges vis-a-vis the NHS TC 
data. Because the NHS TC data is embedded in the overall Trust data, the evidence 
suggests that by separating out the current reported data, NHS Trust Hospital 
performance could be even lower than suggested.
Another important limitation is that the HRGs have not been linked (until 
recently) to financial remuneration for the majority of providers assessed. Therefore, 
there is little financial incentive to report data accurately. This is an issue even within 
the ISTCs, as they are paid a guaranteed volume payment. In reality, reporting the 
data accurately is a cost, as it takes more time but offers no financial remuneration. If 
discharges were linked to remuneration, we wouldn’t have missing provider codes for 
one-third of the patient records.
The nascence of the programme may not fully capture prospective performance of 
these new treatment centres. All these facilities are in start-up businesses, which 
typically take years to build up volume and performance. A related issue is that these 
facilities are not receiving the expected referrals, with many operating at below 50% 
occupancy.
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Another weakness of the HRG methodology, at its current level, is that the 
groupings are not refined enough to account for variations in complexity in the 
individual patients and the total case mix of the respective facilities.
Further, there are certain limitations to the case mix adjustment with only two 
types of variables being used for assessing provider case mix. This is particularly 
important as despite a recent study using nine (9) case mix adjustment variables, the 
authors had reservations on whether their research had adequately adjusted their 
results for case mix due to their risk adjustment models having a poor predictive 
power (Brown, Jamieson et al. 2008).
Further, the quantitative analysis does not assess potential cost differentials 
between the various NHS and IS facilities. Cost data is not possible to attain as these 
are not reported to Dr. Fosters. There are commercial confidentiality reasons for not 
sharing this information to the public by the independent sector. However, certain 
data figures should be reported so that the NHS purchaser can estimate the true costs 
of an HRG. At minimum, as reference costs become linked to HRG payment, cost 
data of the HRG will become more in line with the true costs of services to, at 
minimum, allow for taking a view of the cost to the public purchaser for provision of 
care.
Evidence of misclassification of cases could have introduced a major distortion 
into the reported differences. Further, only seven (7) of the 60 NHS TCs are reporting 
to Dr Fosters. As a result, NHS TC data for the other 53 cases is incorporated 
statistically into the Trust Hospital data which may significant affect the findings, 
whereby improving the data reported by the NHS Trust Hospitals.
7.4.2 Qualitative Work
Selection bias is also a potential limitation in the qualitative data used. While 
selection bias in statistical studies typically understates the strength of the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, in case studies, selection bias may 
overstate the relationship (George and Bennett 2005). This would mean that the 
selection of ISTCs is not adequately uncorrelated with performance, but rather that 
only well performing ISTCs have been able to open so far. Thus selection bias may 
overstate the relationships found; in this case higher performance would be found 
across ISTCs than types of facilities that have been in use for a longer period of time.
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The researcher gained access to the NHS TCs and NHS Trust Hospitals visited 
because they had asked to have their performance appraised. As a result, the NHS 
TCs chosen to be interviewed are likely to have been selected because of a recognised 
underperformance in their operational approach. In this case, it would appear that 
these facilities are performing more poorly. Moreover, it is possible these facilities 
were willing to be more open about the clinical operations in order to obtain the 
appropriate feedback. In the case study qualitative work, for the most part, evidence 
suggested that NHS TCs were not operating as intended. However, bias is minimised 
by the fact that the sites chosen were fairly representative of all NHS TCs 
(Douthwaite 2007). There were differences from facility to facility on the types of 
clinical specialty areas covered. Broadly, however, the case studies were 
representative in their use of technology, organisational structure, skill mix in staff, 
management practices, method of financial remuneration as well as having wait list 
problems and financial pressures as other NHS TCs not included in the case study 
research. Furthermore, the findings were found to be consistent with the work of the 
NHS Elect (Parker 2008).
This leads to potential limitations on the findings with respect to how ALOS in 
NHS TCs may be affected by the fact that the NHS TCs were in many cases being 
used by the NHS Trusts inappropriately to treat a range of cases outside the scope of 
the TCs. Certainly, the use of the operating theatres for inappropriate patients will 
affect throughput and recovery and inpatient beds being used by patients that are 
deemed inappropriate could certainly have knock-on affects on the ALOS of the TC 
providers.
Another potential issue is that the facilities chosen were facilities that were both 
operational and reporting to the NHS during the period January 1, 2007 to December 
31, 2007, and these facilities may therefore be better performers than the facilities 
opened later, as indicated by their ability to open quickly. This issue was discussed 
further in the limits to quantitative analysis section.
It must be noted that all the private operators were new market entrants which 
may act as confounders to the evidence. Therefore it is important to disentangle the 
differences of the various new market entrants in their strategies and motivations for 
entering the UK ISTC market, which may have driven management decision-making 
and working patterns, thereby impacting the evidence observed.
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The enquiry also found that the NHS was undergoing immense pressure at the 
time of study. The on-going changes, which may be the greatest since the inception of 
the NHS, undoubtedly have had some effect on the findings. Further, a number of the 
NHS Run TC interviews took place during the end of the fiscal year, as the Trusts 
were attempting to meet wait list targets, so as not to be in breach. As a result, there is 
a cyclical aspect to the operations of NHS facilities.
Observer error is another possible source of unreliability. For example, the 
interviewer does not have a medical background. As a result, the discussions with 
anaesthetists and consultants may not have been as detailed as they would have been 
for someone with formal medical training. This was mitigated by the fact that a 
number of the site visits were conducted with an independent consultant for NHS 
Elect, an operations expert in the field, and a nurse. As a result, the medical 
background of the co-interviewer allowed the research to pay attention to greater 
medical detail than if the researcher had conducted all the interviews alone. 
Additionally, outstanding questions were cross-checked with other medical personnel.
There is also the possibility of observer bias. Within the NHS there were many 
sensitive issues at play, as it was undergoing radical transformation. Many of these 
issues had been discussed openly in the media. However, in the ISTCs there was less 
conflictual information garnered. For instance, from the interviews, a number of the 
NHS consultants mentioned that at the ISTCs, the provisioning was not always as 
good as one would expect. This could not be verified. The interviewer certainly spent 
less time with consultant staff in ISTCs than with the NHS. This could be due to the 
fact that the ISTCs were more sensitive about information and the potential for 
negative information being published.
There may also be some endogeneity with respect to the use of consultants. The 
ISTCs were not allowed to hire consultants that had worked for the NHS within the 
past twelve months. As a result, most, if not all, of the ISTC consultants were from 
overseas. On the other hand, the NHS TCs used NHS consultants. As a result, some of 
the findings may be specific to the types of consultants that are on staff.
Finally, there is also the potential that while the NHS may underperform on some 
criteria, its overall social utility is compensated for by its outstanding performance on 
other criteria. The researcher was focused on internal efficiency, a criterion by which 
the independent sector is performing very well. However, the NHS has a larger role to
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play in society. The researcher may have missed some of the bigger issues that the 
NHS struggles with that intervene in day-to-day operations.
7.4.3 Further Research
There will be obviously longer-term impacts of the Wave 1 ISTC programme, and 
accordingly, it is suggested that further research be conducted on this topic. The 
evidence will become clearer as the treatment centres increase in volume and the local 
environment becomes more accustomed to working with the independent sector.
There will be some very interesting research to be undertaken with respect to the 
implementation of the second wave of ISTC contracts (often referred to as Wave 2). 
The Wave 2 contracts will be different from Wave 1 in two important respects. These 
contracts will remove the provision of additionality. Second, the independent sector 
will be paid based on its performance - minimum payment will not be guaranteed. It is 
recommended that research be conducted on these two important aspects of the 
second contract wave.
The above weaknesses may limit the comparability between ISTCs and NHS TCs. 
Further research would be welcomed in this area on a number of fronts: the actual 
medical provisioning and quality outcomes; the various incentives or disincentives 
that drive the NHS and its consultants; and a survey of patients who have received 
care within the independent sector and how their attitudes have changed.
It is recommended that more detailed quantitative statistical evidence be 
conducted in the areas of efficiency, quality and equity. The statistical evidence 
undertaken has been at a relatively broad level and much more detailed analyses can 
be conducted.
It is recommended that research also be conducted on the allocative efficiency of 
the treatment centre expenditure. Opponents of the Treatment Centre Programme 
have argued that, even though there may be evidence of an increase in internal, or 
technical, efficiency, the fragmentation of health service leads to allocative 
inefficiency through the duplication of services, and thus a loss in economies of 
scope. The current theoretical construct amongst opponents of the treatment centre 
programme (e.g. ISTCs) is that fragmentation of health care necessitates poor 
allocative efficiency, as additional capacity leads to higher costs to the system as a 
whole. They further argue that fragmentation of health care services actually lowers
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quality. As a result, the net effects to the entire health system are not so clear. It is 
proposed that research be conducted to shed light on whether this is actually true.
Additional research should also be conducted on quality outcomes, because the 
analyses that can be drawn from NHS patient records cannot illustrate the full extent 
of quality outcomes. The initial findings of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), 
which are reported by the ISTCs to the Central Contract Management Units (CCMU) 
on a monthly basis, were quite positive. The evidence suggests that there is a robust 
quality assurance system in place, more ambitious and demanding than that for NHS 
organisations. The KPI data to be collected and provided by the ISTCs extends 
beyond that used by the NHS and early results of quality monitoring are encouraging 
(National Center for Health Outcomes Development 2005). However, the NHS does 
not report KPIs. As a result, additional research in this area would be welcomed.
7.5 Next Steps: Where Do We Go from Here?
This dissertation attempts to broaden the policy debate on the Treatment Centre 
Programme. It does so by looking at England as a case study. Questions of efficiency, 
quality, and ownership have been examined in the context of the Treatment Centre 
Programme and the core objectives of the NHS. Evidence from England allows for a 
broader discussion of the global role of Treatment Centres, as well as the independent 
sector, in the delivery of care for public patients. However, one must be careful in 
assessing the answers to the research questions in this dissertation, as the true answers 
may be much more complex than evidence suggests. Regulation and competition, in 
addition to ownership, play an important role in the dynamics of the health system 
and the creation of appropriate incentive structures.
The above weaknesses limit the comparability purely from a quantitative and 
qualitative standpoint between the ISTCs and NHS TCs. As a result, some may argue 
that differences in performance may not, in fact, be related to ownership, but perhaps 
in the fact that the NHS has a significant number of additional responsibilities and 
pressures that ISTCs do not have.
The NHS has responsibility over the public health system in general and therefore 
it can be argued that there is an inherent bias in the research. However, the basic 
premise is that if the ISTCs and NHS TCs are intended to operate in the same manner, 
use the same business model to select and admit the same types of patients, and use 
the same technology, why then do they not operate in the same manner? The evidence
280
Matthias Loening Chapter 7 Conclusions
suggests that the difference lies in the ownership of these facilities, specifically that 
the NHS has been unable to manage its treatment centres as they were intended to 
operate, compared to ISTCs.
Questions surrounding the use of Treatment Centres within a health system are 
only beginning to be asked in a number of countries where these types of facilities are 
prevalent (US, Australia, etc). Of course, each health system is different, with varying 
policy goals and objectives, but all share common challenges: managing increasing 
demand, containing rising costs, and, ideally, improving access and quality.
Nevertheless, treatment centres will undoubtedly increase in numbers over the 
coming years, and difficult policy decisions will have to be confronted with regard to 
the role of these facilities in a country’s health system. Further, there is a global trend 
for an increased role for the private sector in delivering care to public patients, a field 
traditionally run by the public sector.
As governments increasingly struggle to control rising health care costs while 
attempting to increase access and improve quality, policy-makers have sought out the 
private sector for solutions. The Treatment Centre Programme in England provides an 
excellent illustration not only of how the private sector can provide superior health 
services, but also how its introduction into a wider health system can lead to benefits 
even outside its immediate purview.
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Appendix A: Age Bands
Id Age
1 0
2 1-4
3 5-9
4 10-14
5 15-19
6 20-24
7 25-29
8 30-34
9 35-39
10 40-44
11 45-49
12 50-54
13 55-59
14 60-64
15 65-69
16 70-74
17 75-79
18 80-84
19 85-89
20 90+
99 Unknown
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Appendix B: Interview Questions -  Treatment Centres and Hospitals
1. Technology
1.1 Are there differing types of technologies used for the procedures (min invasive)?
1.2 Are there differing types of diagnostic (imaging and lab) technologies used that 
allows for quicker results/analysis?______________________________________
2. Differing Organizational Methods
2.1 What is the management structure of the department/centre?
2.2 Who do the physicians report to?
2.3 What is the perception of management control over the physicians?
2.4 What is the ability of administrators to manage/incentivate the physicians
2.5 How are the anaesthetists organised? Are they employees of the 
centre/department? Or are they independent?______________________________
3. Different Skill Mix in Staff
3.1 What are the physician ratios versus nurses?
3.2 What type of nurses are on staff?
3.3 What is the nurse staffing ratio vis-a-vis beds/patients/OR’s?
3.4 What is the role of trainee physicians?
3.5 Are they using different types of consultant staff
3.6 What is the OR staff mix/make-up?
3.7 What is the average years experience of a physician in the OR_______________
4. Management Practices
4.1 How are the operating rooms run and time scheduled?
4.2 Is there block scheduling of physician time?
4.3 Are there parallel theatres always running?
4.4 How are patients selected?
4.5 What are the specific admission practices
4.6 What are the specific discharge practices?
4.7 What is the role of porters getting patients to the operating room?_____________
5. Financial Incentive Structures
5.1 Are there specific physician incentive structure put into place?
5.2 How are these structured? Is it a Per centage of fixed fee? Is there a cap? Is it 
based on volume? Quality?
5.3 Have these incentive structures (variable component) been paid?
5.4 Are there incentive structures in place for other staff (non-physician)?
5.5 What is the general perception of these financial incentive structures put into 
place?______________________________________________________________
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Appendix C: Proportion Day Cases (Per cent)
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Figure C.3: Forest plot for Proportion of Day Cases (Percent): 
ISTCs vs. IS Providers (2007)
Comparison: ISTCs vs. IS Providers 
Outcome: Proportion of Day Cases
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% Cl
Weight WMD (random) 
% 95% a
Figure C.4: Forest plat for Proportion of Day Cases (Percent): 
IS Providers vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS TCs 
Outcome: Proportion of Day Cases
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
0.66H21
H19 0.32
H10 60.50
3.58F74
F73 0.34
F72 1.07
F71 0.25
33.28B13
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100%
11.3 (-1.00, 23.7) 
76 7(54 0. 99.3) 
-22.0 (-24.0, -19.9)) 
47.9(35.2, 60.6) 
64.0 (30.8, 97.2) 
49.7(28.5, 70.9) 
34.8 (-3.40, 73.0)
1.02H21
H19 0.66
H10 61.84
F74 3.72
F73 0.77
F72 1.87
F71 0.81
B13 29.31
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100%
 -16.3 (-60.2. -38.2)
ISTCs IS Providers
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 
5.20; 95% confidence interval 2.00 to 6.40
IS Providers MIS TCs 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 
-5.00 95% confidence Interval -12.3 to -8.70
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Figure C.5: Forest plot lor Proportion of Day Cases (Percent);
IS Providers vs. ISIS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: IS Providers vs. IftiS Hospitals 
Outcome: Proportion of Day Cases
Figure C.6: Forest plot for Proportion of Day Cases (Percent): 
NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals
Outcome: Proportion of Day Cases
Study or sub- WMD (random)
category 95% Cl
H21
H19
H10
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100%
IS Providers NHS Hospitals
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 
-37.0; 95% confidence interval -39.6 to -34.4
0.56 -13.9{-25.B, -2.10)
H71
H21
e 1.37
0.55
0.27 •42.7 (-68.1 -17.3)
H19 -r
0.27
23 99 11.4(9.80, 13.1)
H10 ♦
23.58
3.40 49.1 (-61.0, -37.3)
F74
3.39
0.75 -20.1 (-52.7, 12.4)
F73 —
0.75
2.38 -18.6 (-38.8. 1.5) F72 2.37
0.99 -7.8 (-27.7, 12.1) F71 - 0.99
67.67 -55.0, (-56.1, -53.9) B13 66.72
-12.6 (-22 9, -2.20) 
19.7(4.20, 35.1) 
-8.00 (-9.70, -6.30) 
11.6(6 00, 17.2) 
14.8(2 70. 26.9) 
19.6(11 6, 27.7) 
17.6(10 8, 24.4) 
 2.40(1.60, 3.20)
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100%
NHS TCs NHS Hospitals
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.80; 95% confidence Interval -0.80 to 2.40
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Appendix D: Death within 30 Days after Discharge (Per cent)
Figure D.1: Forest plot for Death30 (Percent); 
ISTCs vs. NHS TC# (2007)
Comparison: ISTCs vs. NHS TCs 
Outcome; Death 30
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% Cl
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81 6.90 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
H80 8.56 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
H71 -  0.77 3.00(0.00, 6.00}
H21 0.44 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
H19 0.31 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
H10 34.95 0.00(0.00, 0.00}
H04 20.14 0.00 (-0.02, 0.02)
F74 3.03 0.00 (0.00, 0.00}
F73 0.44 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
F72 1.17 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
F71 0.40 0.00(0.00, 0.00}
B13 22 89 0.00 (-0.01, 0.01)
-t0% -5% 0% 5% 10%
ISTCs MIS TCs
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 
0.00; 95% confidence interval 0.00 to 0.01
Figure D.2: Forest plot for Desth30 (Percent): 
ISTCs vs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: ISTCs vs NHS Trust Hospitals 
Outcome: Death 30
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random)
35% a
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H10
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
2.89 
5 38 
107  
0.44 
0.21 
19.28 
11.13 
2.74 
0.53
1.89 
0.78 
53.60
-0.20 {-0.50, 0.20) 
-0.30 {-0.60, 0.00) 
2.50(0.00. 5.00) 
0.0 0 ( 0 .00, 0 .00)  
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-0.10 (-0.30, 0.10) 
0.0 0 (0.00, 0.00) 
-0.01 (-1.30, 1.00) 
0 .0 0 (0 .00. 0 .00) 
-0.03 (-2.50, 1.90) 
0.0 0 (0.00, 0.00)
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10%
ISTCs NHS Hospitals 
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.00; 95% confidence Interval -0.01 to 0.01
Figure D.3: Forest plot for Death30 (Percent): 
ISTCs vs. IS Providers (2007)
Comparison: ISTCs vs. IS Providers 
Outcome: Death 30
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10%
ISTCs IS Providers
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.00; 95% confidence interval 0.00 to 0.01
Figure (14: Forest plat for Death30 (Percent): 
IS Providers vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS TCs 
Outcome: Death 30
Study or sub- WMD (random Weight WMD (random) Study or sub-
category 95% a % 95% a category
H81 3.59 0.00(0.00, 0.00) H81
H80 10.56 0.00(0.00, 0.00) H80
H71 0.30 3.00 (-4.00, 10.5) H71
H21 0.45 0.00(0.00, 0.00} H21
H19 0.22 0.00(0.00, 0.00) H19
H10 40.91 0.00(0.00. 0.00} H10
H04
17 92 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03)
H04
17.92 0.00(0.00, 0.00}
F74 F74
2.42 0.00 (0.00, 0.00}
F73 F730.73 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
F72 F720.17 0.00(0.00, 0.00}
F71 F7122.50 0.00 <-0.01, 0.01)
B13 B13
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
7.32 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
9.24 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
1.05 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
0.61 0.00(0.00. 0.00)
0.39 0.00(0 00, 0.00)
36.83 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
22.83 -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)
222 0.00(0 00, 0.00)
0.46 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
1.12 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
0.48 0.00(0.00. 0.00)
17.46 0.00(0.00. 0.00)
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10%
IS Providers NHS TCs 
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.00; 95% confidence Interval -0.01 to 0.00
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Figure D.5: Forest plot for Death 30 (Percent):
IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals 
Outcome: Death 30
Study or sub- WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
cstegoiy 95% Q
Figure D.6: Forest plot for Death30 (Percent):
NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals 
Outcome: Death 30
Study or sub- WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
ctaegory 95% d
2.84H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H10
H04
5.35
1.09
0.44
0.21
19.11
11.08
2.70
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
2.70
0.60
0.79
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0 .0 0 (0 .00 , 0 .00) 
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0.00(0.00, 0.00)
IS Providers NHS Hospitals
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.00; 95% confidence Interval -0.02 to 0.02
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5.29 -0.30 (-0.80. 0.10)
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0.44 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
0.22 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
18.97 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
11.24 -0.10 (-0.30. 0.01)
2.73 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
0.60 -0.01 (-1.00, 0.80)
1.91 0 00(0.00, 0.00)
0.80 -0.30 (-1 60. 1.00)
53.68 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
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Pooled effect vreighted mean difference 
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Appendix E: Readmission (Per cent)
Figure E.1: Forest plot for Readmission {Percent}: 
ISTC* vs. NHS TC* (2007)
Comparison: ISTC* vs. NHS TCs 
Outcome: Readmission
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random} 
95% Cl
Weight
%
WMD {random} 
95% ci
Figure E.2: Forest plot for Readmission (Percent}:
ISTCs vs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: iSTCsvs NHS Trust Hospitals 
Outcome: Readmission
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
HIO
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
6.90 -1.10 (-2.00, 0.30)
8.56 -0.90 (-2.80, 1.00)
0.77 -3.90 (-13.2, 5.30)
0.44 0.00(0.00, 0.00)
0.31 -4.80 (-13.6, 4.10)
34.95 -0.80 (-1.20, -0.30)
20.14 -1.90 <-3.10, -0 80)
3.03 0.00 (-2.20, 2.1}
0.44 -2.10 (-10.9, 6.60)
1.17 -250 (-6.90, 2.00)
0.40 -0 40 (-10.7, 9.90)
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274 -1.30 (-3.10, 0.40)
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1.89 -4.70 (-9.30, 0.00)
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Figure E.3: Forest plot for Readmission (Percent): 
ISTCsvs. IS Providers (2007)
Comparison: ISTCs vs. IS Providers
Outcome:
Study or sub­
category
Readmission
WMD (random) 
95% Cl
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
Figure E.4: Forest plot for Readmission (Percent): 
IS Providers vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS TCs
Outcome:
Study or sub- 
category
Readmission
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H10
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
3.59 -2.50 (-6.60, 1.60 H81
10.56 -1.50 (-3.30, 0.40) H80
0.30 -1.50 (-120, 9.00) H71
0.45 -2.60 (-7.60, 230) H21
0.22 0.00(0.00, 0.00} H19
40.91 -0.20 (-0.60, 0.30} HIO
17 92 -1.90 (-3.30, -0.60) H04
1792 -5.00 (-9.40, -070) F74
2.42 2.90 (-9.40, 15.3) F73
0.73 -7.30 (-15.2, 0.70)
F72
0.17 4.30(-12.0, 20.7)
F71
22 50 -0.10 (-0.80, 0.60)
B13
7.32 1.40 (-2.80, 5.60)
9.24 0.50 (-1.80, 2.90)
1.05 -2.40 (-13.7, 9.00)
0.61 2.60 (-1.90, 7.20)
0.39 4  80 (-16.0, 6.50)
36.83 -0.60 (-1.20. -0.10)
22.83 0.00 (-1.50, 1.60)
2.22 5.00(0 30, 9.70)
0.46 -5.10 (-20.8, 10.7)
1.12 4.80 (-5.00, 14.7)
0.48 4  B0 {-21.1, 11.5)
17.46 0.30 (-0.50, 1.00)
-20%15%-10%-5% 0% 5% 10%15%20% -20%-15%10%5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
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Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
-1.60; 95% confidence Interval -3.70 to 0.50
IS Providers NHS TCs 
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.10 95% confidence Interval -1.70 to 1.80
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Figure E.5: Forest plot for Readmission {Percent): 
IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals (2007) 
Comparison: iS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals 
Outcome: Readmission
Figure E.S: Forest plot for Readmission (Percent):
NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals 
Outcome: Readmission
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81
H80
H71
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H10
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F74
F73
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H04
2.70
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53.89 -0.60 (-1.40, 0.30) F71
B13
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Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 
-0.70; 95% confidence Interval -2.50 to 1.10
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1.10 -1.30 (-6.10, 3.50)
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0.80 -4.50 {-11.6, 2.70)
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Appendix F: Patient Age (Years)
Figure F.1: Forest plot for Patient Age (Years): 
ISTCsvs. NHS TCs (2007)
Figure F.2: Forest plot for Patient Age
(Years): ISTCsvs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: ISTCsvs. NHS TCs 
Outcome: Age
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% Cl
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
Comparison: iSTCsvs NHS Trust Hospitals 
Outcome: Age
Weight 
%
Study or sub 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
HIO
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
6.90
6.56
0.77
0.44
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34.95
20.14
3.03
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0.40
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0.69(0.27, 1.11)
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Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
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Figure F.3: Forest plot for Patient Age 
(Years): ISTCs vs. IS Providers (2007)
Figure F.4: Forest plot for Patient Age 
(Years): IS Providers vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Comparison: ISTCsvs. IS Providers 
Outcome: Age
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% Cl
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS TCs 
Outcome: Age
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H1Q
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F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
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17.92
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Figure F.5: Forest plot for Patient Age 
(Years): IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals 
(2007)
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals
Outcome: Age
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% Cl
Figure F.6: Forest plot for Patient Age
(Years): NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals (2007)
Comparison: NHS TCs vs NHS Hospitals 
Outcome: Age
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
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H80
H71
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F73
F72
F71
B13
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Appendix G: IMD (Income Deprivation)
Figure G.1: Forest plot for IMD (Income 
Deprivation): ISTCs vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Figure €.2: Forest plot for IMD(lncoms
Deprivation): ISTCsvs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
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Figure G.4: Forest plot for IMD (Income Deprivation): 
IS Providers vs. NHS TCs (2007)
Comparison: ISTCsvs. IS Providers
Outcome: Income Score (Proportion with Income Deprivation)
Study or sub- 
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
Weight
%
WMD (random) 
95% a
Comparison: IS Providers vs. NHS TCs
Outcome: Income Score (Proportion with Income Deprivation)
Weight WMD (random) 
% 95% a
Study or sub­
category
WMD (random) 
95% a
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H10
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
3.59 0.08 (0.33, 0.1B)
10.56 0.00(012, 0.12)
0.30 0.06(073, 0.85)
0.45 0.42 (-1.05, 0.21)
0.22 0.13(0.81, 1.06)
40.91 0 2 6 ( 0  32, 0  19)
17.92 0.06 (0.16, 0.04)
17.92 0.31 (0.08, 0.71)
2.42 0.29 (-1.38, 0.80)
0.73 0.05(0.58, 0.69)
0.17 0.20 (-1.39, 0.98)
22.50 0.17(0.26, 0.08)
H81
H80
H71
H21
H19
H10
H04
F74
F73
F72
F71
B13
-10 10 15
l—i— r
-10 -5
7.32 0.02(012. 0.16)
9.24 0.27  (0.41, 0.12)
1.05 0.05 (0.66, 0.56)
0.61 0.25(0.35, 0.86)
0.39 0.10(0.72, 0.91)
36.83 0.08(0.01, 0.16)
22.83 0 0 8 (0 .1 8 , 0.02)
2.22 0 1 7 (0 .5 8 , 0.24)
0.46 0.10 (-1.00, 1.19)
1.12 0.00 (0.65, 0.65)
048 0 3 0  (-1.42, 0.82)
17.46 0.17(0.07, 0.27}
10
"i—n
15
ISTCs IS Providers
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
-0.11; 95% confidence interval 41.31 to 0.09
IS Providers NHS TCs 
Pooled effect weighted mean difference 
0.02 95% confidence interval 41.12 to 0.16
296
Matthias Loening Appendices
Figure 6.5: Forest plot for IMD (Income Deprivation):
IS Providers vs. NHS Hospitals (2007)
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Figure G.6: Forest plot for IMD (Income Deprivation):
MIS TCs vs NHS Hospitals (2007)
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Appendix H: OLS (non log) Regression Analysis
Model Summary
HRG Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
B13 1 .008(a) 0.000 0.000 0.878
F71 1 .099(b) 0.010 0.009 5.438
F72 1 .257(c) 0.066 0.066 2.591
F73 1 .140(c) 0.020 0.018 1.940
F74 1 .182(c) 0.033 0.033 0.945
H04 1 .183(d) 0.034 0.033 5.067
H10 1 .103(c) 0.011 0.011 1.127
H19 1 .079(a) 0.006 0.002 2.150
H21 1 .088(b) 0.008 0.006 1.455
H71 1 .164(c) 0.027 0.026 16.400
H80 1 .178(d) 0.032 0.032 6.565
H81 1 .207(c) 0.043 0.042 4.859
a. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationlD, ageBand, Ownership Status (private, public), Facility 
Type
b. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationlD, Facility Type, ageBand, Ownership Status (private, 
public)
c. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationlD, Ownership Status (private, public), ageBand, Facility 
type
d. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationlD, ageBand, Facility type, Ownership Status (private, 
public)
ANOVA(e)
HRG Model
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
B13 1 Regression 10.604 4 2.651 3.442 .008(a)
Residual 184,270.230 239,231 0.770
Total 184,280.834 239,235
F71 1 Regression 1,027.605 4 256.901 8.686 .000(b)
Residual 103,955.381 3,515 29.575
Total 104,982.986 3,519
F72 1 Regression 4,025.116 4 1,006.279 149.872 .000(c)
Residual 56,997.453 8,489 6.714
Total 61,022.569 8,493
F73 1 Regression 202.657 4 50.664 13.461 .000(c)
Residual 10,105.448 2,685 3.764
Total 10,308.104 2,689
F74 1 Regression 378.901 4 94.725 106.077 .000(c)
Residual 11,072.117 12,399 0.893
Total 11,451.018 12,403
H04 1 Regression 46,731.460 4 11,682.865 455.082 .000(d)
Residual 1,347,162.631 52,476 25.672
Total 1,393,894.091 52,480
H10 1 Regression 1,242.125 4 310.531 244.281 .000(c)
Residual 115,061.800 90,514 1.271
Total 116,303.925 90,518
H19 1 Regression 28.713 4 7.178 1.552 .185(a)
Residual 4,573.349 989 4.624
Total 4,602.061 993
H21 1 Regression 33.689 4 8.422 3.979 .003(b)
Residual 4,277.278 2,021 2.116
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Total 4,310.967 2,025
H71 1 Regression 36,303.170 4 9,075.792 33.746 .000(c)
Residual 1,313,264.830 4,883 268.946
Total 1,349,567.999 4,887
H80 1 Regression 35,426.257 4 8,856.564 205.487 .000(d)
Residual 1,081,516.080 25,093 43.100
Total 1,116,942.337 25,097
H81 1 Regression 14,542.855 4 3,635.714 153.990 .000(c)
Residual 326,031.683 13,809 23.610
Total 340,574.538 13,813
a. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, ageBand, Ownership Status (private, public), Facility type
b. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, Facility type, ageBand, Ownership Status (private, public)
c. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, Ownership Status (private, public), ageBand, Facility type
d. Predictors: (Constant), deprivationID, ageBand, Facility type, Ownership Status (private, public)
e. Dependent Variable: los
Coefficients(a)
HRG Model
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
t Sig.
Correlations
Collinearity
Statistics
B
Std.
Error Beta Part Tolerance VIF B
Std.
Error
| B13 1 (Constant) 0.016 0.019 0.875 0.382
Ownership
Status
(private, 0.012 0.020 0.002 0.585 0.559 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.491 2.038
public)
Facility type 0.022 0.018 0.004 1.226 0.220 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.491 2.039
ageBand -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -2.021 0.043 0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.999 1.001
deprivationID 0.002 0.001 0.004 1.780 0.075 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.997 1.003
F71 1 (Constant) -0.243 1.165 -0.209 0.835
Ownership
Status
(private, 1.760 1.115 0.030 1.579 0.114 0.052 0.027 0.027 0.800 1.249
public)
Facility type 1.655 0.663 0.047 2.495 0.013 0.060 0.042 0.042 0.801 1.248
ageBand 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.012 0.990 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.987 1.013
deprivationID 0.290 0.067 0.073 4.346 0.000 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.987 1.013
F72 1 (Constant) -2.553 0.258 -9.882 0.000
Ownership
Status
(private, 0.830 0.284 0.038 2.924 0.003 0.064 0.032 0.031 0.645 1.550
public)
Facility type 0.700 0.208 0.044 3.370 0.001 0.071 0.037 0.035 0.644 1.552
ageBand 0.206 0.009 0.238 22.656 0.000 0.232 0.239 0.238 0.994 1.006
deprivationID 0.149 0.020 0.078 7.407 0.000 0.064 0.080 0.078 0.993 1.007
F73 1 (Constant) -0.758 0.395 -1.921 0.055
Ownership
Status
(private, 0.518 0.357 0.033 1.448 0.148 0.064 0.028 0.028 0.712 1.404
public)
Facility type 0.579 0.242 0.054 2.389 0.017 0.076 0.046 0.046 0.713 1.402
ageBand 0.029 0.014 0.039 2.046 0.041 0.026 0.039 0.039 0.985 1.015
deprivationID 0.161 0.028 0.112 5.817 0.000 0.111 0.112 0.111 0.986 1.014
F74 1 (Constant) -0.492 0.057 -8.654 0.000
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Ownership
Status
(private, 0.132 0.065 0.025 2.036 0.042 0.037 0.018 0.018 0.506 1.978
public)
Facility type 0.118 0.054 0.027 2.199 0.028 0.040 0.020 0.019 0.506 1.977
ageBand 0.045 0.002 0.165 18.621 0.000 0.155 0.165 0.164 0.987 1.013
deprivationID 0.056 0.006 0.082 9.280 0.000 0.066 0.083 0.082 0.989 1.011
H04 1 (Constant) 0.262 0.157 1.663 0.096
Ownership
Status
(private, 1.583 0.109 0.074 14.584 0.000 0.104 0.064 0.063 0.717 1.394
public)
Facility type 0.980 0.095 0.052 10.271 0.000 0.092 0.045 0.044 0.718 1.394
ageBand 0.235 0.008 0.134 31.109 0.000 0.135 0.135 0.134 1.000 1.000
deprivationID 0.204 0.017 0.053 12.362 0.000 0.057 0.054 0.053 0.999 1.001
H10 1 (Constant) -0.310 0.021 14.678 0.000
Ownership
Status
(private, 0.058 0.017 0.014 3.397 0.001 0.025 0.011 0.011 0.632 1.583
public)
Facility type 0.082 0.017 0.020 4.751 0.000 0.027 0.016 0.016 0.631 1.584
ageBand 0.032 0.001 0.096 28.887 0.000 0.093 0.096 0.096 0.994 1.006
deprivationID 0.028 0.003 0.034 10.201 0.000 0.028 0.034 0.034 0.994 1.006
H19 1 (Constant) 0.425 0.463 0.919 0.359
Ownership
Status
(private, -0.058 0.393 -0.005 -0.146 0.884 0.027 -0.005 0.005 0.797 1.254
public)
Facility type 0.642 0.307 0.074 2.092 0.037 0.073 0.066 0.066 0.796 1.256
ageBand -0.019 0.024 -0.025 -0.779 0.436 0.029 -0.025 0.025 0.992 1.008
deprivationID 0.023 0.050 0.015 0.468 0.640 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.999 1.001
H21 1 (Constant) 1.514 0.218 6.959 0.000
Ownership
Status
(private, -0.226 0.188 -0.030 -1.202 0.229 0.012 -0.027 0.027 0.770 1.298
public)
Facility type 0.305 0.176 0.044 1.729 0.084 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.768 1.303
ageBand -0.032 0.010 -0.074 -3.308 0.001 0.077 -0.073 0.073 0.979 1.021
deprivationID -0.019 0.023 -0.019 -0.840 0.401 0.012 -0.019 0.019 0.992 1.008
H71 1 (Constant) -5.513 2.524 -2.185 0.029
Ownership
Status
(private, 3.764 2.364 0.024 1.592 0.111 0.039 0.023 0.022 0.885 1.130
public)
Facility type 2.090 1.388 0.023 1.505 0.132 0.035 0.022 0.021 0.886 1.129
ageBand 0.749 0.069 0.154 10.876 0.000 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.997 1.003
deprivationID 0.517 0.177 0.041 2.925 0.003 0.037 0.042 0.041 0.998 1.002
H80 1 (Constant) -0.696 0.291 -2.390 0.017
Ownership
Status
(private, 2.025 0.198 0.080 10.244 0.000 0.111 0.065 0.064 0.626 1.598
public)
Facility type 1.157 0.202 0.045 5.731 0.000 0.093 0.036 0.036 0.626 1.597
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ageBand 0.288 0.014 0.129 20.710 0.000 0.128 0.130 0.129 0.999 1.001
deprivationID 0.225 0.031 0.045 7.174 0.000 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.998 1.002
H81 1 (Constant) -0.636 0.299 -2.122 0.034
Ownership
Status
(private, 0.976 0.227 0.042 4.300 0.000 0.089 0.037 0.036 0.741 1.349
public)
Facility type 1.300 0.156 0.081 8.336 0.000 0.102 0.071 0.069 0.741 1.350
ageBand 0.289 0.015 0.163 19.507 0.000 0.159 0.164 0.162 0.996 1.004
deprivationID 0.264 0.031 0.071 8.531 0.000 0.069 0.072 0.071 0.995 1.005
a. Dependent Variable: los
Collinearity Diagnostics(a)
Variance Proportions
HRG Model Dimension Eigenvalue
Condition
Index
Facility
type ageBand deprivationID (Constant)
Ownership
Status
(private,
public)
B13 1 1 4.820 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.140 5.863 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.97
3 0.027 13.282 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.55 0.00
4 0.007 25.758 0.86 0.00 0.27 0.41 0.02
5 0.005 30.585 0.13 0.95 0.65 0.03 0.00
F71 1 1 4.808 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.148 5.692 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.93
3 0.029 12.858 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.65 0.02
4 0.011 20.682 0.13 0.15 0.75 0.23 0.04
5 0.004 35.888 0.87 0.84 0.03 0.10 0.01
F72 1 1 4.773 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.147 5.695 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.88
3 0.060 8.906 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.78 0.07
4 0.013 18.935 0.37 0.04 0.72 0.11 0.03
5 0.006 27.533 0.62 0.93 0.22 0.04 0.01
F73 1 1 4.803 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.145 5.754 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.93
3 0.033 12.064 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.44 0.01
4 0.013 19.013 0.13 0.27 0.64 0.29 0.03
5 0.006 28.722 0.87 0.70 0.06 0.25 0.03
F74 1 1 4.705 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.167 5.312 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.79
3 0.096 6.986 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.62 0.09
4 0.020 15.301 0.68 0.01 0.43 0.22 0.10
5 0.011 20.359 0.32 0.96 0.51 0.03 0.01
H04 1 1 4.733 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.156 5.514 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.88
3 0.065 8.529 0.03 0.05 0.30 0.24 0.07
4 0.033 12.063 0.00 0.83 0.64 0.03 0.00
5 0.014 18.558 0.96 0.09 0.02 0.72 0.04
H10 1 1 4.668 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.173 5.188 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.86
3 0.103 6.743 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.47 0.00
4 0.032 12.043 0.00 0.81 0.80 0.00 0.00
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5 0.024 13.890 0.99 0.08 0.08 0.50 0.13
H19 1 1 4.715 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.162 5.396 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.90
3 0.078 7.755 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.59 0.00
4 0.029 12.773 0.07 0.46 0.76 0.18 0.02
5 0.016 17.133 0.93 0.51 0.01 0.20 0.07
H21 1 1 4.684 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.180 5.097 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.80
3 0.097 6.948 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.68 0.10
4 0.022 14.522 0.01 0.68 0.78 0.04 0.00
5 0.017 16.655 0.99 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.09
H71 1 1 4.782 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.154 5.564 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.95
3 0.041 10.809 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.72 0.01
4 0.017 16.648 0.10 0.16 0.77 0.20 0.02
5 0.005 30.000 0.89 0.83 0.00 0.06 0.01
H80 1 1 4.726 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.162 5.405 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.88
3 0.069 8.280 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.07
4 0.029 12.784 0.00 0.81 0.79 0.00 0.00
5 0.014 18.436 0.96 0.01 0.06 0.76 0.05
H81 1 1 4.712 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
2 0.166 5.333 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.89
3 0.079 7.725 0.02 0.00 0.53 0.16 0.05
4 0.030 12.496 0.00 0.74 0.42 0.23 0.00
5 0.013 18.817 0.97 0.24 0.00 0.60 0.05
a. Dependent Variable: los
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Appendix I: Means and Median Analysis 
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Figure 1.2 Box Plot -  F72
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Figure 1.3 B ox P lo t — F73
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Figure 1.4 B ox P lo t — F74
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Figure 1.5 Box Plot -  H04
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Figure 1.6 Box Plot -  H10
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Figure 1.7 Box Plot -  H19
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Figure 1.8 Box Plot -  H21
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Figure 1.9 Box Plot -  H71
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Figure 1.10 Box Plot -  H80
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Figure 1.11 Box Plot -  H81
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Appendix J: Histogram and P-P Plots (log)
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Appendix K: Total Number of Providers in Competition Area
10 MILES 30 MILES
Facility Name SHA Total Providers Total Providers
Daventry
East Midlands
1 7
Redwood
South East Coast
4 39
Cobalt
North East
3 9
Gainsborough
East Midlands
2 2
Boston
East Midlands
1 1
Bodmin
South West
1 3
Reading
South Central 
Yorkshire and The
6 14
Clifton Humber 2 2
New Hall
South Central
2 8
Kidderminster
West Midlands
4 14
High Wycombe
South Central
2 17
Medway
South East Coast
2 8
Portsmouth
South Central 
Yorkshire and The
3 9
Eccleshill Humber 4 13
Greater Manchester
North West
9 20
Shepton Mallet
South West
1 6
Peninsula
South West
3 4
Barlborough
East Midlands
5 14
Torbay
South West
3 6
ParkNorth 1
South Central
4 12
ParkNorth II
South Central
4 12
Royal Haslar
South Central
4 12
Chase PCT
South East Coast
6 17
Kings College London 27 46
SW London London 27 43
Ravenscourt London 26 46
UCLH London 29 47
Bromley/Orpington London 11 42
Newham PCT London 26 44
Moorfields London 24 47
ACAD London 27 46
Frimley
South East Coast
4 14
Royal Berkshire
South Central
3 14
Dartford/Woodland NHS Treatment Centre
South East Coast
10 34
Princess Alexandra East of England 4 39
Milton Keynes
South Central
1 6
Bury St. Edmond East of England 2 3
Erewash
East Midlands
7 17
Bishop Auckland
North East
2 8
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Wrightington
North West
5 21
Wrightington PCT
North West
5 21
Southport and Ormskirk
North West
7 13
South Devon TC South West 
Yorkshire and The
3 6
MYH NHS Trust Humber 3 11
MCHT
North West
2 14
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